19 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Skinnergreen2 sentences2022Therefore, because plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the geographic-distribution requirement clearly conflicts with the text of Article 12, § 2, they have not met the rigorous standard necessary to establish the requirement’s unconstitutionality under that provision. 79 Skinner, 502 Mich at 99 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Consumers Power Co, 426 Mich at 10 (“A court will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is plain that it violates some provisions of the constitution and the constitutionality of the act will be supported by all possible presumptions not cle 2022Therefore, because plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the geographic-distribution requirement clearly conflicts with the text of Article 12, § 2, they have not met the rigorous standard necessary to establish the requirement’s unconstitutionality under that provision. 79 Skinner, 502 Mich at 99 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Consumers Power Co, 426 Mich at 10 (“A court will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is plain that it violates some provisions of the constitution and the constitutionality of the act will be supported by all possible presumptions not cle | 2 | 2 |
Consumers Power Co. v. Attorney Generalgreen2 sentences2022Therefore, because plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the geographic-distribution requirement clearly conflicts with the text of Article 12, § 2, they have not met the rigorous standard necessary to establish the requirement’s unconstitutionality under that provision. 79 Skinner, 502 Mich at 99 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Consumers Power Co, 426 Mich at 10 (“A court will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is plain that it violates some provisions of the constitution and the constitutionality of the act will be supported by all possible presumptions not cle 2022Therefore, because plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the geographic-distribution requirement clearly conflicts with the text of Article 12, § 2, they have not met the rigorous standard necessary to establish the requirement’s unconstitutionality under that provision. 79 Skinner, 502 Mich at 99 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Consumers Power Co, 426 Mich at 10 (“A court will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is plain that it violates some provisions of the constitution and the constitutionality of the act will be supported by all possible presumptions not cle | 2 | 2 |
Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Paris Townshipgreen2 sentences2021In Silva v Twp of Ada, 416 Mich 153, 156 ; 330 NW2d 663 (1982), our Supreme Court “reaffirm[ed] the rule of Certain-teed Prod Corp v Paris Twp, 351 Mich 434 ; 88 NW2d 705 (1958), that zoning regulations which prevent the extraction of natural resources are invalid unless ‘very serious consequences’ will result from the proposed extraction.” The Silva Court held that “the important public interest in extracting and using natural resources” justified application of “a more rigorous standard of reasonableness when the zoning would prevent the extraction of natural resources.” Silva, 416 Mich at 1 2021In Silva v Twp of Ada, 416 Mich 153, 156 ; 330 NW2d 663 (1982), our Supreme Court “reaffirm[ed] the rule of Certain-teed Prod Corp v Paris Twp, 351 Mich 434 ; 88 NW2d 705 (1958), that zoning regulations which prevent the extraction of natural resources are invalid unless ‘very serious consequences’ will result from the proposed extraction.” The Silva Court held that “the important public interest in extracting and using natural resources” justified application of “a more rigorous standard of reasonableness when the zoning would prevent the extraction of natural resources.” Silva, 416 Mich at 1 | 1 | 2 |
Silva v. Ada Townshipgreen2 sentences2021In Silva v Twp of Ada, 416 Mich 153, 156 ; 330 NW2d 663 (1982), our Supreme Court “reaffirm[ed] the rule of Certain-teed Prod Corp v Paris Twp, 351 Mich 434 ; 88 NW2d 705 (1958), that zoning regulations which prevent the extraction of natural resources are invalid unless ‘very serious consequences’ will result from the proposed extraction.” The Silva Court held that “the important public interest in extracting and using natural resources” justified application of “a more rigorous standard of reasonableness when the zoning would prevent the extraction of natural resources.” Silva, 416 Mich at 1 2021In Silva v Twp of Ada, 416 Mich 153, 156 ; 330 NW2d 663 (1982), our Supreme Court “reaffirm[ed] the rule of Certain-teed Prod Corp v Paris Twp, 351 Mich 434 ; 88 NW2d 705 (1958), that zoning regulations which prevent the extraction of natural resources are invalid unless ‘very serious consequences’ will result from the proposed extraction.” The Silva Court held that “the important public interest in extracting and using natural resources” justified application of “a more rigorous standard of reasonableness when the zoning would prevent the extraction of natural resources.” Silva, 416 Mich at 1 | 1 | 2 |
General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcongreen2 sentences2009The Supreme Court stated in conclusion that "a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied." Id. at 161 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 . [25] Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). [26] Falcon, supra at 160 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (citation and quotation marks omitted). [27] Id. [28] Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 2009The Supreme Court stated in conclusion that “a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have heen satisfied.” Id. at 161 . | 1 | 2 |
Allison v. AEW CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLPgreen1 sentence2025See Lloyd v Millbrook, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 1, 2022 (Docket No. 356055), p 4 (stating that a “patch” of black ice in a common area—as opposed it to being “completely covered with ice”—creates an “inconvenience of access” under Allison, 481 Mich at 430 , without rending it unfit for its intended purpose). | 1 | 1 |
In Re American Medical Systems, Inc. Pfizer, Inc.green2 sentences2009Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1078 (C.A.6, 1996). [30] Id. at 1079 , citing Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1200 (C.A.6, 1974). [31] Id. [32] We note that plaintiffs do not contest this argument. 2009Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1078 (C.A.6, 1996). [30] Id. at 1079 , citing Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1200 (C.A.6, 1974). [31] Id. [32] We note that plaintiffs do not contest this argument. | 1 | 1 |
Dorothy Weathers v. Peters Realty Corporationgreen2 sentences2009Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1078 (C.A.6, 1996). [30] Id. at 1079 , citing Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1200 (C.A.6, 1974). [31] Id. [32] We note that plaintiffs do not contest this argument. 2009Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1078 (C.A.6, 1996). [30] Id. at 1079 , citing Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1200 (C.A.6, 1974). [31] Id. [32] We note that plaintiffs do not contest this argument. | 1 | 1 |
Township of Bloomfield v. Beardsleegreen2 sentences2008“The courts have particularly stressed the importance of not destroying or withholding the right to secure oil, gravel, or mineral from one’s property, through zoning ordinances, unless some very serious consequences will follow therefrom.” North Muskegon v Miller, 249 Mich 52, 57 ; 227 NW 743 (1929) (emphasis added); see also Bloomfield Twp v Beardslee, 349 Mich 296, 310-311 ; 84 NW2d 537 (1957) (BLACK, J., concurring). 2008“The courts have particularly stressed the importance of not destroying or withholding the right to secure oil, gravel, or mineral from one’s property, through zoning ordinances, unless some very serious consequences will follow therefrom.” North Muskegon v Miller, 249 Mich 52, 57 ; 227 NW 743 (1929) (emphasis added); see also Bloomfield Twp v Beardslee, 349 Mich 296, 310-311 ; 84 NW2d 537 (1957) (BLACK, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Theroux v. Doerrgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S 1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S | 1 | 1 |
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Franciscogreen1 sentence1977Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g, a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon speciñc knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.” Camara, supra, p 538 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of North Muskegon v. Miller
green
2 sentences2008“The courts have particularly stressed the importance of not destroying or withholding the right to secure oil, gravel, or mineral from one’s property, through zoning ordinances, unless some very serious consequences will follow therefrom.” North Muskegon v Miller, 249 Mich 52, 57 ; 227 NW 743 (1929) (emphasis added); see also Bloomfield Twp v Beardslee, 349 Mich 296, 310-311 ; 84 NW2d 537 (1957) (BLACK, J., concurring). 2008“The courts have particularly stressed the importance of not destroying or withholding the right to secure oil, gravel, or mineral from one’s property, through zoning ordinances, unless some very serious consequences will follow therefrom.” North Muskegon v Miller, 249 Mich 52, 57 ; 227 NW 743 (1929) (emphasis added); see also Bloomfield Twp v Beardslee, 349 Mich 296, 310-311 ; 84 NW2d 537 (1957) (BLACK, J., concurring). | 2 | 1982–2008 |
Duray Development, LLC v. Perrin
green
1 sentence2024“Disallowing a party to call witnesses can be a severe punishment, equivalent to a dismissal.” Duray Dev, 288 Mich App at 164 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2024Williams, 483 Mich at 231 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Estabrooks
green
2 sentences2011MICHIGAN LAW: INVESTIGATIVE STOPS OF MOVING VEHICLES BASED ON CITIZENS’ TIPS ABOUT ERRATIC DRIVING While no Michigan case has applied the less rigorous test adopted in Wheat , this Court addressed a similar factual situation involving a tip about an automobile accident in People v Estabrooks, 175 Mich App 532 ; 438 NW2d 327 (1989), 2 which predated Wheat . 2011MICHIGAN LAW: INVESTIGATIVE STOPS OF MOVING VEHICLES BASED ON CITIZENS’ TIPS ABOUT ERRATIC DRIVING While no Michigan case has applied the less rigorous test adopted in Wheat , this Court addressed a similar factual situation involving a tip about an automobile accident in People v Estabrooks, 175 Mich App 532 ; 438 NW2d 327 (1989), 2 which predated Wheat . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Tooks
green
1 sentence2011The Estabrooks Court applied Tooks, 403 Mich at 577 , to conclude that a citizen informant’s tip gave the officer a sufficient suspicion that criminal activity had occurred to justify her investigative stop of the defendant. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
In Re BKD
green
1 sentence2009Conversely, “subsection 39(2) determines the rights of putative fathers who have established a relationship according to the more rigorous standard applied to mothers and married fathers.” In re BKD, 246 Mich App at 222 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay
red
2 sentences2009The Supreme Court stated in conclusion that "a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied." Id. at 161 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 . [25] Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). [26] Falcon, supra at 160 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (citation and quotation marks omitted). [27] Id. [28] Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 2009The Supreme Court stated in conclusion that "a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied." Id. at 161 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 . [25] Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). [26] Falcon, supra at 160 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (citation and quotation marks omitted). [27] Id. [28] Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
green
2 sentences2009The Supreme Court stated in conclusion that "a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied." Id. at 161 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 . [25] Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). [26] Falcon, supra at 160 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (citation and quotation marks omitted). [27] Id. [28] Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 2009The Supreme Court stated in conclusion that "a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied." Id. at 161 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 . [25] Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). [26] Falcon, supra at 160 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (citation and quotation marks omitted). [27] Id. [28] Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard
green
2 sentences2009The Supreme Court stated in conclusion that "a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied." Id. at 161 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 . [25] Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). [26] Falcon, supra at 160 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (citation and quotation marks omitted). [27] Id. [28] Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 2009The Supreme Court stated in conclusion that "a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied." Id. at 161 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 . [25] Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). [26] Falcon, supra at 160 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (citation and quotation marks omitted). [27] Id. [28] Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 | 1 | 2009–2009 |
American Aggregates Corp. v. Highland Township
green
2 sentences2008However, “because of the important public interest involved in extracting and using natural resources, a more rigorous standard of reasonableness applies when reviewing zoning regulations that would prevent the extraction of natural resources.” American Aggregates Corp v Highland Twp, 151 Mich App 37, 40 ; 390 NW2d 192 (1986); see also Silva v Ada Twp, 416 Mich 153, 158-159 ; 330 NW2d 663 (1982). 2008However, “because of the important public interest involved in extracting and using natural resources, a more rigorous standard of reasonableness applies when reviewing zoning regulations that would prevent the extraction of natural resources.” American Aggregates Corp v Highland Twp, 151 Mich App 37, 40 ; 390 NW2d 192 (1986); see also Silva v Ada Twp, 416 Mich 153, 158-159 ; 330 NW2d 663 (1982). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Martin v. Martin
green
2 sentences2006In that hierarchy, the most rigorous standard of proof is “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”; the least rigorous is “proof by a preponderance of the evidence”; and between these is “proof by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Martin, 450 Mich 204, 225-227 ; 538 NW2d 399 (1995). 2006In that hierarchy, the most rigorous standard of proof is "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"; the least rigorous is "proof by a preponderance of the evidence"; and between these is "proof by clear and convincing evidence." In re Martin, 450 Mich. 204, 225-227 , 538 N.W.2d 399 (1995). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Lyons v. Lyons
neutral
2 sentences1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S 1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Streicher v. Streicher
neutral
2 sentences1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S 1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Troxler v. Troxler
neutral
2 sentences1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S 1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Longhi v. Longhi
green
2 sentences1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S 1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Siwik v. Siwik
green
2 sentences1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S 1993See, e.g., Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 150 ; 357 NW2d 327 (1984) (court will not enforce "continuity” where custodial parent was the beneficiary of a temporary arrangement); Streicher v Streicher, 128 Mich App 5, 8 ; 339 NW2d 661 (1983) (court ordered change of custody, without making finding regarding: "custodial environment”); Lyons v Lyons (After Remand), 128 Mich App 203, 204 ; 339 NW2d 875 (1983) (court ordered change of custody without stating facts of case); Longhi v Longhi, 119 Mich App 41, 43 ; 325 NW2d 617 (1982) (custodial environment established with both parents); Siwik v S | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Lee v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1991That the carry-over rule cannot properly be applied in the context of codefendant confessions is abundantly clear from the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lee v Illinois, 476 US 530 ; 106 S Ct 2056 ; 90 L Ed 2d 514 (1986). 1991That the carry-over rule cannot properly be applied in the context of codefendant confessions is abundantly clear from the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lee v Illinois, 476 US 530 ; 106 S Ct 2056 ; 90 L Ed 2d 514 (1986). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States
green
2 sentences1977The Court reaffirmed Camara’s requirement of a warrant for an administrative search iii G M Leasing Corp v United States, 429 US 338 ; 97 S Ct 619 ; 50 L Ed 2d 530 (1977), where it held a warrantless search by Internal Revenue Service agents, pursuant to a civil statute, unconstitutional 14 In Camara , the Court also held that probable cause for an administrative search would be determined by a less rigorous standard than in criminal investigations: " '[P]robable cause’ to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspect 1977The Court reaffirmed Camara’s requirement of a warrant for an administrative search iii G M Leasing Corp v United States, 429 US 338 ; 97 S Ct 619 ; 50 L Ed 2d 530 (1977), where it held a warrantless search by Internal Revenue Service agents, pursuant to a civil statute, unconstitutional 14 In Camara , the Court also held that probable cause for an administrative search would be determined by a less rigorous standard than in criminal investigations: " '[P]robable cause’ to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspect | 1 | 1977–1977 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1974Even under the minimum contacts doctrine and the rigorous test of International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 ; 66 S Ct 154 ; 90 L Ed 95 (1945), defendants here under the record made do nothing except transact loan business by mail. 1974Even under the minimum contacts doctrine and the rigorous test of International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 ; 66 S Ct 154 ; 90 L Ed 95 (1945), defendants here under the record made do nothing except transact loan business by mail. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Proctor v. Robinson green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Schmittdiel v. Moore neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Lynch v. Fisk Rubber Co. neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.