rigorous analysis in Connecticut

2018"In determining the propriety of a class action, [however] the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of [the class action rules] are met." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. , supra, 275 Conn. at 321 , 880 A.2d 106 . *158 For purposes of the present case, it is important to emphasize that although a rigorous analysis of these requirements may entail consideration of various factors, such an analysis "does not require the court to assign weight to

2018"In determining the propriety of a class action, [however] the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of [the class action rules] are met." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. , supra, 275 Conn. at 321 , 880 A.2d 106 . *158 For purposes of the present case, it is important to emphasize that although a rigorous analysis of these requirements may entail consideration of various factors, such an analysis "does not require the court to assign weight to

2006“While the fact that [Macomber] was the only plaintiff to come forward and seek to represent the class weighs in favor of certification, see Green [v. Wolf Corp., supra, 406 F.2d 298 ]; [Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., supra, 89 F.R.D. 101 ], aclass may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of [the certification rule] have been satisfied, General [Telephone Co. of the Southwest] v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 , 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 , 72 L.

2006“While the fact that [Macomber] was the only plaintiff to come forward and seek to represent the class weighs in favor of certification, see Green [v. Wolf Corp., supra, 406 F.2d 298 ]; [Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., supra, 89 F.R.D. 101 ], aclass may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of [the certification rule] have been satisfied, General [Telephone Co. of the Southwest] v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 , 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 , 72 L.

2020As we clarified previously in this opinion, that proposition is accurate to a point, as a trial court must ‘‘probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question . . . and . . . certification is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of [r]ule 23 (a) have been satisfied.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 , 133 S. Ct. 1426 , 185 L.

2020As we clarified previously in this opinion, that proposition is accurate to a point, as a trial court must ‘‘probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question . . . and . . . certification is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of [r]ule 23 (a) have been satisfied.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 , 133 S. Ct. 1426 , 185 L.

2004Our review is confined to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marr v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 244 Conn. 676, 680 , 711 A.2d 700 (1998); see also Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1252 (2d Cir. 2002).

2004Our review is confined to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marr v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 244 Conn. 676, 680 , 711 A.2d 700 (1998); see also Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1252 (2d Cir. 2002).

2001Relying on the Appellate Court decisions in Claveloux v. Downtown Racquet Club Associates, 44 Conn. App. 691, 695-97 , 691 A.2d 1112 (1997), rev’d, 256 Conn. 626 , 717 A.2d 1205 (1998), and Martins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 35 Conn. App. 212 , 645 A.2d 557 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915 , 648 A.2d 154 (1994), the trial court concluded that: “[Ujnder Martins the appropriate inquiry was not whether the prior accidents were substantially similar to the accident here but rather whether the prior accidents would call the defendant’s attention to the dangerous condition, held to a less rigoro

1997Id.

1999CT Page 13644 Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 23 Conn. App. 585 , 589-90 , 583 A.2d 152 (1990). "[T]he requirements of the rule are to be given a liberal construction." Campbell v. New Milford Board of Education, 36 Conn. Sup. 357 , 360 , 423 A.2d 900 (1980).

1999CT Page 13644 Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 23 Conn. App. 585 , 589-90 , 583 A.2d 152 (1990). "[T]he requirements of the rule are to be given a liberal construction." Campbell v. New Milford Board of Education, 36 Conn. Sup. 357 , 360 , 423 A.2d 900 (1980).

2025In State v. Metz, supra, 230 Conn. 400 , the former chief justice stated the following: ‘‘Freedom from unjustified 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 33 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 35 State v. DeAngelo governmental intrusions into personal security and bodily freedom are basic, historically recognized liberty interests that are protected by the federal constitution.

2024(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Standard Petroleum Co. v. Faugno Acquisi- tion, LLC, 330 Conn. 40, 48 , 191 A.3d 147 (2018); accord Rodriguez v. Kaiaffa, LLC, supra, 337 Conn. 256 ; Col- lins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 275 Conn. 309 , 320– 21, 880 A.2d 106 (2005).

2024(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Standard Petroleum Co. v. Faugno Acquisi- tion, LLC, 330 Conn. 40, 48 , 191 A.3d 147 (2018); accord Rodriguez v. Kaiaffa, LLC, supra, 337 Conn. 256 ; Col- lins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 275 Conn. 309 , 320– 21, 880 A.2d 106 (2005).

2019The minimal indicium of reliability standard was set forth by our Supreme Court in State v. Huey, 199 Conn. 121, 127 , 505 A.2d 1242 (1986), and has been consistently followed ever since.

2019The minimal indicium of reliability standard was set forth by our Supreme Court in State v. Huey, 199 Conn. 121, 127 , 505 A.2d 1242 (1986), and has been consistently followed ever since.

2012In State v. Melendez, 291 Conn. 693, 707-708 , 970 A.2d 64 (2009), our Supreme Court addressed a case in which the defendant argued that the more rigorous standard set forth in Swinton governed the admission of a digital video disc (DVD) containing unenhanced copies of eight millimeter videotape depicting his involvement in multiple narcotics transactions.

2012In State v. Melendez, 291 Conn. 693, 707-708 , 970 A.2d 64 (2009), our Supreme Court addressed a case in which the defendant argued that the more rigorous standard set forth in Swinton governed the admission of a digital video disc (DVD) containing unenhanced copies of eight millimeter videotape depicting his involvement in multiple narcotics transactions.

2006Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., [ 266 Conn. 12, 23 , 836 A.2d 1124 (2003)].

2006Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., [ 266 Conn. 12, 23 , 836 A.2d 1124 (2003)].

2003The state asks us to overrule State v. Lago, 28 Conn. App. 9, 16-17 , 611 A.2d 866 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 919 , 614 A.2d 828 (1992), in which the Appellate Court concluded that, although there is a distinction between resemblance and identification testimony, the standard for admissibility when there has been unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures is the same for both.

2003The state asks us to overrule State v. Lago, 28 Conn. App. 9, 16-17 , 611 A.2d 866 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 919 , 614 A.2d 828 (1992), in which the Appellate Court concluded that, although there is a distinction between resemblance and identification testimony, the standard for admissibility when there has been unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures is the same for both.

2003The state asks us to overrule State v. Lago, 28 Conn. App. 9, 16-17 , 611 A.2d 866 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 919 , 614 A.2d 828 (1992), in which the Appellate Court concluded that, although there is a distinction between resemblance and identification testimony, the standard for admissibility when there has been unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures is the same for both.

2003The state asks us to overrule State v. Lago, 28 Conn. App. 9, 16-17 , 611 A.2d 866 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 919 , 614 A.2d 828 (1992), in which the Appellate Court concluded that, although there is a distinction between resemblance and identification testimony, the standard for admissibility when there has been unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures is the same for both.

2001Relying on the Appellate Court decisions in Claveloux v. Downtown Racquet Club Associates, 44 Conn. App. 691, 695-97 , 691 A.2d 1112 (1997), rev’d, 256 Conn. 626 , 717 A.2d 1205 (1998), and Martins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 35 Conn. App. 212 , 645 A.2d 557 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915 , 648 A.2d 154 (1994), the trial court concluded that: “[Ujnder Martins the appropriate inquiry was not whether the prior accidents were substantially similar to the accident here but rather whether the prior accidents would call the defendant’s attention to the dangerous condition, held to a less rigoro

2001Relying on the Appellate Court decisions in Claveloux v. Downtown Racquet Club Associates, 44 Conn. App. 691, 695-97 , 691 A.2d 1112 (1997), rev’d, 256 Conn. 626 , 717 A.2d 1205 (1998), and Martins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 35 Conn. App. 212 , 645 A.2d 557 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915 , 648 A.2d 154 (1994), the trial court concluded that: “[Ujnder Martins the appropriate inquiry was not whether the prior accidents were substantially similar to the accident here but rather whether the prior accidents would call the defendant’s attention to the dangerous condition, held to a less rigoro

2001Relying on the Appellate Court decisions in Claveloux v. Downtown Racquet Club Associates, 44 Conn. App. 691, 695-97 , 691 A.2d 1112 (1997), rev’d, 256 Conn. 626 , 717 A.2d 1205 (1998), and Martins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 35 Conn. App. 212 , 645 A.2d 557 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915 , 648 A.2d 154 (1994), the trial court concluded that: “[Ujnder Martins the appropriate inquiry was not whether the prior accidents were substantially similar to the accident here but rather whether the prior accidents would call the defendant’s attention to the dangerous condition, held to a less rigoro

2001Relying on the Appellate Court decisions in Claveloux v. Downtown Racquet Club Associates, 44 Conn. App. 691, 695-97 , 691 A.2d 1112 (1997), rev’d, 256 Conn. 626 , 717 A.2d 1205 (1998), and Martins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 35 Conn. App. 212 , 645 A.2d 557 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915 , 648 A.2d 154 (1994), the trial court concluded that: “[Ujnder Martins the appropriate inquiry was not whether the prior accidents were substantially similar to the accident here but rather whether the prior accidents would call the defendant’s attention to the dangerous condition, held to a less rigoro

2001Relying on the Appellate Court decisions in Claveloux v. Downtown Racquet Club Associates, 44 Conn. App. 691, 695-97 , 691 A.2d 1112 (1997), rev’d, 256 Conn. 626 , 717 A.2d 1205 (1998), and Martins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 35 Conn. App. 212 , 645 A.2d 557 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915 , 648 A.2d 154 (1994), the trial court concluded that: “[Ujnder Martins the appropriate inquiry was not whether the prior accidents were substantially similar to the accident here but rather whether the prior accidents would call the defendant’s attention to the dangerous condition, held to a less rigoro

2001Relying on the Appellate Court decisions in Claveloux v. Downtown Racquet Club Associates, 44 Conn. App. 691, 695-97 , 691 A.2d 1112 (1997), rev’d, 256 Conn. 626 , 717 A.2d 1205 (1998), and Martins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 35 Conn. App. 212 , 645 A.2d 557 , cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915 , 648 A.2d 154 (1994), the trial court concluded that: “[Ujnder Martins the appropriate inquiry was not whether the prior accidents were substantially similar to the accident here but rather whether the prior accidents would call the defendant’s attention to the dangerous condition, held to a less rigoro

1999CT Page 13644 Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 23 Conn. App. 585 , 589-90 , 583 A.2d 152 (1990). "[T]he requirements of the rule are to be given a liberal construction." Campbell v. New Milford Board of Education, 36 Conn. Sup. 357 , 360 , 423 A.2d 900 (1980).

1999CT Page 13644 Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 23 Conn. App. 585 , 589-90 , 583 A.2d 152 (1990). "[T]he requirements of the rule are to be given a liberal construction." Campbell v. New Milford Board of Education, 36 Conn. Sup. 357 , 360 , 423 A.2d 900 (1980).

1998“The rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli prongs and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that many warrants are—quite properly . . . issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of [magistrates] applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 235-36 .

1996Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 , 703 , 99 S.Ct. 2545 , 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corporation, 780 F.2d 124 , 130 (1st Cir. 1985); Fink v. National Savings Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951 , 960 (D.C.

1996Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 , 703 , 99 S.Ct. 2545 , 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corporation, 780 F.2d 124 , 130 (1st Cir. 1985); Fink v. National Savings Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951 , 960 (D.C.

1996Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 , 703 , 99 S.Ct. 2545 , 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corporation, 780 F.2d 124 , 130 (1st Cir. 1985); Fink v. National Savings Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951 , 960 (D.C.

1996Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 , 703 , 99 S.Ct. 2545 , 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corporation, 780 F.2d 124 , 130 (1st Cir. 1985); Fink v. National Savings Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951 , 960 (D.C.