rigorous standard in Oregon

2024A. F., 290 Or App 1, 3 , 414 P3d 486 (2018).

2024A. F., 290 Or App 1, 3 , 414 P3d 486 (2018).

2020See State v. Daniels, 234 Or App 533, 538 , 228 P3d 695 , rev den, 349 Or 171 (2010) (“ ‘Probable cause’ is a more rigorous standard than mere suspicion; even a well-warranted suspicion does not suffice, because ‘a suspicion, no matter how well founded, does not rise to the level of probable cause.’ ” (Quoting State v. Verdine, 290 Or 553, 557 , 624 P2d 580 (1981).)).

2020See State v. Daniels, 234 Or App 533, 538 , 228 P3d 695 , rev den, 349 Or 171 (2010) (“ ‘Probable cause’ is a more rigorous standard than mere suspicion; even a well-warranted suspicion does not suffice, because ‘a suspicion, no matter how well founded, does not rise to the level of probable cause.’ ” (Quoting State v. Verdine, 290 Or 553, 557 , 624 P2d 580 (1981).)).

2025Thus, we are not persuaded that Parras was “plainly Cite as 343 Or App 506 (2025) 513 wrong.” State v. Stevens, 329 Or App 118 , 125, 540 P3d 50 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 437 (2024) (“The plainly wrong stan- dard is a rigorous standard grounded in presumptive fidel- ity to stare decisis.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

2025Thus, we are not persuaded that Parras was “plainly Cite as 343 Or App 506 (2025) 513 wrong.” State v. Stevens, 329 Or App 118 , 125, 540 P3d 50 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 437 (2024) (“The plainly wrong stan- dard is a rigorous standard grounded in presumptive fidel- ity to stare decisis.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

2025Thus, we are not persuaded that Parras was “plainly Cite as 343 Or App 506 (2025) 513 wrong.” State v. Stevens, 329 Or App 118 , 125, 540 P3d 50 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 437 (2024) (“The plainly wrong stan- dard is a rigorous standard grounded in presumptive fidel- ity to stare decisis.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

2025Thus, we are not persuaded that Parras was “plainly Cite as 343 Or App 506 (2025) 513 wrong.” State v. Stevens, 329 Or App 118, 125 , 540 P3d 50 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 437 (2024) (“The plainly wrong stan- dard is a rigorous standard grounded in presumptive fidel- ity to stare decisis.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

2025Although a trial court’s class-certification determination is not a trial on the mer- its, “the issues that must be resolved for [the court’s] deter- mination frequently overlap with the merits of a plaintiffs’ class claim.” Pearson, 358 Or at 107-08 .

2025Although a trial court’s class-certification determination is not a trial on the mer- its, “the issues that must be resolved for [the court’s] deter- mination frequently overlap with the merits of a plaintiffs’ class claim.” Pearson, 358 Or at 107-08 .

2010At the same time, “there is a vast difference between proof of probable cause and proof of guilt[.]” State v. Tacker, 241 Or 597, 600 , 407 P2d 851 (1965).

2010At the same time, “there is a vast difference between proof of probable cause and proof of guilt[.]” State v. Tacker, 241 Or 597, 600 , 407 P2d 851 (1965).

1986I write separately to express my opinion that the legislature should follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court and abandon the Aguilar/Spinelli [1] "two-pronged" test that is codified in ORS 133.545(4). [2] In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 , reh. den. 463 U.S. 1237 , 104 S.Ct. 33 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983), the United States Supreme Court concluded that the "two-pronged" test exalted form over substance: "[T]he `two-pronged test' has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips with undue attention being focused on isolated issue

1986I write separately to express my opinion that the legislature should follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court and abandon the Aguilar/Spinelli [1] "two-pronged" test that is codified in ORS 133.545(4). [2] In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 , reh. den. 463 U.S. 1237 , 104 S.Ct. 33 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983), the United States Supreme Court concluded that the "two-pronged" test exalted form over substance: "[T]he `two-pronged test' has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips with undue attention being focused on isolated issue

2026In order to over- rule our precedents, we must be convinced that those cases are “plainly wrong,” which is “a rigorous standard, satisfied Cite as 347 Or App 769 (2026) 775 only in exceptional circumstances.” State v. Civil, 283 Or App 395, 417 , 388 P3d 1185 (2017).

2026In reaching that conclusion, we note that in United States v. Rahimi, 602 US 680 , 144 S Ct 1889 , 219 L Ed 2d 351 (2024), on which defendant relies, the United States Supreme Court explained that under the Second Amendment “prohi- bitions, like those on the possession of firearms by felons * * * are presumptively lawful.” Id. at 699 (internal quota- tion marks omitted).

2023“That standard is ‘a rigorous standard grounded in presumptive fidelity to stare decisis.’ ” Bates, 315 Or App at 413 (quoting State v. B.

2021Simply put, the interaction here “may have merited continued observation, but it was insufficient to support an arrest and all of the consequences—including handcuffing, search, and jail—that can follow an arrest.” Martin II, 260 Or App at 479 ; see also State v. Daniels, 234 Or App 533, 538 , 228 P3d 695 , rev den, 349 Or 171 (2010) (“Probable cause is a more rigorous standard than mere suspicion; even a well-warranted suspicion does not suffice, because a suspicion, no matter how well founded, does not rise to the level of probable cause.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.)).

2020See State v. Pryor, 294 Or App 125, 130-31 , 430 P3d 197 (2018) (concluding that the analysis in a sub- sequent case did not undermine the analysis in a prior decision so as to require that we overrule the prior case as “plainly wrong”); Dixon v. Oregon State Bd. of Nursing, 291 Or App 207, 213-14 , 419 P3d 774 , rev den, 364 Or 207 (2018) (concluding that a prior decision could not be reconciled with subsequent case law and that overruling that prior decision was the “only way to achieve consistency in our application” of a statute).

2020See State v. Pryor, 294 Or App 125, 130-31 , 430 P3d 197 (2018) (concluding that the analysis in a sub- sequent case did not undermine the analysis in a prior decision so as to require that we overrule the prior case as “plainly wrong”); Dixon v. Oregon State Bd. of Nursing, 291 Or App 207, 213-14 , 419 P3d 774 , rev den, 364 Or 207 (2018) (concluding that a prior decision could not be reconciled with subsequent case law and that overruling that prior decision was the “only way to achieve consistency in our application” of a statute).

2020See State v. Pryor, 294 Or App 125, 130-31 , 430 P3d 197 (2018) (concluding that the analysis in a sub- sequent case did not undermine the analysis in a prior decision so as to require that we overrule the prior case as “plainly wrong”); Dixon v. Oregon State Bd. of Nursing, 291 Or App 207, 213-14 , 419 P3d 774 , rev den, 364 Or 207 (2018) (concluding that a prior decision could not be reconciled with subsequent case law and that overruling that prior decision was the “only way to achieve consistency in our application” of a statute).

2020Cite as 304 Or App 444 (2020) 449 misdemeanor to a Class C felony if “[t]he offense was part of a criminal episode involving 11 or more animals”); ORS 167.325(4)(a) - (b) (classifying felony second-degree animal neglect “[a]s crime category 6 if 11 to 40 animals were the subject of the neglect” or “[a]s crime category 7 if more than 40 animals were the subject of the neglect”).

2020D. meets the rigorous standard of “plainly wrong.” One of those exceptional circumstances that sat- isfies the plainly-wrong standard is when subsequent case law undermines the analysis in a prior decision to the extent that the prior decision and a latter decision (or decisions) are Cite as 307 Or App 17 (2020) 35 irreconcilable.

2020Co. v. Mowry, 350 Or 686, 698 , 261 P3d 1 (2011) (it is appropriate for a court to revisit its own prior construction of a statute when the court was “not presented with an important argument or failed to apply [its] usual framework for decision or ade- quately analyze the controlling issue” in the prior case).

2020Co. v. Mowry, 350 Or 686, 698 , 261 P3d 1 (2011) (it is appropriate for a court to revisit its own prior construction of a statute when the court was “not presented with an important argument or failed to apply [its] usual framework for decision or ade- quately analyze the controlling issue” in the prior case).

2019In rejecting that argument, we explained that, “[b]oth before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hightower, we have held that a trial court’s abuse of discretion in rejecting a defen- dant’s request for self-representation requires reversal of the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.” Id. (citing State v. Ortega, 286 Or App 673, 675 , 399 P3d 470 (2017), and State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514, 524 , 295 P3d 158 (2013)). 788 State v. Martineau The state argues that our holding in Nyquist, which is a recent decision, was “plainly wrong.”3 State v. Civil, 283 Or App 395, 406 ,

2019In rejecting that argument, we explained that, “[b]oth before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hightower, we have held that a trial court’s abuse of discretion in rejecting a defen- dant’s request for self-representation requires reversal of the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.” Id. (citing State v. Ortega, 286 Or App 673, 675 , 399 P3d 470 (2017), and State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514, 524 , 295 P3d 158 (2013)). 788 State v. Martineau The state argues that our holding in Nyquist, which is a recent decision, was “plainly wrong.”3 State v. Civil, 283 Or App 395, 406 ,

2019In rejecting that argument, we explained that, “[b]oth before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hightower, we have held that a trial court’s abuse of discretion in rejecting a defen- dant’s request for self-representation requires reversal of the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.” Id. (citing State v. Ortega, 286 Or App 673, 675 , 399 P3d 470 (2017), and State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514, 524 , 295 P3d 158 (2013)). 788 State v. Martineau The state argues that our holding in Nyquist, which is a recent decision, was “plainly wrong.”3 State v. Civil, 283 Or App 395, 406 ,

2019In rejecting that argument, we explained that, “[b]oth before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hightower, we have held that a trial court’s abuse of discretion in rejecting a defen- dant’s request for self-representation requires reversal of the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.” Id. (citing State v. Ortega, 286 Or App 673, 675 , 399 P3d 470 (2017), and State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514, 524 , 295 P3d 158 (2013)). 788 State v. Martineau The state argues that our holding in Nyquist, which is a recent decision, was “plainly wrong.”3 State v. Civil, 283 Or App 395, 406 ,

2019In rejecting that argument, we explained that, “[b]oth before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hightower, we have held that a trial court’s abuse of discretion in rejecting a defen- dant’s request for self-representation requires reversal of the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.” Id. (citing State v. Ortega, 286 Or App 673, 675 , 399 P3d 470 (2017), and State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514, 524 , 295 P3d 158 (2013)). 788 State v. Martineau The state argues that our holding in Nyquist, which is a recent decision, was “plainly wrong.”3 State v. Civil, 283 Or App 395, 406 ,