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28 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1925–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daimler AG v. Baumangreen2 sentences2020Daimler, 571 U.S. at 134-35 (observing that “several Courts of Appeals have held ... that a subsidiary's jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego”). 2020Daimler, 571 U.S. at 134-35 (observing that “several Courts of Appeals have held ... that a subsidiary's jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego”). | 2 | 2 |
Pap's A.M. v. City of Eriegreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie , 571 Pa. 375 , 812 A.2d 591 , 612 (2002) (explaining that a content-based city ordinance restricting First Amendment rights passes constitutional muster only if it is narrowly drawn and if the municipality can show a compelling state interest, i.e. , strict scrutiny). 2018See, e.g., Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie , 571 Pa. 375 , 812 A.2d 591 , 612 (2002) (explaining that a content-based city ordinance restricting First Amendment rights passes constitutional muster only if it is narrowly drawn and if the municipality can show a compelling state interest, i.e. , strict scrutiny). | 2 | 2 |
Com. v. Mendoza, A.green1 sentence2026See Mendoza, 287 A.3d at 462 ; Rapak, 138 A.3d at 672 . | 1 | 1 |
Witherspoon, W. v. Wright, D.green1 sentence2021See Witherspoon, 241 A.3d at 1187 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Castrogreen1 sentence2015See Castro, 93 A.3d at 827 . - 21 - J. | 1 | 1 |
Baylor v. Soskagreen1 sentence2002See id. at 5 *325 (“Pennsylvania courts have adopted the view that succeeding owners of property are bound by the fences that were accepted and recognized by former owners even without any other privity or formal transfer of the area possessed adversely.” (citing Berzonski, 28 Som. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ciottogreen2 sentences1990See Commonwealth v. Ciotto, 382 Pa.Super. 458 , 555 A.2d 930 (1989) (failure to file briefs constitutes per se ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Hoyman, 385 Pa.Super. 439 , 561 A.2d 756 (1989) (same). 1990See Commonwealth v. Ciotto, 382 Pa.Super. 458 , 555 A.2d 930 (1989) (failure to file briefs constitutes per se ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Hoyman, 385 Pa.Super. 439 , 561 A.2d 756 (1989) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Reillygreen2 sentences1989As defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 314(c)(1), a "mentally ill" person is "[o]ne who as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." This definition establishes a less rigorous standard than, but is similar in language to, the M'Naghten rule, The Queen v. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin. *566 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843), which since Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846), has been the test for legal insanity in this Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Reilly, 519 Pa. 550, 558-59 , 549 1989As defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 314(c)(1), a "mentally ill" person is "[o]ne who as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." This definition establishes a less rigorous standard than, but is similar in language to, the M'Naghten rule, The Queen v. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin. *566 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843), which since Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846), has been the test for legal insanity in this Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Reilly, 519 Pa. 550, 558-59 , 549 | 1 | 1 |
Fish v. Gosnellgreen2 sentences1988These two requirements are summed up in the rigorous standard enunciated in Fish v. Gosnell, 316 Pa.Super. 565, 578 , 463 A.2d 1042, 1049 (1983): “Preliminary and deliberate conduct done with an awareness of the specific risks inherent in the activity is a proper basis for implying assumption of the risk.” Assumption of the risk contrasts with “no duty” cases in that assumption of the risk requires that the plaintiff subjectively understand the risk. 1988These two requirements are summed up in the rigorous standard enunciated in Fish v. Gosnell, 316 Pa.Super. 565, 578 , 463 A.2d 1042, 1049 (1983): “Preliminary and deliberate conduct done with an awareness of the specific risks inherent in the activity is a proper basis for implying assumption of the risk.” Assumption of the risk contrasts with “no duty” cases in that assumption of the risk requires that the plaintiff subjectively understand the risk. | 1 | 1 |
Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc.green2 sentences1988And unless the plaintiffs right is clear and the wrong is manifest, a preliminary injunction will not generally be awarded____ City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33, 112 Pa. Commw. 90 , 535 A.2d 231, 236 (1987) (quoting New Castle Orthopedic Associates v. Burns, 481 Pa. 460, 464 , 392 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1978)); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 181 , 207 A.2d 768, 770 (1965). 1988And unless the plaintiffs right is clear and the wrong is manifest, a preliminary injunction will not generally be awarded____ City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33, 112 Pa. Commw. 90 , 535 A.2d 231, 236 (1987) (quoting New Castle Orthopedic Associates v. Burns, 481 Pa. 460, 464 , 392 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1978)); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 181 , 207 A.2d 768, 770 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33green2 sentences1988And unless the plaintiffs right is clear and the wrong is manifest, a preliminary injunction will not generally be awarded____ City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33, 112 Pa. Commw. 90 , 535 A.2d 231, 236 (1987) (quoting New Castle Orthopedic Associates v. Burns, 481 Pa. 460, 464 , 392 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1978)); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 181 , 207 A.2d 768, 770 (1965). 1988And unless the plaintiffs right is clear and the wrong is manifest, a preliminary injunction will not generally be awarded____ City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33, 112 Pa. Commw. 90 , 535 A.2d 231, 236 (1987) (quoting New Castle Orthopedic Associates v. Burns, 481 Pa. 460, 464 , 392 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1978)); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 181 , 207 A.2d 768, 770 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
New Castle Orthopedic Associates v. Burnsgreen2 sentences1988And unless the plaintiffs right is clear and the wrong is manifest, a preliminary injunction will not generally be awarded____ City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33, 112 Pa. Commw. 90 , 535 A.2d 231, 236 (1987) (quoting New Castle Orthopedic Associates v. Burns, 481 Pa. 460, 464 , 392 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1978)); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 181 , 207 A.2d 768, 770 (1965). 1988And unless the plaintiffs right is clear and the wrong is manifest, a preliminary injunction will not generally be awarded____ City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33, 112 Pa. Commw. 90 , 535 A.2d 231, 236 (1987) (quoting New Castle Orthopedic Associates v. Burns, 481 Pa. 460, 464 , 392 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1978)); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 181 , 207 A.2d 768, 770 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Haverford Township v. Sieglegreen2 sentences1975I Appellant initially asserts that the Act in question is special legislation standing in violation of article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 8 It is, of course, “a fundamental principle of our constitutional form of government that the legislative power ought to be exercised in a general and impartial manner and that new law ought not be made in the individual case.” 9 Article III, section 32 was adopted “to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for private purposes . .. .” Haverford Township v. Siegle, 346 Pa. 1, 6 , 28 A. 2d 786, 1975I Appellant initially asserts that the Act in question is special legislation standing in violation of article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 8 It is, of course, “a fundamental principle of our constitutional form of government that the legislative power ought to be exercised in a general and impartial manner and that new law ought not be made in the individual case.” 9 Article III, section 32 was adopted “to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for private purposes . .. .” Haverford Township v. Siegle, 346 Pa. 1, 6 , 28 A. 2d 786, | 1 | 1 |
C. R. Grove v. Dun & Bradstreetgreen1 sentence1971Our research discloses no case, however, which would support the application of the more rigorous standard to the covert reportage of the credit standing of a small brick and tile brokerage firm, and we decline to do so now.” 13 438 F. 2d at 436, 437 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Henry
green
2 sentences1983But Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns do not control the case where “the Government has interfered with the right to counsel of the accused by ‘deliberately eliciting’ incriminating statements.” Id. (emphasis added): The Government argues that this Court should apply a less rigorous standard under the Sixth Amendment where the accused is prompted by an undisclosed undercover informant than where the accused is speaking in the hearing of persons he knows to be Government officers. 1983But Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns do not control the case where "the Government has interfered with the right to counsel of the accused by `deliberately eliciting' incriminating statements." Id. (emphasis added): The Government argues that this Court should apply a less rigorous standard under the Sixth Amendment where the accused is prompted by an undisclosed undercover informant than where the accused is speaking in the hearing of persons he knows to be Government officers. | 2 | 1983–1992 |
Commonwealth v. Rapak
green
1 sentence2026See Mendoza, 287 A.3d at 462 ; Rapak, 138 A.3d at 672 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
At & T v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
green
2 sentences2000The Supreme Court further stated that “a practice which would hold PUC to a more rigorous standard in expressing its reasons for a cost allocation determination would unnecessarily infringe upon the discretionary aspect of [its] decision.... ” Id. at 312 , 737 A.2d at 213 . 2000The Supreme Court further stated that “a practice which would hold PUC to a more rigorous standard in expressing its reasons for a cost allocation determination would unnecessarily infringe upon the discretionary aspect of [its] decision.... ” Id. at 312 , 737 A.2d at 213 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Massiah v. United States
green
2 sentences1992The Court quoted Massiah in remarking that “if the Sixth Amendment ‘is to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.’ ” 447 U.S. at 273 , 100 S.Ct. at 2188 . quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206 , 84 S.Ct. at 1203 . 1992The Court quoted Massiah in remarking that “if the Sixth Amendment ‘is to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.’ ” 447 U.S. at 273 , 100 S.Ct. at 2188 . quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206 , 84 S.Ct. at 1203 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Commonwealth v. Hoyman
green
2 sentences1990See Commonwealth v. Ciotto, 382 Pa.Super. 458 , 555 A.2d 930 (1989) (failure to file briefs constitutes per se ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Hoyman, 385 Pa.Super. 439 , 561 A.2d 756 (1989) (same). 1990See Commonwealth v. Ciotto, 382 Pa.Super. 458 , 555 A.2d 930 (1989) (failure to file briefs constitutes per se ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Hoyman, 385 Pa.Super. 439 , 561 A.2d 756 (1989) (same). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Commonwealth v. Mosler
green
2 sentences1989As defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 314(c)(1), a “mentally ill” person is “[o]ne who as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” This definition establishes a less rigorous standard than, but is similar in language to, the M’Naghten rule, The Queen v. M’Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843), which since Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846), has been the test for legal insanity in this Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Reilly, 519 Pa. 550, 558-59 , 549 A.2d 1989As defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 314(c)(1), a "mentally ill" person is "[o]ne who as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." This definition establishes a less rigorous standard than, but is similar in language to, the M'Naghten rule, The Queen v. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin. *566 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843), which since Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846), has been the test for legal insanity in this Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Reilly, 519 Pa. 550, 558-59 , 549 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Andrew Tsanas
green
1 sentence1989Id. at 346 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp.
green
2 sentences1988To the extent that the Post-Gazette would argue for a more rigorous standard, the Martin court observed, in the context of product liability litigation, that the goal of limiting punitive damage awards "is best served by focusing on the nature of the defendant’s conduct instead of increasing the plaintiff's burden of persuasion.” Id., 508 Pa. at 173 n. 14, 494 A.2d at 1098 n. 14. 1988To the extent that the Post-Gazette would argue for a more rigorous standard, the Martin court observed, in the context of product liability litigation, that the goal of limiting punitive damage awards "is best served by focusing on the nature of the defendant’s conduct instead of increasing the plaintiff's burden of persuasion.” Id., 508 Pa. at 173 n. 14, 494 A.2d at 1098 n. 14. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1988Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1 , 369 A.2d 1164 (1977); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586 , 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson, 296 Pa.Super. 405 , 442 A.2d 1114 (1982); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa.Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 (1979). *245 The trial court must not grant a preliminary injunction unless the petitioning party has satisfied the following rigorous standard: [Fjirst, that is is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury would result by refusing it t 1988Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1 , 369 A.2d 1164 (1977); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586 , 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson, 296 Pa.Super. 405 , 442 A.2d 1114 (1982); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa.Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 (1979). *245 The trial court must not grant a preliminary injunction unless the petitioning party has satisfied the following rigorous standard: [Fjirst, that is is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury would result by refusing it t | 1 | 1988–1988 |
John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing & Repair, Inc.
green
2 sentences1988Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1 , 369 A.2d 1164 (1977); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586 , 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson, 296 Pa.Super. 405 , 442 A.2d 1114 (1982); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa.Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 (1979). *245 The trial court must not grant a preliminary injunction unless the petitioning party has satisfied the following rigorous standard: [Fjirst, that is is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury would result by refusing it t 1988Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1 , 369 A.2d 1164 (1977); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586 , 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson, 296 Pa.Super. 405 , 442 A.2d 1114 (1982); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa.Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 (1979). *245 The trial court must not grant a preliminary injunction unless the petitioning party has satisfied the following rigorous standard: [Fjirst, that is is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury would result by refusing it t | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Sidco Paper Company v. Aaron
green
2 sentences1988Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1 , 369 A.2d 1164 (1977); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586 , 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson, 296 Pa.Super. 405 , 442 A.2d 1114 (1982); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa.Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 (1979). *245 The trial court must not grant a preliminary injunction unless the petitioning party has satisfied the following rigorous standard: [Fjirst, that is is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury would result by refusing it t 1988Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1 , 369 A.2d 1164 (1977); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586 , 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson, 296 Pa.Super. 405 , 442 A.2d 1114 (1982); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa.Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 (1979). *245 The trial court must not grant a preliminary injunction unless the petitioning party has satisfied the following rigorous standard: [Fjirst, that is is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury would result by refusing it t | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Boyd v. Cooper
green
2 sentences1988Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1 , 369 A.2d 1164 (1977); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586 , 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson, 296 Pa.Super. 405 , 442 A.2d 1114 (1982); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa.Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 (1979). *245 The trial court must not grant a preliminary injunction unless the petitioning party has satisfied the following rigorous standard: [Fjirst, that is is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury would result by refusing it t 1988Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1 , 369 A.2d 1164 (1977); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586 , 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson, 296 Pa.Super. 405 , 442 A.2d 1114 (1982); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa.Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 (1979). *245 The trial court must not grant a preliminary injunction unless the petitioning party has satisfied the following rigorous standard: [Fjirst, that is is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury would result by refusing it t | 1 | 1988–1988 |
In Re Custody of Neal
green
2 sentences1980Nevertheless, we hasten to add that because our paramount concern remains the best interest and welfare of the child, In re Custody of Neal, 260 Pa.Super. 151 , 393 A.2d 1057 (1978); Shoup v. Shoup, 257 Pa.Super. 263 , 390 A.2d 814 (1978); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 248 Pa.Super. 196 , 374 A.2d 1386 (1977), we are not bound by deductions or inferences made by the hearing judge which have no competent evidence to support them and which do not appear to affect the child’s best interest. 1980Nevertheless, we hasten to add that because our paramount concern remains the best interest and welfare of the child, In re Custody of Neal, 260 Pa.Super. 151 , 393 A.2d 1057 (1978); Shoup v. Shoup, 257 Pa.Super. 263 , 390 A.2d 814 (1978); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 248 Pa.Super. 196 , 374 A.2d 1386 (1977), we are not bound by deductions or inferences made by the hearing judge which have no competent evidence to support them and which do not appear to affect the child’s best interest. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Commonwealth v. Morrison
green
2 sentences1980In view of the rule in this Commonwealth that the Commonwealth need not prove the commission of a crime on the date previously alleged in the information, see Commonwealth v. Morrison, 180 Pa.Super. 121 , 118 A.2d 258 (1955), it would be patently absurd to suggest that a more rigorous test of specificity must be used in ruling on a motion to quash. 1980In view of the rule in this Commonwealth that the Commonwealth need not prove the commission of a crime on the date previously alleged in the information, see Commonwealth v. Morrison, 180 Pa.Super. 121 , 118 A.2d 258 (1955), it would be patently absurd to suggest that a more rigorous test of specificity must be used in ruling on a motion to quash. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Shoup v. Shoup
green
2 sentences1980Nevertheless, we hasten to add that because our paramount concern remains the best interest and welfare of the child, In re Custody of Neal, 260 Pa.Super. 151 , 393 A.2d 1057 (1978); Shoup v. Shoup, 257 Pa.Super. 263 , 390 A.2d 814 (1978); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 248 Pa.Super. 196 , 374 A.2d 1386 (1977), we are not bound by deductions or inferences made by the hearing judge which have no competent evidence to support them and which do not appear to affect the child’s best interest. 1980Nevertheless, we hasten to add that because our paramount concern remains the best interest and welfare of the child, In re Custody of Neal, 260 Pa.Super. 151 , 393 A.2d 1057 (1978); Shoup v. Shoup, 257 Pa.Super. 263 , 390 A.2d 814 (1978); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 248 Pa.Super. 196 , 374 A.2d 1386 (1977), we are not bound by deductions or inferences made by the hearing judge which have no competent evidence to support them and which do not appear to affect the child’s best interest. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Tomlinson v. Tomlinson
green
2 sentences1980Nevertheless, we hasten to add that because our paramount concern remains the best interest and welfare of the child, In re Custody of Neal, 260 Pa.Super. 151 , 393 A.2d 1057 (1978); Shoup v. Shoup, 257 Pa.Super. 263 , 390 A.2d 814 (1978); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 248 Pa.Super. 196 , 374 A.2d 1386 (1977), we are not bound by deductions or inferences made by the hearing judge which have no competent evidence to support them and which do not appear to affect the child’s best interest. 1980Nevertheless, we hasten to add that because our paramount concern remains the best interest and welfare of the child, In re Custody of Neal, 260 Pa.Super. 151 , 393 A.2d 1057 (1978); Shoup v. Shoup, 257 Pa.Super. 263 , 390 A.2d 814 (1978); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 248 Pa.Super. 196 , 374 A.2d 1386 (1977), we are not bound by deductions or inferences made by the hearing judge which have no competent evidence to support them and which do not appear to affect the child’s best interest. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Loeb Estate green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Jones & Laughlin Tax Assessment Case green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Gulf Oil Corp. v. Philadelphia green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Keller v. Scranton green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Riley v. Carnegie Steel Co. green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Scranton Electric Co. v. Old Forge Boro. green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Byrne v. Schultz (Stone) green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Decker v. Morton neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Suydam v. . Jackson green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Hildebrand v. American Fine Art Co. green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Sullivan v. Hess green | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Turner's Estate green | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.