14 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1893–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stone v. Stonegreen2 sentences2021We have also held, however, that when applying Rule 1.05, “we put substance (the effect the order has on the parties’ rights) over form (without prejudice).” Id. ¶ 13, 470 P.3d at 562 - 63 (citing Stone v. Stone, 842 P.2d 545, 548 (Wyo. 1992)). [¶31] In GSTC I, as in this case, the district court dismissed GSTC’s counterclaims without prejudice on the ground that they unduly complicated the case.5 GSTC I, ¶¶ 33- 34, 471 P.3d at 301. 2020Stone v. Stone, 842 P.2d 545, 548 (Wyo. 1992) (citation omitted) (“Most appellate courts, in addressing finality, agree that the substance should be elevated over the form of the order.”); Painter, ¶ 13, 450 P.3d at 1246 (citation omitted) (“Instead of emphasizing the name given to an action below, we . . . concentrate on the effect the order has on the parties’ rights.”). [¶14] An “appealable order” is “[a]n order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]” W.R.A.P. 1.05(a); see also Escobedo v. State, 601 P.2d 1028 | 2 | 2 |
Hibsman v. Mullengreen2 sentences2020An “appealable order” is “[a]n order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]” W.R.A.P. 1.05(a); see also Escobedo v. State, 601 P.2d 1028, 1029 (Wyo. 1979); In re Est. of Hibsman, 2012 WY 139, ¶ 17 , 287 P.3d 757, 761 (Wyo. 2012) (“The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 1.05 . . . is that the order affects a ‘substantial right.’”); Inman v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, ¶¶ 11 , 17–18, 187 P.3d 868, 875, 876 (Wyo. 2008) (concluding the trial court’s order was not appealable because it did not affect a substantial right) 2020An “appealable order” is “[a]n order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]” W.R.A.P. 1.05(a); see also Escobedo v. State, 601 P.2d 1028, 1029 (Wyo. 1979); In re Est. of Hibsman, 2012 WY 139, ¶ 17 , 287 P.3d 757, 761 (Wyo. 2012) (“The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 1.05 . . . is that the order affects a ‘substantial right.’”); Inman v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, ¶¶ 11 , 17–18, 187 P.3d 868, 875, 876 (Wyo. 2008) (concluding the trial court’s order was not appealable because it did not affect a substantial right) | 2 | 2 |
Escobedo v. Stategreen2 sentences2020An “appealable order” is “[a]n order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]” W.R.A.P. 1.05(a); see also Escobedo v. State, 601 P.2d 1028, 1029 (Wyo. 1979); In re Est. of Hibsman, 2012 WY 139, ¶ 17 , 287 P.3d 757, 761 (Wyo. 2012) (“The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 1.05 . . . is that the order affects a ‘substantial right.’”); Inman v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, ¶¶ 11 , 17–18, 187 P.3d 868, 875, 876 (Wyo. 2008) (concluding the trial court’s order was not appealable because it did not affect a substantial right) 2020Stone v. Stone, 842 P.2d 545, 548 (Wyo. 1992) (citation omitted) (“Most appellate courts, in addressing finality, agree that the substance should be elevated over the form of the order.”); Painter, ¶ 13, 450 P.3d at 1246 (citation omitted) (“Instead of emphasizing the name given to an action below, we . . . concentrate on the effect the order has on the parties’ rights.”). [¶14] An “appealable order” is “[a]n order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]” W.R.A.P. 1.05(a); see also Escobedo v. State, 601 P.2d 1028 | 2 | 2 |
Mental Condition of Bedford v. Salt Lake Countygreen2 sentences1991Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985), authenticating that no enforceable donative duty exists in civil proceedings; Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc.2d 285 , 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1974); and Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12 , 447 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1968). [16] *851 A rigorous analysis of a developing judicial philosophy for the recognition of responsibility to pay for legal services when appointments are made to represent the indigent is found in a current course of Florida cases. 1991Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985), authenticating that no enforceable donative duty exists in civil proceedings; Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc.2d 285 , 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1974); and Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12 , 447 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1968). [16] *851 A rigorous analysis of a developing judicial philosophy for the recognition of responsibility to pay for legal services when appointments are made to represent the indigent is found in a current course of Florida cases. | 2 | 2 |
Morgan v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Co., 234 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Carmack v. Cichon, 201 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Benmark v. Steffen, 132 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 1965). 15 2000) (discussing the body of law examining the “open courts” provision common to state constitutions) (citation omitted); see also Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, ¶ 20 , 95 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 2004) (reiterating that “in order for this Court to undertake an independent state constitutional analysis, the appellant must ‘use a precise and analytically sound approach and provide us with the proper arguments and briefs to ensure the future growth of t 2025Co., 234 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Carmack v. Cichon, 201 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Benmark v. Steffen, 132 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 1965). 15 2000) (discussing the body of law examining the “open courts” provision common to state constitutions) (citation omitted); see also Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, ¶ 20 , 95 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 2004) (reiterating that “in order for this Court to undertake an independent state constitutional analysis, the appellant must ‘use a precise and analytically sound approach and provide us with the proper arguments and briefs to ensure the future growth of t | 1 | 1 |
In re Herrongreen1 sentence2022See also, Matter of Herron, 441 P.3d 24, 40 (Kan. 2019) (Although the respondent refused to acknowledge his misconduct, the hearing panel was mindful of his argument that he was permitted to make a rigorous defense.). 12 We recognize that Mr. Hinckley’s counsel presented limited evidence of the settlement negotiations during Mr. Hinckley’s testimony in the liability phase. | 1 | 1 |
Clinton Ray Woods v. The State of Wyominggreen2 sentences2021“The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 1.05 . . . is that the order affects a ‘substantial right.’” Woods v. State, 2020 WY 118, ¶ 6 , 471 P.3d 997, 998 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Uden v. State, 2020 WY 109, ¶ 14 , 470 P.3d. 560, 563 (Wyo. 2020)). [¶30] We have recognized that “[d]ismissals without prejudice often are considered non- final, and therefore non-appealable.” Uden, ¶ 13, 470 P.3d at 562 (footnote omitted). 2021“The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 1.05 . . . is that the order affects a ‘substantial right.’” Woods v. State, 2020 WY 118, ¶ 6 , 471 P.3d 997, 998 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Uden v. State, 2020 WY 109, ¶ 14 , 470 P.3d. 560, 563 (Wyo. 2020)). [¶30] We have recognized that “[d]ismissals without prejudice often are considered non- final, and therefore non-appealable.” Uden, ¶ 13, 470 P.3d at 562 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Gerald Lee Uden v. The State of Wyominggreen2 sentences2021“The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 1.05 . . . is that the order affects a ‘substantial right.’” Woods v. State, 2020 WY 118, ¶ 6 , 471 P.3d 997, 998 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Uden v. State, 2020 WY 109, ¶ 14 , 470 P.3d. 560, 563 (Wyo. 2020)). [¶30] We have recognized that “[d]ismissals without prejudice often are considered non- final, and therefore non-appealable.” Uden, ¶ 13, 470 P.3d at 562 (footnote omitted). 2021“The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 1.05 . . . is that the order affects a ‘substantial right.’” Woods v. State, 2020 WY 118, ¶ 6 , 471 P.3d 997, 998 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Uden v. State, 2020 WY 109, ¶ 14 , 470 P.3d. 560, 563 (Wyo. 2020)). [¶30] We have recognized that “[d]ismissals without prejudice often are considered non- final, and therefore non-appealable.” Uden, ¶ 13, 470 P.3d at 562 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Inman v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2020An “appealable order” is “[a]n order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]” W.R.A.P. 1.05(a); see also Escobedo v. State, 601 P.2d 1028, 1029 (Wyo. 1979); In re Est. of Hibsman, 2012 WY 139, ¶ 17 , 287 P.3d 757, 761 (Wyo. 2012) (“The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 1.05 . . . is that the order affects a ‘substantial right.’”); Inman v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, ¶¶ 11 , 17–18, 187 P.3d 868, 875, 876 (Wyo. 2008) (concluding the trial court’s order was not appealable because it did not affect a substantial right) 2020An “appealable order” is “[a]n order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]” W.R.A.P. 1.05(a); see also Escobedo v. State, 601 P.2d 1028, 1029 (Wyo. 1979); In re Est. of Hibsman, 2012 WY 139, ¶ 17 , 287 P.3d 757, 761 (Wyo. 2012) (“The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 1.05 . . . is that the order affects a ‘substantial right.’”); Inman v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, ¶¶ 11 , 17–18, 187 P.3d 868, 875, 876 (Wyo. 2008) (concluding the trial court’s order was not appealable because it did not affect a substantial right) | 1 | 1 |
Nehring v. Russellgreen2 sentences1989Nehring, 582 P.2d at 77-80 (constitutional guaranty of "uniform operation of laws" requires guest statute to be substantially related to legislature's announced purpose, despite constitutionality under deferential federal standard of equal protection). 1989Nehring, 582 P.2d at 77-80 (constitutional guaranty of “uniform operation of laws” requires guest statute to be substantially related to legislature’s announced purpose, despite constitutionality under deferential federal standard of equal protection). | 1 | 1 |
Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marburygreen2 sentences1953In Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury 91 U.S. 587, 592, 593 , ( 23 L. 1953In Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury 91 U.S. 587, 592, 593 , ( 23 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
White v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS OF PINELLAS CTY.
green
2 sentences1991Board of County Com’rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App.1989); White v. Board of County Com’rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986) (see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), rek’g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla.1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . 1991Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986) ( see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), reh'g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Menin v. Menin
green
2 sentences1991Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985), authenticating that no enforceable donative duty exists in civil proceedings; Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc.2d 285 , 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1974); and Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12 , 447 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1968). [16] *851 A rigorous analysis of a developing judicial philosophy for the recognition of responsibility to pay for legal services when appointments are made to represent the indigent is found in a current course of Florida cases. 1991Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985), authenticating that no enforceable donative duty exists in civil proceedings; Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc.2d 285 , 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1974); and Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12 , 447 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1968). [16] *851 A rigorous analysis of a developing judicial philosophy for the recognition of responsibility to pay for legal services when appointments are made to represent the indigent is found in a current course of Florida cases. | 2 | 1991–1991 |
In Interest of DB
green
2 sentences1991Board of County Com’rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App.1989); White v. Board of County Com’rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986) (see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), rek’g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla.1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . 1991Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986) ( see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), reh'g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
BD. OF CTY. COM'RS v. Scruggs
green
2 sentences1991Board of County Com’rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App.1989); White v. Board of County Com’rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986) (see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), rek’g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla.1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . 1991Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986) ( see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), reh'g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Florida Bar In re Roth
neutral
2 sentences1991Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986) ( see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), reh'g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . 1991Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986) ( see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), reh'g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Makemson v. Martin County
green
2 sentences1991Board of County Com’rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App.1989); White v. Board of County Com’rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986) (see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), rek’g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla.1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . 1991Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986) ( see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), reh'g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
The Florida Bar v. Roth
green
2 sentences1991Board of County Com’rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App.1989); White v. Board of County Com’rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986) (see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), rek’g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla.1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . 1991Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986) ( see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), reh'g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Martin County, Florida v. Makemson Et Al.; And Okeechobee County, Florida v. Dennis Et Al.
green
2 sentences1991Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986) ( see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), reh'g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . 1991Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986) ( see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), reh'g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges
green
2 sentences1991Board of County Com’rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App.1989); White v. Board of County Com’rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986) (see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), rek’g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla.1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla.1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . 1991Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. Scruggs, 545 So.2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986) ( see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So.2d 29 (1985), reh'g 500 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 , 107 S.Ct. 908 , 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
State Ex Rel. Scott v. Roper
green
2 sentences1991Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo.1985), authenticating that no enforceable donative duty exists in civil proceedings; Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc.2d 285 , 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1974); and Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12 , 447 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1968). 16 A rigorous analysis of a developing judicial philosophy for the recognition of responsibility to pay for legal services when appointments are made to represent the indigent is found in a current course of Florida cases. 1991Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985), authenticating that no enforceable donative duty exists in civil proceedings; Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc.2d 285 , 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1974); and Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12 , 447 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1968). [16] *851 A rigorous analysis of a developing judicial philosophy for the recognition of responsibility to pay for legal services when appointments are made to represent the indigent is found in a current course of Florida cases. | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Winters v. United States
green
2 sentences1988Analysis Below Both the special master and the district court undertook the rigorous analysis called for by United States v. New Mexico, supra 438 U.S. at 700 , 98 S.Ct. at 3014 : “Each time this Court has applied the ‘implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,’ it has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated.” In determining that there was intent to reserve water for the reservation, the special master looked to the treaty, the decision 1988Analysis Below Both the special master and the district court undertook the rigorous analysis called for by United States v. New Mexico, supra 438 U.S. at 700 , 98 S.Ct. at 3014 : “Each time this Court has applied the ‘implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,’ it has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated.” In determining that there was intent to reserve water for the reservation, the special master looked to the treaty, the decision | 2 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. New Mexico
green
2 sentences1988Analysis Below Both the special master and the district court undertook the rigorous analysis called for by United States v. New Mexico, supra 438 U.S. at 700 , 98 S.Ct. at 3014 : “Each time this Court has applied the ‘implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,’ it has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated.” In determining that there was intent to reserve water for the reservation, the special master looked to the treaty, the decision 1988Analysis Below Both the special master and the district court undertook the rigorous analysis called for by United States v. New Mexico, supra 438 U.S. at 700 , 98 S.Ct. at 3014 : “Each time this Court has applied the ‘implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,’ it has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated.” In determining that there was intent to reserve water for the reservation, the special master looked to the treaty, the decision | 2 | 1988–1988 |
Merrill v. Bishop
green
2 sentences1988He “analyzed the 348 ‘Intent and Purposes’ exhibits offered by the State of Wyoming, along with the competent argument of counsel for the State of October 7, 1981, supporting the position that no reservation of water exists.” The master also studied Merrill v. Bishop, supra 287 P.2d 620 . 1988He "analyzed the 348 `Intent and Purposes' exhibits offered by the State of Wyoming, along with the competent argument of counsel for the State of October 7, 1981, supporting the position that no reservation of water exists." The master also studied Merrill v. Bishop, supra 287 P.2d 620 . | 2 | 1988–1988 |
Fenton Country House, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance
green
1 sentence2025Co., 234 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Carmack v. Cichon, 201 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Benmark v. Steffen, 132 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 1965). 15 2000) (discussing the body of law examining the “open courts” provision common to state constitutions) (citation omitted); see also Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, ¶ 20 , 95 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 2004) (reiterating that “in order for this Court to undertake an independent state constitutional analysis, the appellant must ‘use a precise and analytically sound approach and provide us with the proper arguments and briefs to ensure the future growth of t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Carmack v. Cichon
neutral
1 sentence2025Co., 234 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Carmack v. Cichon, 201 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Benmark v. Steffen, 132 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 1965). 15 2000) (discussing the body of law examining the “open courts” provision common to state constitutions) (citation omitted); see also Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, ¶ 20 , 95 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 2004) (reiterating that “in order for this Court to undertake an independent state constitutional analysis, the appellant must ‘use a precise and analytically sound approach and provide us with the proper arguments and briefs to ensure the future growth of t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Benmark v. Steffen
green
1 sentence2025Co., 234 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Carmack v. Cichon, 201 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Benmark v. Steffen, 132 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 1965). 15 2000) (discussing the body of law examining the “open courts” provision common to state constitutions) (citation omitted); see also Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, ¶ 20 , 95 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 2004) (reiterating that “in order for this Court to undertake an independent state constitutional analysis, the appellant must ‘use a precise and analytically sound approach and provide us with the proper arguments and briefs to ensure the future growth of t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Vasquez v. State
green
1 sentence2002In Vasquez, we examined and compared the protections secured by the United States and Wyoming constitutions concerning searches of automobiles and the containers found within automobiles when suspects are arrested. 990 P.2d at 482-89 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Sconce v. Jones
green
2 sentences1941It measures up to the rigorous standard of utterances admissible as part of the res gestae, that they must be made ‘under such circumstances as will raise the reasonable presumption that they are the spontaneous utterances of thoughts created by, or springing out of, the transaction itself, and so soon thereafter as to exclude the presumption that they are the result of premeditation and design.’ * * * * “The declaration as to the accidental injury to Red-rick’s foot being admissible, there was competent evidence to support the finding of an accidental injury received in the course of his empl 1941It measures up to the rigorous standard of utterances admissible as part of the res gestae, that they must be made ‘under such circumstances as will raise the reasonable presumption that they are the spontaneous utterances of thoughts created by, or springing out of, the transaction itself, and so soon thereafter as to exclude the presumption that they are the result of premeditation and design.’ * * * * “The declaration as to the accidental injury to Red-rick’s foot being admissible, there was competent evidence to support the finding of an accidental injury received in the course of his empl | 1 | 1941–1941 |
People v. Righetti
neutral
1 sentence1893We are aware that the supreme court of California seems to announce a different doctrine in the case of Ex parte Rosenheim, 83 Cal., 184 , overruling People v. Righetti, 66 Cal., 184 , in holding that under statutory provisions of that State, that imprisonment for the non-payment of a fine was illegal when imposed in addition to the imprisonment allowed by law, but this decision rests upon the peculiar construction of the California statute. | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.