rigorous standard in Washington

2010Weston, 137 Wash.App. at 168 , 151 P.3d 1090 . ¶ 37 Courts afford CR 23 liberal interpretation because it "avoids multiplicity of litigation, `saves members of the class the cost and trouble of filing individual suits[,] and ... also frees the defendant from the harassment of identical future litigation.'" Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 113 Wash.App. 306, 318 , 54 P.3d 665 (2002) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash.App. 249, 256-57 , 492 P.2d 581 (1971)). "`[A] primary function of the class suit is to provide a procedure for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify indi

2010Weston, 137 Wn.

2008Under the Washington rule, "substantially prevailing party" represents a less rigorous standard than "prevailing party." Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash.2d 612, 633 , 934 P.2d 669 (1997). ¶ 25 The majority reasons that if the legislature wanted to grant attorney fees to a *96 litigant that only marginally succeeds, it would know how to do so.

2008Under the Washington rule, “substantially prevailing party” repre sents a less rigorous standard than “prevailing party.” Riss v. Angel, 131 Wn.2d 612, 633 , 934 P.2d 669 (1997). ¶25 The majority reasons that if the legislature wanted to grant attorney fees to a litigant that only marginally succeeds, it would know how to do so.

2008Under the Washington rule, "substantially prevailing party" represents a less rigorous standard than "prevailing party." Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash.2d 612, 633 , 934 P.2d 669 (1997). ¶ 25 The majority reasons that if the legislature wanted to grant attorney fees to a *96 litigant that only marginally succeeds, it would know how to do so.

2008Under the Washington rule, “substantially prevailing party” repre sents a less rigorous standard than “prevailing party.” Riss v. Angel, 131 Wn.2d 612, 633 , 934 P.2d 669 (1997). ¶25 The majority reasons that if the legislature wanted to grant attorney fees to a litigant that only marginally succeeds, it would know how to do so.

2004Cole, 128 Wn.2d at 287 (quoting State v. Ibarra, 61 Wn.

2004Cole, 128 Wash.2d at 287 , 906 P.2d 925 (quoting State v. Ibarra, 61 Wash.App. 695, 699-700 , 812 P.2d 114 (1991)).

2004Cole, 128 Wn.2d at 287 (quoting State v. Ibarra, 61 Wn.

2004Cole, 128 Wash.2d at 287 , 906 P.2d 925 (quoting State v. Ibarra, 61 Wash.App. 695, 699-700 , 812 P.2d 114 (1991)).

2003If he had, he would have to meet the rigorous test set forth in Unemployment Compensation Department v. Hunt, 17 Wn.2d 228, 239-40 , 135 P.2d 89 (1943), and show that the statute is unseverable or that the elimination of the invalid part would render the remainder of the act incapable of accomplishing the legislative purposes of RCW 9.41.040.

2003If he had, he would have to meet the rigorous test set forth in Unemployment Compensation Department v. Hunt, 17 Wn.2d 228, 239-40 , 135 P.2d 89 (1943), and show that the statute is unseverable or that the elimination of the invalid part would render the remainder of the act incapable of accomplishing the legislative purposes of RCW 9.41.040.

2003Equally ill-conceived is the majority's adoption of a duty articulated by State v. Atherton whereby "an incarcerated defendant" is presumed to have waived his or her right to be present at trial unless the defendant "make[s] reasonable efforts to inform the court of his [or her] situation." 106 Wash.App. 783, 790 , 24 P.3d 1123 (2001).

2003Equally ill-conceived is the majority’s adoption of a duty articulated by State v. Atherton whereby “an incarcerated defendant” is presumed to have waived his or her right to be present at trial unless the defendant “make[s] reasonable efforts to inform the court of his [or her] situation.” 106 Wn.

2023App. 2d 490 , 501, 516 P.3d 821 (2022) (quoting Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co., 127 Wn.2d 67, 77 , 896 P.2d 682 (1995)).

2023App. 2d 490 , 501, 516 P.3d 821 (2022) (quoting Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co., 127 Wn.2d 67, 77 , 896 P.2d 682 (1995)).

2023State v. Roberts, 25 Wn.

2021In re Parentage of J.A.B., 146 Wn.

2017In re Custody ofC.C.M, 149 Wn.

2015Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 121 .

2010Weston, 137 Wash.App. at 168 , 151 P.3d 1090 . ¶ 37 Courts afford CR 23 liberal interpretation because it "avoids multiplicity of litigation, `saves members of the class the cost and trouble of filing individual suits[,] and ... also frees the defendant from the harassment of identical future litigation.'" Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 113 Wash.App. 306, 318 , 54 P.3d 665 (2002) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash.App. 249, 256-57 , 492 P.2d 581 (1971)). "`[A] primary function of the class suit is to provide a procedure for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify indi

2010Weston, 137 Wash.App. at 168 , 151 P.3d 1090 . ¶ 37 Courts afford CR 23 liberal interpretation because it "avoids multiplicity of litigation, `saves members of the class the cost and trouble of filing individual suits[,] and ... also frees the defendant from the harassment of identical future litigation.'" Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 113 Wash.App. 306, 318 , 54 P.3d 665 (2002) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash.App. 249, 256-57 , 492 P.2d 581 (1971)). "`[A] primary function of the class suit is to provide a procedure for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify indi

2010Weston, 137 Wash.App. at 168 , 151 P.3d 1090 . ¶ 37 Courts afford CR 23 liberal interpretation because it "avoids multiplicity of litigation, `saves members of the class the cost and trouble of filing individual suits[,] and ... also frees the defendant from the harassment of identical future litigation.'" Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 113 Wash.App. 306, 318 , 54 P.3d 665 (2002) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash.App. 249, 256-57 , 492 P.2d 581 (1971)). "`[A] primary function of the class suit is to provide a procedure for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify indi

2010Weston, 137 Wash.App. at 168 , 151 P.3d 1090 . ¶ 37 Courts afford CR 23 liberal interpretation because it "avoids multiplicity of litigation, `saves members of the class the cost and trouble of filing individual suits[,] and ... also frees the defendant from the harassment of identical future litigation.'" Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 113 Wash.App. 306, 318 , 54 P.3d 665 (2002) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash.App. 249, 256-57 , 492 P.2d 581 (1971)). "`[A] primary function of the class suit is to provide a procedure for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify indi

2010Weston, 137 Wash.App. at 168 , 151 P.3d 1090 . ¶ 37 Courts afford CR 23 liberal interpretation because it "avoids multiplicity of litigation, `saves members of the class the cost and trouble of filing individual suits[,] and ... also frees the defendant from the harassment of identical future litigation.'" Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 113 Wash.App. 306, 318 , 54 P.3d 665 (2002) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash.App. 249, 256-57 , 492 P.2d 581 (1971)). "`[A] primary function of the class suit is to provide a procedure for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify indi

2010Weston, 137 Wash.App. at 168 , 151 P.3d 1090 . ¶ 37 Courts afford CR 23 liberal interpretation because it "avoids multiplicity of litigation, `saves members of the class the cost and trouble of filing individual suits[,] and ... also frees the defendant from the harassment of identical future litigation.'" Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 113 Wash.App. 306, 318 , 54 P.3d 665 (2002) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash.App. 249, 256-57 , 492 P.2d 581 (1971)). "`[A] primary function of the class suit is to provide a procedure for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify indi

2010Weston, 137 Wash.App. at 168 , 151 P.3d 1090 . ¶ 37 Courts afford CR 23 liberal interpretation because it "avoids multiplicity of litigation, `saves members of the class the cost and trouble of filing individual suits[,] and ... also frees the defendant from the harassment of identical future litigation.'" Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 113 Wash.App. 306, 318 , 54 P.3d 665 (2002) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash.App. 249, 256-57 , 492 P.2d 581 (1971)). "`[A] primary function of the class suit is to provide a procedure for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify indi

2003Equally ill-conceived is the majority's adoption of a duty articulated by State v. Atherton whereby "an incarcerated defendant" is presumed to have waived his or her right to be present at trial unless the defendant "make[s] reasonable efforts to inform the court of his [or her] situation." 106 Wash.App. 783, 790 , 24 P.3d 1123 (2001).

1995State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250-51 , 60 P. 403 (1900). [7] Our prior cases demonstrate adherence to a rigorous standard when reviewing alleged violations of Const. art. 4, § 16.

1995State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250-51 , 60 P. 403 (1900). [7] Our prior cases demonstrate adherence to a rigorous standard when reviewing alleged violations of Const. art. 4, § 16.

1993In Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wn.2d 786 , 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 872 (1968), we defined "voluntary intoxication" as intoxication not caused by force or fraud.

1993In Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wn.2d 786 , 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 872 (1968), we defined "voluntary intoxication" as intoxication not caused by force or fraud.

1993In Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wn.2d 786 , 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 872 (1968), we defined "voluntary intoxication" as intoxication not caused by force or fraud.

1992Bartholomew II, 101 Wn.2d at 637 .

1992However, it has long been the rule that "[i]nitiatives are to be interpreted according to the general rules of statutory construction." (Citations omitted.) Spokane v. Taxpayers, 111 Wn.2d 91, 97 , 758 P.2d 480 (1988). [4] See generally Comment, Through the Looking Glass: A Comparison of Covered Persons, Defenses, and Liability Under CERCLA and the Washington State Model Toxic Control Act of 1988 (Initiative 97, 1988 General Election), 25 Gonz.

1992However, it has long been the rule that "[i]nitiatives are to be interpreted according to the general rules of statutory construction." (Citations omitted.) Spokane v. Taxpayers, 111 Wn.2d 91, 97 , 758 P.2d 480 (1988). [4] See generally Comment, Through the Looking Glass: A Comparison of Covered Persons, Defenses, and Liability Under CERCLA and the Washington State Model Toxic Control Act of 1988 (Initiative 97, 1988 General Election), 25 Gonz.

1991State v. Phelan, 100 Wn.2d 508, 512 , 671 P.2d 1212 (1983).

1991State v. Phelan, 100 Wn.2d 508, 512 , 671 P.2d 1212 (1983).

1990In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 , 90 L.Ed.2d 735 , 106 S.Ct. 2147 (1986), the Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to a federal statutory requirement that participants in certain welfare programs must provide state welfare agencies administering the program with their social security number and those of each member of their household as a condition of receiving benefits. 476 U.S. at 695 .

1990In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 , 90 L.Ed.2d 735 , 106 S.Ct. 2147 (1986), the Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to a federal statutory requirement that participants in certain welfare programs must provide state welfare agencies administering the program with their social security number and those of each member of their household as a condition of receiving benefits. 476 U.S. at 695 .