rigorous standard in New York

2017An acquittal establishes “only that the jury did not find all elements of those offenses to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a more rigorous standard of proof than the clear and convincing evidence standard” applicable in a SORA risk level determination proceeding (id. at 729; see People v Vasquez, 49 AD3d 1282, 1284 [2008]).

2016The fact that the defendant was acquitted at the trial of sexual abuse in the first degree established only that the trial court did not find all the elements of that offense to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a more rigorous standard of proof than the clear and convincing standard applicable to SORA determinations (see People v Kost, 82 AD3d 729 [2011]; People v Vasquez, 49 AD3d 1282, 1284 [2008]).

2025Co. , 74 NY2d 201, 208 [1989])," the Belnord court rejected the respondent's "argument that a less rigorous standard [found in the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL")] should be applied in construing the substantial limitation language of the rent control succession provision than that applied to the functionally identical substantial limitation language of the ADA." ( Belnord , 10 Misc 3d at 45.) [FN6] Given that "the drafters of the rent control regulations . . . eschewed the broader definitions of disability found elsewhere in" the "e

2025Co. , 74 NY2d 201, 208 [1989])," the Belnord court rejected the respondent's "argument that a less rigorous standard [found in the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL")] should be applied in construing the substantial limitation language of the rent control succession provision than that applied to the functionally identical substantial limitation language of the ADA." ( Belnord , 10 Misc 3d at 45 .) [FN6] Given that "the drafters of the rent control regulations . . . eschewed the broader definitions of disability found elsewhere in" the "

2012Family Court did not conduct the rigorous analysis required by People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976], supra) to justify each escalation in interference with appellant’s freedom of movement.

2012Family Court did not conduct the rigorous analysis required by People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976], supra) to justify each escalation in interference with appellant’s freedom of movement.

2008We find this statement instructive to the instant dispute in that plaintiff is not himself an “injured bystander” and O’Brien herself is not seeking to hold him—or his municipal employer—civilly liable as a result of this accident (see Campbell v City of Elmira, 84 NY2d 505, 512 [1994] [“the more rigorous standard before allowing for municipal liability arising out of emergency circumstances accommodates the realities of the dangerous conditions encountered by officers in performing their municipal duties with necessary dispatch and dispensation from ordinary care” (emphasis added)]).

1996As the majority emphasized in Campbell v City of Elmira (supra, at 512-513), the Legislature recognized the need for a more rigorous standard for liability arising out of emergency circumstances, but also retained the potential for liability based upon "disproportionate, overreactive conduct.

2005(Howell v New York Post Co., 81 NY2d 115 [1993].) The standard for establishing the first element, extreme and outrageous conduct, has been set so high that the Howell court described it as “conduct ... so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” (Howell v New York Post Co., supra at 122.) The Howell court further noted that, because of the rigorous standard, “of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims considered by this Court, every one

1995Ctr., 86 AD2d 867, 868 ; see, Orzechowski v Warner-Lambert Co., 92 AD2d 110, 112 ), the facts fall short of the rigorous standard of outrageous conduct necessary to maintain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (see, Howell v New York Post Co., 81 NY2d 115, 121-122 ).

2026It requires a plaintiff to prove not only that the attorney erred, but that the error materially altered the outcome of the underlying matter ( see Grace v Law , 24 NY3d 203, 208 [2014]).

2026It requires a plaintiff to prove not only that the attorney erred, but that the error materially altered the outcome of the underlying matter ( see Grace v Law , 24 NY3d 203, 208 [2014]).

2025Co. , 74 NY2d 201, 208 [1989])," the Belnord court rejected the respondent's "argument that a less rigorous standard [found in the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL")] should be applied in construing the substantial limitation language of the rent control succession provision than that applied to the functionally identical substantial limitation language of the ADA." ( Belnord , 10 Misc 3d at 45.) [FN6] Given that "the drafters of the rent control regulations . . . eschewed the broader definitions of disability found elsewhere in" the "e

2025Co. , 74 NY2d 201, 208 [1989])," the Belnord court rejected the respondent's "argument that a less rigorous standard [found in the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL")] should be applied in construing the substantial limitation language of the rent control succession provision than that applied to the functionally identical substantial limitation language of the ADA." ( Belnord , 10 Misc 3d at 45.) [FN6] Given that "the drafters of the rent control regulations . . . eschewed the broader definitions of disability found elsewhere in" the "e

2023In imposing this rigorous standard, we recognize that “[t]he insidiousness of electronic surveillance threatens the right to be free from unjustifiable governmental intrusion into one’s individual privacy to a far greater extent than the writs of assistance and general warrants so dreaded by those who successfully battled for the adoption of the Bill of Rights” (People v Schulz, 67 NY2d 144, 148-149 [1986]).

2019Doe v Chiles , 136 F3d 709, 718 [11th Cir 1998]; Reynolds v Giuliani , 35 F Supp 2d 331, 341 [SD NY 1999]; Alexander A. v Novello , 210 FRD 27, 34-37 [ED NY 2002]; see generally Wilder v Va Hosp Assn. , 496 US 498, 509 [1990]). [FN12] However, the Supreme Court of the United States later established a more rigorous analysis, holding that nothing "short of an unambiguously conferred statutory right . . . support[s] a private cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 " ( Gonzaga Univ. v Doe , 536 US 273, 283 [2002]; accord Doe v Gillespie , 867 F3d 1034, 1053 [8th Cir 2017]).

2019Doe v Chiles , 136 F3d 709, 718 [11th Cir 1998]; Reynolds v Giuliani , 35 F Supp 2d 331, 341 [SD NY 1999]; Alexander A. v Novello , 210 FRD 27, 34-37 [ED NY 2002]; see generally Wilder v Va Hosp Assn. , 496 US 498, 509 [1990]). [FN12] However, the Supreme Court of the United States later established a more rigorous analysis, holding that nothing "short of an unambiguously conferred statutory right . . . support[s] a private cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 " ( Gonzaga Univ. v Doe , 536 US 273, 283 [2002]; accord Doe v Gillespie , 867 F3d 1034, 1053 [8th Cir 2017]).

2019Doe v Chiles , 136 F3d 709, 718 [11th Cir 1998]; Reynolds v Giuliani , 35 F Supp 2d 331, 341 [SD NY 1999]; Alexander A. v Novello , 210 FRD 27, 34-37 [ED NY 2002]; see generally Wilder v Va Hosp Assn. , 496 US 498, 509 [1990]). [FN12] However, the Supreme Court of the United States later established a more rigorous analysis, holding that nothing "short of an unambiguously conferred statutory right . . . support[s] a private cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 " ( Gonzaga Univ. v Doe , 536 US 273, 283 [2002]; accord Doe v Gillespie , 867 F3d 1034, 1053 [8th Cir 2017]).

2019Doe v Chiles , 136 F3d 709, 718 [11th Cir 1998]; Reynolds v Giuliani , 35 F Supp 2d 331, 341 [SD NY 1999]; Alexander A. v Novello , 210 FRD 27, 34-37 [ED NY 2002]; see generally Wilder v Va Hosp Assn. , 496 US 498, 509 [1990]). [FN12] However, the Supreme Court of the United States later established a more rigorous analysis, holding that nothing "short of an unambiguously conferred statutory right . . . support[s] a private cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 " ( Gonzaga Univ. v Doe , 536 US 273, 283 [2002]; accord Doe v Gillespie , 867 F3d 1034, 1053 [8th Cir 2017]).

2019Doe v Chiles , 136 F3d 709, 718 [11th Cir 1998]; Reynolds v Giuliani , 35 F Supp 2d 331, 341 [SD NY 1999]; Alexander A. v Novello , 210 FRD 27, 34-37 [ED NY 2002]; see generally Wilder v Va Hosp Assn. , 496 US 498, 509 [1990]). [FN12] However, the Supreme Court of the United States later established a more rigorous analysis, holding that nothing "short of an unambiguously conferred statutory right . . . support[s] a private cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 " ( Gonzaga Univ. v Doe , 536 US 273, 283 [2002]; accord Doe v Gillespie , 867 F3d 1034, 1053 [8th Cir 2017]).

2019Thereafter, in Armstrong v Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc. (___ US ___, ___, 135 S Ct 1378, 1387-1388 [2015]), the Court analyzed 42 USC § 1396a (a) and held that no private right of action existed by which a Medicaid provider could enforce one of the other provisions that, like the reasonable promptness requirement, must be included in state Medicaid plans ( see 42 USC § 1396a [a] [30] [A]).

2018People v Porco , 17 NY3d 877, 878 [2011]; People v DeRaffele , 54 Misc 3d 1 , 5-6 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2016]).