10 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1906–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc.green2 sentences2020Taking an aberrant view of this issue, the majority adopts the reasoning of an intermediate state court, see ante at 15-16, that is both internally inconsistent and in opposition to the Restatement. 13 In Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 898, 905 (2006), the 13 In an effort to demonstrate that its position is not aberrant, the majority cites to cases that apparently allow “recovery in circumstances similar to the one we face here,” see ante at 13 n.5. 2020Taking an aberrant view of this issue, the majority adopts the reasoning of an intermediate state court, see ante at 15-16, that is both internally inconsistent and in opposition to the Restatement. 13 In Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 898, 905 (2006), the 13 In an effort to demonstrate that its position is not aberrant, the majority cites to cases that apparently allow “recovery in circumstances similar to the one we face here,” see ante at 13 n.5. | 2 | 2 |
Lilly v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2013Post-sentencing motions to withdraw a guilty plea are assessed under a more rigorous standard in order " 'to avoid motions for withdrawal based on disappointment in the terms of the sentence.’ " Lilly v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 960, 965 , 243 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1978) (quoting Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 416 (1973)). 2013Post-sentencing motions to withdraw a guilty plea are assessed under a more rigorous standard in order " 'to avoid motions for withdrawal based on disappointment in the terms of the sentence.’ " Lilly v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 960, 965 , 243 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1978) (quoting Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 416 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Michael Joseph Paradiso and Anthony Richard Bonnacci v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013Post-sentencing motions to withdraw a guilty plea are assessed under a more rigorous standard in order " 'to avoid motions for withdrawal based on disappointment in the terms of the sentence.’ " Lilly v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 960, 965 , 243 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1978) (quoting Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 416 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Kotteakos v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2005If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” - 18 - Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 260 , 546 S.E.2d 728, 731-32 (2001) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)). | 1 | 1 |
Clay v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2005If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” - 18 - Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 260 , 546 S.E.2d 728, 731-32 (2001) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)). 2005If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” - 18 - Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 260 , 546 S.E.2d 728, 731-32 (2001) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)). | 1 | 1 |
Holly Farms Foods, Inc. v. Cartergreen2 sentences1997Holly Farms Foods, Inc. v. Carter, 15 Va. App. 29, 38-39 , 422 S.E.2d 165, 170 (1992). 1997Holly Farms Foods, Inc. v. Carter, 15 Va. App. 29, 38-39 , 422 S.E.2d 165, 170 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Western Electric Co. v. Gilliamgreen2 sentences1992In Gilliam , the Supreme Court held that a disease “which had its origin in repeated, work-related trauma, was an ordinary disease of life.” Gilliam, 229 Va. at 247 , 329 S.E.2d at 14 (footnote omitted). 1992In Gilliam , the Supreme Court held that a disease “which had its origin in repeated, work-related trauma, was an ordinary disease of life.” Gilliam, 229 Va. at 247 , 329 S.E.2d at 14 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Lavinder v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1992To inquire, as the majority does, whether the error in giving a defective instruction "could" have affected the guilty verdict is simply to engage in a harmless error analysis, see Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 1003, 1007-09 , 407 S.E.2d 910, 911-12 (1991), and to reverse the appellant's conviction after establishing a "hypothesis" by which the jury "could have" used the defective part of the instruction to convict. 1992To inquire, as the majority does, whether the error in giving a defective instruction "could" have affected the guilty verdict is simply to engage in a harmless error analysis, see Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 1003, 1007-09 , 407 S.E.2d 910, 911-12 (1991), and to reverse the appellant's conviction after establishing a "hypothesis" by which the jury "could have" used the defective part of the instruction to convict. | 1 | 1 |
Buckland v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1987See Buckland v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 290, 293 , 329 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1985). 1987See Buckland v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 290, 293 , 329 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Norfolk v. Norfolk County
green
2 sentences2020In the third-party context, “[l]egitimate concerns about privity of contract” must be “accommodated by imposing a test of unjust enrichment that is highly protective of the defendant,” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment ch. 3, topic 2, intro. note (2011) (emphasis added), and by establishing “a rigorous test of unjust enrichment as a threshold requirement of the claim,” id. § 25 cmt. b (emphasis added). 2020In the third-party context, “[l]egitimate concerns about privity of contract” must be “accommodated by imposing a test of unjust enrichment that is highly protective of the defendant,” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment ch. 3, topic 2, intro. note (2011) (emphasis added), and by establishing “a rigorous test of unjust enrichment as a threshold requirement of the claim,” id. § 25 cmt. b (emphasis added). | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Colbert v. Colbert
green
1 sentence1984(Emphasis added.) Citing Colbert v. Colbert, 162 Va. 393 (1934), Dooley buttresses this requirement by stating that, "The proof should be strict, satisfactory and conclusive." In this case I find the complainant’s proof meets this rigorous standard for showing adultery for the following reasons. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Bass' Administrator v. Norfolk Railway & Light Co.
neutral
2 sentences1906Bass’ Admr. v. Norfolk, &c., Co., 100 Va. 1 , 40 S. E. 100 ; C. & O. 1906Bass’ Admr. v. Norfolk, &c., Co., 100 Va. 1 , 40 S. E. 100 ; C. & O. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.