rigorous standard in Texas

2020App. 2007)). “[P]roof of circumstantial evidence is not subject to a more rigorous standard than is proof by direct testimonial evidence.” McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. Crim.

2013As noted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, “proof of circumstantial evidence is not subject to a more rigorous standard than is proof by direct testimonial evidence.” McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. Crim.

2024Sub-Issue Two: Legal disputes regarding elements of the 15-Day Class claims Progressive next argues that the trial court failed to perform the rigorous analysis required under Rule 42 when it certified the 15-Day Class because the certification order did not evaluate the “claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law.” Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435 .

2015See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551-52 ; Riemer, 392 S.W.3d at 639 ("A trial court must apply a rigorous analysis to determine whether Rule 42's certification requirements have been satisfied." (citing Bowden, 247 S.W.3d at 696 ; Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435 (citing General Tel.

2015See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 285-86 (circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove appellant was shooter in capital murder case even though no eyewitness testimony); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. refd) ("Proof of the accused's identity through circumstantial evidence is not subject to a more rigorous standard than is proof by direct evidence, as both are equally probative."); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.— Austin 2000 , pet. refd) (State may prove identity with circumstantial evidence).

2015See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 285–86 (circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove appellant was shooter in capital murder case even though no eyewitness testimony); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“Proof of the accused’s identity through circumstantial evidence is not subject to a more rigorous standard than is proof by direct evidence, as both are equally probative.”); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d) (State may prove identity with circumstantial evidence).

2016Appraisal Dist., 990 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. 1999) (discussing challenges by taxing units to appraisal district decisions under chapters 41 and 42 of the tax code). 18 explicitly require predominance and superiority as (b)(3) does, (b)(2) does require a rigorous analysis of ‘cohesiveness.’” Lapray, 135 S.W.3d at 670 .

2015Co. v. Lopez, 156 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex. 2004) (reversing certification for failure to reflect the rigorous analysis necessary for typicality and adequate representation requirements); Snyder Commc’ns v. Magaña, 142 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Tex. 2004) (reversing certification due to highly individualized issues predominating); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 681 (Tex. 2004) (reversing certification and holding that predominance requirement was not satisfied); Union Pac.

2022P. 42(b)(3); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348-49 (2011) (explaining the “class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members”) (internal quotations omitted). 29Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 691 (cleaned up). 30Reimer v. State, 392 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2013); Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 691 . 31Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 694 (“The question [a trial] court must decide before certifying a class, after rigorous analysis and not merely a lick and a prayer, is whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they can

2015See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551-52 ; Riemer, 392 S.W.3d at 639 ("A trial court must apply a rigorous analysis to determine whether Rule 42's certification requirements have been satisfied." (citing Bowden, 247 S.W.3d at 696 ; Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435 (citing General Tel.

2022P. 42(b)(3); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348-49 (2011) (explaining the “class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members”) (internal quotations omitted). 29Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 691 (cleaned up). 30Reimer v. State, 392 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2013); Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 691 . 31Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 694 (“The question [a trial] court must decide before certifying a class, after rigorous analysis and not merely a lick and a prayer, is whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they can

2015See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551-52 ; Riemer, 392 S.W.3d at 639 ("A trial court must apply a rigorous analysis to determine whether Rule 42's certification requirements have been satisfied." (citing Bowden, 247 S.W.3d at 696 ; Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435 (citing General Tel.

2006Roberson v. State , 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd); see Couchman v. State , 3 S.W.3d 155 , 162–63 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd) (proof a person named "Tony" improperly touched complainant found to be sufficient evidence when combined with testimony of grandmother of complainant who testified defendant was called "Tony" and identified defendant as the "Tony" she was referring to).

2006Roberson v. State , 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd); see Couchman v. State , 3 S.W.3d 155 , 162–63 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd) (proof a person named "Tony" improperly touched complainant found to be sufficient evidence when combined with testimony of grandmother of complainant who testified the defendant was called "Tony" and identified defendant as the "Tony" she was referring to).

2024But if the expert’s testimony is based on soft sciences or fields based primarily upon experience and training as opposed to scientific methods, the testimony “is held to a less rigorous standard than hard science testimony” as outlined in Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim.

2011But, because, as in this case, interpretation of a dog’s reaction to a scent lineup is based on training and experience, and not scientific principles, we apply the less rigorous test set forth in the Nenno case. [6] See Winston , 78 S.W.3d at 526 (applying criteria set forth in Nenno v. State , 970 S.W.2d 549 , 560–61 (Tex. Crim.

2019“The exclusion of a defendant’s evidence will be constitutional error only if the evidence forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense.” Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex. Crim.

2019“The exclusion of a defendant’s evidence will be constitutional error only if the evidence forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense.” Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Champion v. State, 590 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Pierce, 113 S.W.3d at 436 ; Moore, 11 S.W.3d at 499 .

2009See Champion v. State , 590 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tex. Crim.

2009Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

2009Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

2003Clewis v. State , 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim.

2003Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

2022P. 42(b)(3); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348-49 (2011) (explaining the “class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members”) (internal quotations omitted). 29Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 691 (cleaned up). 30Reimer v. State, 392 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2013); Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 691 . 31Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 694 (“The question [a trial] court must decide before certifying a class, after rigorous analysis and not merely a lick and a prayer, is whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they can

2022P. 42(b)(3); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348-49 (2011) (explaining the “class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members”) (internal quotations omitted). 29Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 691 (cleaned up). 30Reimer v. State, 392 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2013); Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 691 . 31Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 694 (“The question [a trial] court must decide before certifying a class, after rigorous analysis and not merely a lick and a prayer, is whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they can

2015See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 285-86 (circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove appellant was shooter in capital murder case even though no eyewitness testimony); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. refd) ("Proof of the accused's identity through circumstantial evidence is not subject to a more rigorous standard than is proof by direct evidence, as both are equally probative."); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.— Austin 2000 , pet. refd) (State may prove identity with circumstantial evidence).

2015See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 285–86 (circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove appellant was shooter in capital murder case even though no eyewitness testimony); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“Proof of the accused’s identity through circumstantial evidence is not subject to a more rigorous standard than is proof by direct evidence, as both are equally probative.”); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d) (State may prove identity with circumstantial evidence).

2009Medrano v. State , 658 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, pet. ref'd).

1985As we stated in Medrano v. State, 658 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, pet. ref’d): Guilt of the offense of burglary can be established circumstantially by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances, but proof of guilt by accompanying circumstances is subject to the same rigorous standard required of direct evidence, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

2007See id. (“ However, the mere fact of termination of employment, even if the termination is wrongful, is not legally sufficient evidence that the employer’s conduct was extreme and outrageous under the rigorous standard that we established in Twyman .”).

2007See id. (“However, the mere fact of termination of employment, even if the termination is wrongful, is not legally sufficient evidence that the employer’s conduct was extreme and outrageous under the rigorous standard that we established in Twyman.”).

2024App. 1998), overruled on other grounds, State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim.

2013See Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 273-74 (applying Nenno test to testimony of forensic psychiatrist regarding future dangerousness); Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 560-61 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Ruckman v. State, 109 S.W.3d 524, 529-31 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. ref'd) (applying Nenno test to testimony regarding false confessions).

2020“An application to revoke probation [or adjudicate guilt] need not meet the specificity requirements of an indictment or information.” Id. (citing Chacon v. State, 558 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim.

2020“An application to revoke [community supervision or adjudicate guilt] need not meet the specificity requirements of an indictment or information.” Id. (citing Chacon v. State, 558 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim.

2015Co. v. Lopez, 156 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex. 2004) (reversing certification for failure to reflect the rigorous analysis necessary for typicality and adequate representation requirements); Snyder Commc’ns v. Magaña, 142 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Tex. 2004) (reversing certification due to highly individualized issues predominating); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 681 (Tex. 2004) (reversing certification and holding that predominance requirement was not satisfied); Union Pac.

2005See Lopez, 156 S.W.3d at 556 .

2015See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 285-86 (circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove appellant was shooter in capital murder case even though no eyewitness testimony); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. refd) ("Proof of the accused's identity through circumstantial evidence is not subject to a more rigorous standard than is proof by direct evidence, as both are equally probative."); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.— Austin 2000 , pet. refd) (State may prove identity with circumstantial evidence).

2015See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 285–86 (circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove appellant was shooter in capital murder case even though no eyewitness testimony); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“Proof of the accused’s identity through circumstantial evidence is not subject to a more rigorous standard than is proof by direct evidence, as both are equally probative.”); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d) (State may prove identity with circumstantial evidence).

2015Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir.1998) (noting that '[w]hile 23(b)(2) class actions have no predominance or superiority requirements, it is well established that the class claims must be cohesive’).” Com paq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 670 (Tex.2004) (quoting Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143 ). 31 .

2015Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir.1998) (noting that '[w]hile 23(b)(2) class actions have no predominance or superiority requirements, it is well established that the class claims must be cohesive’).” Com paq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 670 (Tex.2004) (quoting Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143 ). 31 .

2020“Texas courts have traditionally recognized that an application to revoke [or adjudicate guilt] is held to a less rigorous standard than an indictment or information.” Pierce v. State, 113 S.W.3d 431 , 436–37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d).

2020“Texas courts have traditionally recognized that an application to revoke [or adjudicate guilt] is held to a less rigorous standard than an indictment or information.” Pierce v. State, 113 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d).

2022Co. v. Pitts, 236 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. 2007). 11 In assessing predominance, courts must identify the substantive issues that control the litigation, decide what issues will predominate in the case, and then determine whether those issues are in fact common to the class. 19 “The test for predominance is not whether common issues outnumber uncommon issues but. . . whether common or individual issues will be the object of most of the efforts of the litigants and the court.” 20 “If, after common issues are resolved, presenting and resolving individual issues is likely to be an overwhelming or unm

2022These are basically quasi-contract theories, theories that do not rely on contracts “at all but an obligation imposed by law to do justice even though it is clear that no promise was ever made or intended.”35 The general rule is that when parties have an express contract covering the 32Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433. 33Pitts, 236 S.W.3d at 205 . 34Id. 35Fortune Prod.

2015These requirements may not be met with “conclusory allegations” in the movant’s pleading.20 Moreover, “good cause” is not presumed merely because Plaintiff has retained a psychologist to testify as an expert regarding Plaintiff’s mental condition.21 Texas courts have repeatedly refused to permit medical examinations when good cause is not shown.22 Here, Defendant IHM has failed to show good cause with any evidence to meet its burden. 16 Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 751-52 (Tex. 1988) (a movant’s showing of good cause is mandatory). 17 Id. at 752 (“Plaintiffs should not be subjected t

2015These requirements may not be met with “conclusory allegations” in the movant’s pleading.20 Moreover, “good cause” is not presumed merely because Plaintiff has retained a psychologist to testify as an expert regarding Plaintiff’s mental condition.21 Texas courts have repeatedly refused to permit medical examinations when good cause is not shown.22 Here, Defendant IHM has failed to show good cause with any evidence to meet its burden. 16 Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 751-52 (Tex. 1988) (a movant’s showing of good cause is mandatory). 17 Id. at 752 (“Plaintiffs should not be subjected t