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40 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lee v. Carter-Reed Co.green2 sentences2026A-1236-24 15 [ 203 N.J. at 505 (Alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).] The rigorous analysis sought by defendants is conducted by the trial court to determine whether plaintiff has met the elements of Rule 4:32-1. 2025"In determining a motion for class certification, a court 'must "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint," and consider the remaining pleadings, discovery (including interrogatory answers, relevant documents, and depositions), and any other pertinent evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff.'" Dugan, 231 N.J. at 49 (quoting Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., 203 N.J. 496, 505 (2010)). "[A] court deciding class certification must undertake a rigorous analysis to determine if the Rule's requirements have been satisfied. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Rosegreen2 sentences2015Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5239, at 445 (1978) ("One of the key words in determining the scope of Rule 404(b) is 'other'; only crimes, wrongs, or acts 'other' than those at issue under the pleadings are made inadmissible under the general rule."). 20 A-2760-11T2 Thus, evidence that is intrinsic to a charged crime need only satisfy the evidence rules relating to relevancy, most importantly the Rule 403 balancing test. [Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).] The Court recognized the implications of subjecting such evidence to the less rigorous standard of N.J.R.E. 403: [C]haracteriz 2015Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5239, at 445 (1978) ("One of the key words in determining the scope of Rule 404(b) is 'other'; only crimes, wrongs, or acts 'other' than those at issue under the pleadings are made inadmissible under the general rule."). 20 A-2760-11T2 Thus, evidence that is intrinsic to a charged crime need only satisfy the evidence rules relating to relevancy, most importantly the Rule 403 balancing test. [Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).] The Court recognized the implications of subjecting such evidence to the less rigorous standard of N.J.R.E. 403: [C]haracteriz | 2 | 2 |
Bullock v. Cartergreen2 sentences2012As the New Jersey Supreme Court later noted in Matthews, supra, 84 N.J. at 159-60 , 417 A.2d 1011 , Dunn imposed strict scrutiny because the voter durational residency requirement directly “implicated two fundamental rights: the right to vote and the right to travel.” As Matthews also pointed out, Bullock showed that the United States Supreme Court “had never ‘attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.’ ” Id. at 158 , 417 A.2d 1011 (quoting Bullock, supra, 405 U.S. at 142-43, 92 S.Ct. at 855-56 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 99-100 ). 2012As the New Jersey Supreme Court later noted in Matthews, supra, 84 N.J. at 159-60 , 417 A.2d 1011 , Dunn imposed strict scrutiny because the voter durational residency requirement directly “implicated two fundamental rights: the right to vote and the right to travel.” As Matthews also pointed out, Bullock showed that the United States Supreme Court “had never ‘attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.’ ” Id. at 158 , 417 A.2d 1011 (quoting Bullock, supra, 405 U.S. at 142-43, 92 S.Ct. at 855-56 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 99-100 ). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Garrongreen2 sentences2019Our Supreme Court has recognized: The Federal and New Jersey Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to A-4916-15T1 10 present a complete defense." "That opportunity would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on . . . credibility . . . when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence." [State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 167 (2003) (citations omitted) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).] Generally, other-crimes evidence is admissible only if it passes the rigorous test outline 2005Similarly, although the requirement in ง 8 that a plaintiff submit an affidavit of lack of care is a more rigorous requirement than the former statutory requirement of an affidavit of merit, it is not incompatible with the Court's rules relating to malpractice suits and will not interfere with the Judiciary's role in resolving such disputes. [16] See, e.g., State v. Gadsden, 245 N.J.Super. 93, 96 , 584 A. 2d 265 (App.Div.1990) (The Legislature, under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 provided that certain maps depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of a school "shall, upon pr | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cofieldgreen2 sentences2019Our Supreme Court has recognized: The Federal and New Jersey Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to A-4916-15T1 10 present a complete defense." "That opportunity would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on . . . credibility . . . when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence." [State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 167 (2003) (citations omitted) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).] Generally, other-crimes evidence is admissible only if it passes the rigorous test outline 2008For example, evidence offered under N.J.R.E. 404(b) must pass the rigorous test set forth in State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 , 605 A.2d 230 (1992), and State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 131-34 , 919 A.2d 90 (2007). | 1 | 2 |
Fitzgerald v. Palmergreen1 sentence2021The Legislature knew how to create a more rigorous standard for holding a public entity liable, as it did in chapter four of the TCA, by adopting the “palpably unreasonable” standard for addressing liability of a public entity for a condition of public property. 8 Defendants attempt to make much of a statement in the pre-TCA case of Fitzgerald v. Palmer that “[i]f government does act, then, when it acts in a manner short of ordinary prudence, liability could be judged as in the case of a private party,” 47 N.J. 106, 109 (1966) -- a statement repeated in the 1972 Attorney General Task Force Com | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Savinongreen1 sentence2020See Young v. Savinon, 201 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bardengreen1 sentence2020The Supreme Court declared that the fourth Cofield prong "requires an inquiry distinct from the familiar balancing required under N.J.R.E. 403: the trial court must determine only whether the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice, not whether it is substantially outweighed by that potential as in the application of Rule 403." State v. Green, 236 N.J. 71, 83 (2018) (citing State v. Barden, 195 N.J. 375, 389 (2008)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Greengreen1 sentence2020The Supreme Court declared that the fourth Cofield prong "requires an inquiry distinct from the familiar balancing required under N.J.R.E. 403: the trial court must determine only whether the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice, not whether it is substantially outweighed by that potential as in the application of Rule 403." State v. Green, 236 N.J. 71, 83 (2018) (citing State v. Barden, 195 N.J. 375, 389 (2008)). | 1 | 1 |
Crane v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence2019Our Supreme Court has recognized: The Federal and New Jersey Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to A-4916-15T1 10 present a complete defense." "That opportunity would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on . . . credibility . . . when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence." [State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 167 (2003) (citations omitted) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).] Generally, other-crimes evidence is admissible only if it passes the rigorous test outline | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jahnell Weaver (069185)green1 sentence2019See also State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 150 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2019And more so than consent orders, orders of protection under the Act "are A-5291-17T3 14 orders of the court, not orders of the victims." State v. Washington, 319 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Greengreen1 sentence2015Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5239, at 445 (1978) ("One of the key words in determining the scope of Rule 404(b) is 'other'; only crimes, wrongs, or acts 'other' than those at issue under the pleadings are made inadmissible under the general rule."). 20 A-2760-11T2 Thus, evidence that is intrinsic to a charged crime need only satisfy the evidence rules relating to relevancy, most importantly the Rule 403 balancing test. [Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).] The Court recognized the implications of subjecting such evidence to the less rigorous standard of N.J.R.E. 403: [C]haracteriz | 1 | 1 |
Matthews v. City of AtLantic Citygreen2 sentences2012As the New Jersey Supreme Court later noted in Matthews, supra, 84 N.J. at 159-60 , 417 A.2d 1011 , Dunn imposed strict scrutiny because the voter durational residency requirement directly “implicated two fundamental rights: the right to vote and the right to travel.” As Matthews also pointed out, Bullock showed that the United States Supreme Court “had never ‘attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.’ ” Id. at 158 , 417 A.2d 1011 (quoting Bullock, supra, 405 U.S. at 142-43, 92 S.Ct. at 855-56 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 99-100 ). 2012As the New Jersey Supreme Court later noted in Matthews, supra, 84 N.J. at 159-60 , 417 A.2d 1011 , Dunn imposed strict scrutiny because the voter durational residency requirement directly “implicated two fundamental rights: the right to vote and the right to travel.” As Matthews also pointed out, Bullock showed that the United States Supreme Court “had never ‘attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.’ ” Id. at 158 , 417 A.2d 1011 (quoting Bullock, supra, 405 U.S. at 142-43, 92 S.Ct. at 855-56 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 99-100 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Maw v. Adv. Clinical Communicationsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwoodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Gatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greenya v. George Washington Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Califano v. Goldfarbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2024Brown, 170 N.J. at 160 . 2021Brown I, 170 N.J. at 160 . | 5 | 2020–2024 |
State v. Birkenmeier
green
2 sentences2020Instead, the Court noted the less rigorous standard, as articulated in Carty, is whether an officer has a "reasonable and articulable suspicion." Ibid. 2020Instead, the Court noted the less rigorous standard, as articulated in Carty, is whether an officer has a "reasonable and articulable suspicion." Ibid. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Gonzalez
green
1 sentence2025That scrutiny requires courts to look beyond the pleadings to understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law." Dugan, 231 N.J. at 49 -50 (quoting Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 106-07 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Debra Dugan v. TGI Friday’s, Inc. (077567) Ernest Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC (077567) (Burlington County and Statewide)
green
2 sentences2025That scrutiny requires courts to look beyond the pleadings to understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law." Dugan, 231 N.J. at 49 -50 (quoting Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 106-07 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2025"In determining a motion for class certification, a court 'must "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint," and consider the remaining pleadings, discovery (including interrogatory answers, relevant documents, and depositions), and any other pertinent evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff.'" Dugan, 231 N.J. at 49 (quoting Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., 203 N.J. 496, 505 (2010)). "[A] court deciding class certification must undertake a rigorous analysis to determine if the Rule's requirements have been satisfied. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Henries
green
1 sentence2021In turn, he argues that 13 A-3843-18 he satisfied the three elements necessary to establish a Brady claim, and therefore, the motion judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial. "[A] new trial analysis premised upon a Brady violation and a new trial analysis premised upon newly discovered evidence, are different[.]'" Henries, 306 N.J. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Green v. United States
neutral
1 sentence2015Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5239, at 445 (1978) ("One of the key words in determining the scope of Rule 404(b) is 'other'; only crimes, wrongs, or acts 'other' than those at issue under the pleadings are made inadmissible under the general rule."). 20 A-2760-11T2 Thus, evidence that is intrinsic to a charged crime need only satisfy the evidence rules relating to relevancy, most importantly the Rule 403 balancing test. [Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).] The Court recognized the implications of subjecting such evidence to the less rigorous standard of N.J.R.E. 403: [C]haracteriz | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Martinez v. United States
neutral
1 sentence2015Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5239, at 445 (1978) ("One of the key words in determining the scope of Rule 404(b) is 'other'; only crimes, wrongs, or acts 'other' than those at issue under the pleadings are made inadmissible under the general rule."). 20 A-2760-11T2 Thus, evidence that is intrinsic to a charged crime need only satisfy the evidence rules relating to relevancy, most importantly the Rule 403 balancing test. [Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).] The Court recognized the implications of subjecting such evidence to the less rigorous standard of N.J.R.E. 403: [C]haracteriz | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.
green
2 sentences2014The Court ruled in Sorrell that a Vermont statute restricting the sale, use, and disclosure of pharmacy records that revealed the prescription practices of individual doctors throughout that state to pharmaceutical manufacturers "must be 21 A-0417-12T4 subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny." Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2659 , 180 L. 2014The Court ruled in Sorrell that a Vermont statute restricting the sale, use, and disclosure of pharmacy records that revealed the prescription practices of individual doctors throughout that state to pharmaceutical manufacturers "must be 21 A-0417-12T4 subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny." Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2659 , 180 L. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Medici v. BPR Co.
green
2 sentences2013Using the more rigorous standard applicable to a (d)(1) use variance, compare Medici, 107 N.J. at 4 , 526 A.2d 109 (establishing quality of proofs required for (d)(1) use variances), with Coventry Square, supra, 138 N.J. at 297-98 , 650 A.2d 340 (identifying standards to apply to evaluation of application for (d)(3) conditional use variance), plaintiffs expert testified that New Vornado failed to satisfy the level of proof required for the variance. 2013Using the more rigorous standard applicable to a (d)(1) use variance, compare Medici, 107 N.J. at 4 , 526 A.2d 109 (establishing quality of proofs required for (d)(1) use variances), with Coventry Square, supra, 138 N.J. at 297-98 , 650 A.2d 340 (identifying standards to apply to evaluation of application for (d)(3) conditional use variance), plaintiffs expert testified that New Vornado failed to satisfy the level of proof required for the variance. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Coventry Square, Inc. v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment
green
2 sentences2013Using the more rigorous standard applicable to a (d)(1) use variance, compare Medici, 107 N.J. at 4 , 526 A.2d 109 (establishing quality of proofs required for (d)(1) use variances), with Coventry Square, supra, 138 N.J. at 297-98 , 650 A.2d 340 (identifying standards to apply to evaluation of application for (d)(3) conditional use variance), plaintiffs expert testified that New Vornado failed to satisfy the level of proof required for the variance. 2013Using the more rigorous standard applicable to a (d)(1) use variance, compare Medici, 107 N.J. at 4 , 526 A.2d 109 (establishing quality of proofs required for (d)(1) use variances), with Coventry Square, supra, 138 N.J. at 297-98 , 650 A.2d 340 (identifying standards to apply to evaluation of application for (d)(3) conditional use variance), plaintiffs expert testified that New Vornado failed to satisfy the level of proof required for the variance. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Associates
green
1 sentence2011Aug. 24, 2009) (finding that class action was not appropriate), vacated sub nom., Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs., 640 F. 3d 72 (2011) (noting that the district court's holding on certification was premature and remanding for discovery to allow a rigorous analysis). [3] Six other states (Alabama, Kansas, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Washington and West Virginia) have permitted class actions, but those decisions are unreported opinions. [4] At least one unreported decision in North Carolina has also denied class certification. [5] One state, Maryland, has also denied certificati | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2008For example, evidence offered under N.J.R.E. 404(b) must pass the rigorous test set forth in State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 , 605 A.2d 230 (1992), and State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 131-34 , 919 A.2d 90 (2007). 2008For example, evidence offered under N.J.R.E. 404(b) must pass the rigorous test set forth in State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 , 605 A.2d 230 (1992), and State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 131-34 , 919 A.2d 90 (2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Gadsden
neutral
2 sentences2005Similarly, although the requirement in ง 8 that a plaintiff submit an affidavit of lack of care is a more rigorous requirement than the former statutory requirement of an affidavit of merit, it is not incompatible with the Court's rules relating to malpractice suits and will not interfere with the Judiciary's role in resolving such disputes. [16] See, e.g., State v. Gadsden, 245 N.J.Super. 93, 96 , 584 A. 2d 265 (App.Div.1990) (The Legislature, under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 provided that certain maps depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of a school "shall, upon pr 2005Similarly, although the requirement in ง 8 that a plaintiff submit an affidavit of lack of care is a more rigorous requirement than the former statutory requirement of an affidavit of merit, it is not incompatible with the Court's rules relating to malpractice suits and will not interfere with the Judiciary's role in resolving such disputes. [16] See, e.g., State v. Gadsden, 245 N.J.Super. 93, 96 , 584 A. 2d 265 (App.Div.1990) (The Legislature, under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 provided that certain maps depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of a school "shall, upon pr | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Szemple
red
2 sentences2005Super. 145 , 335 A. 2d 598 (Law Div. 1975) and Rybeck, supra (under the No Fault Act, evidence of the amounts collectible or paid pursuant to PIP benefits to an injured person is inadmissible in a civil action for recovery of damages for bodily injury by such injured person.); State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406 , 640 A. 2d 817 (1994) and In re Gail D., 217 N.J.Super. 226 , 525 A. 2d 337 (App.Div.1987) (psychologist-patient privilege, physician-patient privilege, marital communications privilege). 2005Super. 145 , 335 A. 2d 598 (Law Div. 1975) and Rybeck, supra (under the No Fault Act, evidence of the amounts collectible or paid pursuant to PIP benefits to an injured person is inadmissible in a civil action for recovery of damages for bodily injury by such injured person.); State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406 , 640 A. 2d 817 (1994) and In re Gail D., 217 N.J.Super. 226 , 525 A. 2d 337 (App.Div.1987) (psychologist-patient privilege, physician-patient privilege, marital communications privilege). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Matter of Gail D.
green
2 sentences2005Super. 145 , 335 A. 2d 598 (Law Div. 1975) and Rybeck, supra (under the No Fault Act, evidence of the amounts collectible or paid pursuant to PIP benefits to an injured person is inadmissible in a civil action for recovery of damages for bodily injury by such injured person.); State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406 , 640 A. 2d 817 (1994) and In re Gail D., 217 N.J.Super. 226 , 525 A. 2d 337 (App.Div.1987) (psychologist-patient privilege, physician-patient privilege, marital communications privilege). 2005Super. 145 , 335 A. 2d 598 (Law Div. 1975) and Rybeck, supra (under the No Fault Act, evidence of the amounts collectible or paid pursuant to PIP benefits to an injured person is inadmissible in a civil action for recovery of damages for bodily injury by such injured person.); State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406 , 640 A. 2d 817 (1994) and In re Gail D., 217 N.J.Super. 226 , 525 A. 2d 337 (App.Div.1987) (psychologist-patient privilege, physician-patient privilege, marital communications privilege). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Pitti v. Astegher
green
2 sentences2005Super. 145 , 335 A. 2d 598 (Law Div. 1975) and Rybeck, supra (under the No Fault Act, evidence of the amounts collectible or paid pursuant to PIP benefits to an injured person is inadmissible in a civil action for recovery of damages for bodily injury by such injured person.); State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406 , 640 A. 2d 817 (1994) and In re Gail D., 217 N.J.Super. 226 , 525 A. 2d 337 (App.Div.1987) (psychologist-patient privilege, physician-patient privilege, marital communications privilege). 2005Similarly, although the requirement in ง 8 that a plaintiff submit an affidavit of lack of care is a more rigorous requirement than the former statutory requirement of an affidavit of merit, it is not incompatible with the Court's rules relating to malpractice suits and will not interfere with the Judiciary's role in resolving such disputes. [16] See, e.g., State v. Gadsden, 245 N.J.Super. 93, 96 , 584 A. 2d 265 (App.Div.1990) (The Legislature, under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 provided that certain maps depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of a school "shall, upon pr | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| New Brunswick Cellular Telephone Co. v. Borough of South Plainfield Board of Adjustment green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Garfole green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Perry v. Fiumano green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Stever green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Hunt green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Oklahoma v. Todd neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Robertson v. City of Louisville ex rel. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Hagar v. National Railroad Passenger green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Societe Nat. Ind. Aero. v. US Dist. Court green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| United States v. Agurs red | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Shelley v. Kraemer green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Rev. Donald L. Jackson v. The Statler Foundation green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| State v. Andretta green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Commonwealth v. Murphy green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| State v. Bock green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Joseph Daniel Holt v. United States green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Buckley v. Valeo red | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.