rigorous standard in California

2023Any error was thus harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even under the more rigorous standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , which Rodriquez argues should apply here. 16 II.

2023Thus, even under the more rigorous test to assess prejudice articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , we can conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt” that any alleged error by the trial court in failing to specifically instruct the jury to consider defendant’s youth in determining the reasonableness of any belief he had in the need to act in self-defense, “did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Id. at p. 24.) 3.

2023Cir. 1987) 824 F.2d 37 , 47 [the existence of a “right to seek political office . . . is undeniable . . . .”], cert. den. (1988) 485 U.S. 959 .) Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court “has not . . . attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.” (Bullock v. Carter (1972) 405 U.S. 134, 142-143 ; see also Clements v. Fashing (1982) 457 U.S. 957, 963 [“Far from recognizing candidacy as a ‘fundamental right,’ we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate’s access to the ballot ‘does not of itself compel close scrutiny.’”] [plur. opn. of

2023Cir. 1987) 824 F.2d 37 , 47 [the existence of a “right to seek political office . . . is undeniable . . . .”], cert. den. (1988) 485 U.S. 959 .) Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court “has not . . . attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.” (Bullock v. Carter (1972) 405 U.S. 134, 142-143 ; see also Clements v. Fashing (1982) 457 U.S. 957, 963 [“Far from recognizing candidacy as a ‘fundamental right,’ we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate’s access to the ballot ‘does not of itself compel close scrutiny.’”] [plur. opn. of

2016(Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 515 U.S. 646, 655-656 .) Public school students’ legitimate expectation of privacy in their persons and effects must be balanced against the schools’ “equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place.” (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 339-340 .) Thus, courts have upheld “‘special needs’” administrative searches in schools, conducted without individualized suspicion, “where the government need is great, the intrusion on the individual is limited, and a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable. [Cita

2014(City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 U.S. 32, 37 [ 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 ]; Randy 5 G., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 565 .) However, in the context of schools, courts have upheld the use of “‘special needs’ administrative searches, conducted without individualized suspicion, . . . where the government need is great, the intrusion on the individual is limited, and a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable.” (Latasha W., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527 .) These administrative searches are generally deemed to be lawful when conducted pursuant to an established policy that in

2001(See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-1328, 1331 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 743 P.2d 1299 ] (Ingersoll); but see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 U.S. 32 [ 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 ] [suspicionless vehicle stops do not pass Fourth Amendment muster when they are conducted as part of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is not to reduce the immediate hazard posed by dangerous drivers, but to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing].) Such stops are based on a regulatory plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individua

2001(See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-1328, 1331 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 743 P.2d 1299 ] (Ingersoll); but see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 U.S. 32 [ 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 ] [suspicionless vehicle stops do not pass Fourth Amendment muster when they are conducted as part of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is not to reduce the immediate hazard posed by dangerous drivers, but to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing].) Such stops are based on a regulatory plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individua

2001(Monsanto, at pp. 757-759, 104 S.Ct. 1464 .) The Supreme Court rejected that analysis but affirmed the judgment based on a more rigorous standard of proof designed to distinguish "independent action by the manufacturer" from "price-fixing agreements." (Id. at pp. 759, 763,104 S.Ct. 1464 .) The Monsanto court first distinguished between "concerted and independent action." ( Monsanto, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 761, 104 S.Ct. 1464 .) It noted the statutory requirement of a "`contract, combination .... or conspiracy'" to establish a Sherman Act violation, and stated that the act therefore does not pro

2001(Monsanto, at pp. 757-759, 104 S.Ct. 1464 .) The Supreme Court rejected that analysis but affirmed the judgment based on a more rigorous standard of proof designed to distinguish "independent action by the manufacturer" from "price-fixing agreements." (Id. at pp. 759, 763,104 S.Ct. 1464 .) The Monsanto court first distinguished between "concerted and independent action." ( Monsanto, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 761, 104 S.Ct. 1464 .) It noted the statutory requirement of a "`contract, combination .... or conspiracy'" to establish a Sherman Act violation, and stated that the act therefore does not pro

2016The trial court’s instruction that the jury could consider the evidence for those purposes thus could not have “adversely affected the 13 verdict,” and any error “was harmless under even the most rigorous standard of prejudice. [Citations.]” (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 542 , citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24 & People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) B.

2015He contends these errors were prejudicial under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , or even under the less rigorous standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , and therefore argues the matter must be remanded for a hearing, at which he has the right to be present, to determine whether he was disqualified from resentencing under the TSRA based on his prior offense of assault with intent to commit rape.

2016(People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 532 (Johnson).) “[T]he statute reflects the legislative judgment that in domestic violence cases, as in sex crimes, similar prior offenses are ‘uniquely probative’ of guilt in a later accusation. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) However, subdivision (e) of section 1109 creates a presumption of inadmissibility if the prior domestic violence is more than 10 years old, “unless the court determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of justice.” The interest of justice test is a more rigorous standard for admissibility, but it is satisfied wh

2016The trial court’s instruction that the jury could consider the evidence for those purposes thus could not have “adversely affected the 13 verdict,” and any error “was harmless under even the most rigorous standard of prejudice. [Citations.]” (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 542 , citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24 & People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) B.

2023Cir. 1987) 824 F.2d 37 , 47 [the existence of a “right to seek political office . . . is undeniable . . . .”], cert. den. (1988) 485 U.S. 959 .) Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court “has not . . . attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.” (Bullock v. Carter (1972) 405 U.S. 134, 142-143 ; see also Clements v. Fashing (1982) 457 U.S. 957, 963 [“Far from recognizing candidacy as a ‘fundamental right,’ we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate’s access to the ballot ‘does not of itself compel close scrutiny.’”] [plur. opn. of

2023Cir. 1987) 824 F.2d 37 , 47 [the existence of a “right to seek political office . . . is undeniable . . . .”], cert. den. (1988) 485 U.S. 959 .) Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court “has not . . . attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.” (Bullock v. Carter (1972) 405 U.S. 134, 142-143 ; see also Clements v. Fashing (1982) 457 U.S. 957, 963 [“Far from recognizing candidacy as a ‘fundamental right,’ we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate’s access to the ballot ‘does not of itself compel close scrutiny.’”] [plur. opn. of

2016(Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 515 U.S. 646, 655-656 .) Public school students’ legitimate expectation of privacy in their persons and effects must be balanced against the schools’ “equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place.” (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 339-340 .) Thus, courts have upheld “‘special needs’” administrative searches in schools, conducted without individualized suspicion, “where the government need is great, the intrusion on the individual is limited, and a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable. [Cita

2014(City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 U.S. 32, 37 [ 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 ]; Randy 5 G., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 565 .) However, in the context of schools, courts have upheld the use of “‘special needs’ administrative searches, conducted without individualized suspicion, . . . where the government need is great, the intrusion on the individual is limited, and a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable.” (Latasha W., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527 .) These administrative searches are generally deemed to be lawful when conducted pursuant to an established policy that in

2015(Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1747 [rejected due process challenge to CSAAS evidence, because the defendant failed to demonstrate how his constitutional right to a fair trial was violated by the introduction of CSAAS testimony to rehabilitate the victim’s testimony after a rigorous defense cross- examination calling into question the victim’s credibility].) 2.

2014(See People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 534 .)” (Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1747 .) Thus, Patino rejected the due process challenge because the defendant in that case “failed to demonstrate how his fundamental right to a fair trial was violated by the introduction of CSAAS testimony to rehabilitate [the victim’s] testimony after a rigorous defense cross-examination calling into question the victim’s credibility.” (Id. at p. 1747.) The same result is compelled here, where defense counsel cross-examined both T.M. and Dr. Urquiza at length.

2014(See People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 534 .)” (Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1747 .) Patino rejected the due process challenge because the defendant in that case “failed to demonstrate how his fundamental right to a fair trial was violated by the introduction of CSAAS testimony to rehabilitate [the victim’s] testimony after a rigorous defense cross-examination calling into question the victim’s credibility.” (Ibid.) This court has noted its agreement with the opinions of other districts that admission of CSAAS evidence does not violate a defendant’s due process and fair trial rights.

2014(See People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 534 .)” (Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1747 .) Thus, Patino rejected the due process challenge because the defendant in that case “failed to demonstrate how his fundamental right to a fair trial was violated by the introduction of CSAAS testimony to rehabilitate [the victim’s] testimony after a rigorous defense cross-examination calling into question the victim’s credibility.” (Id. at p. 1747.) The same result is compelled here, where defense counsel cross-examined both T.M. and Dr. Urquiza at length.

2021In brief, the court must weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim. . . . [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” ’ (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1473 . . . .)” ( Nolte, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1407–1408.) Some courts have, in the wake of Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163 (Cel Tech), adopted a more rigorous standard, requiring that “unfairness” be “tethered to some legislatively declared policy.” (See generally Moran v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc.

2014The Gregory court disagreed with the balancing test applied by courts before Cel-Tech, stating: 'Cel-Tech . . . may signal a narrower interpretation of the prohibition of unfair acts or practices in all unfair competition actions and provides reason for caution in relying on the broad language in earlier decisions that the [Cel-Tech] court found to be “too amorphous.” Moreover, where a claim of an unfair act or practice is predicated on public policy, we read Cel-Tech to require that the public policy which is a predicate to the action must be “tethered” to specific constitutional, statutory o

2021(Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1279-1280 .) 1.

2021(Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1282, 1286-1287 .) 2 Speegle did not testify regarding the concours-trailered rating he believed car 0128 would earn. 11 Here, however, the issue is not simply a conflict in the evidence or inferences to draw.

2014(City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 U.S. 32, 37 [ 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 ]; Randy 5 G., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 565 .) However, in the context of schools, courts have upheld the use of “‘special needs’ administrative searches, conducted without individualized suspicion, . . . where the government need is great, the intrusion on the individual is limited, and a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable.” (Latasha W., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527 .) These administrative searches are generally deemed to be lawful when conducted pursuant to an established policy that in

2014(City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 U.S. 32, 37 [ 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 ]; Randy 5 G., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 565 .) However, in the context of schools, courts have upheld the use of “‘special needs’ administrative searches, conducted without individualized suspicion, . . . where the government need is great, the intrusion on the individual is limited, and a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable.” (Latasha W., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527 .) These administrative searches are generally deemed to be lawful when conducted pursuant to an established policy that in

2013(See Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. 479–485; Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 240–266.) Our precedent indulges the presumption that a trial court has conducted this rigorous inquiry, despite no indication in the record that it did, so long as the prosecutor‘s stated reason is inherently plausible and not contradicted by the record.

2013(See Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. 479–485; Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 240–266.) Our precedent indulges the presumption that a trial court has conducted this rigorous inquiry, despite no indication in the record that it did, so long as the prosecutor‘s stated reason is inherently plausible and not contradicted by the record.

2001(See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-1328, 1331 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 743 P.2d 1299 ( Ingersoll ); but see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 U.S. 32 , 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 [suspicion less vehicle stops do not pass Fourth Amendment muster when they are conducted as part of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is not to reduce the immediate hazard posed by dangerous drivers, but to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing].) Such stops are based on a regulatory plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual

2001(See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-1328, 1331 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 743 P.2d 1299 ( Ingersoll ); but see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 U.S. 32 , 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 [suspicion less vehicle stops do not pass Fourth Amendment muster when they are conducted as part of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is not to reduce the immediate hazard posed by dangerous drivers, but to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing].) Such stops are based on a regulatory plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual