rigorous standard in Utah

2016This recitation of the facts relies in part on the description found in Maak v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2007 UT App 244 , 166 P.3d 631 .

2016This recitation of the facts relies in part on the description found in Maak v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2007 UT App 244 , 166 P.3d 631 .

2012See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641-42 (Utah 1996) (comparing the federal standard an-pounced in Daubert I with the more rigorous standard outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 , 1234 (Utah 1980) (abandoning the Frye test used in federal courts in favor of an "inherent reliability" standard); Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, ¶ 23 , 131 P.3d 252 (noting that, following the decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Utah Supreme Court has reiterate

2012See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641-42 (Utah 1996) (comparing the federal standard an-pounced in Daubert I with the more rigorous standard outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 , 1234 (Utah 1980) (abandoning the Frye test used in federal courts in favor of an "inherent reliability" standard); Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, ¶ 23 , 131 P.3d 252 (noting that, following the decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Utah Supreme Court has reiterate

2012See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641-42 (Utah 1996) (comparing the federal standard an-pounced in Daubert I with the more rigorous standard outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 , 1234 (Utah 1980) (abandoning the Frye test used in federal courts in favor of an "inherent reliability" standard); Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, ¶ 23 , 131 P.3d 252 (noting that, following the decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Utah Supreme Court has reiterate

2012See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641-42 (Utah 1996) (comparing the federal standard an-pounced in Daubert I with the more rigorous standard outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 , 1234 (Utah 1980) (abandoning the Frye test used in federal courts in favor of an "inherent reliability" standard); Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, ¶ 23 , 131 P.3d 252 (noting that, following the decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Utah Supreme Court has reiterate

2012See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641-42 (Utah 1996) (comparing the federal standard an-pounced in Daubert I with the more rigorous standard outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 , 1234 (Utah 1980) (abandoning the Frye test used in federal courts in favor of an "inherent reliability" standard); Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, ¶ 23 , 131 P.3d 252 (noting that, following the decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Utah Supreme Court has reiterate

2012The Frye test originated with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). 15 .

2012See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641-42 (Utah 1996) (comparing the federal standard an-pounced in Daubert I with the more rigorous standard outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 , 1234 (Utah 1980) (abandoning the Frye test used in federal courts in favor of an "inherent reliability" standard); Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, ¶ 23 , 131 P.3d 252 (noting that, following the decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Utah Supreme Court has reiterate

2012Indeed, if a petitioner cannot prove that he would prevail under Adams's former interest of justice exception, which we expressly abandoned after the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, then a petitioner certainly cannot qualify under a more rigorous standard such as "egregious injustice." See Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 91 , 234 P.3d 1115 (noting that the 2008 PCRA amendments appear to have extinguished the "interest of justice" exception.) The concurrence criticizes our use of the "now-defunct" interest of justice exception.

2012Indeed, if a petitioner cannot prove that he would prevail under Adams's former interest of justice exception, which we expressly abandoned after the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, then a petitioner certainly cannot qualify under a more rigorous standard such as "egregious injustice." See Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 91 , 234 P.3d 1115 (noting that the 2008 PCRA amendments appear to have extinguished the "interest of justice" exception.) The concurrence criticizes our use of the "now-defunct" interest of justice exception.

2011By affirming the district court's decision under a correctness standard of review, however, the court of appeals implicitly found that the district court had not abused its discretion. [31] Huston, 818 P.2d at 534 . [32] Pyper v. Bond, 2009 UT App 331, ¶ 18 , 224 P.3d 713 . [33] Id. [1] The court of appeals' and the majority's opinions outline additional interactions between the parties that occurred after May 8, 2007, when the redemption period expired.

2011By affirming the district court's decision under a correctness standard of review, however, the court of appeals implicitly found that the district court had not abused its discretion. [31] Huston, 818 P.2d at 534 . [32] Pyper v. Bond, 2009 UT App 331, ¶ 18 , 224 P.3d 713 . [33] Id. [1] The court of appeals' and the majority's opinions outline additional interactions between the parties that occurred after May 8, 2007, when the redemption period expired.

2011By affirming the district court's decision under a correctness standard of review, however, the court of appeals implicitly found that the district court had not abused its discretion. [31] Huston, 818 P.2d at 534 . [32] Pyper v. Bond, 2009 UT App 331, ¶ 18 , 224 P.3d 713 . [33] Id. [1] The court of appeals' and the majority's opinions outline additional interactions between the parties that occurred after May 8, 2007, when the redemption period expired.

2007Rather, sufficient probable cause was present only where there was a "clear indication that ... evidence will be found." Id. at 762 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 (citation and quotation marks omitted). {25 The significance assigned to the elevated expectation of privacy for one's body not only led the Court to impose a more rigorous standard for probable cause, but also prompted the Court to emphasize the importance of acquiring a warrant in advance of conducting a bodily intrusion.

2007Rather, sufficient probable cause was present only where there was a "clear indication that ... evidence will be found." Id. at 762 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 (citation and quotation marks omitted). {25 The significance assigned to the elevated expectation of privacy for one's body not only led the Court to impose a more rigorous standard for probable cause, but also prompted the Court to emphasize the importance of acquiring a warrant in advance of conducting a bodily intrusion.

1997However, the Eighth Amendment analysis that actually appears in Salerno makes no reference to this rigorous standard of review and addresses only the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, not the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. [11] The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute permitting the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child under twelve years of age, State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063 (La.1996), cert. denied sub nom, Bethley v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2425 , 138 L.Ed.2d 188 (1997), but there were no convictions and no sente

1994However, in State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the supreme court undertook a rigorous analysis of the standard of review applicable to determinations of vol-untariness of consent and attenuation.

1994Id. at 1262-72 .

1994This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that appellate courts “do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts.” Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886 .

1955Co. v. Industrial Comm.: 3 “While the writer is firmly of the opinion that the rule laid down in Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm. [ 61 Utah 514 , 215 P. 1047 ], should be adhered to, yet he is also convinced that section 3144, supra, should receive a liberal construction and application where, as in this case, the jurisdictional facts are all established * * * it is clear that the manifest intention of the Legislature was to abrogate, or, at least, to curtail or modify, the rigorous rule of res adjudicata.” This court has indeed uttered some very liberal expressions with respect to the conti

1955Co. v. Industrial Comm.: 3 “While the writer is firmly of the opinion that the rule laid down in Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm. [ 61 Utah 514 , 215 P. 1047 ], should be adhered to, yet he is also convinced that section 3144, supra, should receive a liberal construction and application where, as in this case, the jurisdictional facts are all established * * * it is clear that the manifest intention of the Legislature was to abrogate, or, at least, to curtail or modify, the rigorous rule of res adjudicata.” This court has indeed uttered some very liberal expressions with respect to the conti

1933This brings us to the case of Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 70 Utah 354 , 260 P. 279, 281 .

1933This brings us to the case of Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 70 Utah 354 , 260 P. 279, 281 .

1933However, in that connection it there was further observed that because of section 3144, a large latitude and discretion was given the commission in making a modification or change with respect to findings and orders, and that, when the section was considered in connection with section 3149, “it is clear that the manifest intention of the Legislature was to abrogate, or, at least to curtail or modify, the rigorous rule of res adjudicata.” A similar conclusion was reached in the case of Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 553 , 210 P. 611 , where after an award on a full hea

1933However, in that connection it there was further observed that because of section 3144, a large latitude and discretion was given the commission in making a modification or change with respect to findings and orders, and that, when the section was considered in connection with section 3149, “it is clear that the manifest intention of the Legislature was to abrogate, or, at least to curtail or modify, the rigorous rule of res adjudicata.” A similar conclusion was reached in the case of Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 553 , 210 P. 611 , where after an award on a full hea