17 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1898–1997 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigationgreen2 sentences1997Litig., 955 F.Supp. 700 (E.D.Tex.1997) reviewed the Massachusetts rule. 1997Litig., 955 F.Supp. 700 (E.D.Tex.1997) reviewed the Massachusetts rule. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Trust Under Will of Arensgreen2 sentences1994Id at 367-68, 197 A2d 1 . 1994Id at 367-68, 197 A2d 1 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Vito Panepintogreen2 sentences1972See also United States v. Panepinto, 430 F. 2d 613, 617-619 (3 Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. 1972See also United States v. Panepinto, 430 F. 2d 613, 617-619 (3 Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1972Id. 32 N.J. at 557, 559-560 . 1972Id. 32 N.J. at 557, 559-560 . | 1 | 1 |
Ballantine v. Younggreen2 sentences1964Ct. 1868)), and was forcefully pointed out in Ballantine v. Young, 79 N.J. 1964Ct. 1868)), and was forcefully pointed out in Ballantine v. Young, 79 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
International Textbook Co. v. Martingreen2 sentences1964See International Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 221 Mass. 1 , 108 N.E. 469 ( Sup. Jud. 1964See International Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 221 Mass. 1 , 108 N.E. 469 ( Sup. Jud. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Klapprottgreen2 sentences1953It carries the idea of opportunity, necessity or need or even cause in a limited sense. * * * Even if the same person at the same moment of time becomes `bail or surety' for more than one defendant, he becomes `bail or surety' on more than one `separate occasion.' There is a separate opportunity, necessity and cause for that person to become `bail or surety' for each defendant." By analogy we note that in the instant matter each allegation or indictment, although disposed of in groups on various days, required a separate and distinct plea; separate and individual determination as to bail or su 1953It carries the idea of opportunity, necessity or need or even cause in a limited sense. * * * Even if the same person at the same moment of time becomes `bail or surety' for more than one defendant, he becomes `bail or surety' on more than one `separate occasion.' There is a separate opportunity, necessity and cause for that person to become `bail or surety' for each defendant." By analogy we note that in the instant matter each allegation or indictment, although disposed of in groups on various days, required a separate and distinct plea; separate and individual determination as to bail or su | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Holt v. Mann
green
2 sentences1976This is our underlying reason for rejecting the Massachusetts rule expressed in Holt v. Mann, 294 Mass. 21 , 200 N. E. 403 (Sup. Jud. 1976This is our underlying reason for rejecting the Massachusetts rule expressed in Holt v. Mann, 294 Mass. 21 , 200 N. E. 403 (Sup. Jud. | 2 | 1976–1976 |
Minot v. Paine
green
2 sentences1964This conceptual analysis underlies the Massachusetts rule awarding stock distributions to principal (see the original case enunciating the rule, Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (Sup. Jud. 1964This conceptual analysis underlies the Massachusetts rule awarding stock distributions to principal (see the original case enunciating the rule, Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (Sup. Jud. | 2 | 1964–1964 |
Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co.
green
2 sentences1997Thus, this court declines to adopt the Massachusetts exception for contraceptives because there is no apparent reason "to differentiate between contraceptives and other prescription drugs to which the learned intermediary applies." Spychala, supra, 705 F.Supp. at 1032 . 1997Thus, this court declines to adopt the Massachusetts exception for contraceptives because there is no apparent reason "to differentiate between contraceptives and other prescription drugs to which the learned intermediary applies." Spychala, supra, 705 F.Supp. at 1032 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co.
green
2 sentences1987Relying on the Massachusetts rule regarding prospective damages, the Anderson court reasoned that “recovery depends on establishing a ‘reasonable probability’ that the harm will occur.” Id. at 1231 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912 comment e). 1987Relying on the Massachusetts rule regarding prospective damages, the Anderson court reasoned that “recovery depends on establishing a ‘reasonable probability’ that the harm will occur.” Id. at 1231 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912 comment e). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences1984(Cf. the "Massachusetts rule,” where the judge made the initial determination but resubmitted the issue to the jury for their "second opinion.”) This approach was invalidated by the Supreme Court as "posting] substantial threats to a defendant's constitutional rights to have an involuntary confession entirely disregarded and to have the coercion issue fairly and reliably determined.” Jackson v. Denno, supra, 378 U.S. at 389 , 84 S.Ct. at 1787 , 12 L.Ed.2d at 922 . 1984(Cf. the "Massachusetts rule,” where the judge made the initial determination but resubmitted the issue to the jury for their "second opinion.”) This approach was invalidated by the Supreme Court as "posting] substantial threats to a defendant's constitutional rights to have an involuntary confession entirely disregarded and to have the coercion issue fairly and reliably determined.” Jackson v. Denno, supra, 378 U.S. at 389 , 84 S.Ct. at 1787 , 12 L.Ed.2d at 922 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Meyer v. GREENWOOD ETC.
green
2 sentences1975Ct. 1947), and adopted in Connecticut, Silverman v. Swift & Co., supra, 141 Conn. 450 , 107 A. 2d 277 ; Indiana, Meyer v. Greenwood, supra, 125 Ind. App. 288 , 124 N.E. 2d 870 ; Maryland, Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614 , 31 A. 2d 316 (1943); and Pennsylvania, Adams v. Schieb, supra, 408 Pa. 452 , 184 A. 2d 700 . *341 The so-called `Massachusetts rule' expressed above has been explicitly rejected in two jurisdictions. 1975Ct. 1947), and adopted in Connecticut, Silverman v. Swift & Co., supra, 141 Conn. 450 , 107 A. 2d 277 ; Indiana, Meyer v. Greenwood, supra, 125 Ind. App. 288 , 124 N.E. 2d 870 ; Maryland, Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614 , 31 A. 2d 316 (1943); and Pennsylvania, Adams v. Schieb, supra, 408 Pa. 452 , 184 A. 2d 700 . *341 The so-called `Massachusetts rule' expressed above has been explicitly rejected in two jurisdictions. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Vaccarino v. Cozzubo
green
2 sentences1975Ct. 1947), and adopted in Connecticut, Silverman v. Swift & Co., supra, 141 Conn. 450 , 107 A. 2d 277 ; Indiana, Meyer v. Greenwood, supra, 125 Ind. App. 288 , 124 N.E. 2d 870 ; Maryland, Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614 , 31 A. 2d 316 (1943); and Pennsylvania, Adams v. Schieb, supra, 408 Pa. 452 , 184 A. 2d 700 . *341 The so-called `Massachusetts rule' expressed above has been explicitly rejected in two jurisdictions. 1975Ct. 1947), and adopted in Connecticut, Silverman v. Swift & Co., supra, 141 Conn. 450 , 107 A. 2d 277 ; Indiana, Meyer v. Greenwood, supra, 125 Ind. App. 288 , 124 N.E. 2d 870 ; Maryland, Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614 , 31 A. 2d 316 (1943); and Pennsylvania, Adams v. Schieb, supra, 408 Pa. 452 , 184 A. 2d 700 . *341 The so-called `Massachusetts rule' expressed above has been explicitly rejected in two jurisdictions. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Silverman v. Swift & Co.
green
2 sentences1975Ct. 1947), and adopted in Connecticut, Silverman v. Swift & Co., supra, 141 Conn. 450 , 107 A. 2d 277 ; Indiana, Meyer v. Greenwood, supra, 125 Ind. App. 288 , 124 N.E. 2d 870 ; Maryland, Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614 , 31 A. 2d 316 (1943); and Pennsylvania, Adams v. Schieb, supra, 408 Pa. 452 , 184 A. 2d 700 . *341 The so-called `Massachusetts rule' expressed above has been explicitly rejected in two jurisdictions. 1975Ct. 1947), and adopted in Connecticut, Silverman v. Swift & Co., supra, 141 Conn. 450 , 107 A. 2d 277 ; Indiana, Meyer v. Greenwood, supra, 125 Ind. App. 288 , 124 N.E. 2d 870 ; Maryland, Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614 , 31 A. 2d 316 (1943); and Pennsylvania, Adams v. Schieb, supra, 408 Pa. 452 , 184 A. 2d 700 . *341 The so-called `Massachusetts rule' expressed above has been explicitly rejected in two jurisdictions. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Adams v. Scheib
green
2 sentences1975Ct. 1947), and adopted in Connecticut, Silverman v. Swift & Co., supra, 141 Conn. 450 , 107 A. 2d 277 ; Indiana, Meyer v. Greenwood, supra, 125 Ind. App. 288 , 124 N.E. 2d 870 ; Maryland, Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614 , 31 A. 2d 316 (1943); and Pennsylvania, Adams v. Schieb, supra, 408 Pa. 452 , 184 A. 2d 700 . *341 The so-called `Massachusetts rule' expressed above has been explicitly rejected in two jurisdictions. 1975Ct. 1947), and adopted in Connecticut, Silverman v. Swift & Co., supra, 141 Conn. 450 , 107 A. 2d 277 ; Indiana, Meyer v. Greenwood, supra, 125 Ind. App. 288 , 124 N.E. 2d 870 ; Maryland, Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614 , 31 A. 2d 316 (1943); and Pennsylvania, Adams v. Schieb, supra, 408 Pa. 452 , 184 A. 2d 700 . *341 The so-called `Massachusetts rule' expressed above has been explicitly rejected in two jurisdictions. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Zorger v. Hillman's
green
1 sentence1975Illinois' courts have held that proper cooking of raw pork means that the meat has been heated to the temperature of 137° F. Zorger v. Hillman's, supra, 287 Ill. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Lego v. Twomey
green
1 sentence1972Id. 32 N. J. at 557, 559-560. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
McCracken v. Gulick
neutral
2 sentences1962In McCracken v. Gulick, 92 N.J. 1962In McCracken v. Gulick, 92 N.J. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
In Re the Estate of Fera
green
2 sentences1962In re Fera's Estate, 26 N.J. 131 (1958). 1962In re Fera's Estate, 26 N.J. 131 (1958). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
In Re Wehrhane's Estate
green
1 sentence1962In re Catherwood's Trust, supra . *317 The history of the apportionment rule applied in this State is amply reviewed in In re Wehrhane's Estate, 41 N.J. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Farrington v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1959The third approach, the Massachusetts doctrine, is expounded in Farrington v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 280 Mass. 121 , 181 N.E. 779 ( Sup. Jud. 1959The third approach, the Massachusetts doctrine, is expounded in Farrington v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 280 Mass. 121 , 181 N.E. 779 ( Sup. Jud. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
In re the Accounting of Brown
green
1 sentence1956While the distinction drawn by the court is far from satisfying it is entirely clear in the instant matter that Massachusetts’ claim is not as a true heir but is in the nature of bona vacantia or escheat. *300 Although there is some diversity in the American decisions, most of them follow the principles enunciated in Barnett’s Trusts, supra. In In re Menschefrend’s Estate, 283 App. Div. 463 , 128 N. Y. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Boggs v. Plybon
green
2 sentences1935Virginia seems to have followed the Massachusetts rule (Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30 ) as to liability, in such cases, viz.: that gross negligence is the test of liability. 1935Virginia seems to have followed the Massachusetts rule (Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30 ) as to liability, in such cases, viz.: that gross negligence is the test of liability. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Mead v. Parker
green
2 sentences1898Mead v. Parke, 115 Mass. 413. 1898Mead v. Parke, 115 Mass. 413. | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.