Massachusetts rule in Maryland

1975In Carroll v. Spencer, supra, at 393, the Court of Appeals observed that it was made clear in Jackson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 176 Md. 1 and Duff v. United States, 171 F. 2d 846 (4th Cir. 1949) that Maryland continues to follow the substance of the Massachusetts rule.

1970R., 176 Md. 1 ; Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co., supra; State, Use of Lorenz v. Machen, 164 Md. 579 ; and Duff v. United States, (4th Cir.) 171 F. 2d 846 . “* * * The Restatement, Torts, Sections 337-339, adopted the essence of the Michigan rule, while Maryland has continued to follow the substance of the Massachusetts rule.

1975In Carroll v. Spencer, supra, at 393, the Court of Appeals observed that it was made clear in Jackson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 176 Md. 1 and Duff v. United States, 171 F. 2d 846 (4th Cir. 1949) that Maryland continues to follow the substance of the Massachusetts rule.

1970R., 176 Md. 1 ; Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co., supra; State, Use of Lorenz v. Machen, 164 Md. 579 ; and Duff v. United States, (4th Cir.) 171 F. 2d 846 . “* * * The Restatement, Torts, Sections 337-339, adopted the essence of the Michigan rule, while Maryland has continued to follow the substance of the Massachusetts rule.

1971Clarke adopted what is sometimes called the Massachusetts rule, enunciated in Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374 , 26 N. E. 1112 (1891), which was followed in 3 Restatement of Property, Future Interests § 303 (1) at 1655 (1940): “When a conveyance creates a class gift by a limitation in ft ir of a group described as the ‘issue of B,’ or as the ‘descendants of B,’ and the membership in such class has been ascertained in accordance with the rules stated in §§ 292 and 294-299, then, unless a contrary intent of the conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances, distribution is made to

1971Clarke adopted what is sometimes called the Massachusetts rule, enunciated in Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374 , 26 N. E. 1112 (1891), which was followed in 3 Restatement of Property, Future Interests § 303 (1) at 1655 (1940): “When a conveyance creates a class gift by a limitation in ft ir of a group described as the ‘issue of B,’ or as the ‘descendants of B,’ and the membership in such class has been ascertained in accordance with the rules stated in §§ 292 and 294-299, then, unless a contrary intent of the conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances, distribution is made to

1989Crown, 213 Md. at 157 , 131 A.2d 470 .

1989Crown, 213 Md. at 157 , 131 A.2d 470 .

1986This rule was set forth in Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596 , 56 A.2d 818 (1948).

1986This rule was set forth in Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596 , 56 A.2d 818 (1948).

1986In Hillard v. State, 286 Md. at 157 , 406 A.2d at 422 , we recognized “the longstanding public policy of this State against the use of involuntary confessions, which policy can be said to implicitly stem from two interrelated concerns—the belief that an involuntary or coerced confession is quite likely to be contrary to the truth, and also the recognition of the devastating effect which an adverse statement from a defendant’s own lips may have upon the trier of fact in determining his guilt or innocence.” (footnote and citations omitted). *665 Clearly, the Massachusetts rule is followed to fur

1986In Hillard v. State, 286 Md. at 157 , 406 A.2d at 422 , we recognized “the longstanding public policy of this State against the use of involuntary confessions, which policy can be said to implicitly stem from two interrelated concerns—the belief that an involuntary or coerced confession is quite likely to be contrary to the truth, and also the recognition of the devastating effect which an adverse statement from a defendant’s own lips may have upon the trier of fact in determining his guilt or innocence.” (footnote and citations omitted). *665 Clearly, the Massachusetts rule is followed to fur

1986E.g., State v. Mitchell, 611 S.W.2d 211 (Mo.1981).

1986E.g., State v. Mitchell, 611 S.W.2d 211 (Mo.1981).

1979In Miller , the Court relied upon and quoted from People v. Rutigliano, 261 N. Y. 103 , 184 N. E. 689 (1933).

1979In Miller , the Court relied upon and quoted from People v. Rutigliano, 261 N. Y. 103 , 184 N. E. 689 (1933).

1976While this Court has extensively dealt with the procedure to be utilized by trial courts in deciding whether confessions are voluntary, it has not ruled upon the particular aspect of that procedure involved in this case, namely whether it is proper for the trial judge to tell the jury that he has found the confession to be voluntary. 2 The Court of Special Appeals, however, beginning with its decision in Barnhart v. State, 5 Md.

1976The Supreme Court found no infirmity, however, in the so-called “orthodox rule” whereby the judge alone decides the voluntariness of the confession, or the so-called “Massachusetts rule,” which is the Maryland procedure, whereby the jury determines voluntariness only after the judge has “fully and independently” ruled that the confession is voluntary, 378 U. S. at 378 . 1 See also, regarding *146 the procedure for determining the voluntariness of confessions, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477 , 92 S. Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (19

1976The Supreme Court found no infirmity, however, in the so-called “orthodox rule” whereby the judge alone decides the voluntariness of the confession, or the so-called “Massachusetts rule,” which is the Maryland procedure, whereby the jury determines voluntariness only after the judge has “fully and independently” ruled that the confession is voluntary, 378 U. S. at 378 . 1 See also, regarding *146 the procedure for determining the voluntariness of confessions, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477 , 92 S. Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (19

1976The Supreme Court found no infirmity, however, in the so-called “orthodox rule” whereby the judge alone decides the voluntariness of the confession, or the so-called “Massachusetts rule,” which is the Maryland procedure, whereby the jury determines voluntariness only after the judge has “fully and independently” ruled that the confession is voluntary, 378 U. S. at 378 . 1 See also, regarding *146 the procedure for determining the voluntariness of confessions, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477 , 92 S. Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (19

1976The Supreme Court found no infirmity, however, in the so-called “orthodox rule” whereby the judge alone decides the voluntariness of the confession, or the so-called “Massachusetts rule,” which is the Maryland procedure, whereby the jury determines voluntariness only after the judge has “fully and independently” ruled that the confession is voluntary, 378 U. S. at 378 . 1 See also, regarding *146 the procedure for determining the voluntariness of confessions, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477 , 92 S. Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (19

1976The Supreme Court found no infirmity, however, in the so-called “orthodox rule” whereby the judge alone decides the voluntariness of the confession, or the so-called “Massachusetts rule,” which is the Maryland procedure, whereby the jury determines voluntariness only after the judge has “fully and independently” ruled that the confession is voluntary, 378 U. S. at 378 . 1 See also, regarding *146 the procedure for determining the voluntariness of confessions, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477 , 92 S. Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (19

1976The Supreme Court found no infirmity, however, in the so-called “orthodox rule” whereby the judge alone decides the voluntariness of the confession, or the so-called “Massachusetts rule,” which is the Maryland procedure, whereby the jury determines voluntariness only after the judge has “fully and independently” ruled that the confession is voluntary, 378 U. S. at 378 . 1 See also, regarding *146 the procedure for determining the voluntariness of confessions, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477 , 92 S. Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (19

1976The Supreme Court found no infirmity, however, in the so-called “orthodox rule” whereby the judge alone decides the voluntariness of the confession, or the so-called “Massachusetts rule,” which is the Maryland procedure, whereby the jury determines voluntariness only after the judge has “fully and independently” ruled that the confession is voluntary, 378 U. S. at 378 . 1 See also, regarding *146 the procedure for determining the voluntariness of confessions, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477 , 92 S. Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (19

1975Since Mergenthaler v. Kirby, 79 Md. 182 , decided in 1894, the Court has uniformly rejected any exception to it. 3 The standard of care in this jurisdiction owed by an owner of real property to a bare licensee or trespasser is essentially what is known as the Massachusetts rule, under which the owner’s sole duty is to abstain from intentional injury.

1975Since Mergenthaler v. Kirby, 79 Md. 182 , decided in 1894, the Court has uniformly rejected any exception to it. 3 The standard of care in this jurisdiction owed by an owner of real property to a bare licensee or trespasser is essentially what is known as the Massachusetts rule, under which the owner’s sole duty is to abstain from intentional injury.

1975“Careful reading of all of those cases makes it quite plain to us that what was meant was there could be no entrapment, concealment or presentation of deceptive appearance, ‘something like fraud’, by a licensor without liability.” 258 Md. at 411 .

1975“Careful reading of all of those cases makes it quite plain to us that what was meant was there could be no entrapment, concealment or presentation of deceptive appearance, ‘something like fraud’, by a licensor without liability.” 258 Md. at 411 .

1970R., 176 Md. 1 ; Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co., supra; State, Use of Lorenz v. Machen, 164 Md. 579 ; and Duff v. United States, (4th Cir.) 171 F. 2d 846 . “* * * The Restatement, Torts, Sections 337-339, adopted the essence of the Michigan rule, while Maryland has continued to follow the substance of the Massachusetts rule.

1966In Hoag, supra, the Pennsylvania Suprexne Court, in refusing to follow the Massachusetts cases, said, 273 Pa. at 199 -200: “We are led to conclude that a trust for a public charity is not invalid merely because it contemplates the procuring of such changes in existing laws as the donor deems beneficial to the people in general, or to a class for whose benefit the trust is created.

1966In Hoag, supra, the Pennsylvania Suprexne Court, in refusing to follow the Massachusetts cases, said, 273 Pa. at 199 -200: “We are led to conclude that a trust for a public charity is not invalid merely because it contemplates the procuring of such changes in existing laws as the donor deems beneficial to the people in general, or to a class for whose benefit the trust is created.

1964The Massachusetts rule appears to have been first announced in the case of Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357 , 45 Am.

1964The Massachusetts rule appears to have been first announced in the case of Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357 , 45 Am.

1964Erickson v. Buckley, 120 N. E. 126 (Mass.).

1964Erickson v. Buckley, 120 N. E. 126 (Mass.).

1964A little more than forty years after the landmark Massachusetts case, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Reardon v. Shimelman, 128 Atl. 705 , expressly rejected the Massachusetts rule and announced the modern rule.

1964A little more than forty years after the landmark Massachusetts case, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Reardon v. Shimelman, 128 Atl. 705 , expressly rejected the Massachusetts rule and announced the modern rule.

1952Then there is the so-called Massachusetts rule, which crystallized in 1929 [Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 Mass. 500 , 165 N. E. 657 ], which holds that the earnings upon testator’s property used to pay costs of administration, debts and legacies derived during the course of administration, if not disposed of by the express terms of the will, are distributable to the life beneficiaries as income.

1952Then there is the so-called Massachusetts rule, which crystallized in 1929 [Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 Mass. 500 , 165 N. E. 657 ], which holds that the earnings upon testator’s property used to pay costs of administration, debts and legacies derived during the course of administration, if not disposed of by the express terms of the will, are distributable to the life beneficiaries as income.

1937“As applied to public parks of this nature, the fundamental proposition of the Massachusetts rule, which this court has generally approved, is well sustained by the reasoning in the following cases.and those they lead to: Tindley v. Salem, supra ( 137 Mass. 171 ) Donohue v. Newburyport, 211 Mass. 561 , 98 N. E. 1081 ; Bolster v. Lawrence, supra ( 225 Mass. 387 , 114 N. E. 722 ) ; Blair v. Granger, 24 R.

1937“As applied to public parks of this nature, the fundamental proposition of the Massachusetts rule, which this court has generally approved, is well sustained by the reasoning in the following cases.and those they lead to: Tindley v. Salem, supra ( 137 Mass. 171 ) Donohue v. Newburyport, 211 Mass. 561 , 98 N. E. 1081 ; Bolster v. Lawrence, supra ( 225 Mass. 387 , 114 N. E. 722 ) ; Blair v. Granger, 24 R.

1937“As applied to public parks of this nature, the fundamental proposition of the Massachusetts rule, which this court has generally approved, is well sustained by the reasoning in the following cases.and those they lead to: Tindley v. Salem, supra ( 137 Mass. 171 ) Donohue v. Newburyport, 211 Mass. 561 , 98 N. E. 1081 ; Bolster v. Lawrence, supra ( 225 Mass. 387 , 114 N. E. 722 ) ; Blair v. Granger, 24 R.

1937“As applied to public parks of this nature, the fundamental proposition of the Massachusetts rule, which this court has generally approved, is well sustained by the reasoning in the following cases.and those they lead to: Tindley v. Salem, supra ( 137 Mass. 171 ) Donohue v. Newburyport, 211 Mass. 561 , 98 N. E. 1081 ; Bolster v. Lawrence, supra ( 225 Mass. 387 , 114 N. E. 722 ) ; Blair v. Granger, 24 R.

1937“As applied to public parks of this nature, the fundamental proposition of the Massachusetts rule, which this court has generally approved, is well sustained by the reasoning in the following cases.and those they lead to: Tindley v. Salem, supra ( 137 Mass. 171 ) Donohue v. Newburyport, 211 Mass. 561 , 98 N. E. 1081 ; Bolster v. Lawrence, supra ( 225 Mass. 387 , 114 N. E. 722 ) ; Blair v. Granger, 24 R.

1937“As applied to public parks of this nature, the fundamental proposition of the Massachusetts rule, which this court has generally approved, is well sustained by the reasoning in the following cases.and those they lead to: Tindley v. Salem, supra ( 137 Mass. 171 ) Donohue v. Newburyport, 211 Mass. 561 , 98 N. E. 1081 ; Bolster v. Lawrence, supra ( 225 Mass. 387 , 114 N. E. 722 ) ; Blair v. Granger, 24 R.

1937I. 17, 51 A. 1042 ; Bisbing v. Asbury Park, supra (80 N. J.

1937I. 17, 51 A. 1042 ; Bisbing v. Asbury Park, supra (80 N. J.

1914In Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 549 , the Massachusetts rule was repudiated in favor of that of Earp’s Appeal , and the case of Quinn v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 93 Md. 285 , was clearly distinguishable from the earlier case as set forth in the opinion.

1914In Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 549 , the Massachusetts rule was repudiated in favor of that of Earp’s Appeal , and the case of Quinn v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 93 Md. 285 , was clearly distinguishable from the earlier case as set forth in the opinion.