Massachusetts rule in Virginia

1994That commentary suggests that Virginia adheres to the majority “Massachusetts rule” which permits “rebuttal by means of otherwise inadmissible evidence only if the evidence originally submitted created significant prejudice and there is a need for a corrective that can be provided only by that evidence.” Id. § 15, at 741 n.5 (relying upon Graham v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 808 , 103 S.E. 565 (1920)).

1994That commentary suggests that Virginia adheres to the majority “Massachusetts rule” which permits “rebuttal by means of otherwise inadmissible evidence only if the evidence originally submitted created significant prejudice and there is a need for a corrective that can be provided only by that evidence.” Id. § 15, at 741 n.5 (relying upon Graham v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 808 , 103 S.E. 565 (1920)).

1937This court, by its holding in Boggs v. Ply bon, 157 Va. 30 , 160 S. E. 77 , having adopted the Massachusetts’ rule in regard to the relationship existing between a guest and his host," the case of Blood v. Adams, 269 Mass. 480 , 169 N. E. 412, 413 , is pertinent authority for the proposition that where the operator of an automobile goes to sleep and an accident follows, resulting in injuries to his guest, the question of negligence becomes one of fact for the jury.

1937This court, by its holding in Boggs v. Ply bon, 157 Va. 30 , 160 S. E. 77 , having adopted the Massachusetts’ rule in regard to the relationship existing between a guest and his host," the case of Blood v. Adams, 269 Mass. 480 , 169 N. E. 412, 413 , is pertinent authority for the proposition that where the operator of an automobile goes to sleep and an accident follows, resulting in injuries to his guest, the question of negligence becomes one of fact for the jury.

1937This court, by its holding in Boggs v. Ply bon, 157 Va. 30 , 160 S. E. 77 , having adopted the Massachusetts’ rule in regard to the relationship existing between a guest and his host," the case of Blood v. Adams, 269 Mass. 480 , 169 N. E. 412, 413 , is pertinent authority for the proposition that where the operator of an automobile goes to sleep and an accident follows, resulting in injuries to his guest, the question of negligence becomes one of fact for the jury.

1937This court, by its holding in Boggs v. Ply bon, 157 Va. 30 , 160 S. E. 77 , having adopted the Massachusetts’ rule in regard to the relationship existing between a guest and his host," the case of Blood v. Adams, 269 Mass. 480 , 169 N. E. 412, 413 , is pertinent authority for the proposition that where the operator of an automobile goes to sleep and an accident follows, resulting in injuries to his guest, the question of negligence becomes one of fact for the jury.

1934The distinction between acts or omissions which constitute gross negligence and those which are termed wanton or wilful negligence is not always observed in the different jurisdictions, but inasmuch as this State deliberately adopted the Massachusetts rule in this class of cases, approving the reasoning in Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487 , 118 N. E. 168 , L.

1934The distinction between acts or omissions which constitute gross negligence and those which are termed wanton or wilful negligence is not always observed in the different jurisdictions, but inasmuch as this State deliberately adopted the Massachusetts rule in this class of cases, approving the reasoning in Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487 , 118 N. E. 168 , L.

1939This he is required to do upon the principle embodied in the fundamental maxim: ‘So use your own as not to hurt another.’ ” The rule of law relied upon by the respondents and known as the Massachusetts rule is succinctly stated in Michalson et al. v. Nutting et al., 275 Mass. 232 , 175 N. E. 490 , 76 A. L.

1939This he is required to do upon the principle embodied in the fundamental maxim: ‘So use your own as not to hurt another.’ ” The rule of law relied upon by the respondents and known as the Massachusetts rule is succinctly stated in Michalson et al. v. Nutting et al., 275 Mass. 232 , 175 N. E. 490 , 76 A. L.

1929A. (N. S.) 1147, it was held that the defendant city was not liable for an injury to a child caused by the negligence of a driver of a city dump wagon, which was being used for street-cleaning-purposes; This is the Massachusetts rule also: Haley v. City of Boston, 191 Mass. 291 , 77 N. E. 888 , 5 L.

1929A. (N. S.) 1147, it was held that the defendant city was not liable for an injury to a child caused by the negligence of a driver of a city dump wagon, which was being used for street-cleaning-purposes; This is the Massachusetts rule also: Haley v. City of Boston, 191 Mass. 291 , 77 N. E. 888 , 5 L.

1925In Bitting v. Maxatawny, 177 Pa. 213, 35 A. 715 , decided after the Schaeffer Case, the court says: “The mistake made in the argument is in treating the unexpected movement of the horse when affrightened as something that defendant ought not to be answerable for; but the fright could be foreseen; and that a horse acting under fright would jump to one side, back, turn short around, or run away, was also foreseeable; and that is really foreseen by those having charge of the public highways.” The Massachusetts rule is laid down in Hinckley v. Somerset, 145 Mass. 326 , 14 N. E. 166 , where the fol

1925In Bitting v. Maxatawny, 177 Pa. 213, 35 A. 715 , decided after the Schaeffer Case, the court says: “The mistake made in the argument is in treating the unexpected movement of the horse when affrightened as something that defendant ought not to be answerable for; but the fright could be foreseen; and that a horse acting under fright would jump to one side, back, turn short around, or run away, was also foreseeable; and that is really foreseen by those having charge of the public highways.” The Massachusetts rule is laid down in Hinckley v. Somerset, 145 Mass. 326 , 14 N. E. 166 , where the fol

1925In Bitting v. Maxatawny, 177 Pa. 213, 35 A. 715 , decided after the Schaeffer Case, the court says: “The mistake made in the argument is in treating the unexpected movement of the horse when affrightened as something that defendant ought not to be answerable for; but the fright could be foreseen; and that a horse acting under fright would jump to one side, back, turn short around, or run away, was also foreseeable; and that is really foreseen by those having charge of the public highways.” The Massachusetts rule is laid down in Hinckley v. Somerset, 145 Mass. 326 , 14 N. E. 166 , where the fol

1925In Bitting v. Maxatawny, 177 Pa. 213, 35 A. 715 , decided after the Schaeffer Case, the court says: “The mistake made in the argument is in treating the unexpected movement of the horse when affrightened as something that defendant ought not to be answerable for; but the fright could be foreseen; and that a horse acting under fright would jump to one side, back, turn short around, or run away, was also foreseeable; and that is really foreseen by those having charge of the public highways.” The Massachusetts rule is laid down in Hinckley v. Somerset, 145 Mass. 326 , 14 N. E. 166 , where the fol

1906Kellyville Coal Co. v. Petraytis, 195 Ill. 215 , 63 N. E. 94 , 88 Am.

1906Kellyville Coal Co. v. Petraytis, 195 Ill. 215 , 63 N. E. 94 , 88 Am.