12 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1923–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Highway Commission v. Parkergreen2 sentences1965State Highway Commission v. Parker, 225 Or 143, 159 , 357 P2d 548, 555 (1960), states as follows: "The general rule for the determination of the market value of property admits in evidence the price paid for similar property recently sold. 1965State Highway Commission v. Parker, 225 Or 143, 159 , 357 P2d 548, 555 (1960), states as follows: "The general rule for the determination of the market value of property admits in evidence the price paid for similar property recently sold. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hoodgreen2 sentences1964For an approved instruction conforming to the Massachusetts rule see State v. Hood, 69 Ariz 294, 213 P2d 368 at 371, 372 (1950). [5] *604 If the state elects to prove that the confessions received in the trial of this case were voluntary, the trial court shall hold a hearing and determine whether Brewton's confessions were voluntary. 1964For an approved instruction conforming to the Massachusetts rule see State v. Hood, 69 Ariz 294, 213 P2d 368 at 371, 372 (1950). [5] *604 If the state elects to prove that the confessions received in the trial of this case were voluntary, the trial court shall hold a hearing and determine whether Brewton's confessions were voluntary. | 1 | 1 |
Manning v. Simpsongreen1 sentence1960Friedman, Inc., 110 Conn 1, 147 A 263 (1929) and Berman v. Berman, 110 Conn 169, 147 A 568 (1929) with Burke v. Cooke, 246 Mass 518, 141 NE 585 (1923) and Manning v. Simpson, 261 Mass 494, 159 NE 440 (1928). *380 It would seem that in Massachusetts gross negligence and reckless conduct are one and the same in spite of the judicial declarations to the contrary. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brewton
green
2 sentences1989In State v. Brewton, 238 Or 590, 600 , 395 P2d 874 (1964), the Supreme Court adopted the Massachusetts rule, under which “the judge hears all the evidence and must ‘fully and independently’ resolve the issue of voluntariness against the accused before allowing the confession in evidence. 1989In State v. Brewton, 238 Or 590, 600 , 395 P2d 874 (1964), the Supreme Court adopted the Massachusetts rule, under which “the judge hears all the evidence and must ‘fully and independently’ resolve the issue of voluntariness against the accused before allowing the confession in evidence. | 3 | 1969–1989 |
American National Bank v. Kerley
green
2 sentences1958Bank v. Kerley, 109 Or 155, 186-193 , 220 P 116 , 32 ALR 262 , where the court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Harris, announced its approval of what was referred to as the Massachusetts rule and its agreement with the reasoning of Chief Justice Rugg in Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mass 462, 105 NE 605 , LRA 1915B 144. 1958Bank v. Kerley, 109 Or 155, 186-193 , 220 P 116 , 32 ALR 262 , where the court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Harris, announced its approval of what was referred to as the Massachusetts rule and its agreement with the reasoning of Chief Justice Rugg in Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mass 462, 105 NE 605 , LRA 1915B 144. | 2 | 1929–1958 |
Slate v. Saxon, Marquoit, Bertoni & Todd
green
1 sentence2011It is circular and not based on reality to argue, as he does, that either his reliance or his change in position was attributable to the promise of at will employment rather than the at will employment contract itself.” 166 Or App at 7 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Berman v. Berman
green
1 sentence1960Friedman, Inc., 110 Conn 1, 147 A 263 (1929) and Berman v. Berman, 110 Conn 169, 147 A 568 (1929) with Burke v. Cooke, 246 Mass 518, 141 NE 585 (1923) and Manning v. Simpson, 261 Mass 494, 159 NE 440 (1928). *380 It would seem that in Massachusetts gross negligence and reckless conduct are one and the same in spite of the judicial declarations to the contrary. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Ascher v. H. E. Friedman, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1960Friedman, Inc., 110 Conn 1, 147 A 263 (1929) and Berman v. Berman, 110 Conn 169, 147 A 568 (1929) with Burke v. Cooke, 246 Mass 518, 141 NE 585 (1923) and Manning v. Simpson, 261 Mass 494, 159 NE 440 (1928). *380 It would seem that in Massachusetts gross negligence and reckless conduct are one and the same in spite of the judicial declarations to the contrary. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Nash v. Webber
green
2 sentences1931In what might be referred to as the Massachusetts doctrine, the landlord, in the absence of an express or implied contract to do so, is not under obligation to remove snow or ice from a common passageway: Erickson v. Buckley, 230 Mass. 467 ( 120 N. E. 126 ); Nash v. Webber, 204 Mass. 419 ( 90 N. E. 872 ). 1931In what might be referred to as the Massachusetts doctrine, the landlord, in the absence of an express or implied contract to do so, is not under obligation to remove snow or ice from a common passageway: Erickson v. Buckley, 230 Mass. 467 ( 120 N. E. 126 ); Nash v. Webber, 204 Mass. 419 ( 90 N. E. 872 ). | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Erickson v. Buckley
green
2 sentences1931In what might be referred to as the Massachusetts doctrine, the landlord, in the absence of an express or implied contract to do so, is not under obligation to remove snow or ice from a common passageway: Erickson v. Buckley, 230 Mass. 467 ( 120 N. E. 126 ); Nash v. Webber, 204 Mass. 419 ( 90 N. E. 872 ). 1931In what might be referred to as the Massachusetts doctrine, the landlord, in the absence of an express or implied contract to do so, is not under obligation to remove snow or ice from a common passageway: Erickson v. Buckley, 230 Mass. 467 ( 120 N. E. 126 ); Nash v. Webber, 204 Mass. 419 ( 90 N. E. 872 ). | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Jensen v. Laurel Meat Co.
green
2 sentences1931Jensen v. Laurel Meat Co., 71 Mont. 582 ( 230 P. 1081 ). 1931Jensen v. Laurel Meat Co., 71 Mont. 582 ( 230 P. 1081 ). | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Exchange Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Third Nat. Bank of NY
green
2 sentences1931And as a part of the same doctrine, it is well settled that, if the acceptor of a bill or promisor of a note has his residence in another place, it shall be presumed to have been intended and understood between the depositor for collection and the bank, that it was to be transmitted to the place of the residence of the promisor, and the same rule shall then apply as if, on the face of the note, it was payable at that place. ’ ’ Also, see Selover, Bank Collections, section 99. 1 Morse on Banks (6th Ed.), section 274, states the rule thus: “The Massachusetts rule is, that when the first bank tra 1931And as a part of the same doctrine, it is well settled that, if the acceptor of a bill or promisor of a note has his residence in another place, it shall be presumed to have been intended and understood between the depositor for collection and the bank, that it was to be transmitted to the place of the residence of the promisor, and the same rule shall then apply as if, on the face of the note, it was payable at that place. ’ ’ Also, see Selover, Bank Collections, section 99. 1 Morse on Banks (6th Ed.), section 274, states the rule thus: “The Massachusetts rule is, that when the first bank tra | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Bank of Gresham v. Walch
green
2 sentences1929Supp. 845 ), this court apparently adopted the “Massachusetts rule,” in Bank of Gresham v. Walch, 76 Or. 272 ( 147 Pac. 534 ), as it was therein said: “Under the statute the burden of showing that there was a want of consideration rests upon the defendant, and, if he offers any evidence that shows or tends to show a want of consideration, then it is in *646 cumbent upon the plaintiff to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence upon the whole case that there was a consideration.” Although the question at bar was not before the court in American National Bank v. Kerley et al., 109 Or. 155 ( 1929Supp. 845 ), this court apparently adopted the “Massachusetts rule,” in Bank of Gresham v. Walch, 76 Or. 272 ( 147 Pac. 534 ), as it was therein said: “Under the statute the burden of showing that there was a want of consideration rests upon the defendant, and, if he offers any evidence that shows or tends to show a want of consideration, then it is in *646 cumbent upon the plaintiff to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence upon the whole case that there was a consideration.” Although the question at bar was not before the court in American National Bank v. Kerley et al., 109 Or. 155 ( | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis
neutral
2 sentences1923Bank v. Wilson (Vt.), 120 Atl. 889 ; Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis, 191 Ala. 356 ( 67 South. 839 , L. 1923Bank v. Wilson (Vt.), 120 Atl. 889 ; Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis, 191 Ala. 356 ( 67 South. 839 , L. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Howard National Bank v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1923Bank v. Wilson (Vt.), 120 Atl. 889 ; Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis, 191 Ala. 356 ( 67 South. 839 , L. 1923Bank v. Wilson (Vt.), 120 Atl. 889 ; Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis, 191 Ala. 356 ( 67 South. 839 , L. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.