Massachusetts rule in Connecticut

1932We said in that case that “we have kept the remedies by mandamus and quo warranto distinct from each other, and confined the remedy of mandamus within its original and well established limits under the common law; Duane v. McDonald, 41 Conn. 517 ; and in that case we definitely adopted the English rule in preference to the Massachusetts rule which permits title to be tried by mandamus to restore one to an office.” We added: “Mandamus neither gives nor defines rights which one does not already have. ...

1932We said in that case that “we have kept the remedies by mandamus and quo warranto distinct from each other, and confined the remedy of mandamus within its original and well established limits under the common law; Duane v. McDonald, 41 Conn. 517 ; and in that case we definitely adopted the English rule in preference to the Massachusetts rule which permits title to be tried by mandamus to restore one to an office.” We added: “Mandamus neither gives nor defines rights which one does not already have. ...

1999The case of Begelfer, et al. v. Najarian et al., CT Page 9527 409 N.E.2d 167 (Mass., 1980) is a Massachusetts Supreme Court case that might be said to modify or limit Lantner at its most expansive reading.

1999The case of Begelfer, et al. v. Najarian et al., CT Page 9527 409 N.E.2d 167 (Mass., 1980) is a Massachusetts Supreme Court case that might be said to modify or limit Lantner at its most expansive reading.

1998As stated in American Alliance Co v. Brady Transfer and Storage , 101 F.2d 144 , 147 (8th Cir. 1939), "The term `other insurance must . . . be construed to apply to other insurance by the insured." This is the Massachusetts rule.

1998As stated in American Alliance Co v. Brady Transfer and Storage , 101 F.2d 144 , 147 (8th Cir. 1939), "The term `other insurance must . . . be construed to apply to other insurance by the insured." This is the Massachusetts rule.

1998The Massachusetts Appellate Court states in McCormick v. Travelers Indemnity Co. , 496 N.E.2d 174 , 176 (Mass.App.Ct. 1986), "The `other insurance' clause of the defendant's policy limits the priorities provision to those situations where the damage is the result of a peril or peril included in the coverage of both the defendant's policy and any other policy that the insured may have ." (emphasis added).

1998The Massachusetts Appellate Court states in McCormick v. Travelers Indemnity Co. , 496 N.E.2d 174 , 176 (Mass.App.Ct. 1986), "The `other insurance' clause of the defendant's policy limits the priorities provision to those situations where the damage is the result of a peril or peril included in the coverage of both the defendant's policy and any other policy that the insured may have ." (emphasis added).

1997See Beit v. Beit, supra , 135 Conn. 204 -205;, Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 29 Conn. Sup. 180 , 185 , 277 A.2d 512 (1971 Armentano, J.) (explaining that the Massachusetts rule is rejected because it would require the court to "write out a new contracts for the parties"); see generally, 6A A. Corbin, Contracts (1962) §§ 1390 1394; 14 S. Williston, Contracts (3rd ed. 1972) § 1647C.

1997See Beit v. Beit, supra , 135 Conn. 204 -205;, Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 29 Conn. Sup. 180 , 185 , 277 A.2d 512 (1971 Armentano, J.) (explaining that the Massachusetts rule is rejected because it would require the court to "write out a new contracts for the parties"); see generally, 6A A. Corbin, Contracts (1962) §§ 1390 1394; 14 S. Williston, Contracts (3rd ed. 1972) § 1647C.

1983Laws c. 93A, § 9 (1); must have suffered “loss of money or property.” Baldassari v. Public Finance Trust, supra, 44-46. 11 In Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld an order enjoining Spiegel, Inc.’s practice of instituting collection suits in Illinois, against retail credit mail order purchasers who resided in states other than Illinois.

1970He urges that Connecticut adopt the so-called “Massachusetts rule” referred to in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 , 84 S. Ct. 1774 , 12 L.

1970He urges that Connecticut adopt the so-called “Massachusetts rule” referred to in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 , 84 S. Ct. 1774 , 12 L.

1969Wehrhane v. Peyton, 133 Conn. 478, 501 , 52 A.2d 711 .

1969Wehrhane v. Peyton, 133 Conn. 478, 501 , 52 A.2d 711 .

1969Spooner v. Phillips, 62 Conn. 62, 72 , 24 A. 524 .

1969Spooner v. Phillips, 62 Conn. 62, 72 , 24 A. 524 .

1964Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 293 , 73 N.E.2d 468 .

1964Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 293 , 73 N.E.2d 468 .

1963This Massachusetts rule is part of a general rule of prudence governing all investments by trustees and developed by the Massachusetts courts beginning with the case of Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 , 461 (1830).

1963This Massachusetts rule is part of a general rule of prudence governing all investments by trustees and developed by the Massachusetts courts beginning with the case of Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 , 461 (1830).

1963Russell v. Russell, supra, 197 .

1963Russell v. Russell, supra, 197 .

1954Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 689 , 163 P.2d 470 ; Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 899 , 162 P.2d 801 .

1954Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 689 , 163 P.2d 470 ; Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 899 , 162 P.2d 801 .

1954Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 689 , 163 P.2d 470 ; Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 899 , 162 P.2d 801 .

1954Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 689 , 163 P.2d 470 ; Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 899 , 162 P.2d 801 .

1953Brandt v. Rakaushas, 112 Conn. 69, 73 , 151 A. 315 .

1953Brandt v. Rakaushas, 112 Conn. 69, 73 , 151 A. 315 .

1947Many trusts have probably been established in reliance upon it and many, no doubt, have been and still are being administered under it; it has become a rule of property; In re Joy’s Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 433 , 225 N.W. 878 ; Crozer’s Estate, 336 Pa. 266, 271 , 9 A.2d 535 ; and it should be maintained unless there are most compelling reasons to the contrary.

1947Many trusts have probably been established in reliance upon it and many, no doubt, have been and still are being administered under it; it has become a rule of property; In re Joy’s Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 433 , 225 N.W. 878 ; Crozer’s Estate, 336 Pa. 266, 271 , 9 A.2d 535 ; and it should be maintained unless there are most compelling reasons to the contrary.

1947Many trusts have probably been established in reliance upon it and many, no doubt, have been and still are being administered under it; it has become a rule of property; In re Joy’s Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 433 , 225 N.W. 878 ; Crozer’s Estate, 336 Pa. 266, 271 , 9 A.2d 535 ; and it should be maintained unless there are most compelling reasons to the contrary.

1947Many trusts have probably been established in reliance upon it and many, no doubt, have been and still are being administered under it; it has become a rule of property; In re Joy’s Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 433 , 225 N.W. 878 ; Crozer’s Estate, 336 Pa. 266, 271 , 9 A.2d 535 ; and it should be maintained unless there are most compelling reasons to the contrary.

1940It is pointed out in Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Marsh, supra, that dividends on stock are not, under the law of this state, which follows the so-called Massachusetts rule, apportion-able until they become a debt due the stockholder; Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543 , 60 Atl. 117 ; Richter & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 366 , 116 Atl. 600 ; 12 Fletcher, Corporations, § 5393; and to this extent our law would control the question in the case before us.

1940It is pointed out in Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Marsh, supra, that dividends on stock are not, under the law of this state, which follows the so-called Massachusetts rule, apportion-able until they become a debt due the stockholder; Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543 , 60 Atl. 117 ; Richter & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 366 , 116 Atl. 600 ; 12 Fletcher, Corporations, § 5393; and to this extent our law would control the question in the case before us.

1940It is pointed out in Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Marsh, supra, that dividends on stock are not, under the law of this state, which follows the so-called Massachusetts rule, apportion-able until they become a debt due the stockholder; Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543 , 60 Atl. 117 ; Richter & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 366 , 116 Atl. 600 ; 12 Fletcher, Corporations, § 5393; and to this extent our law would control the question in the case before us.

1940It is pointed out in Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Marsh, supra, that dividends on stock are not, under the law of this state, which follows the so-called Massachusetts rule, apportion-able until they become a debt due the stockholder; Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543 , 60 Atl. 117 ; Richter & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 366 , 116 Atl. 600 ; 12 Fletcher, Corporations, § 5393; and to this extent our law would control the question in the case before us.

1910L. 332, 334, 19 Atl. 780 . *559 We have kept the remedies by mandamus and quo warranto distinct from each other, and confined the remedy of mandamus within its original and well-established limits under the common law; Duane v. McDonald, 41 Conn. 517 ; and in that case we definitely adopted the English rule in preference to the Massachusetts rule which permits title to be tried by mandamus to restore one to an office.

1910L. 332, 334, 19 Atl. 780 . *559 We have kept the remedies by mandamus and quo warranto distinct from each other, and confined the remedy of mandamus within its original and well-established limits under the common law; Duane v. McDonald, 41 Conn. 517 ; and in that case we definitely adopted the English rule in preference to the Massachusetts rule which permits title to be tried by mandamus to restore one to an office.

1905This court has heretofore given its adhesion to the doctrine of Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 , as the one to be ordinarily applied.

1905This court has heretofore given its adhesion to the doctrine of Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 , as the one to be ordinarily applied.

1905The more the matter is studied the more apparent it becomes that the Maine court, speaking of the Massachusetts rule through Chief Justice Peters, was justified in its expression: “We are satisfied that this can be the only safe, sound, just and practicable rule, and that any attempt to engraft refined and nice distinctions upon such rule will be productive of much more evil than any good that can come from it.” Richardson v. Richardson, 75 Me. 570, 574 .

1905The more the matter is studied the more apparent it becomes that the Maine court, speaking of the Massachusetts rule through Chief Justice Peters, was justified in its expression: “We are satisfied that this can be the only safe, sound, just and practicable rule, and that any attempt to engraft refined and nice distinctions upon such rule will be productive of much more evil than any good that can come from it.” Richardson v. Richardson, 75 Me. 570, 574 .

1895The court said that if the trustees could be regarded as trustees of a public charity, the case came within McDonald v. Massachusetts Greneral Hospital ; but held that under the statute incorporating them, the trustees were agents for the city, that the city in the performance of the duty of maintaining the hospital was not liable for negligence, because the case came within the principle of Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass., 344 , where Judge Gray in an elaborate opinion and exhaustive review of the cases, defended the Massachusetts doctrine of non-liability of municipal corporations; and als

1895The court said that if the trustees could be regarded as trustees of a public charity, the case came within McDonald v. Massachusetts Greneral Hospital ; but held that under the statute incorporating them, the trustees were agents for the city, that the city in the performance of the duty of maintaining the hospital was not liable for negligence, because the case came within the principle of Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass., 344 , where Judge Gray in an elaborate opinion and exhaustive review of the cases, defended the Massachusetts doctrine of non-liability of municipal corporations; and als

1895The court said that if the trustees could be regarded as trustees of a public charity, the case came within McDonald v. Massachusetts Greneral Hospital ; but held that under the statute incorporating them, the trustees were agents for the city, that the city in the performance of the duty of maintaining the hospital was not liable for negligence, because the case came within the principle of Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass., 344 , where Judge Gray in an elaborate opinion and exhaustive review of the cases, defended the Massachusetts doctrine of non-liability of municipal corporations; and als

1895The court said that if the trustees could be regarded as trustees of a public charity, the case came within McDonald v. Massachusetts Greneral Hospital ; but held that under the statute incorporating them, the trustees were agents for the city, that the city in the performance of the duty of maintaining the hospital was not liable for negligence, because the case came within the principle of Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass., 344 , where Judge Gray in an elaborate opinion and exhaustive review of the cases, defended the Massachusetts doctrine of non-liability of municipal corporations; and als

1895And in Donnelly v. Boston Catholic Cemetery Asso., 146 Mass., 163 , the court states that McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital was decided on the ground “that the defendant was a public charitable institution under the laws of the Commonwealth ; ” and Benton v. Trustees of Boston City Hospital on the ground that the real duty was imposed by statute on the city for public benefit, that the city would not be liable under the rule stated in Tindly v. Salem and Hill v. Boston, and therefore a mere statutory agent without property, intervening between the city and the actual wrong-doer, was f

1895And in Donnelly v. Boston Catholic Cemetery Asso., 146 Mass., 163 , the court states that McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital was decided on the ground “that the defendant was a public charitable institution under the laws of the Commonwealth ; ” and Benton v. Trustees of Boston City Hospital on the ground that the real duty was imposed by statute on the city for public benefit, that the city would not be liable under the rule stated in Tindly v. Salem and Hill v. Boston, and therefore a mere statutory agent without property, intervening between the city and the actual wrong-doer, was f

1890In Sutton v. Town of Wauwatosa, 29 Wis., 21 , the plaintiff was driving his cattle to market on Sunday in violation of the statute, when they were injured by the breaking-down of a defective bridge, which the defendant town was bound to maintain.

1890In Sutton v. Town of Wauwatosa, 29 Wis., 21 , the plaintiff was driving his cattle to market on Sunday in violation of the statute, when they were injured by the breaking-down of a defective bridge, which the defendant town was bound to maintain.