Massachusetts rule in Hawaii

2019It is Most Appropriate for This Court to Look to Washington Case Law for Guidance The Majority relies heavily on Cieri , 80 Hawai'i 54 , 905 P.2d 29 (1995), for the proposition that Hawai'i courts have already endorsed, and should continue to follow, Massachusetts' framework for analyzing the applicability of UDAP liability.

2019It is Most Appropriate for This Court to Look to Washington Case Law for Guidance The Majority relies heavily on Cieri , 80 Hawai'i 54 , 905 P.2d 29 (1995), for the proposition that Hawai'i courts have already endorsed, and should continue to follow, Massachusetts' framework for analyzing the applicability of UDAP liability.

1981To the same effect is Board of Selectmen v. Monument Inn, Inc., a decision of the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, appearing at 391 N.E.2d 1265 (Mass. App. 1979), construing the parallel Massachusetts rule.

1981In Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144 (D.C. 1950), Judge Hood did an in depth review of the various views and chose the Massachusetts rule which says that if the branches and roots from your neighbor’s tree offend you or your property, you must cut them back yourself; you may not require him to do so or to pay for the damages.

1981In Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144 (D.C. 1950), Judge Hood did an in depth review of the various views and chose the Massachusetts rule which says that if the branches and roots from your neighbor’s tree offend you or your property, you must cut them back yourself; you may not require him to do so or to pay for the damages.

1964Dickinson’s Appeal, 152 Mass. 184 , 25 N.E. 99 ; Davis’ Appeal, 183 Mass. 499 , 67 N.E. 604 ; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328 , 89 N.E. 381 ; *564 In re Sanders, 304 Ill.

1964Dickinson’s Appeal, 152 Mass. 184 , 25 N.E. 99 ; Davis’ Appeal, 183 Mass. 499 , 67 N.E. 604 ; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328 , 89 N.E. 381 ; *564 In re Sanders, 304 Ill.

1964Dickinson’s Appeal, 152 Mass. 184 , 25 N.E. 99 ; Davis’ Appeal, 183 Mass. 499 , 67 N.E. 604 ; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328 , 89 N.E. 381 ; *564 In re Sanders, 304 Ill.

1964Dickinson’s Appeal, 152 Mass. 184 , 25 N.E. 99 ; Davis’ Appeal, 183 Mass. 499 , 67 N.E. 604 ; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328 , 89 N.E. 381 ; *564 In re Sanders, 304 Ill.

1964Dickinson’s Appeal, 152 Mass. 184 , 25 N.E. 99 ; Davis’ Appeal, 183 Mass. 499 , 67 N.E. 604 ; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328 , 89 N.E. 381 ; *564 In re Sanders, 304 Ill.

1964Dickinson’s Appeal, 152 Mass. 184 , 25 N.E. 99 ; Davis’ Appeal, 183 Mass. 499 , 67 N.E. 604 ; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328 , 89 N.E. 381 ; *564 In re Sanders, 304 Ill.

1964Dickinson’s Appeal, 152 Mass. 184 , 25 N.E. 99 ; Davis’ Appeal, 183 Mass. 499 , 67 N.E. 604 ; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328 , 89 N.E. 381 ; *564 In re Sanders, 304 Ill.

1964Dickinson’s Appeal, 152 Mass. 184 , 25 N.E. 99 ; Davis’ Appeal, 183 Mass. 499 , 67 N.E. 604 ; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328 , 89 N.E. 381 ; *564 In re Sanders, 304 Ill.

1961That was the ruling in Kennedy v. Standard Sugar Refinery, 125 Mass. 90 , in which the plaintiff’s intestate lived thirty-six hours after the accident, so that the cause of action survived even under the Massachusetts rule, but the verdict was set aside because the judge instructed the jury that damages might be awarded “for mental or other suffering endured by the intestate from the time he fell until he struck the ground,” a fall of twenty feet.

1961That was the ruling in Kennedy v. Standard Sugar Refinery, 125 Mass. 90 , in which the plaintiff’s intestate lived thirty-six hours after the accident, so that the cause of action survived even under the Massachusetts rule, but the verdict was set aside because the judge instructed the jury that damages might be awarded “for mental or other suffering endured by the intestate from the time he fell until he struck the ground,” a fall of twenty feet.

1940This argument has its basis in the contention advanced by appellees that this court, at the time of the rendition of the Carter v. Crehore, supra, decision, was as a matter of law bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 , decided May 19, 1890, and upon the further ground that if it be held that Gibbons v. Mahon, supra, was not controlling, then the Pennsyl *517 vania rule should be repudiated because the Massachusetts rule is the superior and better of the two.

1940This argument has its basis in the contention advanced by appellees that this court, at the time of the rendition of the Carter v. Crehore, supra, decision, was as a matter of law bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 , decided May 19, 1890, and upon the further ground that if it be held that Gibbons v. Mahon, supra, was not controlling, then the Pennsyl *517 vania rule should be repudiated because the Massachusetts rule is the superior and better of the two.

1940J. 774.)” In Estate Thomas Cummins, 16 Haw. 185, 192 , decided in 1904, this court said: “The decision in Carter v. Crehore, in reference to stock dividends, is conclusive in the present case.” The appellees urged that this court now renounce the rule adopted by it first in the Carter v. Crehore, supra, decision, rendered February 27, 1900, and the subsequent decisions reaffirming adherence to the Pennsylvania rule and to now declare the Massachusetts rule to be the law in the Territory.

1940J. 774.)” In Estate Thomas Cummins, 16 Haw. 185, 192 , decided in 1904, this court said: “The decision in Carter v. Crehore, in reference to stock dividends, is conclusive in the present case.” The appellees urged that this court now renounce the rule adopted by it first in the Carter v. Crehore, supra, decision, rendered February 27, 1900, and the subsequent decisions reaffirming adherence to the Pennsylvania rule and to now declare the Massachusetts rule to be the law in the Territory.

1940(Estate of Allen, ante, p. 501; Robinson v. McWayne, *751 ante, p. 689.) Cogent reasons are given in the recent decisions of this court for refusing to sanction the decision of the circuit judge holding that we should abandon the rule of apportionment of stock dividends between life tenants and remaindermen, generally referred to as the Pennsylvania rule, first adopted in this jurisdiction more than forty years ago in the case of Carter v. Crehore, supra, and adopt the rule which treats all stock dividends as corpus, generally referred to as the Massachusetts rule, exemplified in the two cases

1940(Estate of Allen, ante, p. 501; Robinson v. McWayne, *751 ante, p. 689.) Cogent reasons are given in the recent decisions of this court for refusing to sanction the decision of the circuit judge holding that we should abandon the rule of apportionment of stock dividends between life tenants and remaindermen, generally referred to as the Pennsylvania rule, first adopted in this jurisdiction more than forty years ago in the case of Carter v. Crehore, supra, and adopt the rule which treats all stock dividends as corpus, generally referred to as the Massachusetts rule, exemplified in the two cases

1940Parker, 14 Haw. 317 ; Kapiolani Estate v. Atcherly, 21 Haw. 441 ; Valli v. United States, 91 F. [2d] 687; 11 Cyc. 717.) As indicated in the three leading local decisions, namely, Carter v. Crehore, supra; Evans v. Garvie, sufra; and Estate of Weber, 31 Haw. 137, 116 , dealing with extraordinary dividends, this court referred to the fact that there are two divergent American rules, one commonly designated as the “Pennsylvania rule” and the other the “Massachusetts rule.” The State of Kentucky appears to have followed neither but has taken what might be called a middle course which is sanctioned

1940The facts certainly do not bring this case Avithin the general rules laid down by the authorities and applied in Smith v. Smith, supra. Although it is not mentioned in said opinion, North Carolina had adopted the Massachusetts rule in 1915, in Humphrey v. Lang, 169 N. C. 601 , 86 S. E. 526 .

1940The facts certainly do not bring this case Avithin the general rules laid down by the authorities and applied in Smith v. Smith, supra. Although it is not mentioned in said opinion, North Carolina had adopted the Massachusetts rule in 1915, in Humphrey v. Lang, 169 N. C. 601 , 86 S. E. 526 .

1907It is inconsistent with the decision is Ledbetter v. U. S., 170 U. S. 606, 612 , which sustained a conviction on a charge of a continuing offense “on the-day of April, 1896/’ on the theory that if the particular date had been inserted proof of any other date within the statute of limitations and before the charge would be admissible and that therefore it was immaterial whether a particular day was specified or not.

1907It is inconsistent with the decision is Ledbetter v. U. S., 170 U. S. 606, 612 , which sustained a conviction on a charge of a continuing offense “on the-day of April, 1896/’ on the theory that if the particular date had been inserted proof of any other date within the statute of limitations and before the charge would be admissible and that therefore it was immaterial whether a particular day was specified or not.

1907The case of Republic v. Kamakauila, 9 Haw. 607 , is relied on bjr the defendant in support of the Massachusetts rule.

1907The case of Republic v. Kamakauila, 9 Haw. 607 , is relied on bjr the defendant in support of the Massachusetts rule.

1905It would seem that the present case at any rate is within the Massachusetts rule as set forth in Fears v. Story, 131 Mass. 47 , in which a promise made by the purchaser of a vessel to pay a lien incurred upon it by a previous owner, in consideration that the holder of the lien would forbear to enforce the same, but without any relinquishment of the lien or transfer thereof to the new owner, was held sufficient to prevent the promise from falling within the statute.

1905It would seem that the present case at any rate is within the Massachusetts rule as set forth in Fears v. Story, 131 Mass. 47 , in which a promise made by the purchaser of a vessel to pay a lien incurred upon it by a previous owner, in consideration that the holder of the lien would forbear to enforce the same, but without any relinquishment of the lien or transfer thereof to the new owner, was held sufficient to prevent the promise from falling within the statute.

1900But this has proved to be very elastic rule, in the state of its origin; for in Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542 , while professing to adhere to it, the court did in fact treat a cash dividend as capital, and a stock dividend as income.

1900But this has proved to be very elastic rule, in the state of its origin; for in Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542 , while professing to adhere to it, the court did in fact treat a cash dividend as capital, and a stock dividend as income.

1900And in Maine in a later case, Gilkey v. Paine, 80 Me. 319 , the court said: “A rule supposed to have been established in Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 , and known as the Massachusetts rule, is that, stock dividends are to be regarded as principal, and cash dividends as income.

1900And in Maine in a later case, Gilkey v. Paine, 80 Me. 319 , the court said: “A rule supposed to have been established in Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 , and known as the Massachusetts rule, is that, stock dividends are to be regarded as principal, and cash dividends as income.

1900And in Maine in a later case, Gilkey v. Paine, 80 Me. 319 , the court said: “A rule supposed to have been established in Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 , and known as the Massachusetts rule, is that, stock dividends are to be regarded as principal, and cash dividends as income.

1900And in Maine in a later case, Gilkey v. Paine, 80 Me. 319 , the court said: “A rule supposed to have been established in Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 , and known as the Massachusetts rule, is that, stock dividends are to be regarded as principal, and cash dividends as income.