Massachusetts rule in Colorado

2019United States v. Correa-Osorio , 784 F.3d 11 , 19-22 (1st Cir. 2015).

2010See Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c); seq, eg., Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265 , 806 N.E.2d 72, 76 (2004) (Massachusetts's rule was modeled after the federal rule); Schreibvogel v. State, 228 P.3d 874 , 881 n. 5 (Wyo.2010) (Wyoming's rule was based on the federal rule).

1987For cases following the Massachusetts rule, see, e.g., Reed v. People, 174 Colo. 43 , 482 P.2d 110 (1971); Feldstein v. People, 159 Colo. 107 , 410 P.2d 188 (1966); Martz v. People, 114 Colo. 278 , 162 P.2d 408 (1945). 3 .

1987For cases following the Massachusetts rule, see, e.g., Reed v. People, 174 Colo. 43 , 482 P.2d 110 (1971); Feldstein v. People, 159 Colo. 107 , 410 P.2d 188 (1966); Martz v. People, 114 Colo. 278 , 162 P.2d 408 (1945). 3 .

1987For cases following the Massachusetts rule, see, e.g., Reed v. People, 174 Colo. 43 , 482 P.2d 110 (1971); Feldstein v. People, 159 Colo. 107 , 410 P.2d 188 (1966); Martz v. People, 114 Colo. 278 , 162 P.2d 408 (1945). 3 .

1987For cases following the Massachusetts rule, see, e.g., Reed v. People, 174 Colo. 43 , 482 P.2d 110 (1971); Feldstein v. People, 159 Colo. 107 , 410 P.2d 188 (1966); Martz v. People, 114 Colo. 278 , 162 P.2d 408 (1945). 3 .

1987In Baker v. People, 168 Colo. 11 , 449 P.2d 815 (1969), the court stated: Whenever there is evidence, not sufficient to require exclusion of the alleged confession, but sufficient to raise a question as to the weight to which it is entitled at the hands of the jury, the court must refer the question of the voluntarity of the confession to the jury under proper instructions.

1987In Baker v. People, 168 Colo. 11 , 449 P.2d 815 (1969), the court stated: Whenever there is evidence, not sufficient to require exclusion of the alleged confession, but sufficient to raise a question as to the weight to which it is entitled at the hands of the jury, the court must refer the question of the voluntarity of the confession to the jury under proper instructions.

1987In Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194 , 156 P.2d 111 (1945), however, this court applied the Massachusetts rule by stating that the judge must preliminarily determine the vol-untariness of a confession, but must then submit the issue to the jury. *1270 The jury is charged with the duty of determining in the last and final analysis whether the confession is freely and voluntarily made, and if the jury determines that it is not freely and voluntarily made, it is proper to disregard all testimony relative to the confession.

1987In Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194 , 156 P.2d 111 (1945), however, this court applied the Massachusetts rule by stating that the judge must preliminarily determine the vol-untariness of a confession, but must then submit the issue to the jury. *1270 The jury is charged with the duty of determining in the last and final analysis whether the confession is freely and voluntarily made, and if the jury determines that it is not freely and voluntarily made, it is proper to disregard all testimony relative to the confession.

1987For cases following the Massachusetts rule, see, e.g., Reed v. People, 174 Colo. 43 , 482 P.2d 110 (1971); Feldstein v. People, 159 Colo. 107 , 410 P.2d 188 (1966); Martz v. People, 114 Colo. 278 , 162 P.2d 408 (1945). 3 .

1987For cases following the Massachusetts rule, see, e.g., Reed v. People, 174 Colo. 43 , 482 P.2d 110 (1971); Feldstein v. People, 159 Colo. 107 , 410 P.2d 188 (1966); Martz v. People, 114 Colo. 278 , 162 P.2d 408 (1945). 3 .

1987Generally, courts have adopted one of two rules: the orthodox rule, “under which the judge himself solely and finally determines the voluntariness of the confession," or the Massachusetts rule, “under which the the jury passes on volun-tariness only after the judge has fully and independently resolved the issue against the accused.” Jackson, 378 U.S. at 378 , 84 S.Ct. at 1781-1782 ; see generally McCormick on Evidence, 430-34 (Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (discussion of procedures for determining the admissibility of confessions); 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 861 (Chadboum rev. 1970 & 1987 Supp.) (same).

1987Generally, courts have adopted one of two rules: the orthodox rule, “under which the judge himself solely and finally determines the voluntariness of the confession," or the Massachusetts rule, “under which the the jury passes on volun-tariness only after the judge has fully and independently resolved the issue against the accused.” Jackson, 378 U.S. at 378 , 84 S.Ct. at 1781-1782 ; see generally McCormick on Evidence, 430-34 (Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (discussion of procedures for determining the admissibility of confessions); 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 861 (Chadboum rev. 1970 & 1987 Supp.) (same).

1987See, e.g., Compton v. People, 166 Colo. 419, 425 , 444 P.2d 263, 266 (1968) ("The fact that the jury thereafter determines the weight to be given a confession, or as is sometimes the practice, the fact that the issue as to the voluntariness of a confession ... is also submitted to the jury_”); Read v. People, 122 Colo. 308 , 221 P.2d 1070 (1950) (Claiming that it is solely the duty of the court to determine admissibility, but adding that “where there is a conflict in the evidence as to the voluntariness of a confession, it is proper that the court instruct the jury that if they do not believe

1987See, e.g., Compton v. People, 166 Colo. 419, 425 , 444 P.2d 263, 266 (1968) ("The fact that the jury thereafter determines the weight to be given a confession, or as is sometimes the practice, the fact that the issue as to the voluntariness of a confession ... is also submitted to the jury_”); Read v. People, 122 Colo. 308 , 221 P.2d 1070 (1950) (Claiming that it is solely the duty of the court to determine admissibility, but adding that “where there is a conflict in the evidence as to the voluntariness of a confession, it is proper that the court instruct the jury that if they do not believe

1987Since that time the cases have followed one of three approaches: (1) the orthodox rule espoused in Osborn; 1 (2) the Massachusetts rule alluded to in Bruner ; 2 or (3) like Roper , those cases that make reference to both the orthodox rule and Massachusetts rule or blur the line between the two doctrines. 3 See generally Kwiatkoski, 706 P.2d at 408 n. 4 (cataloging the cases). 4 The roles of the judge and jury embodied by the Colorado Rules of Evidence shed light upon these conflicting lines of authority.

1987Since that time the cases have followed one of three approaches: (1) the orthodox rule espoused in Osborn; 1 (2) the Massachusetts rule alluded to in Bruner ; 2 or (3) like Roper , those cases that make reference to both the orthodox rule and Massachusetts rule or blur the line between the two doctrines. 3 See generally Kwiatkoski, 706 P.2d at 408 n. 4 (cataloging the cases). 4 The roles of the judge and jury embodied by the Colorado Rules of Evidence shed light upon these conflicting lines of authority.

1987See, e.g., Compton v. People, 166 Colo. 419, 425 , 444 P.2d 263, 266 (1968) ("The fact that the jury thereafter determines the weight to be given a confession, or as is sometimes the practice, the fact that the issue as to the voluntariness of a confession ... is also submitted to the jury_”); Read v. People, 122 Colo. 308 , 221 P.2d 1070 (1950) (Claiming that it is solely the duty of the court to determine admissibility, but adding that “where there is a conflict in the evidence as to the voluntariness of a confession, it is proper that the court instruct the jury that if they do not believe

1987See, e.g., Compton v. People, 166 Colo. 419, 425 , 444 P.2d 263, 266 (1968) ("The fact that the jury thereafter determines the weight to be given a confession, or as is sometimes the practice, the fact that the issue as to the voluntariness of a confession ... is also submitted to the jury_”); Read v. People, 122 Colo. 308 , 221 P.2d 1070 (1950) (Claiming that it is solely the duty of the court to determine admissibility, but adding that “where there is a conflict in the evidence as to the voluntariness of a confession, it is proper that the court instruct the jury that if they do not believe

1975In summary, I believe that the trial judge should be bound by a test that would be equivalent to the Massachusetts test and patterned upon the principles we established in People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125 , 515 P.2d 466 (1973), to assess a motion for judgment of acquittal.

1975In summary, I believe that the trial judge should be bound by a test that would be equivalent to the Massachusetts test and patterned upon the principles we established in People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125 , 515 P.2d 466 (1973), to assess a motion for judgment of acquittal.

1975See Colbert v. Hennessey, 351 Mass. 131 , 217 N.E.2d 914 ; Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of American Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114 , 111 N.E.2d 447 .

1975See Colbert v. Hennessey, 351 Mass. 131 , 217 N.E.2d 914 ; Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of American Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114 , 111 N.E.2d 447 .

1958No good reason appears to suggest a departure from the rule laid down in Brown v. International Trust Co. supra. There, our recent Chief Justice Moore, said: "A settlor may revoke a valid trust *671 where a power of revocation is validly reserved, but if a particular method of revocation is specified, that procedure must be strictly followed in order to make the revocation effective. " (Emphasis supplied.) Numerous cases are cited in support of the rule there announced, and by that decision this state aligned itself with the Massachusetts rule as laid down in Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326

1958No good reason appears to suggest a departure from the rule laid down in Brown v. International Trust Co. supra. There, our recent Chief Justice Moore, said: "A settlor may revoke a valid trust *671 where a power of revocation is validly reserved, but if a particular method of revocation is specified, that procedure must be strictly followed in order to make the revocation effective. " (Emphasis supplied.) Numerous cases are cited in support of the rule there announced, and by that decision this state aligned itself with the Massachusetts rule as laid down in Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326

1958In National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457 , 53 N.E.2d 113, 124 , it was held that lesser powers to alter, amend, or withdraw principal, etc. are included in, and add nothing to the power to revoke.

1958In National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457 , 53 N.E.2d 113, 124 , it was held that lesser powers to alter, amend, or withdraw principal, etc. are included in, and add nothing to the power to revoke.

1958No good reason appears to suggest a departure from the rule laid down in Brown v. International Trust Co. supra. There, our recent Chief Justice Moore, said: "A settlor may revoke a valid trust *671 where a power of revocation is validly reserved, but if a particular method of revocation is specified, that procedure must be strictly followed in order to make the revocation effective. " (Emphasis supplied.) Numerous cases are cited in support of the rule there announced, and by that decision this state aligned itself with the Massachusetts rule as laid down in Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326

1958No good reason appears to suggest a departure from the rule laid down in Brown v. International Trust Co. supra. There, our recent Chief Justice Moore, said: "A settlor may revoke a valid trust *671 where a power of revocation is validly reserved, but if a particular method of revocation is specified, that procedure must be strictly followed in order to make the revocation effective. " (Emphasis supplied.) Numerous cases are cited in support of the rule there announced, and by that decision this state aligned itself with the Massachusetts rule as laid down in Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326

1947The United States Supreme Court, both in respect to property questions- involving life tenants and remainder-men arising, in the District of Columbia (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 ) and in cases arising under the levying of federal taxes (Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 , and Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 ), has consistently followed the Massachusetts rule.

1947The United States Supreme Court, both in respect to property questions- involving life tenants and remainder-men arising, in the District of Columbia (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 ) and in cases arising under the levying of federal taxes (Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 , and Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 ), has consistently followed the Massachusetts rule.

1947The United States Supreme Court, both in respect to property questions- involving life tenants and remainder-men arising, in the District of Columbia (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 ) and in cases arising under the levying of federal taxes (Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 , and Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 ), has consistently followed the Massachusetts rule.

1947The United States Supreme Court, both in respect to property questions- involving life tenants and remainder-men arising, in the District of Columbia (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 ) and in cases arising under the levying of federal taxes (Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 , and Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 ), has consistently followed the Massachusetts rule.

1947The United States Supreme Court, both in respect to property questions- involving life tenants and remainder-men arising, in the District of Columbia (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 ) and in cases arising under the levying of federal taxes (Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 , and Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 ), has consistently followed the Massachusetts rule.

1947The United States Supreme Court, both in respect to property questions- involving life tenants and remainder-men arising, in the District of Columbia (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 ) and in cases arising under the levying of federal taxes (Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 , and Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 ), has consistently followed the Massachusetts rule.

1947The United States Supreme Court, both in respect to property questions- involving life tenants and remainder-men arising, in the District of Columbia (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 ) and in cases arising under the levying of federal taxes (Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 , and Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 ), has consistently followed the Massachusetts rule.

1947The United States Supreme Court, both in respect to property questions- involving life tenants and remainder-men arising, in the District of Columbia (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 ) and in cases arising under the levying of federal taxes (Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 , and Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 ), has consistently followed the Massachusetts rule.

1910Even where the Massachusetts rule obtains it is held that only nominal or slight damage should go, except wrongful conduct be charged and proven. —Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350 ; Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372 ; Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544 .

1910Even where the Massachusetts rule obtains it is held that only nominal or slight damage should go, except wrongful conduct be charged and proven. —Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350 ; Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372 ; Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544 .

1910The right of a qualified elector to vote is neither a property right nor right of person. —Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 ; 15 Cyc., page 280, paragraph 2, and authorities cited.

1910The right of a qualified elector to vote is neither a property right nor right of person. —Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 ; 15 Cyc., page 280, paragraph 2, and authorities cited.

1910Even where the Massachusetts rule obtains it is held that only nominal or slight damage should go, except wrongful conduct be charged and proven. —Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350 ; Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372 ; Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544 .

1910Even where the Massachusetts rule obtains it is held that only nominal or slight damage should go, except wrongful conduct be charged and proven. —Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350 ; Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372 ; Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544 .

1891The case of The People ex rel. v. Luther, 1 Wend. 42 , related to the redemption of lands sold under execution.

1891The case of The People ex rel. v. Luther, 1 Wend. 42 , related to the redemption of lands sold under execution.