Massachusetts rule in California

1964(Op. cit., § 3.57, at p. 297.) By Barkhaus v. Producers Fruit Co., 192 Cal. 200 [ 219 P. 435 ], California became committed (see Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 243 [ 73 P.2d 1163 ]) to the so-called “Massachusetts rule” determining when an instrument is to be classified as an assignment, when a sublease.

1964(Op. cit., § 3.57, at p. 297.) By Barkhaus v. Producers Fruit Co., 192 Cal. 200 [ 219 P. 435 ], California became committed (see Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 243 [ 73 P.2d 1163 ]) to the so-called “Massachusetts rule” determining when an instrument is to be classified as an assignment, when a sublease.

2018(Comm. of Div. of Unemployment Assistance v. Town Taxi of Cape Code, Inc. (Mass.App.Ct. 2007) 862 N.E.2d 430, 431 .) The Massachusetts test is simply not the formulation of part C articulated in Dynamex.

2018(Comm. of Div. of Unemployment Assistance v. Town Taxi of Cape Code, Inc. (Mass.App.Ct. 2007) 862 N.E.2d 430, 431 .) The Massachusetts test is simply not the formulation of part C articulated in Dynamex.

1944Nevertheless in the Hartman ease the court said (p. 243) : “By virtue of our decision in Barkhaus v. Producers’ Fruit Co., 192 Cal. 200 [ 219 P. 435 ], followed in Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal.App. 41, 48 [ 265 P. 844 ], Backus v. Duffy, 103 Cal.App. 755 [ 284 P. 954 ], and Webb v. Jones, 88 Cal.App. 20, 27 [ 263 P. 538 ], we are committed to the so-called Massachusetts rule that where the transferor reserves the right of reentry for breach of conditions he has a ‘contingent reversionary interest’ which prevents his transfer from operating as an assignment of the whole of the unexpired term.

1944Nevertheless in the Hartman ease the court said (p. 243) : “By virtue of our decision in Barkhaus v. Producers’ Fruit Co., 192 Cal. 200 [ 219 P. 435 ], followed in Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal.App. 41, 48 [ 265 P. 844 ], Backus v. Duffy, 103 Cal.App. 755 [ 284 P. 954 ], and Webb v. Jones, 88 Cal.App. 20, 27 [ 263 P. 538 ], we are committed to the so-called Massachusetts rule that where the transferor reserves the right of reentry for breach of conditions he has a ‘contingent reversionary interest’ which prevents his transfer from operating as an assignment of the whole of the unexpired term.

2008Three reported decisions of the United States District Court, two from the Northern District of California, reach the same conclusion. ( Lin v. Universal Card Services Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2002) 238 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 ( Lin ); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP (N.D.Cal. 2005) 370 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1010-1011 ; Roybal v. Equifax (E.D.Cal. 2005) 405 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1181, fn. 5 .) Likewise, the United States District Court for Massachusetts has come to an identical conclusion as to the Massachusetts exception. ( Leet v. Cellco Partnership (D.Mass. 2007) 480 F.Supp.2d 422, 430 .) We find no contrary vie

2008Three reported decisions of the United States District Court, two from the Northern District of California, reach the same conclusion. ( Lin v. Universal Card Services Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2002) 238 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 ( Lin ); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP (N.D.Cal. 2005) 370 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1010-1011 ; Roybal v. Equifax (E.D.Cal. 2005) 405 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1181, fn. 5 .) Likewise, the United States District Court for Massachusetts has come to an identical conclusion as to the Massachusetts exception. ( Leet v. Cellco Partnership (D.Mass. 2007) 480 F.Supp.2d 422, 430 .) We find no contrary vie

2008Three reported decisions of the United States District Court, two from the Northern District of California, reach the same conclusion. ( Lin v. Universal Card Services Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2002) 238 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 ( Lin ); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP (N.D.Cal. 2005) 370 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1010-1011 ; Roybal v. Equifax (E.D.Cal. 2005) 405 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1181, fn. 5 .) Likewise, the United States District Court for Massachusetts has come to an identical conclusion as to the Massachusetts exception. ( Leet v. Cellco Partnership (D.Mass. 2007) 480 F.Supp.2d 422, 430 .) We find no contrary vie

2008Three reported decisions of the United States District Court, two from the Northern District of California, reach the same conclusion. ( Lin v. Universal Card Services Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2002) 238 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 ( Lin ); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP (N.D.Cal. 2005) 370 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1010-1011 ; Roybal v. Equifax (E.D.Cal. 2005) 405 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1181, fn. 5 .) Likewise, the United States District Court for Massachusetts has come to an identical conclusion as to the Massachusetts exception. ( Leet v. Cellco Partnership (D.Mass. 2007) 480 F.Supp.2d 422, 430 .) We find no contrary vie

2002E.g., Cybersell, supra, 130 F.3d 414, 418-420 ; Bensusan Restaurant Corp., supra, 937 F.Supp. 295, 299-300 ; but see Inset Systems, Inc., supra, 937 F.Supp. 161, 164-165 (Massachusetts defendant directed its activities toward all states, including Connecticut, by advertising via Internet and toll-free telephone number; hence, Connecticut jurisdiction was proper for suit by Connecticut firm alleging that the defendant’s Web site domain name infringed the plaintiffs trademark).

2002E.g., Cybersell, supra, 130 F.3d 414, 418-420 ; Bensusan Restaurant Corp., supra, 937 F.Supp. 295, 299-300 ; but see Inset Systems, Inc., supra, 937 F.Supp. 161, 164-165 (Massachusetts defendant directed its activities toward all states, including Connecticut, by advertising via Internet and toll-free telephone number; hence, Connecticut jurisdiction was proper for suit by Connecticut firm alleging that the defendant’s Web site domain name infringed the plaintiffs trademark).

2002The majority reject Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy (7th Cir. 1997) 132 F.3d 1200 , deeming it the only federal decision that would support jurisdiction over Pavlovich, because, they conclude, it stands for the unpersuasive notion that jurisdiction over an intentional tort is always proper where the injury, or at least foreseeable injury, occurred.

2002E.g., Cybersell, supra, 130 F.3d 414, 418-420 ; Bensusan Restaurant Corp., supra, 937 F.Supp. 295, 299-300 ; but see Inset Systems, Inc., supra, 937 F.Supp. 161, 164-165 (Massachusetts defendant directed its activities toward all states, including Connecticut, by advertising via Internet and toll-free telephone number; hence, Connecticut jurisdiction was proper for suit by Connecticut firm alleging that the defendant’s Web site domain name infringed the plaintiffs trademark).

1998(See Kolodziej v. Smith (1992) 412 Mass. 215 [ 588 N.E.2d 634 ]; Rodriques v. Furtado (1991) 410 Mass. 878 [ 575 N.E.2d 1124 ]; Bally v. Northeastern University (1989) 403 Mass. 713 [ 532 N.E.2d 49 ]; O’Connell v. Chasdi (1987) 400 Mass. 686 [ 511 N.E.2d 349 ]; and Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra (1987) 399 Mass. 93 [ 502 N.E.2d 1375 ].) To the extent that Bell and its Massachusetts progeny bear this defect, we decline to follow them in applying California law.

1998(See Kolodziej v. Smith (1992) 412 Mass. 215 [ 588 N.E.2d 634 ]; Rodriques v. Furtado (1991) 410 Mass. 878 [ 575 N.E.2d 1124 ]; Bally v. Northeastern University (1989) 403 Mass. 713 [ 532 N.E.2d 49 ]; O’Connell v. Chasdi (1987) 400 Mass. 686 [ 511 N.E.2d 349 ]; and Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra (1987) 399 Mass. 93 [ 502 N.E.2d 1375 ].) To the extent that Bell and its Massachusetts progeny bear this defect, we decline to follow them in applying California law.

1998(See Kolodziej v. Smith (1992) 412 Mass. 215 [ 588 N.E.2d 634 ]; Rodriques v. Furtado (1991) 410 Mass. 878 [ 575 N.E.2d 1124 ]; Bally v. Northeastern University (1989) 403 Mass. 713 [ 532 N.E.2d 49 ]; O’Connell v. Chasdi (1987) 400 Mass. 686 [ 511 N.E.2d 349 ]; and Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra (1987) 399 Mass. 93 [ 502 N.E.2d 1375 ].) To the extent that Bell and its Massachusetts progeny bear this defect, we decline to follow them in applying California law.

1998(See Kolodziej v. Smith (1992) 412 Mass. 215 [ 588 N.E.2d 634 ]; Rodriques v. Furtado (1991) 410 Mass. 878 [ 575 N.E.2d 1124 ]; Bally v. Northeastern University (1989) 403 Mass. 713 [ 532 N.E.2d 49 ]; O’Connell v. Chasdi (1987) 400 Mass. 686 [ 511 N.E.2d 349 ]; and Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra (1987) 399 Mass. 93 [ 502 N.E.2d 1375 ].) To the extent that Bell and its Massachusetts progeny bear this defect, we decline to follow them in applying California law.

1998(See Kolodziej v. Smith (1992) 412 Mass. 215 [ 588 N.E.2d 634 ]; Rodriques v. Furtado (1991) 410 Mass. 878 [ 575 N.E.2d 1124 ]; Bally v. Northeastern University (1989) 403 Mass. 713 [ 532 N.E.2d 49 ]; O’Connell v. Chasdi (1987) 400 Mass. 686 [ 511 N.E.2d 349 ]; and Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra (1987) 399 Mass. 93 [ 502 N.E.2d 1375 ].) To the extent that Bell and its Massachusetts progeny bear this defect, we decline to follow them in applying California law.

1998(See Kolodziej v. Smith (1992) 412 Mass. 215 [ 588 N.E.2d 634 ]; Rodriques v. Furtado (1991) 410 Mass. 878 [ 575 N.E.2d 1124 ]; Bally v. Northeastern University (1989) 403 Mass. 713 [ 532 N.E.2d 49 ]; O’Connell v. Chasdi (1987) 400 Mass. 686 [ 511 N.E.2d 349 ]; and Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra (1987) 399 Mass. 93 [ 502 N.E.2d 1375 ].) To the extent that Bell and its Massachusetts progeny bear this defect, we decline to follow them in applying California law.

1998(See Kolodziej v. Smith (1992) 412 Mass. 215 [ 588 N.E.2d 634 ]; Rodriques v. Furtado (1991) 410 Mass. 878 [ 575 N.E.2d 1124 ]; Bally v. Northeastern University (1989) 403 Mass. 713 [ 532 N.E.2d 49 ]; O’Connell v. Chasdi (1987) 400 Mass. 686 [ 511 N.E.2d 349 ]; and Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra (1987) 399 Mass. 93 [ 502 N.E.2d 1375 ].) To the extent that Bell and its Massachusetts progeny bear this defect, we decline to follow them in applying California law.

1998(See Kolodziej v. Smith (1992) 412 Mass. 215 [ 588 N.E.2d 634 ]; Rodriques v. Furtado (1991) 410 Mass. 878 [ 575 N.E.2d 1124 ]; Bally v. Northeastern University (1989) 403 Mass. 713 [ 532 N.E.2d 49 ]; O’Connell v. Chasdi (1987) 400 Mass. 686 [ 511 N.E.2d 349 ]; and Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra (1987) 399 Mass. 93 [ 502 N.E.2d 1375 ].) To the extent that Bell and its Massachusetts progeny bear this defect, we decline to follow them in applying California law.

1998(See Kolodziej v. Smith (1992) 412 Mass. 215 [ 588 N.E.2d 634 ]; Rodriques v. Furtado (1991) 410 Mass. 878 [ 575 N.E.2d 1124 ]; Bally v. Northeastern University (1989) 403 Mass. 713 [ 532 N.E.2d 49 ]; O’Connell v. Chasdi (1987) 400 Mass. 686 [ 511 N.E.2d 349 ]; and Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra (1987) 399 Mass. 93 [ 502 N.E.2d 1375 ].) To the extent that Bell and its Massachusetts progeny bear this defect, we decline to follow them in applying California law.

1998(See Kolodziej v. Smith (1992) 412 Mass. 215 [ 588 N.E.2d 634 ]; Rodriques v. Furtado (1991) 410 Mass. 878 [ 575 N.E.2d 1124 ]; Bally v. Northeastern University (1989) 403 Mass. 713 [ 532 N.E.2d 49 ]; O’Connell v. Chasdi (1987) 400 Mass. 686 [ 511 N.E.2d 349 ]; and Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra (1987) 399 Mass. 93 [ 502 N.E.2d 1375 ].) To the extent that Bell and its Massachusetts progeny bear this defect, we decline to follow them in applying California law.

1987Bank (1936) 294 Mass. 480 [ 2 N.E.2d 543 ], which had held a completed sale null and void in the absence of legal notice.

1987Bank (1936) 294 Mass. 480 [ 2 N.E.2d 543 ], which had held a completed sale null and void in the absence of legal notice.

1966This disposition, popularly called the Massachusetts rule, is codified by new § 162.5., 1 It is thus clear that the core of the problem is whether, because of the quoted provision of the will, the probate income cannot be considered to be income insofar as the testamentary trust is concerned because it is “otherwise provided by the will of the testator.” In Estate of Schiffmann, 86 Cal.App.2d 638 , at pages 643-644 [ 195 P.2d 484 ], this court stated: “ In applying the general rule, the court in Folsom v. Strain, 138 Neb. 497 [ 293 N.W. 357 ], gave an excellent interpretation to the expression

1966This disposition, popularly called the Massachusetts rule, is codified by new § 162.5., 1 It is thus clear that the core of the problem is whether, because of the quoted provision of the will, the probate income cannot be considered to be income insofar as the testamentary trust is concerned because it is “otherwise provided by the will of the testator.” In Estate of Schiffmann, 86 Cal.App.2d 638 , at pages 643-644 [ 195 P.2d 484 ], this court stated: “ In applying the general rule, the court in Folsom v. Strain, 138 Neb. 497 [ 293 N.W. 357 ], gave an excellent interpretation to the expression

1966This disposition, popularly called the Massachusetts rule, is codified by new § 162.5., 1 It is thus clear that the core of the problem is whether, because of the quoted provision of the will, the probate income cannot be considered to be income insofar as the testamentary trust is concerned because it is “otherwise provided by the will of the testator.” In Estate of Schiffmann, 86 Cal.App.2d 638 , at pages 643-644 [ 195 P.2d 484 ], this court stated: “ In applying the general rule, the court in Folsom v. Strain, 138 Neb. 497 [ 293 N.W. 357 ], gave an excellent interpretation to the expression

1966This disposition, popularly called the Massachusetts rule, is codified by new § 162.5., 1 It is thus clear that the core of the problem is whether, because of the quoted provision of the will, the probate income cannot be considered to be income insofar as the testamentary trust is concerned because it is “otherwise provided by the will of the testator.” In Estate of Schiffmann, 86 Cal.App.2d 638 , at pages 643-644 [ 195 P.2d 484 ], this court stated: “ In applying the general rule, the court in Folsom v. Strain, 138 Neb. 497 [ 293 N.W. 357 ], gave an excellent interpretation to the expression

1964Instead, a sublease arises.” In Garner v. Knudsen, 129 Cal.App.2d 747 [ 277 P.2d 890 ] (hearing by Supreme Court denied), decision turned upon the court’s construction of a transfer by a lessee of an oil and gas lease.

1964Instead, a sublease arises.” In Garner v. Knudsen, 129 Cal.App.2d 747 [ 277 P.2d 890 ] (hearing by Supreme Court denied), decision turned upon the court’s construction of a transfer by a lessee of an oil and gas lease.

1961Smith Corp. v. Ellis, 257 Mass. 269 [ 153 N.E. 548, 549 ]; Goss v. Suburban Motors (Mo. App.), 282 S.W.2d 864, 866 ; Racklin-Fagin Const. Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220 [ 281 N.Y.S. 426, 427 ].) Several cases not involving the statute of frauds have applied the Massachusetts rule in holding that there was no sale in situations where the person supplying the labor and materials incorporated the product into a building.

1961Smith Corp. v. Ellis, 257 Mass. 269 [ 153 N.E. 548, 549 ]; Goss v. Suburban Motors (Mo. App.), 282 S.W.2d 864, 866 ; Racklin-Fagin Const. Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220 [ 281 N.Y.S. 426, 427 ].) Several cases not involving the statute of frauds have applied the Massachusetts rule in holding that there was no sale in situations where the person supplying the labor and materials incorporated the product into a building.

1961Smith Corp. v. Ellis, 257 Mass. 269 [ 153 N.E. 548, 549 ]; Goss v. Suburban Motors (Mo. App.), 282 S.W.2d 864, 866 ; Racklin-Fagin Const. Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220 [ 281 N.Y.S. 426, 427 ].) Several cases not involving the statute of frauds have applied the Massachusetts rule in holding that there was no sale in situations where the person supplying the labor and materials incorporated the product into a building.

1961Smith Corp. v. Ellis, 257 Mass. 269 [ 153 N.E. 548, 549 ]; Goss v. Suburban Motors (Mo. App.), 282 S.W.2d 864, 866 ; Racklin-Fagin Const. Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220 [ 281 N.Y.S. 426, 427 ].) Several cases not involving the statute of frauds have applied the Massachusetts rule in holding that there was no sale in situations where the person supplying the labor and materials incorporated the product into a building.

1961(Authorized Supply Co. of Arizona v. Swift & Co., 277 F.2d 710, 712 [refrigeration installation]; Rino v. Statewide Plumbing & Heating Co., 74 Idaho 374 [ 262 P.2d 1003, 1005 ] [heating system]; Crystal Recreation v. Seattle Assn. of Credit Men, 34 Wn.2d 553 [ 209 P.2d 358, 362 ] [restaurant fixtures]; see Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc., 141 Cal.App.2d 812, 815 [ 297 P.2d 768 ] [construction of building]; United States v. San Francisco Electrical Contractors Assn., 57 F.Supp. 57, 67 [construction of building]; 77 C.J.S. 584-585; cf. Steiger etc. Pottery Works v. Sonoma, 9 Cal.App. 698, 7

1961(Authorized Supply Co. of Arizona v. Swift & Co., 277 F.2d 710, 712 [refrigeration installation]; Rino v. Statewide Plumbing & Heating Co., 74 Idaho 374 [ 262 P.2d 1003, 1005 ] [heating system]; Crystal Recreation v. Seattle Assn. of Credit Men, 34 Wn.2d 553 [ 209 P.2d 358, 362 ] [restaurant fixtures]; see Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc., 141 Cal.App.2d 812, 815 [ 297 P.2d 768 ] [construction of building]; United States v. San Francisco Electrical Contractors Assn., 57 F.Supp. 57, 67 [construction of building]; 77 C.J.S. 584-585; cf. Steiger etc. Pottery Works v. Sonoma, 9 Cal.App. 698, 7