171 Massachusetts opinions name it 5 courts 1887–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Saferiangreen2 sentences2013The Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel tracks the Massachusetts test, which asks (1) whether there has been “behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer” and (2) “whether it has likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground of defence.” Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). 2013The Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel tracks the Massachusetts test, which asks (1) whether there has been “behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer” and (2) “whether it has likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground of defence.” Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). | 6 | 8 |
Commonwealth v. Fullergreen2 sentences2011Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394 Mass. 251 , 256 n.3 (1985) (“Consideration of the Massachusetts test of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . leads us to the conclusion that if the Saferian test is met, the Federal test is necessarily met as well”). 2011Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394 Mass. 251 , 256 n.3 (1985) (“Consideration of the Massachusetts test of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . leads us to the conclusion that if the Saferian test is met, the Federal test is necessarily met as well”). | 3 | 7 |
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.green2 sentences2012Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 858 (1975); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, §580B (one who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a private person is subject to liability if he acts negligently in failing to ascertain the truth or falsity of the communication). 2012Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 858 (1975); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, §580B (one who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a private person is subject to liability if he acts negligently in failing to ascertain the truth or falsity of the communication). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Fremont Investment & Loangreen2 sentences2022See Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. at 218 . 2022See Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. at 218 . | 2 | 2 |
Strom v. American Honda Motor Co.green2 sentences2004“Otherwise, amendments to an analogous federal rule should be regarded as persuasive evidence (though not binding authority) of how a comparable Massachusetts rule of procedure should be interpreted because of the desirability of national uniformity, particularly in a matter such as this, which is likely to involve litigants with contacts in many jurisdictions.” Strom v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 423 Mass. 330, 335 (1996). 2004Otherwise, amendments to an analogous federal rule should be regarded as persuasive evidence (though not binding authority) of how a comparable Massachusetts rule of procedure should be interpreted because of the desirability of national uniformity, particularly in a matter such as this, which is likely to involve litigants with contacts in many jurisdictions." Strom v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 423 Mass. 330, 335 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCSgreen2 sentences2004Mass.R.Civ.P. 11(a) requires that the “signature of an attorney to a pleading constitutes a certificate by him that... there is good ground to support it.” Although the Massachusetts rule embodies a subjective standard unlike the corresponding federal rule, “our rule does not excuse an attorney’s ‘wilful ignorance’ of facts and law which would have been known had the attorney simply not consciously disregarded them.” Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 417 (1998) (“The principles enunciated above lead us to conclude that our rule 11(a) authorizes a judge to impose atto 2004Mass.R.Civ.P. 11(a) requires that the “signature of an attorney to a pleading constitutes a certificate by him that... there is good ground to support it.” Although the Massachusetts rule embodies a subjective standard unlike the corresponding federal rule, “our rule does not excuse an attorney’s ‘wilful ignorance’ of facts and law which would have been known had the attorney simply not consciously disregarded them.” Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 417 (1998) (“The principles enunciated above lead us to conclude that our rule 11(a) authorizes a judge to impose atto | 2 | 2 |
Dinsdale v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004See also Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc. v. Board of Braintree, 415 Mass. 876 , 885 n. 8 (1993) (“We give our rules the construction given to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, absent compelling reasons to the contrary”); Din sdale v. Commonwealth, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 926, 928 (1995) (“The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure are construed in conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure absent compelling reasons to the contrary”). 2004See also Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc. v. Board of Braintree, 415 Mass. 876 , 885 n.8 (1993) (“We give our rules the construction given to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, absent compelling reasons to the contrary”); Dinsdale v. Commonwealth, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 926, 928 (1995) (“The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure are construed in conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure absent compelling reasons to the contrary”). | 2 | 2 |
Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc. v. BD. OF BRAINTREEgreen2 sentences2004See also Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc. v. Board of Braintree, 415 Mass. 876 , 885 n. 8 (1993) (“We give our rules the construction given to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, absent compelling reasons to the contrary”); Din sdale v. Commonwealth, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 926, 928 (1995) (“The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure are construed in conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure absent compelling reasons to the contrary”). 2004See also Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc. v. Board of Braintree, 415 Mass. 876 , 885 n.8 (1993) (“We give our rules the construction given to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, absent compelling reasons to the contrary”); Dinsdale v. Commonwealth, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 926, 928 (1995) (“The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure are construed in conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure absent compelling reasons to the contrary”). | 2 | 2 |
Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1999The Massachusetts Appeals Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court have never addressed, in a published opinion, the issue presented at bar. 1 In that vacuum, this Court will follow the course of Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 179-80 (1975) (holding that, where a particular Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure substantially mirrors its Federal counterpart, the construction given to the Federal Rule by the federal courts will guide a Massachusetts court’s application of the Massachusetts rule, absent compelling reasons to the contrary or signif 1999The Massachusetts Appeals Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court have never addressed, in a published opinion, the issue presented at bar. 1 In that vacuum, this Court will follow the course of Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 179-80 (1975) (holding that, where a particular Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure substantially mirrors its Federal counterpart, the construction given to the Federal Rule by the federal courts will guide a Massachusetts court’s application of the Massachusetts rule, absent compelling reasons to the contrary or signif | 2 | 2 |
Reilly v. Pinkusgreen2 sentences1999See Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 275 (1949). 1992See Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 275 (1949). | 2 | 2 |
Woodward v. Leavittgreen2 sentences1991Had the jury deliberated with all the evidence, I believe the result would have been different.” In his memorandum of decision, the judge thoroughly discussed the Massachusetts rule on juror impeachment first ar *96 ticulated in Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 460 (1871), and more recently discussed at length and applied in Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192 (1979). 1991Had the jury deliberated with all the evidence, I believe the result would have been different.” In his memorandum of decision, the judge thoroughly discussed the Massachusetts rule on juror impeachment first ar *96 ticulated in Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 460 (1871), and more recently discussed at length and applied in Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192 (1979). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Uptongreen2 sentences1991See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 (1985). 1991See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 (1985). | 2 | 2 |
In re Pragergreen2 sentences2025Those attributes include, among other things, "[t]he ability to conduct oneself with respect for and in accordance with the law." Id. 2004Had the respondent been truthful in his answers on the bar application, these prior incidents would not necessarily have precluded his admission to the Massachusetts bar, but he would have had to establish his good moral character and demonstrate the requisite rehabilitation, see Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 91-92 (1996), a task that could charitably be described as difficult and doubtful of success. | 1 | 3 |
Beacon Residential Management, LP v. R.P.green2 sentences2024P. 24(a), as the Massachusetts rule on intervention is nearly identical to this analogous rule." Beacon Residential Mgt., LP v. R.P., 477 Mass. 749, 753 (2017). 2024P. 24(a), as the Massachusetts rule on intervention is nearly identical to this analogous rule." Beacon Residential Mgt., LP v. R.P., 477 Mass. 749, 753 (2017). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Peasleegreen2 sentences2013This approach is in stark contrast to the Massachusetts requirement of a “present opportunity” to commit the crime, Commonwealth v. Bell, 455 Mass. 408, 415 (2009), with no need for “further acts.” Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 272 (1901). 2006The modem Massachusetts doctrine of attempt traces its roots back to the principles set forth by Chief Justice Holmes in Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18 (1887), and Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267 (1901). | 1 | 2 |
Wei Jia v. Board of Bar Examinersgreen2 sentences2006But we do require that each foreign law graduate who seeks admission to the bar demonstrate that she or he has received an appropriate legal education in the fundamentals of American law.” Wei Jia, supra at 787 . 2002See Wei Jia v Board of Bar Examiners, 427 Mass. 777, 782-783 (1998) (judicial review of board’s recommendation is de nova). | 1 | 2 |
Hiyab, Inc. v. Ocean Petroleum, LLCgreen2 sentences2024Accord Hiyab, Inc. v. Ocean Petroleum, LLC, 183 Md. 2024Accord Hiyab, Inc. v. Ocean Petroleum, LLC, 183 Md. | 1 | 1 |
COMMONWEALTH v. RONNIE M. HARRIS.green2 sentences2023Harris, supra at 314.10 If so, then second, we view the instruction "'in the context of the charge as a whole' to determine whether '[o]ther instructions might explain the particular infirm language' and thereby prevent a reasonable 10 In Medina, the court confirmed that the Massachusetts standard is "whether a 'reasonable juror could have used the instruction incorrectly," derived from Francis, and explained that the standard is more favorable to a defendant than the current Federal standard of "whether there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that jurors applied the challenged instruction in a way 2023Harris, supra at 314.10 If so, then second, we view the instruction "'in the context of the charge as a whole' to determine whether '[o]ther instructions might explain the particular infirm language' and thereby prevent a reasonable 10 In Medina, the court confirmed that the Massachusetts standard is "whether a 'reasonable juror could have used the instruction incorrectly," derived from Francis, and explained that the standard is more favorable to a defendant than the current Federal standard of "whether there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that jurors applied the challenged instruction in a way | 1 | 1 |
Interstate Gourmet Coffee Roasters, Inc. v. Seaco Insurancegreen1 sentence2021Co., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 84 (2003) (applying broad evidence rule where “actual cash value” was undefined); O’Connor, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 210 (applying broad evidence rule to determine ACV of property insured under Massachusetts standard fire insurance policy, because neither the subject policy nor the statute that defines its terms “import[s] a single standard” to determine actual cash value). | 1 | 1 |
O'Connor v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurancegreen1 sentence2021Co., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 84 (2003) (applying broad evidence rule where “actual cash value” was undefined); O’Connor, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 210 (applying broad evidence rule to determine ACV of property insured under Massachusetts standard fire insurance policy, because neither the subject policy nor the statute that defines its terms “import[s] a single standard” to determine actual cash value). | 1 | 1 |
| Sterling v. Weinsteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chandler v. Larsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kurtigian v. City of Worcestergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fancher v. Fagellagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ahmadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Raposo v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burton v. Northern Dutchess Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Nardigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Blygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Van Bellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fishgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Steinert v. Steinertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| New York Times Co. v. Sullivangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Culebras Enterprises Corporation v. Miguel A. Rivera-Riosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stewart v. Roy Bros. Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. LeBlancgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Edwardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nader v. Citrongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Conley v. Gibsonred | 1 | 1 |
| Mahoney v. Perreaultgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
green
2 sentences2011Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), whose holding under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) the Iannacchino decision adopted for proceedings under the cognate Massachusetts rule. 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977) (“In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief,” quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), which the Supreme Court later overruled in Bell Atlantic v. 2009Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007): “While a complaint attacked by a... motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations ... a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his entitle [ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions . . . | 2 | 2009–2011 |
Goulart v. Canton Housing Authority
green
2 sentences2008Goulart, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 443 (citing as compatible with Massachusetts doctrine the reasoning laid out in Zielinski v. Szokola, 167 Mich.App. 611, 621 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. Detroit, 231 Mich.App. 361 (1988) (“Salting does not create a hazard, instead it only alleviates, albeit temporarily, a hazard that already existed. 2005Authy., 57 Mass. App. Ct. at 442 . | 2 | 2005–2008 |
Aylward v. McCloskey
green
2 sentences2005Even under the Massachusetts rule, however, liability may attach ‘where some act or failure to act has changed the condition of naturally accumulated snow and ice, and the elements alone or in connection with the land become a hazard to lawful visitors.’ Aylward v. McCloskey, supra at 80 n. 3.” Goulart v. Canton Hous. 2005Even under the Massachusetts rule, however, liability may attach ‘where some act or failure to act has changed the condition of naturally accumulated snow and ice, and the elements alone or in connection with the land become a hazard to lawful visitors.’ Aylward v. McCloskey, supra at 80 n. 3.” Goulart v. Canton Hous. | 2 | 2003–2005 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
2 sentences1991The Massachusetts test for determining probable cause in cases involving unnamed informers follows the established principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 1991The Massachusetts test for determining probable cause in cases involving unnamed informers follows the established principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). | 2 | 1990–1991 |
Spinelli v. United States
red
2 sentences1991The Massachusetts test for determining probable cause in cases involving unnamed informers follows the established principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 1991The Massachusetts test for determining probable cause in cases involving unnamed informers follows the established principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). | 2 | 1990–1991 |
Goddard v. Binney
green
2 sentences1926L. c. 106, § 6) which is declaratory of the Massachusetts rule as stated in the leading case of Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450, 454 . 1926L. c. 106, § 6) which is declaratory of the Massachusetts rule as stated in the leading case of Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450, 454 . | 2 | 1922–1926 |
Padilla v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2026Plea counsel averred that, at the time of the plea, he "would have explained to [the defendant] that he would be subject to deportation but not that he would be automatically deported, mandatorily detained by [Federal immigration officials], and ineligible for any relief in Immigration Court." Plea counsel further averred that he "now know[s] that such advice is inadequate pursuant to Padilla v. Kentucky, [ 559 U.S. 356 (2010),] and its Massachusetts progeny, including Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174 (2014)." See DeJesus, 8 supra at 181-182 & n.5 (where immigration consequence was clear | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. DeJesus
green
2 sentences2026Plea counsel averred that, at the time of the plea, he "would have explained to [the defendant] that he would be subject to deportation but not that he would be automatically deported, mandatorily detained by [Federal immigration officials], and ineligible for any relief in Immigration Court." Plea counsel further averred that he "now know[s] that such advice is inadequate pursuant to Padilla v. Kentucky, [ 559 U.S. 356 (2010),] and its Massachusetts progeny, including Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174 (2014)." See DeJesus, 8 supra at 181-182 & n.5 (where immigration consequence was clear 2026Plea counsel averred that, at the time of the plea, he "would have explained to [the defendant] that he would be subject to deportation but not that he would be automatically deported, mandatorily detained by [Federal immigration officials], and ineligible for any relief in Immigration Court." Plea counsel further averred that he "now know[s] that such advice is inadequate pursuant to Padilla v. Kentucky, [ 559 U.S. 356 (2010),] and its Massachusetts progeny, including Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174 (2014)." See DeJesus, 8 supra at 181-182 & n.5 (where immigration consequence was clear | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Trustees of Tufts College v. Ramsdell
green
2 sentences2025"The Massachusetts rule limiting attorney's fees to what is fair and reasonable, particularly when they are being imposed against an unwilling party who did not engage the services of the attorney, is one of significance to the administration of justice." Trustees of Tufts College, supra at 585-586 . 2025"The Massachusetts rule limiting attorney's fees to what is fair and reasonable, particularly when they are being imposed against an unwilling party who did not engage the services of the attorney, is one of significance to the administration of justice." Trustees of Tufts College, supra at 585-586 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Medina
green
2 sentences2023Medina, 430 Mass. at 804 n.4. 2023Medina, 430 Mass. at 804 n.4. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Melnick v. C.S.X. Corp. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Michalson v. Nutting green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United Press Associations v. Charles green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Mahurin v. Lockhart green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Lewis v. Lewis green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Office Employes International Union, Local No. 11 v. National Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Culver green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Lane v. WJ. Curry & Sons green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Papadopoulos v. Target Corporation green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Grunewald v. United States green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Blue Sky L. Rep. P 72,496, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,186 Thorburn Kennedy, Trustee v. Josephthal & Company, Inc., Edward M. Swartz and Fredric Swartz green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Owens v. United States green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Oliveri v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Robinson v. City of Detroit neutral | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.