Massachusetts rule in Utah

7 Utah opinions name it 1 courts 1917–2000 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc.green ri · 1975 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000Inc., 313 N.C. 150 , 326 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1985) (setting forth and adopting elements of attractive nuisance doctrine as provided by section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), and Griffin v. Woodard, 126 N.C.App. 649 , 486 $.E.2d 240, 243 (1997) (emphasizing that attractive nuisance doctrine applies to protect only "children of tender years"); compare Mariorenci v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 RIL. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975) (adopting the reasonableness standard in place of the land entrant classifications), with Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. 2000Inc., 313 N.C. 150 , 326 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1985) (setting forth and adopting elements of attractive nuisance doctrine as provided by section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), and Griffin v. Woodard, 126 N.C.App. 649 , 486 $.E.2d 240, 243 (1997) (emphasizing that attractive nuisance doctrine applies to protect only "children of tender years"); compare Mariorenci v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 RIL. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975) (adopting the reasonableness standard in place of the land entrant classifications), with Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut.	1	1
Nelson v. Freelandgreen nc · 1998 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000No. 55, 710 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Me.1998) (indicating that Maine retained the attractive nuisance doctrine as enunciated in section 339); compare Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 1229 693, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (1973) (abolishing the invitee-licensee classifications but retaining the trespasser distinction), with McDonald v. Conrail, 399 Mass. 25 , 502 N.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1987) (indicating that the Massachusetts rule is "indistinguishable in its elements from the statute or from its twin, § 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)"); compare Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 , 507 S.E.2d 882 (1 2000No. 55, 710 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Me.1998) (indicating that Maine retained the attractive nuisance doctrine as enunciated in section 339); compare Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 1229 693, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (1973) (abolishing the invitee-licensee classifications but retaining the trespasser distinction), with McDonald v. Conrail, 399 Mass. 25 , 502 N.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1987) (indicating that the Massachusetts rule is "indistinguishable in its elements from the statute or from its twin, § 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)"); compare Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 , 507 S.E.2d 882 (1	1	1
McDonald v. Consolidated Rail Corp.green mass · 1987 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000No. 55, 710 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Me.1998) (indicating that Maine retained the attractive nuisance doctrine as enunciated in section 339); compare Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 1229 693, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (1973) (abolishing the invitee-licensee classifications but retaining the trespasser distinction), with McDonald v. Conrail, 399 Mass. 25 , 502 N.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1987) (indicating that the Massachusetts rule is "indistinguishable in its elements from the statute or from its twin, § 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)"); compare Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 , 507 S.E.2d 882 (1 2000No. 55, 710 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Me.1998) (indicating that Maine retained the attractive nuisance doctrine as enunciated in section 339); compare Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 1229 693, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (1973) (abolishing the invitee-licensee classifications but retaining the trespasser distinction), with McDonald v. Conrail, 399 Mass. 25 , 502 N.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1987) (indicating that the Massachusetts rule is "indistinguishable in its elements from the statute or from its twin, § 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)"); compare Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 , 507 S.E.2d 882 (1	1	1
Collomy v. School Administrative District No. 55.green me · 1998 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000No. 55, 710 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Me.1998) (indicating that Maine retained the attractive nuisance doctrine as enunciated in section 339); compare Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 1229 693, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (1973) (abolishing the invitee-licensee classifications but retaining the trespasser distinction), with McDonald v. Conrail, 399 Mass. 25 , 502 N.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1987) (indicating that the Massachusetts rule is "indistinguishable in its elements from the statute or from its twin, § 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)"); compare Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 , 507 S.E.2d 882 (1 2000No. 55, 710 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Me.1998) (indicating that Maine retained the attractive nuisance doctrine as enunciated in section 339); compare Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 1229 693, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (1973) (abolishing the invitee-licensee classifications but retaining the trespasser distinction), with McDonald v. Conrail, 399 Mass. 25 , 502 N.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1987) (indicating that the Massachusetts rule is "indistinguishable in its elements from the statute or from its twin, § 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)"); compare Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 , 507 S.E.2d 882 (1	1	1
Broadway v. Blythe Industries, Inc.green nc · 1985 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000Inc., 313 N.C. 150 , 326 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1985) (setting forth and adopting elements of attractive nuisance doctrine as provided by section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), and Griffin v. Woodard, 126 N.C.App. 649 , 486 $.E.2d 240, 243 (1997) (emphasizing that attractive nuisance doctrine applies to protect only "children of tender years"); compare Mariorenci v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 RIL. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975) (adopting the reasonableness standard in place of the land entrant classifications), with Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. 2000Inc., 313 N.C. 150 , 326 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1985) (setting forth and adopting elements of attractive nuisance doctrine as provided by section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), and Griffin v. Woodard, 126 N.C.App. 649 , 486 $.E.2d 240, 243 (1997) (emphasizing that attractive nuisance doctrine applies to protect only "children of tender years"); compare Mariorenci v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 RIL. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975) (adopting the reasonableness standard in place of the land entrant classifications), with Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut.	1	1
Mounsey v. Ellardgreen mass · 1973 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000No. 55, 710 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Me.1998) (indicating that Maine retained the attractive nuisance doctrine as enunciated in section 339); compare Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 1229 693, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (1973) (abolishing the invitee-licensee classifications but retaining the trespasser distinction), with McDonald v. Conrail, 399 Mass. 25 , 502 N.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1987) (indicating that the Massachusetts rule is "indistinguishable in its elements from the statute or from its twin, § 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)"); compare Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 , 507 S.E.2d 882 (1 2000No. 55, 710 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Me.1998) (indicating that Maine retained the attractive nuisance doctrine as enunciated in section 339); compare Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 1229 693, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (1973) (abolishing the invitee-licensee classifications but retaining the trespasser distinction), with McDonald v. Conrail, 399 Mass. 25 , 502 N.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1987) (indicating that the Massachusetts rule is "indistinguishable in its elements from the statute or from its twin, § 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)"); compare Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 , 507 S.E.2d 882 (1	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Griffin v. Woodard green ncctapp · 1997 2 sentences 2000Inc., 313 N.C. 150 , 326 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1985) (setting forth and adopting elements of attractive nuisance doctrine as provided by section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), and Griffin v. Woodard, 126 N.C.App. 649 , 486 $.E.2d 240, 243 (1997) (emphasizing that attractive nuisance doctrine applies to protect only "children of tender years"); compare Mariorenci v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 RIL. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975) (adopting the reasonableness standard in place of the land entrant classifications), with Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. 2000Inc., 313 N.C. 150 , 326 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1985) (setting forth and adopting elements of attractive nuisance doctrine as provided by section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), and Griffin v. Woodard, 126 N.C.App. 649 , 486 $.E.2d 240, 243 (1997) (emphasizing that attractive nuisance doctrine applies to protect only "children of tender years"); compare Mariorenci v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 RIL. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975) (adopting the reasonableness standard in place of the land entrant classifications), with Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut.	1	2000–2000
International Textbook Co. v. Martin green · 1915 2 sentences 1951One view, commonly referred to as the Massachusetts rule, is represented by the decision in International Textbook Co. v. Martin, 221 Mass. 1 , 108 N.E. 469, 470 , where the court held that the promise of the student to pay all the installments for the right to receive the instruction was an independent promise which was not affected by the student's refusal to proceed any further with the course after about four months of study, and accordingly that the full unpaid balance was due under the contract and could be recovered. 1951One view, commonly referred to as the Massachusetts rule, is represented by the decision in International Textbook Co. v. Martin, 221 Mass. 1 , 108 N.E. 469, 470 , where the court held that the promise of the student to pay all the installments for the right to receive the instruction was an independent promise which was not affected by the student's refusal to proceed any further with the course after about four months of study, and accordingly that the full unpaid balance was due under the contract and could be recovered.	1	1951–1951
International Text-Book Co. v. Anderson green moctapp · 1913 2 sentences 1951Said the court: "In case of independent promises the promisor has to perform his promise and if he does not get what he pays for his remedy is by a cross-action." A similar position was taken in International Textbook Co. v. Anderson, 179 Mo. App. 631 , 162 S.W. 641, 643 , where a correspondence school brought an action against a student who had become dissatisfied with the course, abandoned it, and refused to make further payments. 1951Said the court: "In case of independent promises the promisor has to perform his promise and if he does not get what he pays for his remedy is by a cross-action." A similar position was taken in International Textbook Co. v. Anderson, 179 Mo. App. 631 , 162 S.W. 641, 643 , where a correspondence school brought an action against a student who had become dissatisfied with the course, abandoned it, and refused to make further payments.	1	1951–1951
Goddard v. Binney green mass · 1874 2 sentences 1937It was not a sale of the article to be built, and was not within the terms of the Sales Act which is declaratory of the Massachusetts rule as stated in the leading case of Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450, 454 , 15 Am. 1937It was not a sale of the article to be built, and was not within the terms of the Sales Act which is declaratory of the Massachusetts rule as stated in the leading case of Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450, 454 , 15 Am.	1	1937–1937
New England Cabinet Works v. Morris green nm · 1917 2 sentences 1937Under that rule, as stated in Mixer v. Howarth, supra, “Where it is an agreement with a workman, to put materials together and construct an article for the employer, whether at an agreed price or not, though in common parlance it may be called a purchase and sale of the article, to be completed in futuro, it is not a sale until an actual or constructive delivery and acceptance; and the remedy for not accepting is on the agreement.” See, also, New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 226 Mass. 246 , 115 N. E. 315 . 273 The case of M. 1937Under that rule, as stated in Mixer v. Howarth, supra, “Where it is an agreement with a workman, to put materials together and construct an article for the employer, whether at an agreed price or not, though in common parlance it may be called a purchase and sale of the article, to be completed in futuro, it is not a sale until an actual or constructive delivery and acceptance; and the remedy for not accepting is on the agreement.” See, also, New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 226 Mass. 246 , 115 N. E. 315 . 273 The case of M.	1	1937–1937
Adams v. Cohen green mass · 1922 2 sentences 1937In his work on Sales (2d Ed.) § 55a, Williston says: “In the Uniform Shies Act it was thought best to follow the Massachusetts rule representing, on the whole, the weight of American authority * * * Those states which have enacted the Sales Act, therefor, if their previous decisions applied a different test from that expressed in the statute, must revise their early rulings.” See, also, Adams v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 17 , 136 N. E. 183 . 1937In his work on Sales (2d Ed.) § 55a, Williston says: “In the Uniform Shies Act it was thought best to follow the Massachusetts rule representing, on the whole, the weight of American authority * * * Those states which have enacted the Sales Act, therefor, if their previous decisions applied a different test from that expressed in the statute, must revise their early rulings.” See, also, Adams v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 17 , 136 N. E. 183 .	1	1937–1937
Prudential Realty Co. v. Commissioner of Banks green mass · 1922 2 sentences 1935Prudential Realty Co. v. Allen, Commissioner of Banks, 241 Mass. 277 , 135 N. E. 221 , 25 A. L. 1935Prudential Realty Co. v. Allen, Commissioner of Banks, 241 Mass. 277 , 135 N. E. 221 , 25 A. L.	1	1935–1935
Kozel v. Kozel neutral kan · 1919 2 sentences 1931We cannot follow both. 97 In support of the Massachusetts rule, the plaintiff also cites Kozel v. Kozel, 104 Kan. 530 , 180 P. 278 . 1931We cannot follow both. 97 In support of the Massachusetts rule, the plaintiff also cites Kozel v. Kozel, 104 Kan. 530 , 180 P. 278 .	1	1931–1931
First National Bank v. Hall neutral idaho · 1917 2 sentences 1923Bank v. Hall, 31 Idaho, 167 , 169 P. 936 . 1923Bank v. Hall, 31 Idaho, 167 , 169 P. 936 .	1	1923–1923
Leavitt v. Thurston green utah · 1911 2 sentences 1923As an answer to this question, what was said by Mr. Justice Straup in Leavitt v. Thurston, 38 Utah, 351 , 113 P. 77 , referring to the North Carolina and Massachusetts rule, may well be repeated: ‘ ‘ The facts of the case in hand do not require us to go to that extent. * * ” Our attention has been called to First Nat. 1923As an answer to this question, what was said by Mr. Justice Straup in Leavitt v. Thurston, 38 Utah, 351 , 113 P. 77 , referring to the North Carolina and Massachusetts rule, may well be repeated: ‘ ‘ The facts of the case in hand do not require us to go to that extent. * *” Our attention has been called to First Nat.	1	1923–1923
Byram v. Stout green ind · 1891 2 sentences 1917As is well said by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Byram v. Stout, 127 Ind. 195 , 26 N. E. 687 , in referring to the authorities which follow the Massachusetts rule, “These authorities, however, depend upon a mere technicality, and not upon any principle of equity.” Moreover, our statute (Comp. 1917As is well said by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Byram v. Stout, 127 Ind. 195 , 26 N. E. 687 , in referring to the authorities which follow the Massachusetts rule, “These authorities, however, depend upon a mere technicality, and not upon any principle of equity.” Moreover, our statute (Comp.	1	1917–1917

Where else courts name it

MA 171 (1887–2026) NY 38 (1886–2009) MO 21 (1878–2014) IL 19 (1881–2010) CA 18 (1919–2018) MI 18 (1872–2008) RI 17 (1873–2011) NJ 17 (1898–1997) ME 17 (1914–2015) CT 17 (1890–1999) MD 15 (1894–1989) OH 15 (1914–1980) NH 15 (1894–2013) PA 13 (1924–2015) WA 12 (1914–2001) HI 12 (1900–2019) TX 12 (1894–2005) WI 12 (1897–1969) OR 12 (1923–2011) TN 11 (1896–2024) MN 11 (1914–1977) CO 10 (1891–2019) WY 10 (1901–2004) VA 10 (1906–1994) DE 10 (1913–1984) NM 9 (1937–2025) IA 9 (1920–1974) KY 8 (1912–2019) AR 8 (1895–2018) FL 7 (1929–2005) AL 7 (1914–2008) AZ 7 (1964–1974) UT 7 (1917–2000) NE 7 (1903–1978) ND 6 (1895–2012) SD 6 (1927–1968) VT 6 (1882–2006) NV 5 (1929–1992) WV 5 (1910–2022) OK 4 (1912–1994) IN 4 (1881–1982) NC 4 (1929–1994) DC 4 (1972–2006) LA 3 (1934–2014) SC 3 (1927–2004) GA 3 (1924–1965) MS 3 (1894–1983) MT 2 (1914–1924) ID 2 (1989–1995) KS 2 (1936–1990)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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