Massachusetts rule in Rhode Island

1969We are aided in this analysis by the well-reasoned application of the same guidelines by Chief Justice Kenison in Clark v. Clark, 107 N. H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 . 7 First, then, predictability of results is not of great importance in the present case.

1969We are aided in this analysis by the well-reasoned application of the same guidelines by Chief Justice Kenison in Clark v. Clark, 107 N. H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 . 7 First, then, predictability of results is not of great importance in the present case.

1969This contention looks for support to the holdings in Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (W.D.Mo.); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.Wash.); and Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 117 N.Y.S.2d 587 , modified 5 N.Y.2d 1016 , 158 N.E.2d 128 .

1969This contention looks for support to the holdings in Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (W.D.Mo.); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.Wash.); and Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 117 N.Y.S.2d 587 , modified 5 N.Y.2d 1016 , 158 N.E.2d 128 .

1969This contention looks for support to the holdings in Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (W.D.Mo.); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.Wash.); and Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 117 N.Y.S.2d 587 , modified 5 N.Y.2d 1016 , 158 N.E.2d 128 .

1969This contention looks for support to the holdings in Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (W.D.Mo.); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.Wash.); and Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 117 N.Y.S.2d 587 , modified 5 N.Y.2d 1016 , 158 N.E.2d 128 .

1969This contention looks for support to the holdings in Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (W.D.Mo.); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.Wash.); and Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 117 N.Y.S.2d 587 , modified 5 N.Y.2d 1016 , 158 N.E.2d 128 .

1969This contention looks for support to the holdings in Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (W.D.Mo.); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.Wash.); and Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 117 N.Y.S.2d 587 , modified 5 N.Y.2d 1016 , 158 N.E.2d 128 .

1969This contention looks for support to the holdings in Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (W.D.Mo.); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.Wash.); and Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 117 N.Y.S.2d 587 , modified 5 N.Y.2d 1016 , 158 N.E.2d 128 .

1969This contention looks for support to the holdings in Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (W.D.Mo.); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.Wash.); and Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 117 N.Y.S.2d 587 , modified 5 N.Y.2d 1016 , 158 N.E.2d 128 .

1931Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 .

1931Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 .

2011That proffered instruction said, in part, that "[t]he absence of an electronic recording of an interrogation in its entirety permits (but does not compel) [the jury] to conclude that State has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, which in this context is a heavy burden." I do not, by this dissent, specifically endorse either of these approaches. [21] The rejection of a due-process approach by numerous jurisdictions was reviewed comprehensively by the Connecticut Supreme Court in its decision in State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537 , 4 A.3d 1176 , 1188-89 n. 10 (2010). [22] Minn

2011That proffered instruction said, in part, that "[t]he absence of an electronic recording of an interrogation in its entirety permits (but does not compel) [the jury] to conclude that State has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, which in this context is a heavy burden." I do not, by this dissent, specifically endorse either of these approaches. [21] The rejection of a due-process approach by numerous jurisdictions was reviewed comprehensively by the Connecticut Supreme Court in its decision in State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537 , 4 A.3d 1176 , 1188-89 n. 10 (2010). [22] Minn

2011That proffered instruction said, in part, that "[t]he absence of an electronic recording of an interrogation in its entirety permits (but does not compel) [the jury] to conclude that State has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, which in this context is a heavy burden." I do not, by this dissent, specifically endorse either of these approaches. [21] The rejection of a due-process approach by numerous jurisdictions was reviewed comprehensively by the Connecticut Supreme Court in its decision in State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537 , 4 A.3d 1176 , 1188-89 n. 10 (2010). [22] Minn

2011That proffered instruction said, in part, that "[t]he absence of an electronic recording of an interrogation in its entirety permits (but does not compel) [the jury] to conclude that State has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, which in this context is a heavy burden." I do not, by this dissent, specifically endorse either of these approaches. [21] The rejection of a due-process approach by numerous jurisdictions was reviewed comprehensively by the Connecticut Supreme Court in its decision in State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537 , 4 A.3d 1176 , 1188-89 n. 10 (2010). [22] Minn

2006Therefore, the Massachusetts rule is that the insolvency fund will pay only so much as is necessary for the victim to receive — from all insurance sources — the amount that he or she would have received under the tortfeasor's liability insurance policy. 14 If the UM coverage is greater than or equal to the tortfeasor's liability coverage, the Mass. Fund has no liability, and the only way for a victim to obtain a recovery greater than the tortfeasor's liability policy is to have UM coverage that exceeds those liability limits. 15 That two similar enactments of the same model provision can be in

2006Therefore, the Massachusetts rule is that the insolvency fund will pay only so much as is necessary for the victim to receive — from all insurance sources — the amount that he or she would have received under the tortfeasor's liability insurance policy. 14 If the UM coverage is greater than or equal to the tortfeasor's liability coverage, the Mass. Fund has no liability, and the only way for a victim to obtain a recovery greater than the tortfeasor's liability policy is to have UM coverage that exceeds those liability limits. 15 That two similar enactments of the same model provision can be in

2004In Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713 , 718-19 n. 7 (R.I.1999), we held that: "under the Connecticut Rule[, which replaced the Massachusetts rule in Rhode Island,] and the reasonable prudent person standard, any duty owed by a business invitor to an invitee is to be evaluated in light of any unusual circumstances that have been created by the business invitor and left to exist at the particular time and place which results in injury to the invitee.”

2004In Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713 , 718-19 n. 7 (R.I.1999), we held that: "under the Connecticut Rule[, which replaced the Massachusetts rule in Rhode Island,] and the reasonable prudent person standard, any duty owed by a business invitor to an invitee is to be evaluated in light of any unusual circumstances that have been created by the business invitor and left to exist at the particular time and place which results in injury to the invitee.”

1983John, 233 Mass. 547, 551 .

1983John, 233 Mass. 547, 551 .

1980He relies on the Massachusetts rule stated in Commonwealth v. Brewer, 164 Mass. 577 , 42 N.E. 92 (1895).

1980He relies on the Massachusetts rule stated in Commonwealth v. Brewer, 164 Mass. 577 , 42 N.E. 92 (1895).

1972Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408 , 75 S.Ct. 804 , 99 L.Ed. 1183 (1955).

1972Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408 , 75 S.Ct. 804 , 99 L.Ed. 1183 (1955).

1965We realize that it has met with sharp criticism in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383 , and United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Paine, 26 F.2d 594 , but we are not persuaded that such criticism has destroyed or seriously impaired the reasoning upon which the Massachusetts cases rest.

1965Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383 ; Ahearn v. Roux, 96 N. H. 71; Massor v. Yates, 137 Ore. 669 ; Robinson v. Belmont-Buckingham Holding Co., 94 Colo. 634 .

1965We realize that it has met with sharp criticism in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383 , and United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Paine, 26 F.2d 594 , but we are not persuaded that such criticism has destroyed or seriously impaired the reasoning upon which the Massachusetts cases rest.

1933See also Re Watertown Paper Co., supra. ■ The Massachusetts rule is set forth in Star Brewing Co. v. Flynn, 237 Mass. 213 at 217 , as follows: “In the absence of a fraudulent purpose in the organization of a corporation, it is settled law in this Commonwealth that the ownership of all the stock and the absolute control of the affairs of a corporation do not make that corporation and that individual owner identical.” See also Bachrach v. Commissioner of Banks, 239 Mass. 272 ; Donaldson v. Andresen, 300 Pa. 312 .

1933See also Re Watertown Paper Co., supra. ■ The Massachusetts rule is set forth in Star Brewing Co. v. Flynn, 237 Mass. 213 at 217 , as follows: “In the absence of a fraudulent purpose in the organization of a corporation, it is settled law in this Commonwealth that the ownership of all the stock and the absolute control of the affairs of a corporation do not make that corporation and that individual owner identical.” See also Bachrach v. Commissioner of Banks, 239 Mass. 272 ; Donaldson v. Andresen, 300 Pa. 312 .

1933See also Re Watertown Paper Co., supra. ■ The Massachusetts rule is set forth in Star Brewing Co. v. Flynn, 237 Mass. 213 at 217 , as follows: “In the absence of a fraudulent purpose in the organization of a corporation, it is settled law in this Commonwealth that the ownership of all the stock and the absolute control of the affairs of a corporation do not make that corporation and that individual owner identical.” See also Bachrach v. Commissioner of Banks, 239 Mass. 272 ; Donaldson v. Andresen, 300 Pa. 312 .

1933See also Re Watertown Paper Co., supra. ■ The Massachusetts rule is set forth in Star Brewing Co. v. Flynn, 237 Mass. 213 at 217 , as follows: “In the absence of a fraudulent purpose in the organization of a corporation, it is settled law in this Commonwealth that the ownership of all the stock and the absolute control of the affairs of a corporation do not make that corporation and that individual owner identical.” See also Bachrach v. Commissioner of Banks, 239 Mass. 272 ; Donaldson v. Andresen, 300 Pa. 312 .

1931See Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 ; Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 ; Hayes v. St.

1931See Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 ; Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 ; Hayes v. St.

1931See Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 ; Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 ; Hayes v. St.

1931See Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 ; Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 ; Hayes v. St.

1918Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543, 550 ; Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Taintor, 85 Conn. 452 ; from Rhode Island, as following the Massachusetts rule, Brown & Larned, Petitioners, 14 R.

1918Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543, 550 ; Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Taintor, 85 Conn. 452 ; from Rhode Island, as following the Massachusetts rule, Brown & Larned, Petitioners, 14 R.

1918Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543, 550 ; Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Taintor, 85 Conn. 452 ; from Rhode Island, as following the Massachusetts rule, Brown & Larned, Petitioners, 14 R.

1918Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543, 550 ; Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Taintor, 85 Conn. 452 ; from Rhode Island, as following the Massachusetts rule, Brown & Larned, Petitioners, 14 R.

1917The opinion is short, and no cases are cited, although it would seem that the court followed the doctrine of Read v. Hatch and other Massachusetts cases which were cited by counsel; the court says, page 547: “A fraud committed by one, the result of which creates a liability upon another to pay money, is not such a damage done to the latter’s personal estate as will create a cause of action which survives.” Killen v. Barnes, 106 Wis. 546, 560 , expressly follows the case of Read v. Hatch in the construction of a statute of Wisconsin of the same terms as that of Massachusetts. *161 Stebbins v. D

1917The opinion is short, and no cases are cited, although it would seem that the court followed the doctrine of Read v. Hatch and other Massachusetts cases which were cited by counsel; the court says, page 547: “A fraud committed by one, the result of which creates a liability upon another to pay money, is not such a damage done to the latter’s personal estate as will create a cause of action which survives.” Killen v. Barnes, 106 Wis. 546, 560 , expressly follows the case of Read v. Hatch in the construction of a statute of Wisconsin of the same terms as that of Massachusetts. *161 Stebbins v. D

1917The opinion is short, and no cases are cited, although it would seem that the court followed the doctrine of Read v. Hatch and other Massachusetts cases which were cited by counsel; the court says, page 547: “A fraud committed by one, the result of which creates a liability upon another to pay money, is not such a damage done to the latter’s personal estate as will create a cause of action which survives.” Killen v. Barnes, 106 Wis. 546, 560 , expressly follows the case of Read v. Hatch in the construction of a statute of Wisconsin of the same terms as that of Massachusetts. *161 Stebbins v. D

1917The opinion is short, and no cases are cited, although it would seem that the court followed the doctrine of Read v. Hatch and other Massachusetts cases which were cited by counsel; the court says, page 547: “A fraud committed by one, the result of which creates a liability upon another to pay money, is not such a damage done to the latter’s personal estate as will create a cause of action which survives.” Killen v. Barnes, 106 Wis. 546, 560 , expressly follows the case of Read v. Hatch in the construction of a statute of Wisconsin of the same terms as that of Massachusetts. *161 Stebbins v. D

1899The statement of the New York rule was made upon the authority of Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134 , cited also in Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297 ; Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 206; Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421 .

1899The statement of the New York rule was made upon the authority of Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134 , cited also in Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297 ; Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 206; Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421 .