Massachusetts rule in Arizona

1966But the fact that an expert may use hearsay as a ground of opinion does not make the hearsay admissible.” (Emphasis added) 56 N.E. at 290 That this is the principal reason for the extension of the Massachusetts rule in California, permitting the experts to detail the hearsay upon which their opinions are based, is indicated by the decision of Young v. Bates Valve Bag Corp., 52 Cal.App.2d 86 , 125 P.2d 840, 846 (1942), and the cases cited therein. *435 We know of no substantial body of law which would approve the hearsay testimony admitted in this case.

1966It is to be noted that in Town of Williams v. Perrin, 70 Ariz. 157 , 217 P.2d 918 (1950), in passing upon the related but separate problem of whether comparable sales are admissible at all as direct proof, our Supreme Court expressly adopted the “Massachusetts rule,” ( 70 Ariz. at 163 , 217 P.2d 918 ) which permits the introduction of evidence of comparable sales on direct examination, as opposed to the “Pennsylvania rule,” holding evidence of comparable sales to be irrelevant except to test the expert witness on cross-examination. 7 If in Perrin , our court intended to adopt the Massachusetts

1966It is to be noted that in Town of Williams v. Perrin, 70 Ariz. 157 , 217 P.2d 918 (1950), in passing upon the related but separate problem of whether comparable sales are admissible at all as direct proof, our Supreme Court expressly adopted the “Massachusetts rule,” ( 70 Ariz. at 163 , 217 P.2d 918 ) which permits the introduction of evidence of comparable sales on direct examination, as opposed to the “Pennsylvania rule,” holding evidence of comparable sales to be irrelevant except to test the expert witness on cross-examination. 7 If in Perrin , our court intended to adopt the Massachusetts

1966It is to be noted that in Town of Williams v. Perrin, 70 Ariz. 157 , 217 P.2d 918 (1950), in passing upon the related but separate problem of whether comparable sales are admissible at all as direct proof, our Supreme Court expressly adopted the “Massachusetts rule,” ( 70 Ariz. at 163 , 217 P.2d 918 ) which permits the introduction of evidence of comparable sales on direct examination, as opposed to the “Pennsylvania rule,” holding evidence of comparable sales to be irrelevant except to test the expert witness on cross-examination. 7 If in Perrin , our court intended to adopt the Massachusetts

1966It is to be noted that in Town of Williams v. Perrin, 70 Ariz. 157 , 217 P.2d 918 (1950), in passing upon the related but separate problem of whether comparable sales are admissible at all as direct proof, our Supreme Court expressly adopted the “Massachusetts rule,” ( 70 Ariz. at 163 , 217 P.2d 918 ) which permits the introduction of evidence of comparable sales on direct examination, as opposed to the “Pennsylvania rule,” holding evidence of comparable sales to be irrelevant except to test the expert witness on cross-examination. 7 If in Perrin , our court intended to adopt the Massachusetts

1966In McElligott v. Freeland, 139 Cal.App. 143 , 33 P.2d 430 (1934), an accountant was permitted to describe an “investigation” conducted through . “ * * * our New York office * * * ” to ascertain that a certain corporation had “ * * - no assets and no liabilities * * * ” in order to support his opinion that a certain promissory note was worthless.

1966In McElligott v. Freeland, 139 Cal.App. 143 , 33 P.2d 430 (1934), an accountant was permitted to describe an “investigation” conducted through . “ * * * our New York office * * * ” to ascertain that a certain corporation had “ * * - no assets and no liabilities * * * ” in order to support his opinion that a certain promissory note was worthless.

1966State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18 , 401 P.2d 721 ; State v. Simoneau, 98 Ariz. 2 , 401 P.2d 404 .

1966State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18 , 401 P.2d 721 ; State v. Simoneau, 98 Ariz. 2 , 401 P.2d 404 .

1966State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18 , 401 P.2d 721 ; State v. Simoneau, 98 Ariz. 2 , 401 P.2d 404 .

1966State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18 , 401 P.2d 721 ; State v. Simoneau, 98 Ariz. 2 , 401 P.2d 404 .

1965The Massachusetts rule, which was approved by the Court, was thus described in Jackson, supra, 378 U.S. at page 378 , 84 S.Ct. at page 1781 : “The judge’s consideration of voluntariness is carried out separate and aside from issues of the reliability of the confession and the guilt or. innocence of the accused and without regard to the fact the issue may again be raised before the jury if decided against the defendant.

1965The Massachusetts rule, which was approved by the Court, was thus described in Jackson, supra, 378 U.S. at page 378 , 84 S.Ct. at page 1781 : “The judge’s consideration of voluntariness is carried out separate and aside from issues of the reliability of the confession and the guilt or. innocence of the accused and without regard to the fact the issue may again be raised before the jury if decided against the defendant.

1964Evidence tending to contradict the voluntary nature of the statement or confession may be admitted, and the jury may, as under the Massachusetts rule, then in effect disagree with the judge, and reject the confession.” 96 Ariz. at 277, 394 P.2d at 208. • A determination as to voluntariness no longer hinges upon a showing of overt threats or' physical duress — although the evidence of tubercular illness in the case at bar may even suggest elements of the latter. ■ We recognize “that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361

1964Evidence tending to contradict the voluntary nature of the statement or confession may be admitted, and the jury may, as under the Massachusetts rule, then in effect disagree with the judge, and reject the confession.” 96 Ariz. at 277, 394 P.2d at 208. • A determination as to voluntariness no longer hinges upon a showing of overt threats or' physical duress — although the evidence of tubercular illness in the case at bar may even suggest elements of the latter. ■ We recognize “that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361