Massachusetts rule in Alabama

2008The trial judge had not disclosed those facts during the defendant’s trial because he had not remembered that he had written the letter of recommendation or that he had signed the certificate of attendance on behalf of the witness. 364 Mass. at 724-25 , 307 N.E.2d at 843 .

2008The trial judge had not disclosed those facts during the defendant’s trial because he had not remembered that he had written the letter of recommendation or that he had signed the certificate of attendance on behalf of the witness. 364 Mass. at 724-25 , 307 N.E.2d at 843 .

1988While federal courts in cases decided when an accused had a privilege to preclude his spouse from testifying have stated that an opportunity should be afforded for the spousal privilege to be claimed in the absence of a jury, Melton v. United States , 398 F.2d 321 , 322 (10th Cir. 1968); Tallo v. United States , 344 F.2d 467 , 469 (1st Cir. 1965); San Fratello v. United States , 343 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1965), and this apparently is the Massachusetts rule, Commonwealth v. Labbe , 373 N.E.2d at 232; Commonwealth v. Stokes , 374 Mass. 583 , 374 N.E.2d 87 , 96 n. 9, we do not see that this procedur

1988While federal courts in cases decided when an accused had a privilege to preclude his spouse from testifying have stated that an opportunity should be afforded for the spousal privilege to be claimed in the absence of a jury, Melton v. United States , 398 F.2d 321 , 322 (10th Cir. 1968); Tallo v. United States , 344 F.2d 467 , 469 (1st Cir. 1965); San Fratello v. United States , 343 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1965), and this apparently is the Massachusetts rule, Commonwealth v. Labbe , 373 N.E.2d at 232; Commonwealth v. Stokes , 374 Mass. 583 , 374 N.E.2d 87 , 96 n. 9, we do not see that this procedur

1988While federal courts in cases decided when an accused had a privilege to preclude his spouse from testifying have stated that an opportunity should be afforded for the spousal privilege to be claimed in the absence of a jury, Melton v. United States , 398 F.2d 321 , 322 (10th Cir. 1968); Tallo v. United States , 344 F.2d 467 , 469 (1st Cir. 1965); San Fratello v. United States , 343 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1965), and this apparently is the Massachusetts rule, Commonwealth v. Labbe , 373 N.E.2d at 232; Commonwealth v. Stokes , 374 Mass. 583 , 374 N.E.2d 87 , 96 n. 9, we do not see that this procedur

1988While federal courts in cases decided when an accused had a privilege to preclude his spouse from testifying have stated that an opportunity should be afforded for the spousal privilege to be claimed in the absence of a jury, Melton v. United States , 398 F.2d 321 , 322 (10th Cir. 1968); Tallo v. United States , 344 F.2d 467 , 469 (1st Cir. 1965); San Fratello v. United States , 343 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1965), and this apparently is the Massachusetts rule, Commonwealth v. Labbe , 373 N.E.2d at 232; Commonwealth v. Stokes , 374 Mass. 583 , 374 N.E.2d 87 , 96 n. 9, we do not see that this procedur

1988While federal courts in cases decided when an accused had a privilege to preclude his spouse from testifying have stated that an opportunity should be afforded for the spousal privilege to be claimed in the absence of a jury, Melton v. United States , 398 F.2d 321 , 322 (10th Cir. 1968); Tallo v. United States , 344 F.2d 467 , 469 (1st Cir. 1965); San Fratello v. United States , 343 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1965), and this apparently is the Massachusetts rule, Commonwealth v. Labbe , 373 N.E.2d at 232; Commonwealth v. Stokes , 374 Mass. 583 , 374 N.E.2d 87 , 96 n. 9, we do not see that this procedur

1935In Bancroft v. Vizard, 202 Ala. 618 , 81 So. 560 , the Massachusetts rule (Dunlap et al. v. Bullard, 131 Mass. 161 ) was adhered to, to the effect that, where a lessee sublets, reserving to himself a reversionary interest, the transaction is that of a sublease, as distinguished from an assignment of a lease; that a sublessee is not liable to the original lessor on the covenants to pay rent reserved in the original lease.

1935In Bancroft v. Vizard, 202 Ala. 618 , 81 So. 560 , the Massachusetts rule (Dunlap et al. v. Bullard, 131 Mass. 161 ) was adhered to, to the effect that, where a lessee sublets, reserving to himself a reversionary interest, the transaction is that of a sublease, as distinguished from an assignment of a lease; that a sublessee is not liable to the original lessor on the covenants to pay rent reserved in the original lease.

1935Cesar et al. v. Virgin et al., 207 Ala. 148 , 92 So. 406 , 24 A. L.

1935Cesar et al. v. Virgin et al., 207 Ala. 148 , 92 So. 406 , 24 A. L.

1935In Bancroft v. Vizard, 202 Ala. 618 , 81 So. 560 , the Massachusetts rule (Dunlap et al. v. Bullard, 131 Mass. 161 ) was adhered to, to the effect that, where a lessee sublets, reserving to himself a reversionary interest, the transaction is that of a sublease, as distinguished from an assignment of a lease; that a sublessee is not liable to the original lessor on the covenants to pay rent reserved in the original lease.

1935In Bancroft v. Vizard, 202 Ala. 618 , 81 So. 560 , the Massachusetts rule (Dunlap et al. v. Bullard, 131 Mass. 161 ) was adhered to, to the effect that, where a lessee sublets, reserving to himself a reversionary interest, the transaction is that of a sublease, as distinguished from an assignment of a lease; that a sublessee is not liable to the original lessor on the covenants to pay rent reserved in the original lease.

1932Miller v. Walson, 71 Iowa, 610 , 33 N. W. 128 ; Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray (Mass.) 522 ; Pierce v. George, 108 Mass. 78 , 11 Am.

1932Miller v. Walson, 71 Iowa, 610 , 33 N. W. 128 ; Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray (Mass.) 522 ; Pierce v. George, 108 Mass. 78 , 11 Am.

1932Menard v. Courchaine (Mass.) 179 N. E. 167 ; Bankers’ & Merchants’ Credit Co. v. Harlem *599 Park B. & L.

1932Menard v. Courchaine (Mass.) 179 N. E. 167 ; Bankers’ & Merchants’ Credit Co. v. Harlem *599 Park B. & L.

1932They classify Alabama as one of the states which do not follow the Massachusetts rule, citing Broaddus v. Smith, 121 Ala. 335 , 26 So. 34 , 77 Am.

1932They classify Alabama as one of the states which do not follow the Massachusetts rule, citing Broaddus v. Smith, 121 Ala. 335 , 26 So. 34 , 77 Am.

1932In Dudley v. Phenix-Girard Bank, 216 Ala. 591, 594 , 114 So. 188, 191 , the authorities were again considered, and the opinion concluded as follows: “ * * * Our judgment is that the Massachusetts rule is more consonant with what must be the mutual understanding of the parties in such cases, i. e., that the contract implied on the part of a bank taking paper for collection — for of course the parties by express contract may arrange the matter as they will — is simply an undertaking on the part of the bank to exercise care and diligence in the selection of a proper and suitable subagent and in t

1932In Dudley v. Phenix-Girard Bank, 216 Ala. 591, 594 , 114 So. 188, 191 , the authorities were again considered, and the opinion concluded as follows: “ * * * Our judgment is that the Massachusetts rule is more consonant with what must be the mutual understanding of the parties in such cases, i. e., that the contract implied on the part of a bank taking paper for collection — for of course the parties by express contract may arrange the matter as they will — is simply an undertaking on the part of the bank to exercise care and diligence in the selection of a proper and suitable subagent and in t

1932Ekstrom v. Hall, 90 Me. 186 , 38 A. 106 .

1932Ekstrom v. Hall, 90 Me. 186 , 38 A. 106 .

1932In the case of Young v. Chandler, 102 Me. 251 , 66 A. 539 , the conflict is again noted with the cases cited as to each contention, showing that Maine follows the Massachusetts rule.

1932In the case of Young v. Chandler, 102 Me. 251 , 66 A. 539 , the conflict is again noted with the cases cited as to each contention, showing that Maine follows the Massachusetts rule.

1932Miller v. Walson, 71 Iowa, 610 , 33 N. W. 128 ; Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray (Mass.) 522 ; Pierce v. George, 108 Mass. 78 , 11 Am.

1932Miller v. Walson, 71 Iowa, 610 , 33 N. W. 128 ; Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray (Mass.) 522 ; Pierce v. George, 108 Mass. 78 , 11 Am.

1927Bank v. Lerman Milling Co., 9 Ala. App. 322 , 63 So. 776 , the Court of Appeals definitely committed itself to the Massachusetts doctrine, but did so on the assumption that this court had so done in Eufaula Grocery Co. v. Missouri Bank, supra. We have stated the process followed by the court in the Eufaula Grocery Co. Case.

1927Bank v. Lerman Milling Co., 9 Ala. App. 322 , 63 So. 776 , the Court of Appeals definitely committed itself to the Massachusetts doctrine, but did so on the assumption that this court had so done in Eufaula Grocery Co. v. Missouri Bank, supra. We have stated the process followed by the court in the Eufaula Grocery Co. Case.

1927In Alexander v. Birmingham Trust Co., 206 Ala. 50 , 89 So. 66 , 16 A, L.

1927In Alexander v. Birmingham Trust Co., 206 Ala. 50 , 89 So. 66 , 16 A, L.

1914In support of the conclusion that the mortgagee of personal property is a mere lien-holder, Indiana decisions are there referred to holding that personal property under mortgage may be levied upon and sold by execution subject to the mortgage lien.” The Massachusetts doctrine is thus criticised by an annotator of the case of Dix v. Smith, 9 Okl. 124 , 60 Pac. 303 , 50 L.

1914In support of the conclusion that the mortgagee of personal property is a mere lien-holder, Indiana decisions are there referred to holding that personal property under mortgage may be levied upon and sold by execution subject to the mortgage lien.” The Massachusetts doctrine is thus criticised by an annotator of the case of Dix v. Smith, 9 Okl. 124 , 60 Pac. 303 , 50 L.

1914In support of the conclusion that the mortgagee of personal property is a mere lien-holder, Indiana decisions are there referred to holding that personal property under mortgage may be levied upon and sold by execution subject to the mortgage lien.” The Massachusetts doctrine is thus criticised by an annotator of the case of Dix v. Smith, 9 Okl. 124 , 60 Pac. 303 , 50 L.

1914In support of the conclusion that the mortgagee of personal property is a mere lien-holder, Indiana decisions are there referred to holding that personal property under mortgage may be levied upon and sold by execution subject to the mortgage lien.” The Massachusetts doctrine is thus criticised by an annotator of the case of Dix v. Smith, 9 Okl. 124 , 60 Pac. 303 , 50 L.