15 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1888–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Abney v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024We observed that the Supreme Court of the United States had explained - 12 - that a ruling denying a claimed violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause comes within the collateral order doctrine because the ruling constitutes a final rejection of the claim, the issue is entirely collateral to and separable from the issue of guilt or innocence, and most significantly, delay in appellate review until after a final judgment would undermine the very right accorded by the double jeopardy prohibition, that is, the “guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense.” Id. at 505 n.4, 24 A.3 2011The Supreme Court explained in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-61 , 97 S.Ct. 2034 , 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) that a ruling denying a claimed violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause comes within the collateral order doctrine because the ruling constitutes a final rejection of the claim, the issue is entirely collateral to and separable from the issue of guilt or innocence, and most significantly, delay in appellate review until after a final judgment would undermine the very right *506 accorded by the double jeopardy prohibition, that is, the "guarantee against being twice put to trial f | 2 | 3 |
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences1984Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.” [397 U.S.] at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194 . 1979Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where .the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.” 397 U. S. at 443-45 , 90 S. Ct. at 1194 (citation and footnotes omitted). | 1 | 3 |
Stephens v. Stategreen2 sentences2024We observed that the Supreme Court of the United States had explained - 12 - that a ruling denying a claimed violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause comes within the collateral order doctrine because the ruling constitutes a final rejection of the claim, the issue is entirely collateral to and separable from the issue of guilt or innocence, and most significantly, delay in appellate review until after a final judgment would undermine the very right accorded by the double jeopardy prohibition, that is, the “guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense.” Id. at 505 n.4, 24 A.3 2024We observed that the Supreme Court of the United States had explained - 12 - that a ruling denying a claimed violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause comes within the collateral order doctrine because the ruling constitutes a final rejection of the claim, the issue is entirely collateral to and separable from the issue of guilt or innocence, and most significantly, delay in appellate review until after a final judgment would undermine the very right accorded by the double jeopardy prohibition, that is, the “guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense.” Id. at 505 n.4, 24 A.3 | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Judge McAuliffe's concurring opinion in Ford , joined by Judges Rodowsky and Karwacki, characterized the majority's discussion of "transferred intent" as "dictum," attempting to "invalidate a portion of [the] doctrine that [the Court had] recently and specifically approved in [ Wilson ]." Id. at 724 , 625 A.2d at 1004 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). 2004Judge McAuliffe's concurring opinion in Ford , joined by Judges Rodowsky and Karwacki, characterized the majority's discussion of "transferred intent" as "dictum," attempting to "invalidate a portion of [the] doctrine that [the Court had] recently and specifically approved in [ Wilson ]." Id. at 724 , 625 A.2d at 1004 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Helstoski v. Meanorgreen2 sentences1984Similarly, an immediate appeal lies from the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment which is challenged as violative of the speech or debate clause because that constitutional guarantee “was designed to protect Congressmen ‘not only from the consequences of litigation’s results but also from the burden of defending themselves.’ ” Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 , 99 S.Ct. 2445, 2449 , 61 L.Ed.2d 30, 37 (1979). 1984Similarly, an immediate appeal lies from the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment which is challenged as violative of the speech or debate clause because that constitutional guarantee “was designed to protect Congressmen ‘not only from the consequences of litigation’s results but also from the burden of defending themselves.’ ” Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 , 99 S.Ct. 2445, 2449 , 61 L.Ed.2d 30, 37 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Intercounty Constraction Corp. v. Walter
green
1 sentence2002That section provided that “the deputy commissioner may, at anytime prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case....” Id. at 6, 95 S.Ct. 2016 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 922 (1970)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Town of Brunswick v. Hyatt
green
2 sentences1997They point out that the Court of Appeals has never approved (or disapproved) an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order rejecting a defense of qualified immunity, and they ask us to reconsider Fineran and, implicitly, [Town of] Brunswick [v. Hyatt, 91 Md.App. 555 [ 605 A.2d 620 ] (1992) ]. 1997They point out that the Court of Appeals has never approved (or disapproved) an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order rejecting a defense of qualified immunity, and they ask us to reconsider Fineran and, implicitly, [Town of] Brunswick [v. Hyatt, 91 Md.App. 555 [ 605 A.2d 620 ] (1992) ]. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Deems v. Western Maryland Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1970However, we fully realize that the rejection of this doctrine of purgation by oath by this Court will have only a prospective effect and will not *566 deny its use to the appellant in the present proceeding or affect the “rights of defendants which may have so accrued.” Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 115 , 231 A. 2d 514 (1967). 1970However, we fully realize that the rejection of this doctrine of purgation by oath by this Court will have only a prospective effect and will not *566 deny its use to the appellant in the present proceeding or affect the “rights of defendants which may have so accrued.” Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 115 , 231 A. 2d 514 (1967). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Marx v. Marx
neutral
2 sentences1965Zahn v. Heil, 192 Md. 576, 580-581 , 64 A. 2d 564 (1949) ; Marx v. Marx, 127 Md. 373, 382 , 96 A. 544 (1916), supra. The plaintiff’s claim was also timely filed in the estate on August 5, 1960 and suit instituted within the six-month period after the rejection of the claim on October 10, 1960 as required by Code Art. 93, Sec. 119 (as amended by Chapter 12 of the Acts of 1959) and Section 120. 1965Zahn v. Heil, 192 Md. 576, 580-581 , 64 A. 2d 564 (1949) ; Marx v. Marx, 127 Md. 373, 382 , 96 A. 544 (1916), supra. The plaintiff’s claim was also timely filed in the estate on August 5, 1960 and suit instituted within the six-month period after the rejection of the claim on October 10, 1960 as required by Code Art. 93, Sec. 119 (as amended by Chapter 12 of the Acts of 1959) and Section 120. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Zahn v. Heil
neutral
2 sentences1965Zahn v. Heil, 192 Md. 576, 580-581 , 64 A. 2d 564 (1949) ; Marx v. Marx, 127 Md. 373, 382 , 96 A. 544 (1916), supra. The plaintiff’s claim was also timely filed in the estate on August 5, 1960 and suit instituted within the six-month period after the rejection of the claim on October 10, 1960 as required by Code Art. 93, Sec. 119 (as amended by Chapter 12 of the Acts of 1959) and Section 120. 1965Zahn v. Heil, 192 Md. 576, 580-581 , 64 A. 2d 564 (1949) ; Marx v. Marx, 127 Md. 373, 382 , 96 A. 544 (1916), supra. The plaintiff’s claim was also timely filed in the estate on August 5, 1960 and suit instituted within the six-month period after the rejection of the claim on October 10, 1960 as required by Code Art. 93, Sec. 119 (as amended by Chapter 12 of the Acts of 1959) and Section 120. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Dunlop v. United States
green
1 sentence1960In the case of Dunlop v. The United States, 165 U. S. 486 , the Court said: ‘If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried away by this temptation.’ See also Esterline v. State, 105 Md. 629 .” Glickman v. State, 190 Md. 516 , 60 A. 2d 216 , used the same reasoning to support the rejection of a claim of prejudice from a remark that the defendant was a “Philadelphia foreigner.” The Court distingui | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Glickman v. State
green
2 sentences1960In the case of Dunlop v. The United States, 165 U. S. 486 , the Court said: ‘If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried away by this temptation.’ See also Esterline v. State, 105 Md. 629 .” Glickman v. State, 190 Md. 516 , 60 A. 2d 216 , used the same reasoning to support the rejection of a claim of prejudice from a remark that the defendant was a “Philadelphia foreigner.” The Court distingui 1960In the case of Dunlop v. The United States, 165 U. S. 486 , the Court said: ‘If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried away by this temptation.’ See also Esterline v. State, 105 Md. 629 .” Glickman v. State, 190 Md. 516 , 60 A. 2d 216 , used the same reasoning to support the rejection of a claim of prejudice from a remark that the defendant was a “Philadelphia foreigner.” The Court distingui | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Esterline v. State
green
1 sentence1960In the case of Dunlop v. The United States, 165 U. S. 486 , the Court said: ‘If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried away by this temptation.’ See also Esterline v. State, 105 Md. 629 .” Glickman v. State, 190 Md. 516 , 60 A. 2d 216 , used the same reasoning to support the rejection of a claim of prejudice from a remark that the defendant was a “Philadelphia foreigner.” The Court distingui | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Meno v. State
green
2 sentences1960In the case of Dunlop v. The United States, 165 U. S. 486 , the Court said: ‘If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried away by this temptation.’ See also Esterline v. State, 105 Md. 629 .” Glickman v. State, 190 Md. 516 , 60 A. 2d 216 , used the same reasoning to support the rejection of a claim of prejudice from a remark that the defendant was a “Philadelphia foreigner.” The Court distingui 1960In the case of Dunlop v. The United States, 165 U. S. 486 , the Court said: ‘If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried away by this temptation.’ See also Esterline v. State, 105 Md. 629 .” Glickman v. State, 190 Md. 516 , 60 A. 2d 216 , used the same reasoning to support the rejection of a claim of prejudice from a remark that the defendant was a “Philadelphia foreigner.” The Court distingui | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Wood v. State
green
2 sentences1960In Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643 , 65 A. 2d 316 , the Court found *88 certain references by the State’s Attorney cured by his disavowal, but the Court went on to say ( 192 Md. at 652 ): “It is quite true that appeals to class prejudice or to passion are improper and may so poison the mind of jurors that an accused may be deprived of a fair trial. 1960In Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643 , 65 A. 2d 316 , the Court found *88 certain references by the State’s Attorney cured by his disavowal, but the Court went on to say ( 192 Md. at 652 ): “It is quite true that appeals to class prejudice or to passion are improper and may so poison the mind of jurors that an accused may be deprived of a fair trial. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital
green
1 sentence1959The same arguments that are now being advanced for the rejection of the doctrine were made, considered and denied in Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617 (1948). | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Fox v. Bernard
neutral
1 sentence1954In Fox v. Bernard, 29 Nev. 127 , 85 Pac. 351 , it is said at page 352: “It is also urged that suit was not begun within the time required by the provisions of the probate act after the rejection of the claim by the executrix. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Nichols v. Eaton
green
1 sentence1888Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 , has furnished authority for the rejection of the doctrine of the English Courts, and the adoption of this species of trusts in this State. | 1 | 1888–1888 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.