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14 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1917–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Spradling v. Treasurer of the Stategreen1 sentence2016Spradling v. Treasurer of State, 415 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Mo.App.S.D.2013); Archer v. City of Cameron, 460 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Mo.App.W.D.2015). *818 Appellants’ remaining Point 2 claim is that even if the accident occurred while Employee was in the course of his employment, the accident was not “shown to be the prevailing factor for his death[.]” Point 3 goes one step further and contends that even if the accident was the prevailing factor in Employee's' death, “the claim should still be denied, due to the fact that the death of [Employee] is a result more likely than not of an idiopathic condition” | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Contract Freighters, Inc.green1 sentence2016Idiopathic means “‘peculiar to the individual, innate[.]’ ” Ahern v. P & H, LLC, 254 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Mo.App.E.D.2008) (affirming the denial of a worker’s compensation claim based upon a seizure being an idiopathic cause); cf. Taylor v. Contract Freighters, Inc., 315 S.W.3d 379, 382-83 (Mo.App.S.D.2010) (“that a cough is an idiopathic condition strains beyond recognition the definition of idiopathic condition”). | 1 | 1 |
Ahern v. P & H, LLCgreen1 sentence2016Idiopathic means “‘peculiar to the individual, innate[.]’ ” Ahern v. P & H, LLC, 254 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Mo.App.E.D.2008) (affirming the denial of a worker’s compensation claim based upon a seizure being an idiopathic cause); cf. Taylor v. Contract Freighters, Inc., 315 S.W.3d 379, 382-83 (Mo.App.S.D.2010) (“that a cough is an idiopathic condition strains beyond recognition the definition of idiopathic condition”). | 1 | 1 |
Rusty Archer v. City of Cameron and Midwest Public Risk of Missouri Treasurer of the State of Missouri-Custodian of the Second Injury Fundgreen1 sentence2016Spradling v. Treasurer of State, 415 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Mo.App.S.D.2013); Archer v. City of Cameron, 460 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Mo.App.W.D.2015). *818 Appellants’ remaining Point 2 claim is that even if the accident occurred while Employee was in the course of his employment, the accident was not “shown to be the prevailing factor for his death[.]” Point 3 goes one step further and contends that even if the accident was the prevailing factor in Employee's' death, “the claim should still be denied, due to the fact that the death of [Employee] is a result more likely than not of an idiopathic condition” | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Hamiltongreen1 sentence2011“If a party fails to substantially comply with Rule 84.04, which requires the appellant to ‘identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges,’ then the argument is not preserved for appeal.” Hamilton v. Hamilton, 340 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
Ashe v. Swensongreen1 sentence2010See Ashe, 397 U.S at 444, 90 S.Ct. 1189 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Walkergreen2 sentences1999See State v. Walker, 972 S.W.2d 623 (Mo.App.1998). 1999See State v. Walker, 972 S.W.2d 623 (Mo.App.1998). . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ginnerygreen1 sentence1984The statutory presumption that all persons are free of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility for their conduct has been held sufficient, alone, to sustain the rejection of the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility by a jury, State v. Gin-nery, 617 S.W.2d 117, 120 [3] (Mo.App. 1981), and by a judge, State v. West, 575 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Mo.App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Westgreen1 sentence1984The statutory presumption that all persons are free of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility for their conduct has been held sufficient, alone, to sustain the rejection of the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility by a jury, State v. Gin-nery, 617 S.W.2d 117, 120 [3] (Mo.App. 1981), and by a judge, State v. West, 575 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Mo.App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Taylorgreen1 sentence1980State v. Taylor, 589 S.W.2d 302, 304-05 [3] (Mo. banc 1979). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Campbellgreen1 sentence1975“The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant concedes that he can “cite no cases to the effect that this instruction has been held to be one in which it is reversible error to refuse to instruct when requested.” He recognizes also, by his citations, that despite a feeling that instruction on the element in question should have been given in a particular case, the court would “not, however, rule that the rejection of such an instruction would, of itself, be reversible error,” State v. Brown, 115 Mo. 409 , 22 S.W. 367, 369 (1893); and that | 1 | 1 |
State v. Whitegreen2 sentences1975“The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant concedes that he can “cite no cases to the effect that this instruction has been held to be one in which it is reversible error to refuse to instruct when requested.” He recognizes also, by his citations, that despite a feeling that instruction on the element in question should have been given in a particular case, the court would “not, however, rule that the rejection of such an instruction would, of itself, be reversible error,” State v. Brown, 115 Mo. 409 , 22 S.W. 367, 369 (1893); and that 1975“The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant concedes that he can “cite no cases to the effect that this instruction has been held to be one in which it is reversible error to refuse to instruct when requested.” He recognizes also, by his citations, that despite a feeling that instruction on the element in question should have been given in a particular case, the court would “not, however, rule that the rejection of such an instruction would, of itself, be reversible error,” State v. Brown, 115 Mo. 409 , 22 S.W. 367, 369 (1893); and that | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sealfon v. United States
green
1 sentence2010“Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral es-toppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.” 4 Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2003The majority's rejection of the presumption that juries follow the court's instructions is based, at least in part, on the perceived "confusion that the complex death penalty submission can cause even for a trial judge, much less a jury." In that regard, the majority relies on this Court's decision in State v. Thompson, 85 S.W.3d 635 (Mo. banc 2002), albeit in a footnote. 2003The majority’s rejection of the presumption that juries follow the court’s instructions is based, at least in part, on the perceived “confusion that the complex death penalty submission can cause even for a trial judge, much less a jury.” In that regard, the majority relies on this Court’s decision in State v. Thompson, 85 S.W.3d 635 (Mo. banc 2002), albeit in a footnote. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Wainwright v. Witt
green
2 sentences1997A venireperson is properly excluded for cause if his views on capital punishment would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). 1997A venireperson is properly excluded for cause if his views on capital punishment would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Collins v. Division of Welfare
green
2 sentences1978Collins v. Division of Welfare, 364 Mo. 1032 , 270 S.W.2d 817 (banc 1954). 1978Collins v. Division of Welfare, 364 Mo. 1032 , 270 S.W.2d 817 (banc 1954). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Century State Bank v. State Banking Board of Mo.
green
1 sentence1977On this appeal the Hospital contends the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Board in establishing the bargaining unit were insufficient as measured by the requirements set forth in Century State Bank v. State Banking Board of Missouri, 523 S.W.2d 856 (Mo.App.1975) and cases therein cited. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Brown
neutral
1 sentence1975“The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant concedes that he can “cite no cases to the effect that this instruction has been held to be one in which it is reversible error to refuse to instruct when requested.” He recognizes also, by his citations, that despite a feeling that instruction on the element in question should have been given in a particular case, the court would “not, however, rule that the rejection of such an instruction would, of itself, be reversible error,” State v. Brown, 115 Mo. 409 , 22 S.W. 367, 369 (1893); and that | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Whitney National Bank in Jefferson Parish v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1974He also rejected the notion that the Board’s determinations could be attacked collaterally before the Comptroller, commenting that: “A rejection of this doctrine here would result in unnecessary duplication and conflicting litigation . . . ” Supra, 379 U.S. at 422 , 85 S.Ct. at 558 . 1974He also rejected the notion that the Board’s determinations could be attacked collaterally before the Comptroller, commenting that: “A rejection of this doctrine here would result in unnecessary duplication and conflicting litigation . . . ” Supra, 379 U.S. at 422 , 85 S.Ct. at 558 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State v. Bailey
green
2 sentences1933This, it is held in State v. Bailey, 320 Mo. 271, 278 , 8 S. W. (2d) 57, 59 , is not sufficiently specific to constitute a valid assignment under our new trial statute. [Sec. 3735, R. 1933This, it is held in State v. Bailey, 320 Mo. 271, 278 , 8 S. W. (2d) 57, 59 , is not sufficiently specific to constitute a valid assignment under our new trial statute. [Sec. 3735, R. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Reppy v. Jefferson County
neutral
1 sentence1917In Reppy v. Jefferson County, 47 Mo. 66 , it was said: “Defendant’s counsel first contend that the rejection of the claim is a judgment; that the plaintiff is concluded by it, and cannot prosecute in the circuit court. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.