rejection defense in Texas

2016See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595 (“we hold that when a defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the rejection of a defense, the reviewing court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light and asks whether the State’s evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence”). 6 Analysis The trial court instructed the jury on the definition of self-defense in accordance with the applicable law, and further instructed the jury that if it found that the State had f

2010When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the rejection of a defense, we view “all of the evidence in a neutral light and ask[ ] whether the State’s evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

2026In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s rejection of self-defense, “we determine whether after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.” Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 . (2) Application Jones argues that the jury’s rejection of his defense is not supported by the evidence because “[t]he State produced no evidence to contradict [Jones’s] cl

2020In short, we do not view the justification evidence solely from the defendant’s perspective in our sufficiency review, as Salas asserts; we review all of the evidence in light of and in favor of the jury’s rejection of the defense.3 See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 ; Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). 2 Salas does not dispute that the State presented sufficient evidence of the elements of assault involving family violence. 3 The defendant’s perspective comes into play when determining whether the evidence sufficiently raised self-defense such tha

2006See Zuniga v. State , 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); see also Zuliani v. State , 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (specifically outlining the factual sufficiency standard concerning jury’s rejection of self-defense).

2006See Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); see also Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (specifically outlining the factual sufficiency standard concerning jury’s rejection of self-defense). 2.

2020In short, we do not view the justification evidence solely from the defendant’s perspective in our sufficiency review, as Salas asserts; we review all of the evidence in light of and in favor of the jury’s rejection of the defense.3 See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 ; Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). 2 Salas does not dispute that the State presented sufficient evidence of the elements of assault involving family violence. 3 The defendant’s perspective comes into play when determining whether the evidence sufficiently raised self-defense such tha

2015Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138 (Tex.App-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet.ref’d) holds that the State carries the burden of persuasion to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt and the review of challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s rejection of a claim of self-defense should only be under the Jackson standard.

2024Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal. 397 U.S. at 444 ; see also Murphy, 239 S.W.3d at 794–95 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 ).

2024Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal. 397 U.S. at 444 ; see also Murphy, 239 S.W.3d at 794–95 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 ).

2024We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s rejection of defense of third person under the standard in Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Raza v. State, No. 05-17-00066-CR, 2018 WL 1062451 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 1 Appellant testified that at some point during the day’s events, Washington started coming towards her with a paver (landscaping brick) in his hand saying he was going to “F me up.” Despite video footage capturing parts of the incident, she did not have video evidence corroborating th

2018We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s rejection of defense of third person claim under the standard in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

2022Acknowledging that factual sufficiency review in a criminal case was abrogated by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895 .

2015See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 ; Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd); see also Miranda v. State, 350 S.W.3d 141, 147 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.).3 We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. At 318–19); see Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 77

2015See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 ; Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd); see also Miranda v. State, 350 S.W.3d 141, 147 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.).3 We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19); see Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 77

2025A. Standard of Review In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 ; Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd); see also Miranda v. State, 350 S.W.3d 141, 147 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.).3 We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19); see Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 77

2024Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal. 397 U.S. at 444 ; see also Murphy, 239 S.W.3d at 794–95 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 ).

2024Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal. 397 U.S. at 444 ; see also Murphy, 239 S.W.3d at 794–95 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 ).

2006Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (citing Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)).

2004Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Cr.App.2003); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Cr.App.2000).

2026Under appropriate circumstances, a defendant may affirmatively raise the claim of self-defense to a prosecution for murder if the use of force is “justified.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 606 (“It is a defense to prosecution that the conduct in question is justified under this chapter.” (quoting PENAL § 9.02)); see also Gamino v. State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim.

2026See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 611–13; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 19 914; Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 404.

2014The court stated that it would “find the evidence factually sufficient to support the rejection of a claim of duress where the evidence 9 shows that the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to compulsion.” Id.

2014The court stated that it would “find the evidence factually sufficient to support the rejection of a claim of duress where the evidence 9 shows that the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to compulsion.” Id.

2008Id. at 595 (holding that “when a defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the rejection of a defense, the reviewing court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light and asks whether the State's evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence”); see Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417 ; Guia v. State, 220 S.W.3d 197, 204 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. ref’d); accord Dotson, 146 S.W.3d at 292 (analyzing factual sufficiency under former factual sufficiency standar

2008Id . at 595 (holding that “when a defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the rejection of a defense, the reviewing court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light and asks whether the State's evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence”); see Watson , 204 S.W.3d at 417 ; Guia v. State , 220 S.W.3d 197, 204 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. ref’d); accord Dotson , 146 S.W.3d at 292 (analyzing factual sufficiency under former factual sufficiency sta

2008Id. at 595 (holding that “when a defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the rejection of a defense, the reviewing court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light and asks whether the State's evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence”); see Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417 ; Guia v. State, 220 S.W.3d 197, 204 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. ref’d); accord Dotson, 146 S.W.3d at 292 (analyzing factual sufficiency under former factual sufficiency standar

2008Id . at 595 (holding that “when a defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the rejection of a defense, the reviewing court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light and asks whether the State's evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence”); see Watson , 204 S.W.3d at 417 ; Guia v. State , 220 S.W.3d 197, 204 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. ref’d); accord Dotson , 146 S.W.3d at 292 (analyzing factual sufficiency under former factual sufficiency sta

2005Roy v. State , Nos. 14-02-00909-CR & 14-02-00910-CR, 2004 WL 1607489, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 20, 2004, no pet.); see Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 482, 483, 484-85 ; Zuliani v. State , 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim.

2005Roy v. State , Nos. 14-02-00909-CR & 14-02-00910-CR, 2004 WL 1607489, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 20, 2004, no pet.); see Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 482, 483, 484-85 ; Zuliani v. State , 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim.

2024Id. (citing Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609 ); see Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572 .

2024See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609 ; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 ; see also Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572 .

2023We have applied this principle in multiple contexts, including determining a promissory note’s maturity date, Young v. Van Benthuysen, 30 Tex. 762, 768 (1868); calculating time from the rendition of a judgment, Lubbock v. Cook, 49 Tex. 96 , 100–01 (1878); establishing the time frame for filing suit after the rejection of a claim against an estate, Hunter v. Lanius, 18 S.W. 201 , 202–03 (Tex. 1892); and in calculating a grace period for payment of a life insurance policy, Aetna Life Ins.

2023We have applied this principle in multiple contexts, including determining a promissory note’s maturity date, Young v. Van Benthuysen, 30 Tex. 762, 768 (1868); calculating time from the rendition of a judgment, Lubbock v. Cook, 49 Tex. 96 , 100–01 (1878); establishing the time frame for filing suit after the rejection of a claim against an estate, Hunter v. Lanius, 18 S.W. 201 , 202–03 (Tex. 1892); and in calculating a grace period for payment of a life insurance policy, Aetna Life Ins.

2023Co. v. Wimberly, 112 S.W. 1038, 1039 (Tex. 1908).13 13 It is usually clear when parties depart from the default rule, but we have also had occasion to elaborate on the kind of circumstances that constitute sufficient indicia of objective intent to do so.

2023Co. v. Wimberly, 112 S.W. 1038, 1039 (Tex. 1908).13 13 It is usually clear when parties depart from the default rule, but we have also had occasion to elaborate on the kind of circumstances that constitute sufficient indicia of objective intent to do so.

2019See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 670 . 4 In reviewing Appellant’s factual sufficiency challenge to the jury’s rejection of his claim of sudden passion, we review all the evidence in a neutral light to determine if the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence that supports the jury’s determination.

2019See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 670 . 4 In reviewing Appellant’s factual sufficiency challenge to the jury’s rejection of his claim of sudden passion, we review all the evidence in a neutral light to determine if the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence that supports the jury’s determination.

2015See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 ; Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd); see also Miranda v. State, 350 S.W.3d 141, 147 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.).3 We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. At 318–19); see Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 77

2015See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 ; Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd); see also Miranda v. State, 350 S.W.3d 141, 147 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.).3 We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19); see Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 77

2013Particularly in view of the rejection of a waiver-by-conduct exception to the immunity of governmental entities from breach-of-contract suits in the later case of Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011), we will not reconsider the issue here. 6 Finding Ahmed has not plead a waiver of Texas Tech’s immunity from suit for his breach-of-contract claim, we overrule Ahmed’s second issue.

2013Particularly in view of the rejection of a waiver-by-conduct exception to the immunity of governmental entities from breach-of-contract suits in the later case of Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011), we will not reconsider the issue here.

2012See Op. at 29-30 (citing Cervantes-Peterson, 221 S.W.3d at 252).

2012See Slip Op. at 15–16 (citing Cervantes-Peterson, 221 S.W.3d at 252 ).

2010Section 313 of the Texas Probate Code provides in part that “[w]hen a claim or a part thereof has been rejected by the representative, the claimant shall institute suit thereon in the court of original probate jurisdiction in which the estate is pending within ninety days after such rejection, or the claim shall be barred.” Id. 1 The judgm ent also awarded $8,000 in attorney’s fees upon an unsuccessful appeal to this Court and an additional $7,500 in attorney’s fees upon an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Suprem e Court. 3 § 313; see Russell v. Dobbs, 163 Tex. 282, 286 , 354 S.W.2d 373, 376 (

2010Section 313 of the Texas Probate Code provides in part that "[w]hen a claim or a part thereof has been rejected by the representative, the claimant shall institute suit thereon in the court of original probate jurisdiction in which the estate is pending within ninety days after such rejection, or the claim shall be barred." Id. § 313; see Russell v. Dobbs , 163 Tex. 282, 286 , 354 S.W.2d 373, 376 (1962) (holding that claimant's debt was "extinguished" because claimant failed to bring suit within ninety days of rejection of claim by operation of law); In re Estate of Ayala , 19 S.W.3d 477, 479

2010Section 313 of the Texas Probate Code provides in part that “[w]hen a claim or a part thereof has been rejected by the representative, the claimant shall institute suit thereon in the court of original probate jurisdiction in which the estate is pending within ninety days after such rejection, or the claim shall be barred.” Id. 1 The judgm ent also awarded $8,000 in attorney’s fees upon an unsuccessful appeal to this Court and an additional $7,500 in attorney’s fees upon an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Suprem e Court. 3 § 313; see Russell v. Dobbs, 163 Tex. 282, 286 , 354 S.W.2d 373, 376 (

2010Section 313 of the Texas Probate Code provides in part that “[w]hen a claim or a part thereof has been rejected by the representative, the claimant shall institute suit thereon in the court of original probate jurisdiction in which the estate is pending within ninety days after such rejection, or the claim shall be barred.” Id. 1 The judgm ent also awarded $8,000 in attorney’s fees upon an unsuccessful appeal to this Court and an additional $7,500 in attorney’s fees upon an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Suprem e Court. 3 § 313; see Russell v. Dobbs, 163 Tex. 282, 286 , 354 S.W.2d 373, 376 (