rejection claim in California

1966It is there said, at pages 448-449 [ 182 P.2d 557 ] : “Moreover, the facts and circumstances of this case suggest other grounds for the rejection of the doctrine of laches: ... ‘it is not designed to punish a plaintiff’ but is ‘invoked only where a refusal would be to permit an unwarranted injustice. ’ (Hiett v. Inland Finance Corp., 210 Cal. 293, 300 [ 291 P. 414 ].) To this latter point, the court said in Hovey v. Bradbury, 112 Cal. 620 , at page 625 [ 44 P. 1077 ] : ‘. . . it is never permitted to be invoked merely to aid a faithless trustee in consummating his wrong. ’ ’ ’ The defense of l

1966It is there said, at pages 448-449 [ 182 P.2d 557 ] : “Moreover, the facts and circumstances of this case suggest other grounds for the rejection of the doctrine of laches: ... ‘it is not designed to punish a plaintiff’ but is ‘invoked only where a refusal would be to permit an unwarranted injustice. ’ (Hiett v. Inland Finance Corp., 210 Cal. 293, 300 [ 291 P. 414 ].) To this latter point, the court said in Hovey v. Bradbury, 112 Cal. 620 , at page 625 [ 44 P. 1077 ] : ‘. . . it is never permitted to be invoked merely to aid a faithless trustee in consummating his wrong. ’ ’ ’ The defense of l

2026(People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 825 (Gutierrez I).) 24 Admission of Evidence of Machleit’s Involvement in Fraudulent Conduct with Anderson was not Error Machleit contends that the trial court committed error in allowing evidence related to her involvement in a pending case regarding automobile theft by fraud.

2026(People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 825 (Gutierrez I).) 24 Admission of Evidence of Machleit’s Involvement in Fraudulent Conduct with Anderson was not Error Machleit contends that the trial court committed error in allowing evidence related to her involvement in a pending case regarding automobile theft by fraud.

2024(See e.g., Rojas, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450 [assertedly omitted findings “may reasonably be found to be implicit in other findings”].) In determining the amount of the penalty, the court first listed all of the statutory penalty factors, including “the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth” (§§ 17206, subd. (b), 17536, subd. (b)), and stated it “considered the factors” as well as “the entire record” (italics added) and decided that $22,375,782 in statutory penalties is “reasonable and supported by the evidence.” 63 Although the trial court did not detail all of the relevant evi

2024(See e.g., Rojas, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450 [assertedly omitted findings “may reasonably be found to be implicit in other findings”].) In determining the amount of the penalty, the court first listed all of the statutory penalty factors, including “the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth” (§§ 17206, subd. (b), 17536, subd. (b)), and stated it “considered the factors” as well as “the entire record” (italics added) and decided that $22,375,782 in statutory penalties is “reasonable and supported by the evidence.” 63 Although the trial court did not detail all of the relevant evi

2014(See People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 441, fn. 17 .) Therefore, the trial court’s ruling that Johnston’s letter was admissible as an adoptive admission would not have necessarily led to a rejection of the claim that defendant was denied due process of law because law enforcement had misplaced his letter to Johnston.

2011(People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 133 P.3d 581 ].) 9 The prosecutor’s theory on the guns was the following: During the Hillgrove Market robbery, Gonzales was armed with a .38-caliber special or a .357-caliber Magnum revolver and Soliz was armed with a nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol, although he did not fire it there.

2001Therefore, it is consistent with the [CPRA], Under this privilege, the burden of demonstrating a need for nondisclosure is on the agency claiming the right to withhold the information. [Citation.] Thus, this court’s rejection of the claim of exemption under section 6255 on the ground that the public interest weighs in favor of disclosure similarly requires rejection of the claims of exemption under section 6254, subdivision (k) and Evidence Code section 1040.” (See also American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Deukmejian (1982) 32 Cal.3d 440, 446-447, fn. 6 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 235 , 651 P.2d 8

2001Therefore, it is consistent with the [CPRA], Under this privilege, the burden of demonstrating a need for nondisclosure is on the agency claiming the right to withhold the information. [Citation.] Thus, this court’s rejection of the claim of exemption under section 6255 on the ground that the public interest weighs in favor of disclosure similarly requires rejection of the claims of exemption under section 6254, subdivision (k) and Evidence Code section 1040.” (See also American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Deukmejian (1982) 32 Cal.3d 440, 446-447, fn. 6 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 235 , 651 P.2d 8

1974Thus, a rejection of a claim is merely a refusal to approve it and adjudicates nothing as to the merits of the claim (Estate of Wood, 117 Cal.App.2d 132, 133 [ 254 P.2d 940 ]).

1974Thus, a rejection of a claim is merely a refusal to approve it and adjudicates nothing as to the merits of the claim (Estate of Wood, 117 Cal.App.2d 132, 133 [ 254 P.2d 940 ]).

1947(Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. Ingersoll, 158 Cal. 474, 486 [ 111 P. 360 ].) Moreover, the facts and circumstances of this case suggest other grounds for the rejection of the doctrine of laches: It is not applied strictly between near, relatives (Butler v. Hyland, 89 Cal. 575 , *449 582 [ 26 P. 1108 ] ; Rottman v. Rottman, 55 Cal.App. 624, 632 [ 204 P. 46 ]); it is of little significance in the case of a resulting trust (Moultrie v. Wright, 154 Cal. 520, 526 [ 98 P. 257 ]) ; and “it is not designed to punish a plaintiff” but is “invoked only where a refusal would be to permit an unwarranted i

1947(Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. Ingersoll, 158 Cal. 474, 486 [ 111 P. 360 ].) Moreover, the facts and circumstances of this case suggest other grounds for the rejection of the doctrine of laches: It is not applied strictly between near, relatives (Butler v. Hyland, 89 Cal. 575 , *449 582 [ 26 P. 1108 ] ; Rottman v. Rottman, 55 Cal.App. 624, 632 [ 204 P. 46 ]); it is of little significance in the case of a resulting trust (Moultrie v. Wright, 154 Cal. 520, 526 [ 98 P. 257 ]) ; and “it is not designed to punish a plaintiff” but is “invoked only where a refusal would be to permit an unwarranted i

1939(County of Yolo v. Joyce, 156 Cal. 429, 432 [ 105 Pac. 125 ].) However, the converse does not necessarily follow and upon the rejection of a claim by such board the claimant may bring an action at law and establish his claim against the county as fully and effectively as it would have been established by a favorable order of the board in the first instance.” The defendant does not refer to, nor does there appear to be included in the statute, any limitation upon the jurisdiction of the court in the trial of an action permitted to be brought on a rejected claim pursuant to section 4078 of the P

1939(County of Yolo v. Joyce, 156 Cal. 429, 432 [ 105 Pac. 125 ].) However, the converse does not necessarily follow and upon the rejection of a claim by such board the claimant may bring an action at law and establish his claim against the county as fully and effectively as it would have been established by a favorable order of the board in the first instance.” The defendant does not refer to, nor does there appear to be included in the statute, any limitation upon the jurisdiction of the court in the trial of an action permitted to be brought on a rejected claim pursuant to section 4078 of the P

2018In that matter, the DMV filed a writ petition complaining that the trial *706 court had erred by including individuals who had not filed timely claims and who had not consented to representation within it certified class of persons entitled to vehicle license fee refunds. ( Id. at p. 424, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 .) The appellate court agreed that Woosley made clear that the class on remand should be limited to persons who had filed timely claims for refund: "Each [class member] must demonstrate both the filing of a timely valid claim within the period provided by the *385 claims statute and the reje

2018In that matter, the DMV filed a writ petition complaining that the trial *706 court had erred by including individuals who had not filed timely claims and who had not consented to representation within it certified class of persons entitled to vehicle license fee refunds. ( Id. at p. 424, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 .) The appellate court agreed that Woosley made clear that the class on remand should be limited to persons who had filed timely claims for refund: "Each [class member] must demonstrate both the filing of a timely valid claim within the period provided by the *385 claims statute and the reje

2013(Anson v. County of Merced (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1202 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 457 ].) The Department, however, disregards the express language of section 945.6, which limits its application to “a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented.” (§ 945.6, subd. (a).) We have determined that a WPA claim is not subject to the presentation process of the Claims Act.

2013(Anson v. County of Merced (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1202 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 457 ].) The Department, however, disregards the express language of section 945.6, which limits its application to “a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented.” (§ 945.6, subd. (a).) We have determined that a WPA claim is not subject to the presentation process of the Claims Act.

1998We agree the defense was unavailable in light of the evidence at trial. “[A] trial court is not required to instruct on a claim-of-right defense unless there is evidence to support an inference that appellant acted with a subjective belief he or she had a lawful claim on the property.” (People v. Romo (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 440 ].) Whether or not the evidence provides the necessary support for drawing that particular inference is a question of law.

1998We agree the defense was unavailable in light of the evidence at trial. “[A] trial court is not required to instruct on a claim-of-right defense unless there is evidence to support an inference that appellant acted with a subjective belief he or she had a lawful claim on the property.” (People v. Romo (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 440 ].) Whether or not the evidence provides the necessary support for drawing that particular inference is a question of law.

1988Such extraordinary relief was provided in Scott v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d 476, 481 , where the claim was deemed denied by operation of law, but the notice from the county stated that the claim was untimely.

1985(Scott v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 476, 482 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 785 ].) Likewise in the instant case, Jenkins presented the County with a timely claim and an unnecessary application for leave to present a late claim.

1940Although the basis for this instruction is found in subdivisions 6 and 7 of section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nevertheless the rejection of such an instruction has been held not to be error for the reasons assigned in People v. Cuff, 122 Cal. 589, 591 [ 55 Pac. 407 ].

1940Although the basis for this instruction is found in subdivisions 6 and 7 of section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nevertheless the rejection of such an instruction has been held not to be error for the reasons assigned in People v. Cuff, 122 Cal. 589, 591 [ 55 Pac. 407 ].

2025(See People v. Clark, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 378 [“Issues arising out of self-defense, including whether the circumstances would cause a reasonable person to perceive the necessity of defense, whether the defendant actually acted out of defense of himself, and whether the force used was excessive, are normally questions of fact for the trier of fact to resolve.”], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Blakeley, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 92 .) Relying on isolated portions of the testimony of prosecution witnesses and his own testimony, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to

2024(See Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1044 [“‘“[W]here the evidence is uncontroverted and establishes all of the elements for a finding of self-defense it may be held as a matter of law that the killing was justified; however, where some of the evidence tends to show a situation in which a killing may not be justified then the issue is a question of fact for the jury to determine.”’”].) Alternatively, she argues that even if we find there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s rejection of her claim of an actual, reasonable need to defend J.B., there is not substantial evidence supportin