rejection rule (District of Columbia) · Go Syfert
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rejection rule in District of Columbia

10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Snipes v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen
dc · 1988 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997The controlling provisions of the statute governing modification of a compensation award, D.C.Code § 36-324, provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) At any time prior to 1 year after the date of the last payment of compensation or at any time prior to 1 year after the rejection of a claim, ... the Mayor may, upon his own initiative or upon application of a party in interest, order a review of a compensation case pursuant to the procedures provided in § 36-320 where there is reason to believe that a change of conditions has occurred which raises issues concerning: (1) The fact or the degree

1997Such conditions, DOES contends, are established in this record. [1] The controlling provisions of the statute governing modification of a compensation award, D.C.Code § 36-324, provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) At any time prior to 1 year after the date of the last payment of compensation or at any time prior to 1 year after the rejection of a claim, ... the Mayor may, upon his own initiative or upon application of a party in interest, order a review of a compensation case pursuant to the procedures provided in § 36-320 where there is reason to believe that a change of conditions has

22
Bethea v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1976 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022In the trial court’s view, permitting such evidence to be considered on the issue of objective reasonableness would be contrary to this jurisdiction’s rejection of the defense of “diminished capacity.” E.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 83-92 (D.C. 1976).

11
Short v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen
dc · 1998 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015See Short v. DOES, 723 A.2d 845, 851-52 (D.C.1998) (noting that any doubts as to causation “are to be resolved in favor of the claimant”).

11
Finkelstein v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc.green
dc · 2001 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007“This court, for example, has held that a defendant church may appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss based on a claim of immunity from suit under the First Amendment.” Finkelstein, 774 A.2d at 340 (citations omitted).

11
Ferreira v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen
dc · 1987 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000Our decision in Oubre was based to a considerable extent on the principle, expressed in many of our cases, that the Workers' Compensation Act "is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.” Oubre, 630 A.2d at 704 (citing Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Services, 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987)); accord, e.g., Capitol Hill Hospital, 726 A.2d at 686 ("the Act should be construed liberally in favor of the employee”).

11
Capitol Hill Hospital v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen
dc · 1999 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000Our decision in Oubre was based to a considerable extent on the principle, expressed in many of our cases, that the Workers' Compensation Act "is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.” Oubre, 630 A.2d at 704 (citing Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Services, 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987)); accord, e.g., Capitol Hill Hospital, 726 A.2d at 686 ("the Act should be construed liberally in favor of the employee”).

11
United States v. Joseph Alexandergreen
cadc · 1970 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979
2 sentences

1979See United States v. Alexander, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 163 , 430 F.2d 904 (1970). 6 This court, like the federal courts, has followed the traditional rule.

1979See United States v. Alexander, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 163 , 430 F.2d 904 (1970). 6 This court, like the federal courts, has followed the traditional rule.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Mitchell v. United States green
dc · 1991
2 sentences

2017The government relies on Spriggs, 52 A.3d 878 , and Mitchell v. United States, 595 A.2d 1010 (D.C. 1991), for the proposition that a failure to give a lesser-included-offense instruction is harmless when conviction for the greater offense evinces a rejection of the defense’s theory underlying its request for the instruction.

2017The government relies on Spriggs, 52 A.3d 878 , and Mitchell v. United 22 States, 595 A.2d 1010 (D.C. 1991), for the proposition that a failure to give a lesser-included-offense instruction is harmless when conviction for the greater offense evinces a rejection of the defense’s theory underlying its request for the instruction.

12017–2017
Spriggs v. United States green
dc · 2012
2 sentences

2017The government relies on Spriggs, 52 A.3d 878 , and Mitchell v. United States, 595 A.2d 1010 (D.C. 1991), for the proposition that a failure to give a lesser-included-offense instruction is harmless when conviction for the greater offense evinces a rejection of the defense’s theory underlying its request for the instruction.

2017The government relies on Spriggs, 52 A.3d 878 , and Mitchell v. United 22 States, 595 A.2d 1010 (D.C. 1991), for the proposition that a failure to give a lesser-included-offense instruction is harmless when conviction for the greater offense evinces a rejection of the defense’s theory underlying its request for the instruction.

12017–2017
Oubre v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services green
dc · 1993
1 sentence

2000Our decision in Oubre was based to a considerable extent on the principle, expressed in many of our cases, that the Workers' Compensation Act "is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.” Oubre, 630 A.2d at 704 (citing Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Services, 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987)); accord, e.g., Capitol Hill Hospital, 726 A.2d at 686 ("the Act should be construed liberally in favor of the employee”).

12000–2000
McEvily v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services green
dc · 1985
1 sentence

1993In McEvily v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 500 A.2d 1022 (D.C.1985), this court considered the agency’s rejection of a claim for workers’ compensation not unlike the present one.

11993–1993
Sealfon v. United States green
scotus · 1948
2 sentences

1988Id. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (quoting Sealfon, supra, 332 U.S. at 579 , 68 S.Ct. at 240 ).

1988Id. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (quoting Sealfon, supra, 332 U.S. at 579 , 68 S.Ct. at 240 ).

11988–1988
United States v. Jackson green
dc · 1987
1 sentence

1988Id. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (quoting Sealfon, supra, 332 U.S. at 579 , 68 S.Ct. at 240 ). *66 We have addressed the issue of collateral estoppel as a component of double jeopardy in three cases beginning with United States v. Smith, 337 A.2d 499 (D.C.1975), followed by Copening v. United States, 353 A.2d 305 (D.C.1976), and most recently in Jackson v. United States, 528 A.2d 1211 (D.C.1987).

11988–1988
United States v. Smith green
dc · 1975
1 sentence

1988Id. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (quoting Sealfon, supra, 332 U.S. at 579 , 68 S.Ct. at 240 ). *66 We have addressed the issue of collateral estoppel as a component of double jeopardy in three cases beginning with United States v. Smith, 337 A.2d 499 (D.C.1975), followed by Copening v. United States, 353 A.2d 305 (D.C.1976), and most recently in Jackson v. United States, 528 A.2d 1211 (D.C.1987).

11988–1988
Ashe v. Swenson green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

1988Id. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (quoting Sealfon, supra, 332 U.S. at 579 , 68 S.Ct. at 240 ).

1988Id. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (quoting Sealfon, supra, 332 U.S. at 579 , 68 S.Ct. at 240 ).

11988–1988
Copening v. United States green
dc · 1976
1 sentence

1988Id. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (quoting Sealfon, supra, 332 U.S. at 579 , 68 S.Ct. at 240 ). *66 We have addressed the issue of collateral estoppel as a component of double jeopardy in three cases beginning with United States v. Smith, 337 A.2d 499 (D.C.1975), followed by Copening v. United States, 353 A.2d 305 (D.C.1976), and most recently in Jackson v. United States, 528 A.2d 1211 (D.C.1987).

11988–1988

Where else courts name it

TX 186 (1875–2026) CA 103 (1870–2026) NY 79 (1879–2020) LA 59 (1857–2023) PA 33 (1925–2023) WA 25 (1906–2017) NJ 21 (1950–2026) OH 20 (1918–2024) OR 18 (1892–2004) CT 18 (1982–2019) IL 17 (1894–2022) TN 16 (2004–2020) MD 15 (1888–2024) MO 14 (1917–2016) FL 14 (1977–2013) AZ 13 (1925–2013) MA 13 (1831–2024) MS 12 (1884–2022) VA 11 (1950–2014) DC 10 (1979–2022) MI 9 (1878–2019) CO 9 (1977–2025) UT 9 (1923–2023) IN 9 (1891–2020) AL 8 (1847–2008) MT 8 (1920–2002) NM 7 (1936–2014) KY 7 (1964–2000) AK 6 (1977–2010) IA 6 (1971–2020) AR 5 (1974–2007) KS 5 (1924–2021) HI 5 (1961–2022) WV 5 (1914–1990) ID 4 (1925–1974) GA 4 (1885–2024) VI 4 (2011–2023) SD 4 (1906–2010) OK 4 (1915–2020) NV 4 (1955–2021) NE 3 (1896–2016) MN 3 (1883–2008) NC 2 (1989–2004) ME 2 (1861–1994) WY 2 (1987–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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