rejection claim in Illinois

1983Noting that narcotics addicts are “notorious liars” and that their testimony is “subject to suspicion,” the court stated: “It is our opinion that inasmuch as [the informant’s] credibility was the crucial factor in the determination of this case, there being, insufficient independent evidence in the record to establish defendant’s guilt, the trial court’s rejection of defense counsel’s request to examine the informant’s arm was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error. [Citation.]” People v. Strother (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 95, 99 .

1979(People v. Strother (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 95 , 290 N.E.2d 201 .) In the instant case the credibility of the witness Smith was a crucial factor, and the trial court’s rejection of defense counsel’s request to examine the witness’ arm constituted an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error.

1978It is our opinion that inasmuch as Bradley's credibility was the crucial factor in the determination of this case, there being insufficient independent evidence in the record to establish defendant's guilt, the trial court's rejection of defense counsel's request to examine the informant's arm was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error. ( People v. Lewis (1962), 25 Ill.2d 396 .)" ( 52 Ill.2d 95, 99 .) Similarly, I find the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the discovery requested here.

1978(People v. Lewis (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 396 .)” ( 52 Ill. 2d 95, 99 .) Similarly, I find the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the discovery requested here.

2020She contends that counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to object to the composition of the venire from which her jury was chosen on the basis of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and (2) failing to request an additional second-degree murder instruction on serious provocation due to mutual combat.

1994(See Duckworth v. Serrano (1981), 454 U.S. 1, 3 , 70 L.

1994(See Duckworth v. Serrano (1981), 454 U.S. 1, 3 , 70 L.

1991The supreme court observed that the question of entrapment was one for the trier of fact, “unless the trial court or a reviewing court can find entrapment as a matter of law.” ( 78 Ill. 2d at 487 , 401 N.E.2d at 533 ; see also People v. Poulos (1990), 196 Ill.

1991The supreme court observed that the question of entrapment was one for the trier of fact, “unless the trial court or a reviewing court can find entrapment as a matter of law.” ( 78 Ill. 2d at 487 , 401 N.E.2d at 533 ; see also People v. Poulos (1990), 196 Ill.

1986(See also State of Kansas v. One 1978 Chevrolet Corvette (1983), 8 Kan.

1984As a second argument for precluding review of this issue, the State argues the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 508 , should serve to support a rejection of the claim made here.

1974App.2d 466 , 209 N.E.2d 686 , are authority for the proposition that the presumption of substantial pecuniary loss is rebuttable and that the presumption is weighed with other evidence. *150 The judgment in this case is inadequate not because of a rejection of the presumption, but because the affirmative evidence, even if not presented in model form, commands a higher verdict.

1965Co., 251 Ill App 169; McKinney v. Illinois Power Co., 26 Ill App2d 193, 167 NE2d 249 ), but furthermore the plaintiff did not object to the court’s rejection of the instruction in her post-trial motion.

1943(DeWolf v. Bowley, 355 Ill. 530, 538 ; People v. Brown, 281 Ill. 390 ; Bengson v. City of Kewanee, supra.) Appellant’s claim that under that part of the prayer for such other, further or different relief, he is entitled to a writ to compel the county board to take action upon his claim, is answered by the fact that the board’s refusal to act after repeated demands upon it to do so, amounts to a rejection of the claim (Loewenthal v. People ex rel.

1943(DeWolf v. Bowley, 355 Ill. 530, 538 ; People v. Brown, 281 Ill. 390 ; Bengson v. City of Kewanee, supra.) Appellant’s claim that under that part of the prayer for such other, further or different relief, he is entitled to a writ to compel the county board to take action upon his claim, is answered by the fact that the board’s refusal to act after repeated demands upon it to do so, amounts to a rejection of the claim (Loewenthal v. People ex rel.

1943Raymond, 192 Ill. 222 ; Board of Supervisors v. Commissioners of Highways, 66 Ill.

1943(DeWolf v. Bowley, 355 Ill. 530, 538 ; People v. Brown, 281 Ill. 390 ; Bengson v. City of Kewanee, supra.) Appellant’s claim that under that part of the prayer for such other, further or different relief, he is entitled to a writ to compel the county board to take action upon his claim, is answered by the fact that the board’s refusal to act after repeated demands upon it to do so, amounts to a rejection of the claim (Loewenthal v. People ex rel.

1943Raymond, 192 Ill. 222 ; Board of Supervisors v. Commissioners of Highways, 66 Ill.

1907Chase v. Sycamore and Courtland Railroad Co. 38 Ill. 215 , was a suit to recover on a subscription to stock in a railroad company.

1903Association v. Loomis, 43 Ill.

1894The tendency of American decisions is to reconcile every apparent repugnancy, so much so, that Mr. Redfield, in his work on Wills (p. 453), was moved to declare “ that it is now becoming very uncommon with us to hear a court declare a will, or any of its provisions, wholly inoperative by reason of repugnancy or uncertainty.” The rejection of a clause in a will was denominated in Jenks v. Jackson, 127 Ill. 341 , “A desperate remedy to be resorted to only in case of necessity.” The primary consideration, it was said in Walker v. Pritchard, 121 Ill. 221 , “is the ascertainment of the intention of

1894The tendency of American decisions is to reconcile every apparent repugnancy, so much so, that Mr. Redfield, in his work on Wills (p. 453), was moved to declare “ that it is now becoming very uncommon with us to hear a court declare a will, or any of its provisions, wholly inoperative by reason of repugnancy or uncertainty.” The rejection of a clause in a will was denominated in Jenks v. Jackson, 127 Ill. 341 , “A desperate remedy to be resorted to only in case of necessity.” The primary consideration, it was said in Walker v. Pritchard, 121 Ill. 221 , “is the ascertainment of the intention of