rejection defense in Connecticut

2004In State v. Hall, 213 Conn. 579, 589 , 569 A.2d 534 (1990), we held that “the jury’s verdict of guilty on the offense of manslaughter in the first degree was necessarily a rejection of the defense of self-defense.

2004In State v. Hall, 213 Conn. 579, 589 , 569 A.2d 534 (1990), we held that “the jury’s verdict of guilty on the offense of manslaughter in the first degree was necessarily a rejection of the defense of self-defense.

2018Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.' Ashe v. Swenson , supra, at 444 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 . " 'Moreover, in reviewing the earlier trial to determine the jury's basis for the acquittal, a court "should not strain to dream up hypertechnical and unrealistic grounds on which the previous verdict might conceivably have rested." United States v. Jacobson , 547 F.2d 21 , 23 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 4

1990“Moreover, in reviewing the earlier trial to determine the jury’s basis for the acquittal, a court ‘should not strain to dream up hypertechnical and unrealistic grounds on which the previous verdict might conceivably have rested.’ United States v. Jacobson, 547 F.2d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 , 97 S. Ct. 1581 , 51L.

2018Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.' Ashe v. Swenson , supra, at 444 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 . " 'Moreover, in reviewing the earlier trial to determine the jury's basis for the acquittal, a court "should not strain to dream up hypertechnical and unrealistic grounds on which the previous verdict might conceivably have rested." United States v. Jacobson , 547 F.2d 21 , 23 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 4

1990“Moreover, in reviewing the earlier trial to determine the jury’s basis for the acquittal, a court ‘should not strain to dream up hypertechnical and unrealistic grounds on which the previous verdict might conceivably have rested.’ United States v. Jacobson, 547 F.2d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 , 97 S. Ct. 1581 , 51L.

2019The defendant filed a motion to consolidate the appeals, which was granted. 3 ‘‘The trial court acted pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-582 (e) (1) . . . which provides in relevant part: ‘If the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be confined or conditionally released, the court shall order the acquittee committed to the jurisdiction of the board and . . . confined in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities . . . for custody, care and treatment pending a hearing before the board pursuant to section 17a-583; provided (A) the court shall fix a maximum term of commitment, not t

2019The defendant filed a motion to consolidate the appeals, which was granted. 3 ‘‘The trial court acted pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-582 (e) (1) . . . which provides in relevant part: ‘If the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be confined or conditionally released, the court shall order the acquittee committed to the jurisdiction of the board and . . . confined in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities . . . for custody, care and treatment pending a hearing before the board pursuant to section 17a-583; provided (A) the court shall fix a maximum term of commitment, not t

2018Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.' Ashe v. Swenson , supra, at 444 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 . " 'Moreover, in reviewing the earlier trial to determine the jury's basis for the acquittal, a court "should not strain to dream up hypertechnical and unrealistic grounds on which the previous verdict might conceivably have rested." United States v. Jacobson , 547 F.2d 21 , 23 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 4

2010This court has held that “[t]he purpose of [§ 45a-363] is to encourage the timely settlement of decedents’ estates. [Section] 45a-363 is purely procedural in nature, governing the time within which to file a suit against an estate when a claim has been rejected by an executor or administrator.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kubish v. Zega, 61 Conn. App. 608, 620 , 767 A.2d 148 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 949 , 769 A.2d 62 (2001).

2010This court has held that “[t]he purpose of [§ 45a-363] is to encourage the timely settlement of decedents’ estates. [Section] 45a-363 is purely procedural in nature, governing the time within which to file a suit against an estate when a claim has been rejected by an executor or administrator.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kubish v. Zega, 61 Conn. App. 608, 620 , 767 A.2d 148 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 949 , 769 A.2d 62 (2001).

2010This court has held that “[t]he purpose of [§ 45a-363] is to encourage the timely settlement of decedents’ estates. [Section] 45a-363 is purely procedural in nature, governing the time within which to file a suit against an estate when a claim has been rejected by an executor or administrator.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kubish v. Zega, 61 Conn. App. 608, 620 , 767 A.2d 148 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 949 , 769 A.2d 62 (2001).

2010This court has held that “[t]he purpose of [§ 45a-363] is to encourage the timely settlement of decedents’ estates. [Section] 45a-363 is purely procedural in nature, governing the time within which to file a suit against an estate when a claim has been rejected by an executor or administrator.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kubish v. Zega, 61 Conn. App. 608, 620 , 767 A.2d 148 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 949 , 769 A.2d 62 (2001).

2010The Keller group argued that a statute of limitation contained in General Statutes § 45a-363 required it to either file suit in Superior Court within 120 days of the defendant’s rejection of its claim or risk being time barred from seeking relief. 3 On May 15, 2008, the Keller group requested that the Superior Court stay its action until such time as Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, supra, 115 Conn. App. 680 , was decided by this court.

2010The court concluded that the statutory limitation on the time period in which a plaintiff may pursue a claim in the Superior Court following a rejection of such claim by an estate “[does not imbue] [the Superior Court] with jurisdiction it does not otherwise have.” As such, because Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, supra, 115 Conn. App. 680 , still had not been decided by this court, the trial court determined that the matter was not ripe for adjudication.

2008In making this finding, the court cited RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384 , 650 A.2d 153 (1994), for the proposition that “[t]he essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury.” The court upheld *117 the board’s decision that the plaintiff violated § 20-202 (8) and the board’s rejection of his claim that he was providing educational training at his “hospital.” The court further found that the plaintiff had sufficient notice of the charges against him and that admission of the prior disci

2008In making this finding, the court cited RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384 , 650 A.2d 153 (1994), for the proposition that “[t]he essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury.” The court upheld *117 the board’s decision that the plaintiff violated § 20-202 (8) and the board’s rejection of his claim that he was providing educational training at his “hospital.” The court further found that the plaintiff had sufficient notice of the charges against him and that admission of the prior disci

2005The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court; New London v. Foss & Bourke, Inc., 85 Conn. App. 275, 284 , 857 A.2d 370 (2004); and upheld the rejection of the doctrine on the ground that “[n]o Connecticut court ha[d] adopted the assembled economic unit doctrine,” and that “[a]ll of the Connecticut cases that the defendant relie [d] on consistently applied] the principle that just compensation in an eminent domain action [was] based on the market value of the condemned property and in accordance with the traditional fixture analysis.” Id., 280 .

2005The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court; New London v. Foss & Bourke, Inc., 85 Conn. App. 275, 284 , 857 A.2d 370 (2004); and upheld the rejection of the doctrine on the ground that “[n]o Connecticut court ha[d] adopted the assembled economic unit doctrine,” and that “[a]ll of the Connecticut cases that the defendant relie [d] on consistently applied] the principle that just compensation in an eminent domain action [was] based on the market value of the condemned property and in accordance with the traditional fixture analysis.” Id., 280 .

2004Since the elements of self-defense as applied to manslaughter in the second degree would have been the same as those applied to manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant would not have benefited by an instruction that the defense was applicable to manslaughter in the second degree.” See also State v. Cartagena, 47 Conn. App. 317, 325 , 708 A.2d 964 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 904 , 714 A.2d 3 (1998); State v. Williams, 25 Conn. App. 456, 467-68 , 595 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 916 , 597 A.2d 339 (1991).

2004Since the elements of self-defense as applied to manslaughter in the second degree would have been the same as those applied to manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant would not have benefited by an instruction that the defense was applicable to manslaughter in the second degree.” See also State v. Cartagena, 47 Conn. App. 317, 325 , 708 A.2d 964 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 904 , 714 A.2d 3 (1998); State v. Williams, 25 Conn. App. 456, 467-68 , 595 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 916 , 597 A.2d 339 (1991).

2004Since the elements of self-defense as applied to manslaughter in the second degree would have been the same as those applied to manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant would not have benefited by an instruction that the defense was applicable to manslaughter in the second degree.” See also State v. Cartagena, 47 Conn. App. 317, 325 , 708 A.2d 964 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 904 , 714 A.2d 3 (1998); State v. Williams, 25 Conn. App. 456, 467-68 , 595 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 916 , 597 A.2d 339 (1991).

2004Since the elements of self-defense as applied to manslaughter in the second degree would have been the same as those applied to manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant would not have benefited by an instruction that the defense was applicable to manslaughter in the second degree.” See also State v. Cartagena, 47 Conn. App. 317, 325 , 708 A.2d 964 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 904 , 714 A.2d 3 (1998); State v. Williams, 25 Conn. App. 456, 467-68 , 595 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 916 , 597 A.2d 339 (1991).

2004Since the elements of self-defense as applied to manslaughter in the second degree would have been the same as those applied to manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant would not have benefited by an instruction that the defense was applicable to manslaughter in the second degree.” See also State v. Cartagena, 47 Conn. App. 317, 325 , 708 A.2d 964 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 904 , 714 A.2d 3 (1998); State v. Williams, 25 Conn. App. 456, 467-68 , 595 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 916 , 597 A.2d 339 (1991).

2004Since the elements of self-defense as applied to manslaughter in the second degree would have been the same as those applied to manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant would not have benefited by an instruction that the defense was applicable to manslaughter in the second degree.” See also State v. Cartagena, 47 Conn. App. 317, 325 , 708 A.2d 964 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 904 , 714 A.2d 3 (1998); State v. Williams, 25 Conn. App. 456, 467-68 , 595 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 916 , 597 A.2d 339 (1991).

2004Since the elements of self-defense as applied to manslaughter in the second degree would have been the same as those applied to manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant would not have benefited by an instruction that the defense was applicable to manslaughter in the second degree.” See also State v. Cartagena, 47 Conn. App. 317, 325 , 708 A.2d 964 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 904 , 714 A.2d 3 (1998); State v. Williams, 25 Conn. App. 456, 467-68 , 595 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 916 , 597 A.2d 339 (1991).

2004Since the elements of self-defense as applied to manslaughter in the second degree would have been the same as those applied to manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant would not have benefited by an instruction that the defense was applicable to manslaughter in the second degree.” See also State v. Cartagena, 47 Conn. App. 317, 325 , 708 A.2d 964 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 904 , 714 A.2d 3 (1998); State v. Williams, 25 Conn. App. 456, 467-68 , 595 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 916 , 597 A.2d 339 (1991).

1998A settlement agreement will not be invalidated when the duress emanates from third persons who have no involvement with the party seeking to enforce it; King v. Bishop , 879 S.W.2d 222 , 224 (Tex.App. 1994); and because the evidence offered by the defendant himself in this case establishes that the decisive coercive influence exerted upon him to sign the agreement came from his wife at a time when he was also being pressured by the other agents in the office to do so, rather than from the defendant, the rejection of the defense of duress can be justified on that ground alone.

1996We are further guided by our Supreme Court’s decision in Raymond v. Bailey, supra, 98 Conn. 201 .

1992In construing a similar statute, the appellate court said, "[t]he general rule is that a time limitation on the enforcement of a right, created by statute and not existing at common law, is a part of the right and must be CT Page 3290 met in order to provide a court with jurisdiction to hear the cause of action." Wilburn v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 3 Conn. App. 284 , 288 , 487 A.2d 568 (1985).

1992In construing a similar statute, the appellate court said, "[t]he general rule is that a time limitation on the enforcement of a right, created by statute and not existing at common law, is a part of the right and must be CT Page 3290 met in order to provide a court with jurisdiction to hear the cause of action." Wilburn v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 3 Conn. App. 284 , 288 , 487 A.2d 568 (1985).

1988He did not except to the charge at trial, but maintains that this claim is nevertheless reviewable under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1988He did not except to the charge at trial, but maintains that this claim is nevertheless reviewable under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1982Since the court had no occasion to consider this issue under the facts presented, the actual malice standard still applied under the public interest analysis announced in Hill , despite the rejection of this principle in the libel area. 22 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 346 (rejecting public interest test of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 , 91 S. Ct. 1811 , 29 L.

1982Since the court had no occasion to consider this issue under the facts presented, the actual malice standard still applied under the public interest analysis announced in Hill , despite the rejection of this principle in the libel area. 22 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 346 (rejecting public interest test of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 , 91 S. Ct. 1811 , 29 L.