rejection claim in New York

1965Under the prior practice where a claimant was not advised of the rejection of his claim until the commencement of the accounting proceeding, he could thereupon and pending the disposition of such accounting bring an action on the claim in the Supreme Court, which would deprive this court of jurisdiction with regard thereto (Matter of Barclay, 266 App. Div. 1059 , 1060; Moore v. Humbert, 268 App. Div. 813, 814 ).

1951(Surrogate’s Ct. Act, § 211; Matter of Barclay, 266 App. Div. 1059 ; Moore v. Humbert, 268 App. Div. 813 .) It is our opinion that there was insufficient proof of the rejection of the claim sued upon and that the notation on the supplemental citation did not amount to an unequivocal rejection of the claim for $517 and interest which was presented to the executrix.

2005There was ample evidence warranting the jury’s rejection of the defense of temporary lawful possession (see People v Banks, 76 NY2d 799 [1990]; People v Williams, 50 NY2d 1043 [1980]).

1997There was ample evidence, including defendant’s attempt to secrete the loaded pistol in his waistband and admitted intent to take the weapon home, warranting the jury’s rejection of the defense of temporary, lawful possession (see, People v Banks, 76 NY2d 799 ).

1902The claim of the respondent that the failure of the administratrix to give notice of the rejection of the claim for a considerable time after its presentation constituted an acceptance of the claim; by which she is foreclosed, seems to be answered in Matter of Callahan ( 152 N. Y. 320 ).

1902The claim of the respondent that the failure of the administratrix to give notice of the rejection of the claim for a considerable time after its presentation constituted an acceptance of the claim, by which she is foreclosed, seems to be answered in Re Callahan’s Estate, reported in 152 N Y., at page 320, 46 N. E. 486 .

2014Our task on this appeal is not to engage in weighing the evidence, but is limited instead to determining whether the evidence controverting the extreme emotional disturbance defense is so overwhelming that there is no reasonable possibility that the constitutional error affected the jury’s rejection of that defense (see People v Patterelli, 68 AD3d at 1154-1155 ).

2014Our task on this appeal is not to engage in weighing the evidence, but is limited instead to determining whether the evidence controverting the extreme emotional disturbance defense is so overwhelming that there is no reasonable possibility that the constitutional error affected the jury’s rejection of that defense (see People v Patterelli, 68 AD3d at 1154-1155 ).

2013Moreover, upon our independent review of the evidence pursuant to CEL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the jury’s rejection of that defense was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]; People v Sedunova, 83 AD3d at 967 ).

2013Moreover, upon our independent review of the evidence pursuant to CEL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the jury’s rejection of that defense was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]; People v Sedunova, 83 AD3d at 967 ).

2013Moreover, upon our independent review of the evidence pursuant to CEL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the jury’s rejection of that defense was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]; People v Sedunova, 83 AD3d at 967 ).

2013Moreover, upon our independent review of the evidence pursuant to CEL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the jury’s rejection of that defense was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]; People v Sedunova, 83 AD3d at 967 ).

2013The absence of additional timely and specific objections did not deprive defendant of the effective assistance of counsel (compare People v Cass, 18 NY3d 553, 564 [2012], with People v Fisher, 18 NY3d 964 [2012]).

2013The absence of additional timely and specific objections did not deprive defendant of the effective assistance of counsel (compare People v Cass, 18 NY3d 553, 564 [2012], with People v Fisher, 18 NY3d 964 [2012]).

2011The jury was entitled to discredit defendant’s self-serving statements that he was coerced into committing the crimes of which he was convicted (see People v McKinnon, 78 AD3d 864 , lv denied 16 NY3d 744 ) and, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 ), we conclude that the jury’s rejection of that defense is not against the weight of the evidence (see id.; People v Zilberman, 297 AD2d 517, 518 , lv denied 99 NY2d 566 ; see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 ).

2011The jury was entitled to discredit defendant’s self-serving statements that he was coerced into committing the crimes of which he was convicted (see People v McKinnon, 78 AD3d 864 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 744 [2011]) and, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the jury’s rejection of that defense is not against the weight of the evidence (see id.; People v Zilberman, 297 AD2d 517, 518 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 566 [2002]; see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

2011The jury was entitled to discredit defendant’s self-serving statements that he was coerced into committing the crimes of which he was convicted (see People v McKinnon, 78 AD3d 864 , lv denied 16 NY3d 744 ) and, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 ), we conclude that the jury’s rejection of that defense is not against the weight of the evidence (see id.; People v Zilberman, 297 AD2d 517, 518 , lv denied 99 NY2d 566 ; see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 ).

2011The jury was entitled to discredit defendant’s self-serving statements that he was coerced into committing the crimes of which he was convicted (see People v McKinnon, 78 AD3d 864 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 744 [2011]) and, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the jury’s rejection of that defense is not against the weight of the evidence (see id.; People v Zilberman, 297 AD2d 517, 518 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 566 [2002]; see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

1987Under such circumstance the jury’s rejection of the defense of justification had a rational basis and should not be disturbed (see, People v Maldonado, 121 AD2d 400 ).

1986The evidence supports the jury’s rejection of the defense of justification (see, People v Maldonado, 121 AD2d 400 ).

1965Under the prior practice where a claimant was not advised of the rejection of his claim until the commencement of the accounting proceeding, he could thereupon and pending the disposition of such accounting bring an action on the claim in the Supreme Court, which would deprive this court of jurisdiction with regard thereto (Matter of Barclay, 266 App. Div. 1059 , 1060; Moore v. Humbert, 268 App. Div. 813, 814 ).

1951(Surrogate’s Ct. Act, § 211; Matter of Barclay, 266 App. Div. 1059 ; Moore v. Humbert, 268 App. Div. 813 .) It is our opinion that there was insufficient proof of the rejection of the claim sued upon and that the notation on the supplemental citation did not amount to an unequivocal rejection of the claim for $517 and interest which was presented to the executrix.

2014Where, as here, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we must, like the trier of fact below, "weigh conflicting testimony, review any rational inferences that may be drawn from the evidence and evaluate the strength of such conclusions" (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]; see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; 1 Defendant also maintained that his actions were justified (see Penal Law § 35.15); the jury's rejection of this defense is not challenged upon appeal. 2 County Court, in its discretion, submitted only one of the two counts of criminal possession of a w

2014The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance – which a defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (see Penal Law §§ 25.00 [2]; 125.25 [1] [a]) – permits "a defendant charged with murder in the second degree to demonstrate the existence of mitigating factors which indicate that, although he [or she] is not free from responsibility for his [or her] crime, he [or she] ought to be punished less severely by reducing the crime to manslaughter in the first degree" (People v Hoke, 276 AD2d 903 , 903 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 801 [2001]; see People v Gonzalez, 22 NY3d 539,

2014The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance – which a defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (see Penal Law §§ 25.00 [2]; 125.25 [1] [a]) – permits "a defendant charged with murder in the second degree to demonstrate the existence of mitigating factors which indicate that, although he [or she] is not free from responsibility for his [or her] crime, he [or she] ought to be punished less severely by reducing the crime to manslaughter in the first degree" (People v Hoke, 276 AD2d 903 , 903 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 801 [2001]; see People v Gonzalez, 22 NY3d 539,

2014Where, as here, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we must, like the trier of fact below, "weigh conflicting testimony, review any rational inferences that may be drawn from the evidence and evaluate the strength of such conclusions" (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]; see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; 1 Defendant also maintained that his actions were justified (see Penal Law § 35.15); the jury's rejection of this defense is not challenged upon appeal. 2 County Court, in its discretion, submitted only one of the two counts of criminal possession of a w

2009Because this evidence contradicted defendant’s justification defense, and it was for the jury to assess the credibility of the People’s witnesses, we conclude that the jury’s rejection of that defense is supported by legally sufficient evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Gilliam, 300 AD2d 701, 702 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 628 [2003]; People v Reeder, 209 AD2d 551 , 551-552 [1994], lv denied 85 NY2d 913 [1995]; People v Troche, 147 AD2d 513, 514 [1989], lv denied 73 NY2d 1022 [1989]).

2008In any event, this very same argument was made to, and rejected by, the Appellate Division in Scott v State of New York ( 46 AD3d 664 [2007]), which affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim “[s]ince the defendant failed to comply with the provisions of CPLR 3022 for rejecting an unverified claim” (see brief for appellant State of New York, 2007 WL 4701327 [2007]).