Batson challenge in Idaho

2025Since either party may raise a Batson challenge, it is “the party asserting discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge [that] bears the ultimate burden of persuasion and must show that purposeful discrimination was, in fact, the basis for use of the peremptory challenge.” Araiza, 124 6 Idaho at 88, 856 P.2d at 878 .

2025Since either party may raise a Batson challenge, it is “the party asserting discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge [that] bears the ultimate burden of persuasion and must show that purposeful discrimination was, in fact, the basis for use of the peremptory challenge.” Araiza, 124 6 Idaho at 88, 856 P.2d at 878 .

2025Regarding Buck’s Batson challenge, and based on its interpretation of Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991), it held that no Batson violation occurred because Buck “did not establish a prima facie case of 1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). discriminatory intent . . . .” State v. Buck, Dkt.

1995Hansen argued that this was in violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). *678 The state asserts that a Batson motion challenging the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes must be made before the jury is sworn to try the ease.

2025Regarding Buck’s Batson challenge, and based on its interpretation of Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991), it held that no Batson violation occurred because Buck “did not establish a prima facie case of 1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). discriminatory intent . . . .” State v. Buck, Dkt.

2023State’s race-neutral reason Once the opponent of the Batson challenge offers a reason for the use of the peremptory strike, the trial “court must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 .

2025When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a Batson challenge, this Court affords “great deference to the trial court’s finding of discriminatory intent and will not disturb that finding absent clear error.” Ish, 166 Idaho at 501 , 461 P.3d at 783 (citing Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87 , 856 P.2d at 877 ); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (“On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.”).

2025When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a Batson challenge, this Court affords “great deference to the trial court’s finding of discriminatory intent and will not disturb that finding absent clear error.” Ish, 166 Idaho at 501 , 461 P.3d at 783 (citing Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87 , 856 P.2d at 877 ); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (“On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.”).

2025Instead, the Supreme Court clarified the necessary procedural steps in addressing a Batson challenge: We explained in the context of employment discrimination litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that “[w]here the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.” United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 , 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482 , 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983).

2025Instead, the Supreme Court clarified the necessary procedural steps in addressing a Batson challenge: We explained in the context of employment discrimination litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that “[w]here the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.” United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 , 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482 , 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983).

2025“If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack [panelist] who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Miller-El v. 17 Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005).

2025“If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack [panelist] who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Miller-El v. 17 Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005).

2023See Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 716 , 274 P.3d 11, 17 (Ct. App. 2012).

2023See Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 716 , 274 P.3d 11, 17 (Ct. App. 2012).

2023Ctr., 442 S.E.2d 822, 824 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding record insufficient for appellate court to determine whether trial court erred because record did not show identity of individual panel members with any certainty).

2023Ctr., 442 S.E.2d 822, 824 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding record insufficient for appellate court to determine whether trial court erred because record did not show identity of individual panel members with any certainty).

2023Co., 160 F.3d 1023, 1028 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding party waived Batson challenge by failing to dispute opposing party’s proffered reason for peremptory strike); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). 18 We recognize that, in Snyder, the United States Supreme Court conducted a comparative- juror analysis when addressing a Batson challenge despite the argument not being raised before the trial court.

2023Co., 160 F.3d 1023, 1028 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding party waived Batson challenge by failing to dispute opposing party’s proffered reason for peremptory strike); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). 18 We recognize that, in Snyder, the United States Supreme Court conducted a comparative- juror analysis when addressing a Batson challenge despite the argument not being raised before the trial court.

2023Co., 160 F.3d 1023, 1028 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding party waived Batson challenge by failing to dispute opposing party’s proffered reason for peremptory strike); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). 18 We recognize that, in Snyder, the United States Supreme Court conducted a comparative- juror analysis when addressing a Batson challenge despite the argument not being raised before the trial court.

2023Co., 160 F.3d 1023, 1028 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding party waived Batson challenge by failing to dispute opposing party’s proffered reason for peremptory strike); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). 18 We recognize that, in Snyder, the United States Supreme Court conducted a comparative- juror analysis when addressing a Batson challenge despite the argument not being raised before the trial court.

2023Co., 160 F.3d 1023, 1028 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding party waived Batson challenge by failing to dispute opposing party’s proffered reason for peremptory strike); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). 18 We recognize that, in Snyder, the United States Supreme Court conducted a comparative- juror analysis when addressing a Batson challenge despite the argument not being raised before the trial court.

2023Co., 160 F.3d 1023, 1028 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding party waived Batson challenge by failing to dispute opposing party’s proffered reason for peremptory strike); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). 18 We recognize that, in Snyder, the United States Supreme Court conducted a comparative- juror analysis when addressing a Batson challenge despite the argument not being raised before the trial court.

2023Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding without well-crafted record, Batson challenge depends on labored piecing together of transcript fragments to intuit race and ethnicity of jurors and reconstruct and imagine what might have happened); State v. Bennett, 843 S.E.2d 222 , 232 (N.C. 2020) (if there is any question as to prospective juror’s race, issue should be resolved by trial court based upon questioning of juror or other proper evidence); Asbury v. Georgia World Cong.

2023Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding without well-crafted record, Batson challenge depends on labored piecing together of transcript fragments to intuit race and ethnicity of jurors and reconstruct and imagine what might have happened); State v. Bennett, 843 S.E.2d 222 , 232 (N.C. 2020) (if there is any question as to prospective juror’s race, issue should be resolved by trial court based upon questioning of juror or other proper evidence); Asbury v. Georgia World Cong.

2020Id. at 2243 (“A defendant of any race may raise a Batson claim, and a defendant may raise a Batson claim even if the defendant and the excluded juror are of different races.”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).

2020Id. at 2243 (“A defendant of any race may raise a Batson claim, and a defendant may raise a Batson claim even if the defendant and the excluded juror are of different races.”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).

2025When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a Batson challenge, this Court affords “great deference to the trial court’s finding of discriminatory intent and will not disturb that finding absent clear error.” Ish, 166 Idaho at 501 , 461 P.3d at 783 (citing Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87 , 856 P.2d at 877 ); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (“On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.”).

2025When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a Batson challenge, this Court affords “great deference to the trial court’s finding of discriminatory intent and will not disturb that finding absent clear error.” Ish, 166 Idaho at 501 , 461 P.3d at 783 (citing Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87 , 856 P.2d at 877 ); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (“On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.”).

2025We have explained that “[a] factual finding is clearly erroneous only if it is not supported by ‘substantial and competent evidence in the record.’ ” Ish, 166 Idaho at 515 , 461 P.3d at 797 (quoting Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 813 , 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995)). 1.

2025We have explained that “[a] factual finding is clearly erroneous only if it is not supported by ‘substantial and competent evidence in the record.’ ” Ish, 166 Idaho at 515 , 461 P.3d at 797 (quoting Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 813 , 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995)). 1.

2025Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 48 (2010).

2025Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 48 (2010).

2023Requiring the proponent to meet this evidentiary standard “is not to be taken for granted or ignored” because “[u]nder the Batson framework, a defendant has a meaningful burden to 8 establish a prima facie case of discrimination before a court may require explanation from the government.” United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 519 (7th Cir. 2005) (Judge Kanne concurrence in part) (citing United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 925 (11th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1994).

2023Requiring the proponent to meet this evidentiary standard “is not to be taken for granted or ignored” because “[u]nder the Batson framework, a defendant has a meaningful burden to 8 establish a prima facie case of discrimination before a court may require explanation from the government.” United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 519 (7th Cir. 2005) (Judge Kanne concurrence in part) (citing United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 925 (11th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1994).

2023Requiring the proponent to meet this evidentiary standard “is not to be taken for granted or ignored” because “[u]nder the Batson framework, a defendant has a meaningful burden to 8 establish a prima facie case of discrimination before a court may require explanation from the government.” United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 519 (7th Cir. 2005) (Judge Kanne concurrence in part) (citing United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 925 (11th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1994).

2023Requiring the proponent to meet this evidentiary standard “is not to be taken for granted or ignored” because “[u]nder the Batson framework, a defendant has a meaningful burden to 8 establish a prima facie case of discrimination before a court may require explanation from the government.” United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 519 (7th Cir. 2005) (Judge Kanne concurrence in part) (citing United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 925 (11th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1994).

2023United States v. Cooke, 110 F.3d 1288, 1301 (7th Cir.1997) (“[The defendant] must do more than merely point to the fact that the government excluded an African-American venireperson.”); Alverio v. Sam’s Warehouse Club, Inc., 253 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he exclusion of all members of a specific minority group does not, on its own, establish that the peremptory strikes were discriminatory.”); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that simply alleging peremptory strike was used to strike second Black juror from pool, leaving only two other Black jurors, and

2023United States v. Cooke, 110 F.3d 1288, 1301 (7th Cir.1997) (“[The defendant] must do more than merely point to the fact that the government excluded an African-American venireperson.”); Alverio v. Sam’s Warehouse Club, Inc., 253 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he exclusion of all members of a specific minority group does not, on its own, establish that the peremptory strikes were discriminatory.”); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that simply alleging peremptory strike was used to strike second Black juror from pool, leaving only two other Black jurors, and

2023For example, in Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1988), a Batson challenge was raised where only sixteen of the fifty-five persons in the venire were Black and the State used nine of its peremptory challenges to strike nine of the Black prospective jurors, struck one non-Black prospective juror, and left four peremptory challenges unexercised.

2023For example, in Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1988), a Batson challenge was raised where only sixteen of the fifty-five persons in the venire were Black and the State used nine of its peremptory challenges to strike nine of the Black prospective jurors, struck one non-Black prospective juror, and left four peremptory challenges unexercised.

2023United States v. Cooke, 110 F.3d 1288, 1301 (7th Cir.1997) (“[The defendant] must do more than merely point to the fact that the government excluded an African-American venireperson.”); Alverio v. Sam’s Warehouse Club, Inc., 253 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he exclusion of all members of a specific minority group does not, on its own, establish that the peremptory strikes were discriminatory.”); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that simply alleging peremptory strike was used to strike second Black juror from pool, leaving only two other Black jurors, and

2023Requiring the proponent to meet this evidentiary standard “is not to be taken for granted or ignored” because “[u]nder the Batson framework, a defendant has a meaningful burden to 8 establish a prima facie case of discrimination before a court may require explanation from the government.” United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 519 (7th Cir. 2005) (Judge Kanne concurrence in part) (citing United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 925 (11th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1994).

2023Requiring the proponent to meet this evidentiary standard “is not to be taken for granted or ignored” because “[u]nder the Batson framework, a defendant has a meaningful burden to 8 establish a prima facie case of discrimination before a court may require explanation from the government.” United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 519 (7th Cir. 2005) (Judge Kanne concurrence in part) (citing United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 925 (11th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1994).

2022On appeal, the State “acknowledges that [it] failed to proffer a specific gender-neutral explanation for the dismissal of prospective juror R.A. during the second step of the Batson analysis” and that it “instead generally denied any improper purpose.” This concession, however, does not establish a “per se violation of Batson.” See Gonzalez v. Brown, 585 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009).

2022On appeal, the State “acknowledges that [it] failed to proffer a specific gender-neutral explanation for the dismissal of prospective juror R.A. during the second step of the Batson analysis” and that it “instead generally denied any improper purpose.” This concession, however, does not establish a “per se violation of Batson.” See Gonzalez v. Brown, 585 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009).

2022See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 , 923 P.2d 966 , 2 We recognize that, in one opinion, the United States Supreme Court conducted a comparative-juror analysis when addressing a Batson challenge despite the argument not being raised before the trial court.

2022See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 , 923 P.2d 966 , 2 We recognize that, in one opinion, the United States Supreme Court conducted a comparative-juror analysis when addressing a Batson challenge despite the argument not being raised before the trial court.

2020Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (making Batson applicable in civil cases).

2020Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (making Batson applicable in civil cases).

2020Id. at 2243 (“A defendant of any race may raise a Batson claim, and a defendant may raise a Batson claim even if the defendant and the excluded juror are of different races.”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).

2020Id. at 2243 (“A defendant of any race may raise a Batson claim, and a defendant may raise a Batson claim even if the defendant and the excluded juror are of different races.”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).

2020See State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95 , 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019) (“We will not hold that a trial court erred in making a decision on an issue or a party’s position on an issue that it did not have the opportunity to address.”).

2020See State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95 , 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019) (“We will not hold that a trial court erred in making a decision on an issue or a party’s position on an issue that it did not have the opportunity to address.”).