Batson challenge in Missouri

2017Because the fundamental, overarching question on a Batson challenge is whether the strike constituted purposeful discrimination, 476 U.S. at 93 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 935, 939 , the State’s explanation for its strike is not necessarily discriminatory or facially invalid just because it rests on a misstatement or is rooted in a misper-ception of fact.

2017Because the fundamental, overarching question on a Batson challenge is whether the strike constituted purposeful discrimination, 476 U.S. at 93 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 935, 939 , the State’s explanation for its strike is not necessarily discriminatory or facially invalid just because it rests on a misstatement or is rooted in a misper-ception of fact.

2025However, “proof of a similarly situated Caucasian juror is not required in order to make a successful Batson challenge.” Id. at 690 .

2024See State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Mo. banc 2006) (“A finding [regarding a Batson challenge] is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”); State v. Watkins, 618 S.W.3d 265 , 269 (Mo. App. 2021) (“A ruling [on a motion to suppress] is considered clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”).

1996We stated that “[d]enying a Batson motion without allowing [defendant] an opportunity to carry his burden of proving purposeful discrimination constitutes trial court error.” Id.; see also Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939 ; State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 66 (Mo. banc 1987); Purkett v. Elem, — U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 838-40 (1995).

1994The Supreme Court established the following procedure to be followed in addressing a Batson objection: (1) Defendant must raise the Batson challenge to specific venireper-sons and identify the cognizable racial group to which they belong; (2) the State must then come forward with “reasonably specific and clear race-neutral explanations for the strike”; and (3) if the State does so, Defendant then has the burden of showing “the state’s proffered reasons for the strikes were merely pretextual and that the strikes were racially motivated.” State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 [12] (Mo. banc 1992)

2021(LF156:1-2) (LF147:8&12). 4 Standard of Review “When reviewing a ruling on a Batson challenge, we accord ‘great deference’ to the circuit court ‘because its findings of fact largely depend on its evaluation of credibility and demeanor.’” State v. Evans, 490 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (quoting State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 687 (Mo. banc 2010)).

2021A trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge constitutes clear error if "we . . . have a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Id. (quoting State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 687 (Mo. banc 2010)).

2016Standard of Review In reviewing a trial court’s findings relating to a Batson challenge, the trial court “is accorded great deference because its findings of fact largely depend on its evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” Kesler-Ferguson v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 556, 558 (Mo, banc 2008).

2016Standard of Review In reviewing a trial court’s findings relating to a Batson challenge, the trial court “is accorded great deference because its findings of fact largely depend on its evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” Kesler-Ferguson v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 556, 558 (Mo, banc 2008).

2020State v. McFadden, 216 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Mo. banc 2007) (“The trial court’s findings on a Batson challenge will be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. . . .”).

2020State v. McFadden, 216 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Mo. banc 2007) (“The trial court’s findings on a Batson challenge will be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. . . .”).

2019Mr. Boyd asserts three points on appeal: (1) that the trial court clearly erred in denying his Batson1 challenge to the State’s strike of an African-American venireperson; (2) that the trial court clearly erred in granting the State’s reverse-Batson challenge 1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). to the defense’s strike of a Caucasian venireperson; and (3) that the trial court committed evidentiary error relating to the admission of Boyd’s girlfriend’s cell phone records.

2019Mr. Boyd asserts three points on appeal: (1) that the trial court clearly erred in denying his Batson1 challenge to the State’s strike of an African-American venireperson; (2) that the trial court clearly erred in granting the State’s reverse-Batson challenge 1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). to the defense’s strike of a Caucasian venireperson; and (3) that the trial court committed evidentiary error relating to the admission of Boyd’s girlfriend’s cell phone records.

1999See also State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925, 934 (Mo. banc 1997), and State v. Sutherland, 859 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Mo.App.1993), for other cases declining to give plain error review of an unpreserved Batson challenge. 7 Even if plain error review was appropriate, we would find none.

1999See also State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925, 934 (Mo. banc 1997), and State v. Sutherland, 859 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Mo.App.1993), for other cases declining to give plain error review of an unpreserved Batson challenge. [7] Even if plain error review was appropriate, we would find none.

2020State v. Murray, 428 S.W.3d 705, 711 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). 7 AGC/Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing a peremptory strike by HK of Venireperson No. 20.

2017State v. Murray, 428 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Mo.App.

2025See Id. at 692 n.2 (Mo. banc 2013) (declining to address the argument that the strike of an alternate juror is immaterial when the Batson challenge was properly overruled on the merits); see also Goodman v. Holly Angle, LMT, 342 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (declining to address whether Batson applies to an alternate juror when “a review of [the] point on the merits demonstrates that the circuit court did not err in overruling the challenge.”). 14 is that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove Bradford knew or was aware that Victim was deceased when Bradford left the scene.

2025See Id. at 692 n.2 (Mo. banc 2013) (declining to address the argument that the strike of an alternate juror is immaterial when the Batson challenge was properly overruled on the merits); see also Goodman v. Holly Angle, LMT, 342 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (declining to address whether Batson applies to an alternate juror when “a review of [the] point on the merits demonstrates that the circuit court did not err in overruling the challenge.”). 14 is that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove Bradford knew or was aware that Victim was deceased when Bradford left the scene.

2016See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114L.Ed.2d395 (1991) ("disparate impact should be given appropriate weight in determining whether the prosecutor acted with a forbidden intent, but it will not be conclusive in the preliminary race-neutrality step of the Batson inquiry”); see also State v. Carter, 415 S.W.3d 685, 689 (Mo.banc 2013) (“At [the second] stage, the proffered explanation will be deemed race-neutral if it is not inherently discriminatory, even if it has a disparate impact on venirepersons of a particular race group.”).

2016See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114L.Ed.2d395 (1991) ("disparate impact should be given appropriate weight in determining whether the prosecutor acted with a forbidden intent, but it will not be conclusive in the preliminary race-neutrality step of the Batson inquiry”); see also State v. Carter, 415 S.W.3d 685, 689 (Mo.banc 2013) (“At [the second] stage, the proffered explanation will be deemed race-neutral if it is not inherently discriminatory, even if it has a disparate impact on venirepersons of a particular race group.”).

2025State v. Boyd, 597 S.W.3d 263 , 268 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (citing State v. Meeks, 495 S.W.3d 168, 172 (Mo. banc 2016)).

2025State v. Boyd, 597 S.W.3d 263 , 268 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (citing State v. Meeks, 495 S.W.3d 168, 172 (Mo. banc 2016)).

2022Louis County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, stating “[a] previous Batson violation by the same prosecutor’s office does not constitute evidence of a Batson violation in this case, absent allegations relating to this specific case.” State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 561, 571 (Mo. banc 2009).

2022Louis County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, stating “[a] previous Batson violation by the same prosecutor’s office does not constitute evidence of a Batson violation in this case, absent allegations relating to this specific case.” State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 561, 571 (Mo. banc 2009).

2007“First, the defendant must raise a Batson challenge with regard to one or more specific venirepersons struck by the [Sjtate and identify the cognizable racial group to which the venireperson or persons belong.” Hampton, 163 S.W.3d at 904 (quoting Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d at 468 ; State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo. banc 1992)).

2007“First, the defendant must raise a Batson challenge with regard to one or more specific venirepersons struck by the [Sjtate and identify the cognizable racial group to which the venireperson or persons belong.” Hampton, 163 S.W.3d at 904 (quoting Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d at 468 ; State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo. banc 1992)).

2015Putrkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 . , The third step of a Batson challenge places the burden upon the defendant to present affirmative evidence that the prosecutor’s facially valid reasons were actually pretextual.

2015Putrkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 . , The third step of a Batson challenge places the burden upon the defendant to present affirmative evidence that the prosecutor’s facially valid reasons were actually pretextual.

2016Among the factors the trial court may consider when deciding a Batson challenge are “the prosecutor’s credibility based on his or her demeanor or statements during voir dire and the court’s past experiences with the prosecutor.” State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 712 (Mo. banc 2004) (citation and quotations omitted).

2016Among the factors the trial court may consider when deciding a Batson challenge are “the prosecutor’s credibility based on his or her demeanor or statements during voir dire and the court’s past experiences with the prosecutor.” State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 712 (Mo. banc 2004) (citation and quotations omitted).

2008Because weighing the legitimacy of the State’s explanation for a peremptory strike is, by nature, a subjective exercise, “we place great reliance in the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 114 (Mo. banc 1998).

2008Because weighing the legitimacy of the State’s explanation for a peremptory strike is, by nature, a subjective exercise, “we place great reliance in the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 114 (Mo. banc 1998).

2020“Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.” McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 738 (Mo. banc 2012) (citing State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 535 (Mo. banc 2010)).

2020“Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.” McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 738 (Mo. banc 2012) (citing State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 535 (Mo. banc 2010)).

2025This reply satisfied the second step of the Batson framework because “[e]mployment is a valid race-neutral basis for striking a prospective juror.” State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Mo. banc 2006) (quoting State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Mo. banc 2003)); State v. Nylon, 311 S.W.3d 869, 882 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (“Although the State did not explain why it considered Venireperson Cobb's employment important, the State still met its burden in the second Batson step because it must only provide a race-neutral application beyond a mere unsubstantiated denial.”).

2025This reply satisfied the second step of the Batson framework because “[e]mployment is a valid race-neutral basis for striking a prospective juror.” State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Mo. banc 2006) (quoting State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Mo. banc 2003)); State v. Nylon, 311 S.W.3d 869, 882 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (“Although the State did not explain why it considered Venireperson Cobb's employment important, the State still met its burden in the second Batson step because it must only provide a race-neutral application beyond a mere unsubstantiated denial.”).

2020“The Batson doctrine has been… extended to challenges the State makes in response to a defendant’s allegedly purposeful discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, or ethnic origin in the exercise of peremptory strikes.” 7 State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 164 (Mo. banc 2011).

2020“The Batson doctrine has been… extended to challenges the State makes in response to a defendant’s allegedly purposeful discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, or ethnic origin in the exercise of peremptory strikes.” 7 State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 164 (Mo. banc 2011).

2017That an explanation may have a racially disparate impact is relevant to the third step of the Batson analysis, but is “not ... conclusive in the preliminary race-neutrality .step of the Batson inquiry.” Hernandez , 500 U.S at 362, 111 S.Ct. 1859 ; see also Washington, 288 S.W.3d at 316 (“Even if a prosecutor’s criterion might result in the disproportionate removal of a certain racial group, the disproportionate impact does not turn a prosecutor’s actions into a per se violation of the equal protection clause.”).

2017That an explanation may have a racially disparate impact is relevant to the third step of the Batson analysis, but is “not ... conclusive in the preliminary race-neutrality .step of the Batson inquiry.” Hernandez , 500 U.S at 362, 111 S.Ct. 1859 ; see also Washington, 288 S.W.3d at 316 (“Even if a prosecutor’s criterion might result in the disproportionate removal of a certain racial group, the disproportionate impact does not turn a prosecutor’s actions into a per se violation of the equal protection clause.”).

2005See State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d at 416 .

1994The state relies on State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 416 (Mo. banc 1993), to support its argument that McNeal is not entitled to review of his Batson claim.

2017That an explanation may have a racially disparate impact is relevant to the third step of the Batson analysis, but is “not ... conclusive in the preliminary race-neutrality .step of the Batson inquiry.” Hernandez , 500 U.S at 362, 111 S.Ct. 1859 ; see also Washington, 288 S.W.3d at 316 (“Even if a prosecutor’s criterion might result in the disproportionate removal of a certain racial group, the disproportionate impact does not turn a prosecutor’s actions into a per se violation of the equal protection clause.”).

2017That an explanation may have a racially disparate impact is relevant to the third step of the Batson analysis, but is “not ... conclusive in the preliminary race-neutrality .step of the Batson inquiry.” Hernandez , 500 U.S at 362, 111 S.Ct. 1859 ; see also Washington, 288 S.W.3d at 316 (“Even if a prosecutor’s criterion might result in the disproportionate removal of a certain racial group, the disproportionate impact does not turn a prosecutor’s actions into a per se violation of the equal protection clause.”).