Batson violation in Maryland

2021ANALYSIS The first step of the Batson analysis requires that the defendant “make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 ; see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358 .

2021ANALYSIS The first step of the Batson analysis requires that the defendant “make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 ; see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358 .

2021ANALYSIS The first step of the Batson analysis requires that the defendant “make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 ; see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358 .

2021ANALYSIS The first step of the Batson analysis requires that the defendant “make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 ; see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358 .

2009Notably, “[a] Batson objection is timely if the defendant makes it no later than when the last juror has been seated and before the jury has been sworn.” Stanley and Trice v. State, 313 Md. 50, 69 , 542 A.2d 1267 (1988).

2009Notably, “[a] Batson objection is timely if the defendant makes it no later than when the last juror has been seated and before the jury has been sworn.” Stanley and Trice v. State, 313 Md. 50, 69 , 542 A.2d 1267 (1988).

2016See also Edmonds v. State, 372 Md. 314, 332 , 812 A.2d 1034, 1044 (2002) (“Turning to the merits of petitioner's Batson challenge, we note first that step one, whether petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the State's challenges were racially motivated, is not at issue in this case.

2016See also Edmonds v. State, 372 Md. 314, 332 , 812 A.2d 1034, 1044 (2002) (“Turning to the merits of petitioner's Batson challenge, we note first that step one, whether petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the State's challenges were racially motivated, is not at issue in this case.

1999The Court explained that the persuasiveness of the justification does not become relevant until the third step of the Batson inquiry, when “implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” Id.

1999The Court explained that the persuasiveness of the justification does not become relevant until the third step of the Batson inquiry, when “implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” Id.

2018See Chew v. State , 317 Md. 233 , 239, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989) (observing that a new trial is the appropriate remedy for a Batson violation when "the passage of time precludes fair consideration of the relevant issues"); see also Tyler v. State , 330 Md. 261 , 271, 623 A.2d 648 (1993) (remanding for new trial where the State had admitted that its peremptory strikes had been exercised for a discriminatory purpose).

2018See Chew v. State , 317 Md. 233 , 239, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989) (observing that a new trial is the appropriate remedy for a Batson violation when "the passage of time precludes fair consideration of the relevant issues"); see also Tyler v. State , 330 Md. 261 , 271, 623 A.2d 648 (1993) (remanding for new trial where the State had admitted that its peremptory strikes had been exercised for a discriminatory purpose).

2016See Edmonds, 372 Md. at 339–40, 812 A.2d at 1048–49 (holding that the trial judge acted improperly by not making a clear finding of pretext under step three); Mejia, 328 Md. at 539–41, 616 A.2d at 364–65 - 29 - (holding that it was improper for the trial judge to make no specific findings or offer an explanation for his ruling denying the Batson objection).

2016See Edmonds, 372 Md. at 339–40, 812 A.2d at 1048–49 (holding that the trial judge acted improperly by not making a clear finding of pretext under step three); Mejia, 328 Md. at 539–41, 616 A.2d at 364–65 - 29 - (holding that it was improper for the trial judge to make no specific findings or offer an explanation for his ruling denying the Batson objection).

2016Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), does not support the proposition that a post-trial hearing to establish a violation at any step of the Batson analysis is appropriate.

2016Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), does not support the proposition that a post-trial hearing to establish a violation at any step of the Batson analysis is appropriate.

2021Step two of the Batson analysis requires that the State put forward a “a clear and reasonably specific explanation of its reasons for exercising the challenge.” See Ray- Simmons, 446 Md. at 444 .

2021Step two of the Batson analysis requires that the State put forward a “a clear and reasonably specific explanation of its reasons for exercising the challenge.” See Ray- Simmons, 446 Md. at 444 .

1996“The error at issue in a Batson challenge is, of course, the ... racially discriminatory use of peremptory strikes in viola *594 tion of both the accused’s and the excluded venirepersons’ equal protection rights.” State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo.1992) cert. denied Missouri v. Parker, 506 U.S. 1014 , 113 S.Ct. 636 , 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992) (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-08 , 111 S.Ct. at 1368-69 , 113 L.Ed.2d at 422-24 ).

1996“The error at issue in a Batson challenge is, of course, the ... racially discriminatory use of peremptory strikes in viola *594 tion of both the accused’s and the excluded venirepersons’ equal protection rights.” State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo.1992) cert. denied Missouri v. Parker, 506 U.S. 1014 , 113 S.Ct. 636 , 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992) (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-08 , 111 S.Ct. at 1368-69 , 113 L.Ed.2d at 422-24 ).

2021We stress that in evaluating a Batson challenge, the trial court should examine not only the credibility of the striking attorney, but also the credibility of the attorney’s proffered, racially neutral reason; see Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339 ; McDaniels, 813 F.3d at 778 (“A comparative analysis of the application of reasoning applied to [B]lack versus [W]hite jurors is often the best if not ‘the only means we will have for assessing the state court’s factfinding.’”).

2021We stress that in evaluating a Batson challenge, the trial court should examine not only the credibility of the striking attorney, but also the credibility of the attorney’s proffered, racially neutral reason; see Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339 ; McDaniels, 813 F.3d at 778 (“A comparative analysis of the application of reasoning applied to [B]lack versus [W]hite jurors is often the best if not ‘the only means we will have for assessing the state court’s factfinding.’”).

2016See State v. Stringfellow, 425 Md. 461, 469-70 , 42 A.3d 27 (2012) (acceptance of the jury panel without qualification waives prior objection because “accepting the empaneled jury, without qualification or reservation, is directly inconsistent with the earlier complaint”) (quotation and alteration marks omitted); Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 617 , 667 A.2d 876 (1995) (discussing waiver rule in case involving Batson objection); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 579 , 468 A.2d 45 (1983).

2016See State v. Stringfellow, 425 Md. 461, 469-70 , 42 A.3d 27 (2012) (acceptance of the jury panel without qualification waives prior objection because “accepting the empaneled jury, without qualification or reservation, is directly inconsistent with the earlier complaint”) (quotation and alteration marks omitted); Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 617 , 667 A.2d 876 (1995) (discussing waiver rule in case involving Batson objection); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 579 , 468 A.2d 45 (1983).

2016See State v. Stringfellow, 425 Md. 461, 469-70 , 42 A.3d 27 (2012) (acceptance of the jury panel without qualification waives prior objection because “accepting the empaneled jury, without qualification or reservation, is directly inconsistent with the earlier complaint”) (quotation and alteration marks omitted); Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 617 , 667 A.2d 876 (1995) (discussing waiver rule in case involving Batson objection); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 579 , 468 A.2d 45 (1983).

2016See State v. Stringfellow, 425 Md. 461, 469-70 , 42 A.3d 27 (2012) (acceptance of the jury panel without qualification waives prior objection because “accepting the empaneled jury, without qualification or reservation, is directly inconsistent with the earlier complaint”) (quotation and alteration marks omitted); Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 617 , 667 A.2d 876 (1995) (discussing waiver rule in case involving Batson objection); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 579 , 468 A.2d 45 (1983).

1995The trial court, in 1994, apparently was unaware that it was no longer a requirement of the Batson rule that the excluded juror be a member of the same cognizable group as the defendant, an issue resolved by the Supreme Court as early as 1992, see Gorman, 499 U.S. 971 , 111 S.Ct. 1613 , 113 L.Ed.2d 712 (holding that a white defendant had standing to challenge, under Batson , the strike of black venirepersons); Powers, 499 U.S. at 416 , 111 S.Ct. at 1373 , 113 L.Ed.2d at 429 (same), and acknowledged by this Court in 1991, see State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124 , 596 A.2d 629 (1991).

1995The trial court, in 1994, apparently was unaware that it was no longer a requirement of the Batson rule that the excluded juror be a member of the same cognizable group as the defendant, an issue resolved by the Supreme Court as early as 1992, see Gorman, 499 U.S. 971 , 111 S.Ct. 1613 , 113 L.Ed.2d 712 (holding that a white defendant had standing to challenge, under Batson , the strike of black venirepersons); Powers, 499 U.S. at 416 , 111 S.Ct. at 1373 , 113 L.Ed.2d at 429 (same), and acknowledged by this Court in 1991, see State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124 , 596 A.2d 629 (1991).

2024“Because a Batson challenge is largely a factual question, a trial court’s decision in this regard is afforded great deference[.]” Id.

2024“Because a Batson challenge is largely a factual question, a trial court’s decision in this regard is afforded great deference[.]” Id.

2020T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) and Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261 (1993) (holding that the Batson principle extends to exclusion of a person from service because of her sex), or sexual orientation, see SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbot Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that heightened scrutiny under Batson applies to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation), the method itself would sort the venire in a manner that the Constitutions of the United States and Maryland forbid.

2018See Chew v. State , 317 Md. 233 , 239, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989) (observing that a new trial is the appropriate remedy for a Batson violation when "the passage of time precludes fair consideration of the relevant issues"); see also Tyler v. State , 330 Md. 261 , 271, 623 A.2d 648 (1993) (remanding for new trial where the State had admitted that its peremptory strikes had been exercised for a discriminatory purpose).

1995If the requisite showing has been made, “ ‘the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.’ ” Id. at 61 , 542 A.2d at 1272 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 ); Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 18 , 553 A.2d 228, 230 (1989); see also Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522 , 531 n. 6, 616 A.2d 356 , 360 n. 6 (1992) (updating the Batson test in light of subsequent decisions).

1995If the requisite showing has been made, “ ‘the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.’ ” Id. at 61 , 542 A.2d at 1272 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 ); Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 18 , 553 A.2d 228, 230 (1989); see also Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522 , 531 n. 6, 616 A.2d 356 , 360 n. 6 (1992) (updating the Batson test in light of subsequent decisions).

2016As a trial court “has ‘the discretion to fashion a remedy for *103 [the] Batson violation that addresses and resolves the specific harm caused by that violation,’ ” Edmonds v. State, 372 Md. 314, 331 , 812 A.2d 1034 (2002) (citing Jones v. State, 343 Md. 584, 602-03 , 683 A.2d 520 (1996)), we review the remedy, fashioned by the court below, for abuse of discretion.

2016As a trial court “has ‘the discretion to fashion a remedy for *103 [the] Batson violation that addresses and resolves the specific harm caused by that violation,’ ” Edmonds v. State, 372 Md. 314, 331 , 812 A.2d 1034 (2002) (citing Jones v. State, 343 Md. 584, 602-03 , 683 A.2d 520 (1996)), we review the remedy, fashioned by the court below, for abuse of discretion.

2024Appx. 468 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Adams, 996 F.3d 514, 520 (8th Cir. 2021)). 20 2022) (adopting the per se approach and rejecting the substantial motivating factor approach when the proponent of a strike offers both race-based and race-neutral reasons), cert. granted, 2023 WL 3587455 (Colo. May 22, 2023); Robinson v. United States, 890 A.2d 674, 681 (D.C. 2006) (holding that, “even where the exclusion of a potential juror is motivated in substantial part by constitutionally permissible factors . . . , the exclusion is a denial of equal protection and a Batson violation if it is parti

2024Appx. 468 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Adams, 996 F.3d 514, 520 (8th Cir. 2021)). 20 2022) (adopting the per se approach and rejecting the substantial motivating factor approach when the proponent of a strike offers both race-based and race-neutral reasons), cert. granted, 2023 WL 3587455 (Colo. May 22, 2023); Robinson v. United States, 890 A.2d 674, 681 (D.C. 2006) (holding that, “even where the exclusion of a potential juror is motivated in substantial part by constitutionally permissible factors . . . , the exclusion is a denial of equal protection and a Batson violation if it is parti

2019In holding, as we hereby do, that appellate counsel was not in any sense inadequate for failing to pursue the Batson issue on appeal, our conclusion as to appellate counsel's adequacy in this case parallels precisely our conclusion with respect to appellate counsel's adequacy in State v. Gross : It cannot seriously be contended that the issues not raised on Gross's appeal to this Court were "clearly stronger than those presented." It cannot seriously be maintained that appellate counsel failed to select the stronger arguments available to him "in order to maximize the likelihood of success on

2019In holding, as we hereby do, that appellate counsel was not in any sense inadequate for failing to pursue the Batson issue on appeal, our conclusion as to appellate counsel’s 21 adequacy in this case parallels precisely our conclusion with respect to appellate counsel’s adequacy in State v. Gross: It cannot seriously be contended that the issues not raised on Gross’s appeal to this Court were “clearly stronger than those presented.” It cannot seriously be maintained that appellate counsel failed to select the stronger arguments available to him “in order to maximize the likelihood of success o

2016Indeed, upon determining that a Batson violation had occurred, when prospective juror 22 was struck, the trial court could have seated that prospective juror (see Chew v. State, 71 Md.App. 681, 704 , 527 A.2d 332 (1987)); or it could have recalled all of the previously struck jurors and restarted the jury selection process from before the pattern of improper striking began (see Jones, 343 Md. 584 , 683 A.2d 520 ); or it could have seated one of the seven remaining prospective jurors that, according to the record, were still available; and finally, if the foregoing remedies were no longer avail

2016Indeed, upon determining that a Batson violation had occurred, when prospective juror 22 was struck, the trial court could have seated that prospective juror (see Chew v. State, 71 Md.App. 681, 704 , 527 A.2d 332 (1987)); or it could have recalled all of the previously struck jurors and restarted the jury selection process from before the pattern of improper striking began (see Jones, 343 Md. 584 , 683 A.2d 520 ); or it could have seated one of the seven remaining prospective jurors that, according to the record, were still available; and finally, if the foregoing remedies were no longer avail