Batson hearing in Illinois

2025Jury Composition ¶ 13 The defendant argues that he was denied a trial by a jury of his peers, stating that “[t]he jury selection process should have been more diverse, out of the 36 candidates, only 2 was similar 3 ethnic background which 1 was never called so being found guilty was inevitable with the juror selection.” He further speculates that his trial would have had “a more fair outcome” had there been a “more diverse jury.” The defense did not file a pretrial motion challenging the composition of the venire, did not make any objections during the jury selection process, and did not raise

2025Jury Composition ¶ 13 The defendant argues that he was denied a trial by a jury of his peers, stating that “[t]he jury selection process should have been more diverse, out of the 36 candidates, only 2 was similar 3 ethnic background which 1 was never called so being found guilty was inevitable with the juror selection.” He further speculates that his trial would have had “a more fair outcome” had there been a “more diverse jury.” The defense did not file a pretrial motion challenging the composition of the venire, did not make any objections during the jury selection process, and did not raise

2025While not dispositive on this issue, “the unchallenged presence” of that juror is nonetheless a proper factor to consider, which “tends to weaken the basis for a prima facie case of discrimination.” People v. Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d 481, 513 (2006); but see In re A.S., 2016 IL App (1st) 161259, ¶¶ 31, 32 (holding that prima facie case was established where there was “clearly a pattern” of strikes on black members of the venire and State accepted the jury’s only black person “under the shadow of a [previous] Batson challenge”). -17- 2025 IL App (2d) 240375-U ¶ 40 Defendant also complains that the t

2025While not dispositive on this issue, “the unchallenged presence” of that juror is nonetheless a proper factor to consider, which “tends to weaken the basis for a prima facie case of discrimination.” People v. Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d 481, 513 (2006); but see In re A.S., 2016 IL App (1st) 161259, ¶¶ 31, 32 (holding that prima facie case was established where there was “clearly a pattern” of strikes on black members of the venire and State accepted the jury’s only black person “under the shadow of a [previous] Batson challenge”). -17- 2025 IL App (2d) 240375-U ¶ 40 Defendant also complains that the t

2023Merely raising a Batson motion based on the OSP exercising a peremptory challenge on a prospective juror who is African- American without any additional argument is insufficient to carry that initial burden. “[A]s a general rule, the mere number of [African-American] venire members peremptorily challenged, without more, will not establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” People v. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d 189, 203 (1990). ¶ 89 For instance, in Heard, 187 Ill. 2d at 52 , a defendant contended that the State violated Batson when it exercised five peremptory challenges on African-American venir

2017People v. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d 189, 201 (1990) (“If the State were allowed to interrupt the prima facie hearing stage by obtaining judicial consideration of its explanations even though they would be insufficient to overcome an already established prima facie case, those explanations would constitute a thumb on the scales that weigh the prima facie submission, which would undermine the very concept of a prima facie case as outlined in Batson.”). ¶ 35 Austin argues the trial court improperly collapsed the three stages of his Batson inquiry after he challenged the State’s use of peremptory chall

2023“Ordinarily, the party asserting a Batson claim has the burden of proving a prima facie case and preserving the record, and any ambiguities in the record will be construed against that party.” Davis, 231 Ill. 2d at 365 .

2022Moreover, “when the trial court acts sua sponte to conduct a Batson hearing, a bifurcated standard of review applies: the court’s findings of fact, including any specific observations of record bearing on demeanor or credibility, will be accorded deference; however, the ultimate legal determination based on those findings is one that we make de novo.” Davis, 231 Ill. 2d at 364 . - 11 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210281 ¶ 25 In Davis, the trial court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the State improperly used a peremptory challenge against an African American prospective juror, Robert Hicks.

2024In re A.S., 2017 IL App (1st) 161259-B, ¶ 29 (the circuit court’s credibility findings in Batson challenge cases will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365-69 )). ¶ 23 We come to this conclusion in light of the proposition that we must harshly scrutinize explanations pertaining to demeanor.

2022“A finding is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves a reviewing court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re A.S., 2017 IL App (1st) 161259-B, ¶ 23 . ¶ 14 We are primarily concerned with the third stage of the Batson hearing process, in which the trial court must determine whether the State’s proffered race-neutral reasons for its juror strikes are a pretext and whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination, because the State’s burden to “to explain his challenge by articulating a nondiscriminatory, ‘neutral’ explanation rela

2022As such, we reject the State’s forfeiture argument. ¶ 40 Citing our supreme court’s decision in People v. Wiley, 156 Ill. 2d 464, 475 (1993), defendant correctly asserts that it is error to collapse the first two steps of a Batson inquiry into a single procedure because doing so renders defendant’s initial prima facie showing moot.

2022As such, we reject the State’s forfeiture argument. ¶ 40 Citing our supreme court’s decision in People v. Wiley, 156 Ill. 2d 464, 475 (1993), defendant correctly asserts that it is error to collapse the first two steps of a Batson inquiry into a single procedure because doing so renders defendant’s initial prima facie showing moot.

2026In People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 285 (1992), our supreme court found that the issue was preserved solely by raising a Batson objection during voir dire, and Mitchell’s holding has been reiterated in non-capital contexts.

2000However, our supreme court, in People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 285 (1992), held that a defendant who objects to the State’s use of peremptory challenges but fails to raise a Batson claim in a posttrial motion does not waive his or her claim on review.

2025App. 3d 246, 249 (1993). “[G]enerally a trial court’s ultimate conclusion on a Batson claim will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.” People v. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d 244, 261 (2009).

2025App. 3d 246, 249 (1993). “[G]enerally a trial court’s ultimate conclusion on a Batson claim will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.” People v. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d 244, 261 (2009).

2006Justice Scalia — with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in dissent — expressed his view that the Batson principle is “theoretically boundless” (J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161, 128 L.

2006Justice Scalia — with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in dissent — expressed his view that the Batson principle is “theoretically boundless” (J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161, 128 L.

2019People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 54 (1999); People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 426 (1993). ¶ 52 During voir dire, the defendant’s attorney raised a Batson objection at two different points and both times the trial court found that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

2018People v. Heard , 187 Ill. 2d 36 , 54, 240 Ill.Dec. 577 , 718 N.E.2d 58 (1999) ; People v. Hudson , 157 Ill. 2d 401 , 426, 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993). ¶ 52 During voir dire , the defendant's attorney raised a Batson objection at two different points and both times the trial court found that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

2023We encourage a review of our prior decision in Shaw, 2014 IL App (4th) 121157, ¶¶ 32-35 , which set forth a step-by-step approach to conducting a Batson hearing. ¶ 46 III.

2023We encourage a review of our prior decision in Shaw, 2014 IL App (4th) 121157, ¶¶ 32-35 , which set forth a step-by-step approach to conducting a Batson hearing. ¶ 46 III.

2017See also People v. Fellers, 2016 IL App (4th) 140486, ¶ 36 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an appropriate hearing on the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Fleming v. Moswin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103475-U , ¶¶ 45-46 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a Batson hearing within 60 days and requiring the parties to file responses within 14 days of trial court’s ruling on remand). ¶ 178 Unlik

2017See also People v. Fellers, 2016 IL App (4th) 140486, ¶ 36 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an appropriate hearing on the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Fleming v. Moswin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103475-U , ¶¶ 45-46 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a Batson hearing within 60 days and requiring the parties to file responses within 14 days of trial court’s ruling on remand). ¶ 178 Unlik

2025“This final step involves evaluating ‘the persuasiveness of the justification’ proffered by the [attorney exercising the strike], but ‘the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.’ ” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). ¶ 88 The defendants argue that the trial court acknowledged the proper framework of a Batson challenge but applied it improperly.

2025Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). ¶ 33 Here, defendant interposed a Batson objection, arguing that none of Juror No. 60’s answers during voir dire indicated any bias towards the State.

2023At the first stage of a Batson analysis, we will not overturn the court’s conclusion unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence (People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 71 (1996)), which occurs when the opposite conclusion is plainly evident or where the finding itself was arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based upon the evidence.

2023At the first stage of a Batson analysis, we will not overturn the court’s conclusion unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence (People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 71 (1996)), which occurs when the opposite conclusion is plainly evident or where the finding itself was arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based upon the evidence.

2016The court’s conclusory declaration that it “agreed with” the State’s reasons does not constitute “a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s explanations in light of the circumstances of the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 175-76 . -9- ¶ 37 Other irregularities in the remainder of the Batson hearing also require remand.

2016The court’s conclusory declaration that it “agreed with” the State’s reasons does not constitute “a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s explanations in light of the circumstances of the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 175-76 . ¶ 37 Other irregularities in the remainder of the Batson hearing also require remand.

2000See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 142 Ill.2d 258, 283 , 154 Ill.Dec. 785 , 568 N.E.2d 1234 (1990) (finding that the State waived its argument that the defendant failed to make a timely Batson objection by failing to make this argument in the trial court); People v. O'Neal, 104 Ill.2d 399, 407 , 84 Ill.Dec. 481 , 472 N.E.2d 441 (1984) ("The principle of waiver applies to the State as well as the defendant in a criminal case").

2000See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 283 (1990) (finding that the State waived its argument that the defendant failed to make a timely Batson objection by failing to make this argument in the trial court); People v. O’Neal, 104 Ill. 2d 399, 407 (1984) (“The principle of waiver applies to the State as well as the defendant in a criminal case”).

2008See People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 429-30 (1992) (this court rejected the State’s suggestion that defendant should have been required to call the excluded venirepersons to testify at the Batson hearing to establish their race where defense counsel had made a record at the original voir dire in the form of his own statements about the number of strikes used against black venirepersons); People v. Townsend, 275 Ill.

2008See People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 429-30 (1992) (this court rejected the State’s suggestion that defendant should have been required to call the excluded venirepersons to testify at the Batson hearing to establish their race where defense counsel had made a record at the original voir dire in the form of his own statements about the number of strikes used against black venirepersons); People v. Townsend, 275 Ill.

2018Of course, the Batson rule "applies with equal force to private litigants in civil cases." Id. at 526 , 249 Ill.Dec. 636 , 736 N.E.2d 1074 .

2018Of course, the Batson rule "applies with equal force to private litigants in civil cases." Id. at 526 , 249 Ill.Dec. 636 , 736 N.E.2d 1074 .

2004App. 3d 733, 743 (1991) (noting that the trial court raised the Batson issue sua sponte)-, People v. Whaley, 184 Ill.

2004See People v. Beard, 263 Ill.App.3d 1077, 1081 , 201 Ill.Dec. 226 , 636 N.E.2d 658 (1993) (where trial court raised Batson question sua sponte, defendant was not obligated to have raised the issue); People v. Williams, 252 Ill.App. 3d 704, 712-13, 192 Ill.Dec. 599 , 625 N.E.2d 754 (1993) (trial court may sua sponte call Batson hearing), rev'd on other grounds, 165 Ill.2d 51 , 208 Ill.Dec. 341 , 649 N.E.2d 397 (1995) (affirming trial court); People v. Harvey, 209 Ill.App.3d 733, 743 , 154 Ill.Dec. 381 , 568 N.E.2d 381 (1991) (noting that the trial court raised the Batson issue sua sponte ); Peo

2022Id. at 91-97 ; Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005); People v. Davis, 231 Ill. 2d 349, 360 (2008); see Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) (“in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.”).

2014Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 ). ¶ 103 This third step of the Batson inquiry “involves an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility [citation] and ‘the best evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.’ ” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality op.)).

1994However, in Mack, 128 Ill. 2d at 245, we held that a similar oral ruling by a trial judge at the conclusion of a Batson hearing was sufficiently specific for our purposes, and that there was no further need for the trial judge to enter findings with respect to each black member of the venire excluded by the prosecution.

1994However, in Mack, 128 Ill. 2d at 245, we held that a similar oral ruling by a trial judge at the conclusion of a Batson hearing was sufficiently specific for our purposes, and that there was no further need for the trial judge to enter findings with respect to each black member of the venire excluded by the prosecution.

2021More importantly, “[a]ny such proffered reasons *** are irrelevant at this first stage of the Batson analysis, because at this stage, the issue is not whether there were any legitimate race-neutral reasons for the exclusion but, rather, whether defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson.” Davis, 345 Ill.

2021More importantly, “[a]ny such proffered reasons *** are irrelevant at this first stage of the Batson analysis, because at this stage, the issue is not whether there were any legitimate race-neutral reasons for the exclusion but, rather, whether defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson.” Davis, 345 Ill.

2017Mary's L.J. 337 , 341–42 (2011). ¶ 36 If courts are to meet their "affirmative duty to enforce the strong statutory and constitutional policies embodied in" the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Batson, (Powers, 499 U.S. at 416 ), courts need to take a more active role in protecting the rights of defendants to a fair jury. ¶ 37 Following the supreme court’s imprecation that the courts must develop rules to help implement Batson, and to assist in the review of Batson claims, circuit court judges in both civil and criminal cases should be directed, once a Batson claim is made, to make all j

2017Mary's L.J. 337 , 341–42 (2011). ¶ 36 If courts are to meet their "affirmative duty to enforce the strong statutory and constitutional policies embodied in" the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Batson, (Powers, 499 U.S. at 416 ), courts need to take a more active role in protecting the rights of defendants to a fair jury. ¶ 37 Following the supreme court’s imprecation that the courts must develop rules to help implement Batson, and to assist in the review of Batson claims, circuit court judges in both civil and criminal cases should be directed, once a Batson claim is made, to make all j

2006See, e.g., People v. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d 189, 200 (1990) (Batson challenge must be evaluated in methodical manner); People v. Hope, 137 Ill. 2d 430, 456 (1990), vacated, 501 U.S. 1202 , 115 L.

1996He was called to testify at the Batson hearing. 4 In People v. Hope, 137 Ill. 2d 430 , 560 N.E.2d 849 (1990), the court suggested that drug counselling was material where the defense of drug intoxication was anticipated.

2000People v. Hooper, 118 Ill.2d 244, 249 , 107 Ill.Dec. 250 , 506 N.E.2d 1305 (1987) (Ryan, J., concurring) (describing court as remanding "all cases on review in which the Batson issue is viable" to circuit courts for Batson hearings); see, e.g., Evans, 125 *369 Ill.2d at 59-60, 125 Ill.Dec. 790 , 530 N.E.2d 1360 .

2000People v. Hooper, 118 Ill. 2d 244, 249 (1987) (Ryan, J., concurring) (describing court as remanding “all cases on review in which the Batson issue is viable” to circuit courts for Batson hearings); see, e.g., Evans, 125 Ill. 2d at 59-60 .

2000People v. Hooper, 118 Ill.2d 244, 249 , 107 Ill.Dec. 250 , 506 N.E.2d 1305 (1987) (Ryan, J., concurring) (describing court as remanding "all cases on review in which the Batson issue is viable" to circuit courts for Batson hearings); see, e.g., Evans, 125 *369 Ill.2d at 59-60, 125 Ill.Dec. 790 , 530 N.E.2d 1360 .

2000People v. Hooper, 118 Ill. 2d 244, 249 (1987) (Ryan, J., concurring) (describing court as remanding “all cases on review in which the Batson issue is viable” to circuit courts for Batson hearings); see, e.g., Evans, 125 Ill. 2d at 59-60 .

2004We need not address respondent’s third contention, as the remedy for a Batson violation is a new hearing (see People v. McDonald, 125 Ill. 2d 182, 200-01 (1988)) and we have determined that this cause must be remanded for a new hearing based on Master-son.

2004We need not address respondent's third contention, as the remedy for a Batson violation is a new hearing (see People v. McDonald , 125 Ill. 2d 182, 200-01 (1988) ) and we have determined that this cause must be remanded for a new hearing based on Masterson .