Batson challenge in Ohio

2026If the prosecutor does so, “the trial court must determine whether the defendant met his burden of proving intentional discrimination or whether the prosecutor’s explanation was a pretext.” Id. “‘We do not presume prejudice from a trial counsel’s failure to raise a Batson challenge, and . . . without an adequate record, 23 we cannot properly consider on direct appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for a trial counsel’s failure to raise a Batson objection.’” Id. at ¶ 143, quoting State v. Burks, 2008-Ohio-2463, ¶ 57 (10th Dist.). {¶ 55} Here, at sidebar during voir dire, the court

2026If the prosecutor does so, “the trial court must determine whether the defendant met his burden of proving intentional discrimination or whether the prosecutor’s explanation was a pretext.” Id. “‘We do not presume prejudice from a trial counsel’s failure to raise a Batson challenge, and . . . without an adequate record, 23 we cannot properly consider on direct appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for a trial counsel’s failure to raise a Batson objection.’” Id. at ¶ 143, quoting State v. Burks, 2008-Ohio-2463, ¶ 57 (10th Dist.). {¶ 55} Here, at sidebar during voir dire, the court

2026“The Court stated that a defendant can demonstrate a violation of his equal protection rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by showing that the State’s use of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial was used to intentionally exclude members of the defendant’s race.” State v. Evans, 2010-Ohio-4813, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.). {¶45} “‘“A court adjudicates a Batson claim in three steps.”’” State v. Frazier, 2007-Ohio-5048 , ¶ 64, quoting State v. Bryan, 2004-Ohio-971 , ¶ 106, quoting State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 528 (2001). “‘First, the opponent of the p

2026“The Court stated that a defendant can demonstrate a violation of his equal protection rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by showing that the State’s use of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial was used to intentionally exclude members of the defendant’s race.” State v. Evans, 2010-Ohio-4813, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.). {¶45} “‘“A court adjudicates a Batson claim in three steps.”’” State v. Frazier, 2007-Ohio-5048 , ¶ 64, quoting State v. Bryan, 2004-Ohio-971 , ¶ 106, quoting State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 528 (2001). “‘First, the opponent of the p

2023Stark No. 2008 CA 00191, 2009-Ohio-6254 : When a party opposes a peremptory challenge by claiming racial discrimination, “[a] judge should make clear, on the record, that he or she understands and has applied the precise Batson test.” Hicks v. Westinghouse Materials Co., supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 99, 676 N.E.2d 872 .

2023Stark No. 2008 CA 00191, 2009-Ohio-6254 : When a party opposes a peremptory challenge by claiming racial discrimination, “[a] judge should make clear, on the record, that he or she understands and has applied the precise Batson test.” Hicks v. Westinghouse Materials Co., supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 99, 676 N.E.2d 872 .

2025While he acknowledges that counsel did raise Ross App. No. 23CA22 52 a challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of the only black juror in the jury pool, he argues that counsel fell short by failing “to ensure that the trial court engaged in a complete Batson analysis and failed to submit the State’s proffered race-neutral argument to effective adversarial testing.” He claims that his counsel should have challenged the proffered race-neutral reason for the strike because “the State falsely claimed that Mr. Bayless believed he had a familiar relationship to Marvan because of his name.” {¶85}

2025While he acknowledges that counsel did raise Ross App. No. 23CA22 52 a challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of the only black juror in the jury pool, he argues that counsel fell short by failing “to ensure that the trial court engaged in a complete Batson analysis and failed to submit the State’s proffered race-neutral argument to effective adversarial testing.” He claims that his counsel should have challenged the proffered race-neutral reason for the strike because “the State falsely claimed that Mr. Bayless believed he had a familiar relationship to Marvan because of his name.” {¶85}

2025Rather, “the trial court may express its opinion of the state's race-neutral justification in the form of a clear rejection of the Batson challenge, without offering detailed findings, ‘ “[a]s long as [the] trial judge affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to make their respective records.” ’ ” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954 , ¶ 160, quoting Frazier at ¶ 98, quoting Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 198 (2d Cir. 2006).

2025Rather, “the trial court may express its opinion of the state's race-neutral justification in the form of a clear rejection of the Batson challenge, without offering detailed findings, ‘ “[a]s long as [the] trial judge affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to make their respective records.” ’ ” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954 , ¶ 160, quoting Frazier at ¶ 98, quoting Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 198 (2d Cir. 2006).

2019Id., citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) and State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 437 , 709 N.E.2d 140 (1999). {¶ 30} However, even if we assume that the trial court was obligated to proceed to the second prong of the Batson inquiry, we conclude that the record supports the State's race-neutral explanation for exercising a peremptory challenge against Juror #2.

2019Id., citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) and State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 437 , 709 N.E.2d 140 (1999). {¶ 30} However, even if we assume that the trial court was obligated to proceed to the second prong of the Batson inquiry, we conclude that the record supports the State's race-neutral explanation for exercising a peremptory challenge against Juror #2.

2024See id., quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 251-252 , 125 S.Ct. 2317 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). {¶18} Akins argues that the trial court did not assess whether the prosecutor’s reason was plausible and did not expressly apply the three-part Batson test on the record.

2024See id., quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 251-252 , 125 S.Ct. 2317 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). {¶18} Akins argues that the trial court did not assess whether the prosecutor’s reason was plausible and did not expressly apply the three-part Batson test on the record.

2017See State v. Herring , 94 Ohio St.3d 246 , 257, 2002-Ohio-796 , 762 N.E.2d 940 , citing Batson at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712 . {¶ 33} In this matter, the defense made a Batson challenge after the state used a peremptory strike to strike a young African-American male who worked in retail.

2017See State v. Herring , 94 Ohio St.3d 246 , 257, 2002-Ohio-796 , 762 N.E.2d 940 , citing Batson at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712 . {¶ 33} In this matter, the defense made a Batson challenge after the state used a peremptory strike to strike a young African-American male who worked in retail.

2021Relying on Hernandez and State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 437 (1999), appellant asserts the 3 We note that although, in response to appellant's Batson challenge to Prospective Juror No. 5, the prosecutor initially responded that a pattern was needed to establish a prima facie case, the state concedes before this court that a pattern is not necessary.

2021(See Appellee's Brief at 19.) We agree that a pattern is not necessary and observe that the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 437 (1999), rejected the contention that in order to prevail on a Batson claim, a defendant must show the existence of a pattern of peremptory challenges by the state against members of the group in question.

2014This final step involves evaluating “the persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by the prosecutor, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 ; Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. at 338 , 126 S.Ct. 969 , 163 L.Ed.2d 824 . {¶26} On direct appeal in federal court, the credibility findings a trial court makes in a Batson inquiry are reviewed for clear error.

2014This final step involves evaluating “the persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by the prosecutor, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 ; Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. at 338 , 126 S.Ct. 969 , 163 L.Ed.2d 824 . {¶26} On direct appeal in federal court, the credibility findings a trial court makes in a Batson inquiry are reviewed for clear error.

2017See State v. Herring , 94 Ohio St.3d 246 , 257, 2002-Ohio-796 , 762 N.E.2d 940 , citing Batson at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712 . {¶ 33} In this matter, the defense made a Batson challenge after the state used a peremptory strike to strike a young African-American male who worked in retail.

2016See State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 257 , 2002-Ohio-796 , 762 N.E.2d 940 , citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 . {¶23} Following the state’s use of its third peremptory strike on prospective Juror R., the defense raised a Batson challenge.

2019Summit No. 24668, 2010-Ohio-2573 , ¶ 33, citing 3 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). “‘A court adjudicates a Batson claim in three steps.’” State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2008-Ohio-2762 , ¶ 61, quoting State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 528 (2001).

2017No. 24668, 2010-Ohio-2573 , ¶ 33, citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). “’A court adjudicates a Batson claim in three steps.’” State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2008-Ohio-2762 , ¶ 61, quoting State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272 , 2004-Ohio-971 , ¶ 106, quoting State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 528 (2001). “’First, the opponent of the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

2026See also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477-479 (2008) (noting that appellate courts employ a “highly deferential standard of review” when evaluating a trial court’s resolution of a Batson challenge). {¶43} “If, however, a trial court does err in applying Batson, the error is structural.” State v. Thompson, 2014-Ohio-4751, ¶ 53 .

2026See also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477-479 (2008) (noting that appellate courts employ a “highly deferential standard of review” when evaluating a trial court’s resolution of a Batson challenge). {¶43} “If, however, a trial court does err in applying Batson, the error is structural.” State v. Thompson, 2014-Ohio-4751, ¶ 53 .

2025Rather, “the trial court may express its opinion of the state's race-neutral justification in the form of a clear rejection of the Batson challenge, without offering detailed findings, ‘ “[a]s long as [the] trial judge affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to make their respective records.” ’ ” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954 , ¶ 160, quoting Frazier at ¶ 98, quoting Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 198 (2d Cir. 2006).

2025Rather, “the trial court may express its opinion of the state's race-neutral justification in the form of a clear rejection of the Batson challenge, without offering detailed findings, ‘ “[a]s long as [the] trial judge affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to make their respective records.” ’ ” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954 , ¶ 160, quoting Frazier at ¶ 98, quoting Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 198 (2d Cir. 2006).

2026See also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477-479 (2008) (noting that appellate courts employ a “highly deferential standard of review” when evaluating a trial court’s resolution of a Batson challenge). {¶43} “If, however, a trial court does err in applying Batson, the error is structural.” State v. Thompson, 2014-Ohio-4751, ¶ 53 .

2026See also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477-479 (2008) (noting that appellate courts employ a “highly deferential standard of review” when evaluating a trial court’s resolution of a Batson challenge). {¶43} “If, however, a trial court does err in applying Batson, the error is structural.” State v. Thompson, 2014-Ohio-4751, ¶ 53 .

2018“Deference is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 . {¶23} In the instant case, the trial court, as the gatekeeper in a Batson challenge, set forth a lengthy analysis in deciding to deny the challenge.

2018“Deference is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 . {¶23} In the instant case, the trial court, as the gatekeeper in a Batson challenge, set forth a lengthy analysis in deciding to deny the challenge.

2020(Citation omitted.) Id. {¶50} There is a three-part process for proving a Batson violation.

2020(Citation omitted.) Id. {¶50} There is a three-part process for proving a Batson violation.

2025“Where an appellant questions the trial court’s proper analysis of a Batson challenge, no clear error occurs where the appellate court can determine from the record that ‘the trial judge’s analysis of the contested peremptory strike was sufficient to preserve a constitutionally permissible jury- selection process.’ ” State v. Massalay, 2016-Ohio-779, ¶ 47 (10th Dist.), quoting Hicks v. Westinghouse Materials Co., 1997-Ohio-227, ¶ 16 . {¶ 41} A trial court’s decision to call a witness as its own and to permit both parties to cross-examine that witness is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

2025“Where an appellant questions the trial court’s proper analysis of a Batson challenge, no clear error occurs where the appellate court can determine from the record that ‘the trial judge’s analysis of the contested peremptory strike was sufficient to preserve a constitutionally permissible jury- selection process.’ ” State v. Massalay, 2016-Ohio-779, ¶ 47 (10th Dist.), quoting Hicks v. Westinghouse Materials Co., 1997-Ohio-227, ¶ 16 . {¶ 41} A trial court’s decision to call a witness as its own and to permit both parties to cross-examine that witness is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

2024Although the federal “‘Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose,’ * * * generally striking only one prospective juror who belongs to a protected group is not enough to draw an inference [of discriminatory intent] without other evidence.” Id. at 1101, 1102 , quoting Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S.Ct. 2228, 2244 , 204 L.Ed.2d 638 (2019); citing Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir.2000); Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir.2002) (“‘[t]wo challenges out of two [African American] venirepersons are not always enough to establish a

2024Although the federal “‘Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose,’ * * * generally striking only one prospective juror who belongs to a protected group is not enough to draw an inference [of discriminatory intent] without other evidence.” Id. at 1101, 1102 , quoting Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S.Ct. 2228, 2244 , 204 L.Ed.2d 638 (2019); citing Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir.2000); Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir.2002) (“‘[t]wo challenges out of two [African American] venirepersons are not always enough to establish a

2026“At the first step of the Batson inquiry, the defendant is not required to demonstrate that ‘the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’” Hawkins, 2018-Ohio-4649, at ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170-173 (2005). “‘Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’” Id., quoting Johnson at 170 . {¶46} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the proponent of th

2026“At the first step of the Batson inquiry, the defendant is not required to demonstrate that ‘the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’” Hawkins, 2018-Ohio-4649, at ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170-173 (2005). “‘Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’” Id., quoting Johnson at 170 . {¶46} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the proponent of th

2011State v. Walker (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 52, 56 , 742 N.E.2d 1173 ; see, also State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 436 , 1999-Ohio-281 , 709 N.E.2d 140 (“reject[ing] [the] view” that where there is no pattern of discrimination, there is no Batson violation).

2008The law of equal protection does not allow `one free bite.'" State v. White , 85 Ohio St.3d 433 , 436 , 1999-Ohio-281 . {¶ 59} In basing its ruling on the absence of a pattern of discrimination, the trial court failed to provide an adequate basis to uphold the denial of the Batson challenge.