Batson objection in Florida

2018That court held that the failure of counsel “to follow up on his Batson objection could have been reasonably construed by the trial judge as an agreement that the expressed reasons were racially neutral.” Id.; see also United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548 , 1550 n.1 (11th Cir. 1991) (“In the instant case, however, the defendant’s attorney did not allege that the government’s explanation was pretextual at the time the government made its explanation for the strikes.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Smith, 127 F.3d 1388 , 1389–90 (11th Cir. 1997).

2018That court held that the failure of counsel “to follow up on his Batson objection could have been reasonably construed by the trial judge as an agreement that the expressed reasons were racially neutral.” Id.; see also United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548 , 1550 n.1 (11th Cir. 1991) (“In the instant case, however, the defendant’s attorney did not allege that the government’s explanation was pretextual at the time the government made its explanation for the strikes.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Smith, 127 F.3d 1388 , 1389–90 (11th Cir. 1997).

2018See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 470 F. App’x 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (“By failing to dispute the Government’s explanations, Sanders appeared to acquiesce in them.”); United States v. Whitfield, 314 F. App’x 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The failure to argue pretext after the challenged strike has been explained constitutes a waiver of the initial Batson objection.”); see also Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citing Davis, 160 F.3d at 1027 ; Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1377 ; Rudas, 905 F.2d at 41 ) (“Three of our sister circuits have ans

2018See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 470 F. App’x 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (“By failing to dispute the Government's explanations, Sanders appeared to acquiesce in them.”); United States v. Whitfield, 314 F. App’x 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The failure to argue pretext after the challenged strike has been explained constitutes a waiver of the initial Batson objection.”); see also Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citing Davis, 160 F.3d at 1027 ; Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1377 ; Rudas, 905 F.2d at 41 ) (“Three of our sister circuits have ans

2018As discussed below, that language was erroneously interpreted to mean that once a trial court rules on a Batson objection, 9The four cases are: United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1993); Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991); and United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1990).

2018The problem with Rudas is that the Second Circuit asserted that “[o]nce the Government has offered reasons for its peremptory challenges, defense counsel must expressly indicate an intention to pursue the Batson claim,” with no citation of authority. 905 F.2d at 41 . 14 even without determining if the proffered reasons are genuine, the prima facie showing of intentional discrimination becomes moot.

2018As discussed below, that language was erroneously interpreted to mean that once a trial court rules on a Batson objection, 9The four cases are: United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1993); Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991); and United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1990).

2018That court held that the failure of counsel “to follow up on his Batson objection could have been reasonably construed by the trial judge as an agreement that the expressed reasons were racially neutral.” Id.; see also United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548 , 1550 n.1 (11th Cir. 1991) (“In the instant case, however, the defendant’s attorney did not allege that the government’s explanation was pretextual at the time the government made its explanation for the strikes.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Smith, 127 F.3d 1388 , 1389–90 (11th Cir. 1997).

2018See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 470 F. App’x 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (“By failing to dispute the Government’s explanations, Sanders appeared to acquiesce in them.”); United States v. Whitfield, 314 F. App’x 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The failure to argue pretext after the challenged strike has been explained constitutes a waiver of the initial Batson objection.”); see also Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citing Davis, 160 F.3d at 1027 ; Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1377 ; Rudas, 905 F.2d at 41 ) (“Three of our sister circuits have ans

2018See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 470 F. App’x 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (“By failing to dispute the Government's explanations, Sanders appeared to acquiesce in them.”); United States v. Whitfield, 314 F. App’x 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The failure to argue pretext after the challenged strike has been explained constitutes a waiver of the initial Batson objection.”); see also Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citing Davis, 160 F.3d at 1027 ; Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1377 ; Rudas, 905 F.2d at 41 ) (“Three of our sister circuits have ans

2018A movant’s failure to argue pretext may even constitute waiver of his initial Batson objection.” United States v. Jackson, 347 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted).

2018A movant’s failure to argue pretext may even constitute waiver of his initial Batson objection.” United States v. Jackson, 347 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted).

2018Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held that a party “waived his Batson claim, however, by failing to rebut the county’s reasons for striking Juror Number Eight at the time he raised his claim.” Wright v. Harris Cty., 536 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123 , 1126–27 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Because this reason was not facially race- related and the defense did not dispute that explanation, the district court had no need to rule on its validity.”).

2018Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held that a party “waived his Batson claim, however, by failing to rebut the county’s reasons for striking Juror Number Eight at the time he raised his claim.” Wright v. Harris Cty., 536 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 24 1123 , 1126–27 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Because this reason was not facially race- related and the defense did not dispute that explanation, the district court had no need to rule on its validity.”).

2018See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 470 F. App’x 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (“By failing to dispute the Government’s explanations, Sanders appeared to acquiesce in them.”); United States v. Whitfield, 314 F. App’x 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The failure to argue pretext after the challenged strike has been explained constitutes a waiver of the initial Batson objection.”); see also Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citing Davis, 160 F.3d at 1027 ; Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1377 ; Rudas, 905 F.2d at 41 ) (“Three of our sister circuits have ans

2018See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 470 F. App’x 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (“By failing to dispute the Government's explanations, Sanders appeared to acquiesce in them.”); United States v. Whitfield, 314 F. App’x 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The failure to argue pretext after the challenged strike has been explained constitutes a waiver of the initial Batson objection.”); see also Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citing Davis, 160 F.3d at 1027 ; Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1377 ; Rudas, 905 F.2d at 41 ) (“Three of our sister circuits have ans

2018See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 470 F. App’x 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (“By failing to dispute the Government’s explanations, Sanders appeared to acquiesce in them.”); United States v. Whitfield, 314 F. App’x 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The failure to argue pretext after the challenged strike has been explained constitutes a waiver of the initial Batson objection.”); see also Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citing Davis, 160 F.3d at 1027 ; Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1377 ; Rudas, 905 F.2d at 41 ) (“Three of our sister circuits have ans

2018See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 470 F. App’x 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (“By failing to dispute the Government's explanations, Sanders appeared to acquiesce in them.”); United States v. Whitfield, 314 F. App’x 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The failure to argue pretext after the challenged strike has been explained constitutes a waiver of the initial Batson objection.”); see also Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citing Davis, 160 F.3d at 1027 ; Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1377 ; Rudas, 905 F.2d at 41 ) (“Three of our sister circuits have ans

2008Compare Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362 , 626 S.E.2d 383, 412 (stating that mere exclusion of members of a particular race by using peremptory strikes does not establish a prima facie case), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 397 , 166 L.Ed.2d 282 (2006), with Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind.2006) (stating that removal of the only African-American juror does raise an inference that the strike was racially motivated).

2008Compare Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362 , 626 S.E.2d 383, 412 (stating that mere exclusion of members of a particular race by using peremptory strikes does not establish a prima facie case), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 397 , 166 L.Ed.2d 282 (2006), with Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind.2006) (stating that removal of the only African-American juror does raise an inference that the strike was racially motivated).

2008Compare Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362 , 626 S.E.2d 383, 412 (stating that mere exclusion of members of a particular race by using peremptory strikes does not establish a prima facie case), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 397 , 166 L.Ed.2d 282 (2006), with Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind.2006) (stating that removal of the only African-American juror does raise an inference that the strike was racially motivated).

2008Compare Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362 , 626 S.E.2d 383, 412 (stating that mere exclusion of members of a particular race by using peremptory strikes does not establish a prima facie case), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 397 , 166 L.Ed.2d 282 (2006), with Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind.2006) (stating that removal of the only African-American juror does raise an inference that the strike was racially motivated).

2008Compare Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362 , 626 S.E.2d 383, 412 (stating that mere exclusion of members of a particular race by using peremptory strikes does not establish a prima facie case), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 397 , 166 L.Ed.2d 282 (2006), with Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind.2006) (stating that removal of the only African-American juror does raise an inference that the strike was racially motivated).

2008Compare Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362 , 626 S.E.2d 383, 412 (stating that mere exclusion of members of a particular race by using peremptory strikes does not establish a prima facie case), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 397 , 166 L.Ed.2d 282 (2006), with Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind.2006) (stating that removal of the only African-American juror does raise an inference that the strike was racially motivated).

2018Finally, Philmore is not entitled to relitigate his Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), claim in light of Hurst, which does not affect the merits of a Batson claim.

2018Finally, Philmore is not entitled to relitigate his Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), claim in light of Hurst, which does not affect the merits of a Batson claim.

2018Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held that a party “waived his Batson claim, however, by failing to rebut the county’s reasons for striking Juror Number Eight at the time he raised his claim.” Wright v. Harris Cty., 536 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123 , 1126–27 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Because this reason was not facially race- related and the defense did not dispute that explanation, the district court had no need to rule on its validity.”).

2018As discussed below, that language was erroneously interpreted to mean that once a trial court rules on a Batson objection, 9The four cases are: United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1993); Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991); and United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1990).

2017In D.avis, trial counsel raised a meritorious Batson challenge during voir dire, but failed to renew the objection before the jury was sworn in as required by Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174, 175-76 (Fla. 1993). 341 F.3d at 1312 .

2017In Davis, trial counsel raised a meritorious Batson challenge during voir dire, but failed to renew the objection before the jury was sworn in as required by Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174, 175-76 (Fla. 1993). 341 F.3d at 1312 .

1991However, in the same paragraph of Reynolds , the Florida Supreme Court approves the result reached in Pearson v. State, 514 So.2d 374 (Fla.2d DCA 1987), while disagreeing with the district court's "tacit assumption that Neil provides less protection than the federal *1366 law expounded in Batson. " [5] In Pearson , the district court remanded the cause ... for the holding of a Batson hearing with instructions that if the trial court finds that the state has not met its burden of providing a recially neutral explanation for the exercise of its challenge in this case, the trial court should set

1991Id., at 376 .

2018T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

2018T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

2017In D.avis, trial counsel raised a meritorious Batson challenge during voir dire, but failed to renew the objection before the jury was sworn in as required by Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174, 175-76 (Fla. 1993). 341 F.3d at 1312 .

2017In Davis, trial counsel raised a meritorious Batson challenge during voir dire, but failed to renew the objection before the jury was sworn in as required by Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174, 175-76 (Fla. 1993). 341 F.3d at 1312 .

2003Munson, 215 Ill.Dec. 125 , 662 N.E.2d at 1265 (citations omitted); see also State v. Lopez, 721 A.2d 837 (R.I.1998) (peremptory challenge based on "gut feeling" about the juror's desirability was race-neutral explanation and trial court ruling was not clearly wrong in overruling the defendant's Batson objection). [20] See, e.g., V.

2003Munson, 215 Ill.Dec. 125 , 662 N.E.2d at 1265 (citations omitted); see also State v. Lopez, 721 A.2d 837 (R.I.1998) (peremptory challenge based on "gut feeling" about the juror's desirability was race-neutral explanation and trial court ruling was not clearly wrong in overruling the defendant's Batson objection). [20] See, e.g., V.

2003Munson, 215 Ill.Dec. 125 , 662 N.E.2d at 1265 (citations omitted); see also State v. Lopez, 721 A.2d 837 (R.I.1998) (peremptory challenge based on "gut feeling" about the juror's desirability was race-neutral explanation and trial court ruling was not clearly wrong in overruling the defendant's Batson objection). [20] See, e.g., V.