Batson challenge in Arkansas

2005While the trial court was wrong in asserting that Mr. Moore could not make a Batson challenge because he did not share the same race as the struck juror, the result reached by the trial court was correct given that it is not even arguable that Mr. Moore made, or even attempted to make, a. prima facie case as required by Batson v. Kentucky, supra. We will affirm the trial court if it reaches the right result for the wrong reason.

2005While the trial court was wrong in asserting that Mr. Moore could not make a Batson challenge because he did not share the same race as the struck juror, the result reached by the trial court was correct given that it is not even arguable that Mr. Moore made, or even attempted to make, a. prima facie case as required by Batson v. Kentucky, supra. We will affirm the trial court if it reaches the right result for the wrong reason.

2024He explains that defense counsel made it clear that “appellant sought to seat gun owners on the jury, which is clearly a race-neutral reason.”6 Citing Weston v. State, 366 Ark. 265, 271 , 6 We acknowledge that appellant at one point in his brief states, “Along with other reasons, the primary basis of his strike as to the juror the court refused to excuse was that she 23 234 S.W.3d 848, 853 (2006), appellant notes that a race-neutral reason does not need to be “persuasive or even plausible” and that it may even be considered “silly or superstitious.”7 Here, despite any assertion otherwise, the

2024He explains that defense counsel made it clear that “appellant sought to seat gun owners on the jury, which is clearly a race-neutral reason.”6 Citing Weston v. State, 366 Ark. 265, 271 , 6 We acknowledge that appellant at one point in his brief states, “Along with other reasons, the primary basis of his strike as to the juror the court refused to excuse was that she 23 234 S.W.3d 848, 853 (2006), appellant notes that a race-neutral reason does not need to be “persuasive or even plausible” and that it may even be considered “silly or superstitious.”7 Here, despite any assertion otherwise, the

2025Travis v. State, 371 Ark. 621, 628 , 269 S.W.3d 341, 346 (2007).

2025Travis v. State, 371 Ark. 621, 628 , 269 S.W.3d 341, 346 (2007).

2005In Mackintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 397 , 978 S.W.2d 293, 296 (1998), our supreme court outlined the proper steps for the trial court to follow when a Batson claim is made: (1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must come forward with a race-neutral explanation; and (3) the trial court must decide whether the opponent has proven purposeful racial discrimination.

2005In Mackintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 397 , 978 S.W.2d 293, 296 (1998), our supreme court outlined the proper steps for the trial court to follow when a Batson claim is made: (1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must come forward with a race-neutral explanation; and (3) the trial court must decide whether the opponent has proven purposeful racial discrimination.

2007See Stenhouse v. State, 362 Ark. 480 , 209 S.W.3d 352 (2005) (upholding a Batson challenge when the pastor was to be a witness and the State offered that reason as a race-neutral explanation in response to the Batson challenge).

2007See Stenhouse v. State, 362 Ark. 480 , 209 S.W.3d 352 (2005) (upholding a Batson challenge when the pastor was to be a witness and the State offered that reason as a race-neutral explanation in response to the Batson challenge).

2016Owens v. State, 363 Ark. 413 , 214 S.W.3d 849 (2005).

2016Owens v. State, 363 Ark. 413 , 214 S.W.3d 849 (2005).

2009Id. at 539 , 10 S.W.3d at 912 .

2009Id. at 539 , 10 S.W.3d at 912 .

2025Grinning v. City of Pine Bluff, 322 Ark. 45, 50 , 907 S.W.2d 690, 692 (1995) (reversing and remanding but recognizing that 10 record was insufficient to demonstrate Batson error, e.g., the prosecutor’s proffered racially neutral explanation of “past performance” lacked details).

2025Grinning v. City of Pine Bluff, 322 Ark. 45, 50 , 907 S.W.2d 690, 692 (1995) (reversing and remanding but recognizing that 10 record was insufficient to demonstrate Batson error, e.g., the prosecutor’s proffered racially neutral explanation of “past performance” lacked details).

2017Woods relies on Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), and this court’s frequent citation to that case for the proposition that ending the Batson inquiry after the second step and simply accepting the State’s race-neutral explanation is reversible error.

2017Woods relies on Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), and this court’s frequent citation to that case for the proposition that ending the Batson inquiry after the second step and simply accepting the State’s race-neutral explanation is reversible error.

2003In Williams v. State, 338 Ark. 97 , 991 S.W.2d 565 (1999), we stated: We will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a Batson challenge only when its findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

2003In Williams v. State, 338 Ark. 97 , 991 S.W.2d 565 (1999), we stated: We will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a Batson challenge only when its findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

2004Rockett v. State, 318 Ark. 831 , 890 S.W.2d 235 (1994); see also Pacee, supra (holding the State’s peremptory strikes against a Batson challenge where potential jurors had served on panels that either acquitted criminal defendants or had resulted in hung juries was race neutral).

2004Rockett v. State, 318 Ark. 831 , 890 S.W.2d 235 (1994); see also Pacee, supra (holding the State’s peremptory strikes against a Batson challenge where potential jurors had served on panels that either acquitted criminal defendants or had resulted in hung juries was race neutral).

2004Holder, supra. In Pacee v. State, 306 Ark. 563 , 816 S.W.2d 856 (1991), we upheld a prosecutor’s peremptory strikes against a Batson challenge where potential jurors had served on panels that either acquitted criminal defendants or had resulted in hung juries.

2004Holder, supra. In Pacee v. State, 306 Ark. 563 , 816 S.W.2d 856 (1991), we upheld a prosecutor’s peremptory strikes against a Batson challenge where potential jurors had served on panels that either acquitted criminal defendants or had resulted in hung juries.

2024Riley v. State, 2009 Ark.

2024Riley v. State, 2009 Ark.

2021But a Batson challenge concerns more than just numbers: “[R]eliance on numbers alone is not sufficient to prove discriminatory intent.” London, 354 Ark. at 321–22, 125 S.W.3d at 817 .

2021But a Batson challenge concerns more than just numbers: “[R]eliance on numbers alone is not sufficient to prove discriminatory intent.” London, 354 Ark. at 321–22, 125 S.W.3d at 817 .

2005Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).

2005Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).

2005In Jackson v. State, 330 Ark. 126, 129 , 954 S.W.2d 894, 895 (1997), the supreme court reviewed a Batson challenge and announced: In affirming Mr. Jackson’s conviction, the supreme court reasoned: The first of the three-step analysis above requires us to determine whether Jackson proved a prima facie case of discrimination which may be established by (1) showing that the totality of the relevant facts give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, (2) demonstrating total or seriously disproportional exclusion of blacks from the jury, or (3) showing a pattern of strikes, questions or stat

2005In Jackson v. State, 330 Ark. 126, 129 , 954 S.W.2d 894, 895 (1997), the supreme court reviewed a Batson challenge and announced: In affirming Mr. Jackson’s conviction, the supreme court reasoned: The first of the three-step analysis above requires us to determine whether Jackson proved a prima facie case of discrimination which may be established by (1) showing that the totality of the relevant facts give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, (2) demonstrating total or seriously disproportional exclusion of blacks from the jury, or (3) showing a pattern of strikes, questions or stat

2000See Heard v. State, 322 Ark. 553 , 910 S.W.2d 663 (1995).

2000See Heard v. State, 322 Ark. 553 , 910 S.W.2d 663 (1995).

1997While the majority opinion seems to find fault with the trial court’s reference to middle-aged white males, the record is clear that the judge’s ruling dealt with gender and race. 1 The Court in J.E.B. v. T.B. ex rel Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994), extended the Batson principle to gender-based strikes, and the trial court here determined Lammers improperly utilized gender in striking white males.

1994On April 19, 1994, the J.E.B. case was decided, and the Court indeed extended the Batson principle to intentional discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes on the basis of gender, stating “gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.” J.E.B., 511 U.S. at_, 114 S.Ct. at 1421 .

1997Tucker v. State, 313 Ark. 624, 629 , 855 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1993) (affirming on other grounds the trial court’s finding no Batson violation).

1997Tucker v. State, 313 Ark. 624, 629 , 855 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1993) (affirming on other grounds the trial court’s finding no Batson violation).