Batson motion in California

2025In reviewing a trial court’s ruling at the third stage of the Batson analysis, a “comparative juror analysis must be considered” by an appellate court “if relied upon by the defendant and the record is adequate to permit the urged comparisons.” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 622 (Lenix).) This “analysis is but one form of circumstantial evidence that is relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, on the issue of intentional discrimination.” (Ibid.) Such analysis, as applied to a claim alleging improper excusals based on race, “compares the voir dire responses of the challenged prospect

2025Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.’ ” (People v. Lenix (2008) 38 PEOPLE v. BARRETT Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 44 Cal.4th 602, 613 .) “Review of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] ‘We review a trial court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s justifications for exercisin

2025(People v. Adanandus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 503 [“Absent some evidence to the contrary, we are entitled to presume that 16 months after Johnson[ v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 ] the trial court knew and applied the appropriate law governing a Wheeler/Batson motion.”]; People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644 [“As an aspect of the presumption that judicial duty is properly performed, we presume . . . that the court 9 knows and applies the correct statutory and case law”], overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 .) Even if an upda

2022Rather, petitioners seek this information to pursue their constitutional right to equal protection, which outweighs any interest the state may retain in these prosecutor’s notes.”].) “The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process.” (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 172 , italics added.) It “provides an opportunity to the prosecutor to give the reason for striking the 13 Although peremptory strikes have a long historical pedigree in American jury trials, some have questioned whether Batson c

2022A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis.” (Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 , 252 11 In People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 429 (Rhoades), our Supreme Court did not conclude the prosecution’s use of four out of eight peremptory challenges against Black women gave rise to an inference of discrimination when considering the “totality of the circumstances”—which in that case included obvious race-neutral reasons for the prosecution’s peremptory challenges (strong views against the imposition of the death penalty).

2022A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis.” (Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 , 252 11 In People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 429 (Rhoades), our Supreme Court did not conclude the prosecution’s use of four out of eight peremptory challenges against Black women gave rise to an inference of discrimination when considering the “totality of the circumstances”—which in that case included obvious race-neutral reasons for the prosecution’s peremptory challenges (strong views against the imposition of the death penalty).

2021(People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 .) At step one, “the defendant must make out a prima facie case ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ ” (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 .) In ruling on the motion, if a trial court finds that the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination, a trial court may consider whether the record contains “readily apparent” and “obvious race-neutral grounds” for the prosecutor’s use of a challenge to dispel that inference, but “the very purpose of Batson’s first

2021(People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 .) At step one, “the defendant must make out a prima facie case ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ ” (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 .) In ruling on the motion, if a trial court finds that the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination, a trial court may consider whether the record contains “readily apparent” and “obvious race-neutral grounds” for the prosecutor’s use of a challenge to dispel that inference, but “the very purpose of Batson’s first

2024(See Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 479 [finding Batson error where “the record [did] not show that the trial judge actually made a determination concerning [the prospective juror’s] demeanor”].) On this record, we agree with Hicks that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for his peremptory challenge of this juror were race neutral.

2021(Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 478 .) Courts apply the well-established three-step Batson inquiry to motions alleging discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.

2026An honest mistake of fact does not show that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was motivated by C.R.’s race.9 (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 366 ; Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 669 [“ ‘ “no Batson violation when the prosecutor excused a prospective juror for a factually erroneous but race-neutral reason” ’ ”].) And “any mistake or ambiguity involved in the articulation of this reason does not indicate that it or the prosecution’s . . . stated reasons were pretextual.” (Aguirre, at p. 669.) Our focus under Batson/Wheeler is not on whether the prosecutor’s stated reason was objectively r

2023Watson contends the trial court (1) committed Batson error (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson)); (2) violated his constitutional right to a public trial; (3) erred by allowing him to be cross-examined about certain attorney-client privileged matters; (4) erred by allowing the prosecution to amend its information near the end of trial; (5) erred by denying his motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) for the appointment of new counsel; and (6) erred in imposing certain determinate sentences.

2026An honest mistake of fact does not show that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was motivated by C.R.’s race.9 (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 366 ; Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 669 [“ ‘ “no Batson violation when the prosecutor excused a prospective juror for a factually erroneous but race-neutral reason” ’ ”].) And “any mistake or ambiguity involved in the articulation of this reason does not indicate that it or the prosecution’s . . . stated reasons were pretextual.” (Aguirre, at p. 669.) Our focus under Batson/Wheeler is not on whether the prosecutor’s stated reason was objectively r

2017Yet even assuming that the prosecutor was mistaken in her belief, “[t]he purpose of a hearing on a Wheeler/Batson motion is not to test the prosecutor’s memory but to determine whether the reasons given are genuine and race neutral. ‘Faulty memory . . . that might engender a “mistake” of the type the prosecutor proffered to explain [a] peremptory challenge are not necessarily associated with impermissible reliance on presumed group bias.’ [Citation.] [An] ‘isolated mistake or misstatement’ [citation] does not alone compel the conclusion that this reason was not sincere.” (People v. Jones (2011

2022When the prosecution asked the court to excuse Juror 8832, the defense made a Batson motion at sidebar. 6 The defense represented, without dispute, that three of the prosecution’s peremptory challenges had been exercised against Black women, and the defense argued this pattern of strikes warranted compelling the prosecution to state its reasons for excluding the Black women prospective jurors. 7 The trial court agreed, explaining that just by the “sheer number” of strikes used against Black women it would “require the People to provide a race neutral reason for the use of those peremptories.”

2017We note that an objection under Wheeler also preserves a Batson claim on appeal. ( People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602 , 610, fn. 5, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 ( Lenix ).) A. General Principles for Evaluating Peremptory Challenges Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit using peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based solely on group bias. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 272 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ; Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 84 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 .) "It is well settled that '[a] prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective juro

2022Third, as Daniel acknowledges, two Black jurors remained on the panel for trial after an additional jury panel was brought into the courtroom and questioned. “[U]ltimate inclusion on the jury of members of the group allegedly targeted by discrimination indicates ‘“good faith”’ in the use of peremptory challenges, and may show under all the circumstances that no Wheeler/Batson violation occurred.” (People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706 , 747- 748; see People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 599 [no inference of discrimination where the jury included three Black men, even though the prosecutor ha

2014Another example is Bell, supra, which involved the use of peremptory challenges to exclude two of three African-American jurors. ( Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 597-598.) While the dismissal of some or all members of a cognizable group is relevant to the Wheeler/Batson analysis, other probative circumstances must exist.

2016(See People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137 , 165, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 , 878 P.2d 521 ; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 .) Although a prosecutor may rely on any number of bases to select jurors, a legitimate reason is one that does not deny equal protection. ( *672 Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765 , 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 .) "Certainly a challenge based on racial prejudice would not be supported by a legitimate reason." ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 , 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 .) "At the third stage of the Wheeler/B

2016(See People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137 , 165, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 , 878 P.2d 521 ; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 .) Although a prosecutor may rely on any number of bases to select jurors, a legitimate reason is one that does not deny equal protection. ( *672 Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765 , 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 .) "Certainly a challenge based on racial prejudice would not be supported by a legitimate reason." ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 , 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 .) "At the third stage of the Wheeler/B

2015(People v. Hernandez (N.Y. 1990) 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 87 ; Hernandez, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 378 (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Accordingly, as we have previously explained, Hernandez has no application where, as here, the trial court “expressly found that a prima facie case of discrimination was not established.” (Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1103 ; accord, State v. Allen (La. 2005) 913 So.2d 788, 802 [“the defendant’s reliance upon the rule set forth . . . in Hernandez is misplaced,” since “it is obvious from the district court’s ruling that the defense’s Batson challenge had already failed when

2015(People v. Hernandez (N.Y. 1990) 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 87 ; Hernandez, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 378 (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Accordingly, as we have previously explained, Hernandez has no application where, as here, the trial court “expressly found that a prima facie case of discrimination was not established.” (Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1103 ; accord, State v. Allen (La. 2005) 913 So.2d 788, 802 [“the defendant’s reliance upon the rule set forth . . . in Hernandez is misplaced,” since “it is obvious from the district court’s ruling that the defense’s Batson challenge had already failed when

2022(See Battle, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 777 .) “‘[U]ltimate inclusion on the jury of members of the group allegedly targeted by discrimination indicates “‘good faith’” in the use of peremptory challenges, and may show under all the circumstances that no Wheeler/Batson violation occurred.’” (Battle, at p. 777; accord, People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 747-748 ; see People v. Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1000 [“While acceptance of one or more black jurors by the prosecution does not necessarily settle all questions about how the prosecution used its peremptory challenges, these facts nonethel

2019(People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 384 (Scott).) The threshold is low because “[t]he Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process. [Citation.] The inherent uncertainty present in inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels against engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple question.” (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 172 .) Our task is to examine the record so we can determine whether “discrimination may have occurred.” (Id. at

2019In the first stage of a Batson / Wheeler challenge, the defendant must make out a prima facie case that there is an inference of a discriminatory purpose from the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes. ( People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602 , 612-613, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 ( Lenix ).) The burden then shifts to the prosecution to offer race- or gender-neutral justifications for the strikes in the second stage. ( Ibid . ) At the third stage, the trial court evaluates whether the race- or gender-neutral explanations are credible. ( Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472 , 477, 128 S

2019In the first stage of a Batson / Wheeler challenge, the defendant must make out a prima facie case that there is an inference of a discriminatory purpose from the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes. ( People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602 , 612-613, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 ( Lenix ).) The burden then shifts to the prosecution to offer race- or gender-neutral justifications for the strikes in the second stage. ( Ibid . ) At the third stage, the trial court evaluates whether the race- or gender-neutral explanations are credible. ( Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472 , 477, 128 S

2021(See People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 612 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [“[B]ecause [the trial court’s] ruling is not accompanied by any reasons or analysis, there is nothing to defer to.”]; Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1060 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [“There is no reasoning in the PEOPLE v. BAKER Liu, J., concurring trial court’s statement that ‘no discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanations, and the reasons appear to be race neutral.’ ”].) “There is a wide chasm . . . between the absence of reasons to conclude that the trial court did not conduct a proper Batson analysis and the presenc

2021(See People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 612 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [“[B]ecause [the trial court’s] ruling is not accompanied by any reasons or analysis, there is nothing to defer to.”]; Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1060 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [“There is no reasoning in the PEOPLE v. BAKER Liu, J., concurring trial court’s statement that ‘no discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanations, and the reasons appear to be race neutral.’ ”].) “There is a wide chasm . . . between the absence of reasons to conclude that the trial court did not conduct a proper Batson analysis and the presenc

2023Proc., § 231.7, subd. (e); People v. Silas (2021) 43 “Review of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions.” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “Reviewing the trial court’s determination [that a stated reason for a strike is genuine] with restraint does not, however, mean abdication.” (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 76 .) Usually, such rulings “are entitled to deference only when the [trial] court made a ‘sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications of

2022Third, as Daniel acknowledges, two Black jurors remained on the panel for trial after an additional jury panel was brought into the courtroom and questioned. “[U]ltimate inclusion on the jury of members of the group allegedly targeted by discrimination indicates ‘“good faith”’ in the use of peremptory challenges, and may show under all the circumstances that no Wheeler/Batson violation occurred.” (People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706 , 747- 748; see People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 599 [no inference of discrimination where the jury included three Black men, even though the prosecutor ha

2016(See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ].)" ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 , 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 , fn. omitted.) "Review of a trial court's denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions." ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 , 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 .) "We review a trial court's determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor's justifications for exercising peremptory challenges ' "with great restraint." ' [Citation.] We presume

2016(See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ].)" ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 , 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 , fn. omitted.) "Review of a trial court's denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions." ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 , 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 .) "We review a trial court's determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor's justifications for exercising peremptory challenges ' "with great restraint." ' [Citation.] We presume

2021(See People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 612 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [“[B]ecause [the trial court’s] ruling is not accompanied by any reasons or analysis, there is nothing to defer to.”]; Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1060 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [“There is no reasoning in the PEOPLE v. BAKER Liu, J., concurring trial court’s statement that ‘no discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanations, and the reasons appear to be race neutral.’ ”].) “There is a wide chasm . . . between the absence of reasons to conclude that the trial court did not conduct a proper Batson analysis and the presenc

2021(See People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 612 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [“[B]ecause [the trial court’s] ruling is not accompanied by any reasons or analysis, there is nothing to defer to.”]; Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1060 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [“There is no reasoning in the PEOPLE v. BAKER Liu, J., concurring trial court’s statement that ‘no discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanations, and the reasons appear to be race neutral.’ ”].) “There is a wide chasm . . . between the absence of reasons to conclude that the trial court did not conduct a proper Batson analysis and the presenc

2021(See People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 612 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [“[B]ecause [the trial court’s] ruling is not accompanied by any reasons or analysis, there is nothing to defer to.”]; Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1060 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [“There is no reasoning in the PEOPLE v. BAKER Liu, J., concurring trial court’s statement that ‘no discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanations, and the reasons appear to be race neutral.’ ”].) “There is a wide chasm . . . between the absence of reasons to conclude that the trial court did not conduct a proper Batson analysis and the presenc

2021(See People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 612 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [“[B]ecause [the trial court’s] ruling is not accompanied by any reasons or analysis, there is nothing to defer to.”]; Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1060 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [“There is no reasoning in the PEOPLE v. BAKER Liu, J., concurring trial court’s statement that ‘no discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanations, and the reasons appear to be race neutral.’ ”].) “There is a wide chasm . . . between the absence of reasons to conclude that the trial court did not conduct a proper Batson analysis and the presenc

2025“There is ‘no Batson violation when the prosecutor excused a prospective juror for a factually erroneous but race-neutral reason.’ ” ( Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 79–80; see also Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 78 [discussing the differences between mistakes and bias in jury selection].) In giving her reasons, the prosecutor could have focused on the prospective juror’s initial responses indicating knowledge of Dragon Family/Dragon Family Junior or the Young Locs and his acknowledgment of having heard about “this particular gang,” overlooking the passing reference to “V.F.N.” Even if the

2023Proc., § 231.7, subd. (e); People v. Silas (2021) 43 “Review of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions.” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “Reviewing the trial court’s determination [that a stated reason for a strike is genuine] with restraint does not, however, mean abdication.” (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 76 .) Usually, such rulings “are entitled to deference only when the [trial] court made a ‘sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications of

2016(See, e.g., Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 554-555 [trial court was under the mistaken impression that only pattern of discrimination through multiple excusals could make prima facie showing].) We therefore independently review the record to ‘“resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.”’ (Id. at p. 554.)” (Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 664 , italics in original.) 2 In assessing whether defendant established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, we are mindful that it is a “low threshold” the d

2015(Cf. People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 553 ; see People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 710 (Morrison) [“[f]or all we know, counsel stood silent because (1) they saw no legitimate basis for a Wheeler/Batson claim given their knowledge and observations of the excused jurors and/or (2) they themselves found one or more of the jurors objectionable from a defense standpoint.”].) 7 (2) The Wheeler Motions Were Without Merit. (a) Applicable Law.

2021Today’s opinion, like other recent decisions, “illustrate[s] the imprecision of relying on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of discrimination.” (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 173 ; see People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393 , 461–466 (Rhoades) (dis. opn. of Liu, J.); People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804 , 871–879 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) “[T]his mode of analysis — hypothesizing reasons for the removal of minority jurors as a basis for obviating inquiry into the prosecutor’s actual reasons — has become a staple of our Batson jurisprudence, and it raises serious concerns. ‘Th

2021Today’s opinion, like other recent decisions, “illustrate[s] the imprecision of relying on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of discrimination.” (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 173 ; see People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393 , 461–466 (Rhoades) (dis. opn. of Liu, J.); People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804 , 871–879 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) “[T]his mode of analysis — hypothesizing reasons for the removal of minority jurors as a basis for obviating inquiry into the prosecutor’s actual reasons — has become a staple of our Batson jurisprudence, and it raises serious concerns. ‘Th

2021The People claimed the defendant waived any appellate claim of Batson error because he failed to raise it during voir dire. ( Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 115–116.) Yeoman held that the defendant did not waive the Batson argument: 47 “[W]e believe that to consider defendant’s claim under Batson … is more consistent with fairness and good appellate practice than to deny the claim as waived.

2021The People claimed the defendant waived any appellate claim of Batson error because he failed to raise it during voir dire. ( Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 115–116.) Yeoman held that the defendant did not waive the Batson argument: “[W]e believe that to consider defendant’s claim under Batson … is more consistent with fairness and good appellate practice than to deny the claim as waived.

2020As our Supreme Court has explained, a prosecutor who employs the “ ‘laundry list’ approach” at the second step of a Wheeler/Batson motion by “positing of multiple reasons, some of which, upon examination, prove implausible or unsupported by the facts, can in some circumstances fatally impair the prosecutor’s credibility.” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134 , 1157–1158.) Trial courts should therefore “attempt to evaluate the attorney’s statement of reasons as a whole rather than focus exclusively on one or two of the reasons offered.” (Id. at p. 1158.) The court is not, however, required “t

2020As our Supreme Court has explained, a prosecutor who employs the “ ‘laundry list’ approach” at the second step of a Wheeler/Batson motion by “positing of multiple reasons, some of which, upon examination, prove implausible or unsupported by the facts, can in some circumstances fatally impair the prosecutor’s credibility.” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134 , 1157–1158.) Trial courts should therefore “attempt to evaluate the attorney’s statement of reasons as a whole rather than focus exclusively on one or two of the reasons offered.” (Id. at p. 1158.) The court is not, however, required “t

2025In reviewing a trial court’s ruling at the third stage of the Batson analysis, a “comparative juror analysis must be considered” by an appellate court “if relied upon by the defendant and the record is adequate to permit the urged comparisons.” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 622 (Lenix).) This “analysis is but one form of circumstantial evidence that is relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, on the issue of intentional discrimination.” (Ibid.) Such analysis, as applied to a claim alleging improper excusals based on race, “compares the voir dire responses of the challenged prospect

2025In reviewing a trial court’s ruling at the third stage of the Batson analysis, a “comparative juror analysis must be considered” by an appellate court “if relied upon by the defendant and the record is adequate to permit the urged comparisons.” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 622 (Lenix).) This “analysis is but one form of circumstantial evidence that is relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, on the issue of intentional discrimination.” (Ibid.) Such analysis, as applied to a claim alleging improper excusals based on race, “compares the voir dire responses of the challenged prospect

2011Moreover, the prosecutor repeatedly passed J.C., an African-American woman who ultimately served as a juror in the guilt phase. 12 (See People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 69-70 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 117 P.3d 622 ] [no inference of bias in excusing one of two African-American prospective jurors, given that the other African-American prospective juror was passed repeatedly by the prosecutor and sat on the jury].) Although the circumstance that the jury included a member of the identified group is not dispositive (People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 225-226 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 477 , 746 P.2d 45

2011Moreover, the prosecutor repeatedly passed J.C., an African-American woman who ultimately served as a juror in the guilt phase. 12 (See People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 69-70 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 117 P.3d 622 ] [no inference of bias in excusing one of two African-American prospective jurors, given that the other African-American prospective juror was passed repeatedly by the prosecutor and sat on the jury].) Although the circumstance that the jury included a member of the identified group is not dispositive (People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 225-226 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 477 , 746 P.2d 45

2022The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. [Citation.] The three-step procedure also applies to state constitutional claims [Citations.]’” (People v. Taylor, supra, at pp. 885–886; see also People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 473 ; People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 772 (Battle).) The defendant is required to overcome only a “‘low threshold’” to meet the first step of the Batson test.

2022The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. [Citation.] The three-step procedure also applies to state constitutional claims [Citations.]’” (People v. Taylor, supra, at pp. 885–886; see also People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 473 ; People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 772 (Battle).) The defendant is required to overcome only a “‘low threshold’” to meet the first step of the Batson test.

2021(People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 182 .) This principle does not apply here, because although Juror 275 would have been seated as an alternate juror had she not been challenged, three alternate jurors were randomly chosen to be seated on the main jury. 11 In other words, the Batson framework “is not designed to root out implicit bias.” (Shirley v. Yates (9th Cir. 2015) 807 F.3d 1090, 1110, fn. 26 ; see Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 , 267–268 (conc. opn. of Breyer, J.).) 8 Second, if a defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to “state nondiscri

2021(People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 182 .) This principle does not apply here, because although Juror 275 would have been seated as an alternate juror had she not been challenged, three alternate jurors were randomly chosen to be seated on the main jury. 11 In other words, the Batson framework “is not designed to root out implicit bias.” (Shirley v. Yates (9th Cir. 2015) 807 F.3d 1090, 1110, fn. 26 ; see Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 , 267–268 (conc. opn. of Breyer, J.).) 8 Second, if a defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to “state nondiscri