12 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1993–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Don Juan Maxwellgreen2 sentences2014Under the third part of the Batson analysis, the “court’s findings are afforded great deference, as the analysis depends highly on credibility.” Id. ¶ 18 (citing United States v. Maxwell, 473 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir.2007)). 2014Under the third part of the Batson analysis, the “court’s findings are afforded great deference, as the analysis depends highly on credibility.” Id. ¶ 18 (citing United States v. Maxwell, 473 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir.2007)). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences2026State v. Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d 364, 368 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 16 , 829 N.W.2d 458 , 465–66). [¶35.] The State contends, for the first time on appeal, that the defense failed to make a prima facie showing to satisfy the first step under the Batson framework. 2026State v. Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d 364, 368 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 16 , 829 N.W.2d 458 , 465–66). [¶35.] The State contends, for the first time on appeal, that the defense failed to make a prima facie showing to satisfy the first step under the Batson framework. | 2 | 3 |
Hernandez v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences1993See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at ___ , 111 S.Ct. at 1875 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting). ("[T]he Court ... errs when it concludes that a defendant's Batson challenge fails whenever the prosecutor advances a nonpretextual justification that is not facially discriminatory." Id. ) Rather, it seems to have announced a new rule and overruled Batson without even saying so by shifting the burden to the defendant to prove that a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation. 1993See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at ___ , 111 S.Ct. at 1875 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting). ("[T]he Court ... errs when it concludes that a defendant's Batson challenge fails whenever the prosecutor advances a nonpretextual justification that is not facially discriminatory." Id. ) Rather, it seems to have announced a new rule and overruled Batson without even saying so by shifting the burden to the defendant to prove that a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation. | 2 | 2 |
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Osvaldo CONTRERAS-CONTRERAS, Defendant-Appellantgreen2 sentences2000See United States v. Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d 1103 (9thCir.l996) (applying plain error analysis to defendant’s Batson claim raised for the first time on appeal). 2000See United States v. Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.1996) (applying plain error analysis to defendant's Batson claim raised for the first time on appeal). | 2 | 2 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2013So, with that I guess we’ll proceed. [¶ 16.] The test to determine whether a Batson violation has occurred is well-settled: First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Batson v. Kentucky, ] 476 U.S. [79,] 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 [, 1721, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)] (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-242 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). 2013So, with that I guess we’ll proceed. [¶ 16.] The test to determine whether a Batson violation has occurred is well-settled: First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Batson v. Kentucky, ] 476 U.S. [79,] 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 [, 1721, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)] (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-242 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). | 1 | 5 |
Honomichl v. Leapleygreen2 sentences2000While I do not agree that Honomichl v. Leapley, 498 N.W.2d 636 (S.D.1993), necessarily controls the Batson issue here, I believe our examination of the question requires lesser scrutiny on habeas corpus review. 2000While I do not agree that Honomichl v. Leapley, 498 N.W.2d 636 (S.D.1993), necessarily controls the Batson issue here, I believe our examination of the question requires lesser scrutiny on habeas corpus review. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Ryangreen2 sentences2026There are no “‘magic words’ the trial court must use in order to fulfill a Batson analysis.” Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 16 , 843 N.W.2d at 369 (quoting State v. Ryan, 2008 S.D. 94 , ¶ 13, 757 N.W.2d 155, 159 ). 2026There are no “‘magic words’ the trial court must use in order to fulfill a Batson analysis.” Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 16 , 843 N.W.2d at 369 (quoting State v. Ryan, 2008 S.D. 94 , ¶ 13, 757 N.W.2d 155, 159 ). | 1 | 3 |
Johnson v. Californiagreen2 sentences2014Third, [i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide ... whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. 3 State v. Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 16 , 829 N.W.2d 458, 465-66 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 , 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). [¶ 13.] In this case, the following dialogue is the entire record of the Batson challenge and the circuit court’s analysis. 2014Third, [i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide ... whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. 3 State v. Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 16 , 829 N.W.2d 458, 465-66 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 , 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). [¶ 13.] In this case, the following dialogue is the entire record of the Batson challenge and the circuit court’s analysis. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Owengreen2 sentences2012State v. Overbey, 2010 S.D. 78, ¶ 11 , 790 N.W.2d 35, 40 (quoting In re H.L.S., 2009 S.D. 92 , ¶ 11, 774 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 ). [¶ 33.] The test for examining a Batson challenge consists of three steps. “[A] defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group and the State used its peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race from the potential jury candidates.” Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67 , ¶ 33, 736 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21 , ¶ 45, 729 N.W.2d 356, 369 ). 2012State v. Overbey, 2010 S.D. 78, ¶ 11 , 790 N.W.2d 35, 40 (quoting In re H.L.S., 2009 S.D. 92 , ¶ 11, 774 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 ). [¶ 33.] The test for examining a Batson challenge consists of three steps. “[A] defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group and the State used its peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race from the potential jury candidates.” Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67 , ¶ 33, 736 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21 , ¶ 45, 729 N.W.2d 356, 369 ). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Jeremy Younggreen2 sentences2026When attempting to make a prima facie case, “‘[t]he defendant must point to more than the bare fact of the removal of certain venirepersons and the absence of an obvious valid reason for the removal’ before the prosecution is required to offer a race-neutral reason for the strike.” United States v. Young, 129 F.4th 459, 466 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1990)). 2026When attempting to make a prima facie case, “‘[t]he defendant must point to more than the bare fact of the removal of certain venirepersons and the absence of an obvious valid reason for the removal’ before the prosecution is required to offer a race-neutral reason for the strike.” United States v. Young, 129 F.4th 459, 466 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1990)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Craig Young-Beygreen2 sentences2026In Young, the Eighth Circuit held the following language to be insufficient to establish a prima facie case: “Our position is that these are three strikes from the [G]overnment that are Native American people, and we’re making a Batson challenge.” Id. at 466–67 (alteration in original). [¶36.] Here, the language used by the defense in an attempt to make a prima facie case is remarkably similar. 2026In Young, the Eighth Circuit held the following language to be insufficient to establish a prima facie case: “Our position is that these are three strikes from the [G]overnment that are Native American people, and we’re making a Batson challenge.” Id. at 466–67 (alteration in original). [¶36.] Here, the language used by the defense in an attempt to make a prima facie case is remarkably similar. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stanleygreen2 sentences2026Because this issue was not presented to the circuit court, the State has waived this issue on appeal.2 See State v. Stanley, 2017 S.D. 32 , ¶ 26, 896 N.W.2d 669, 678 (“This Court will not address arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.” (citation omitted)). [¶38.] In the second step of the Batson framework, once the defense has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the State must “explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.” Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d at 368 (citation omitted). 2026Because this issue was not presented to the circuit court, the State has waived this issue on appeal.2 See State v. Stanley, 2017 S.D. 32 , ¶ 26, 896 N.W.2d 669, 678 (“This Court will not address arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.” (citation omitted)). [¶38.] In the second step of the Batson framework, once the defense has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the State must “explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.” Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d at 368 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Guthmillergreen2 sentences2026State v. Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d 364, 368 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 16 , 829 N.W.2d 458 , 465–66). [¶35.] The State contends, for the first time on appeal, that the defense failed to make a prima facie showing to satisfy the first step under the Batson framework. 2026State v. Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d 364, 368 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 16 , 829 N.W.2d 458 , 465–66). [¶35.] The State contends, for the first time on appeal, that the defense failed to make a prima facie showing to satisfy the first step under the Batson framework. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences2013See People v. Davis, 368 Ill.App.3d 17 , 305 Ill.Dec. 848 , 856 N.E.2d 653, 655 (2006). 2013See People v. Davis, 368 Ill.App.3d 17 , 305 Ill.Dec. 848 , 856 N.E.2d 653, 655 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2013Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. 476 U.S. at 94 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 , 92 S.Ct. 1221 , 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972). 2013Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. 476 U.S. at 94 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 , 92 S.Ct. 1221 , 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Overbeygreen2 sentences2012State v. Overbey, 2010 S.D. 78, ¶ 11 , 790 N.W.2d 35, 40 (quoting In re H.L.S., 2009 S.D. 92 , ¶ 11, 774 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 ). [¶ 33.] The test for examining a Batson challenge consists of three steps. “[A] defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group and the State used its peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race from the potential jury candidates.” Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67 , ¶ 33, 736 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21 , ¶ 45, 729 N.W.2d 356, 369 ). 2012State v. Overbey, 2010 S.D. 78, ¶ 11 , 790 N.W.2d 35, 40 (quoting In re H.L.S., 2009 S.D. 92 , ¶ 11, 774 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 ). [¶ 33.] The test for examining a Batson challenge consists of three steps. “[A] defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group and the State used its peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race from the potential jury candidates.” Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67 , ¶ 33, 736 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21 , ¶ 45, 729 N.W.2d 356, 369 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mulligangreen2 sentences2012State v. Overbey, 2010 S.D. 78, ¶ 11 , 790 N.W.2d 35, 40 (quoting In re H.L.S., 2009 S.D. 92 , ¶ 11, 774 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 ). [¶ 33.] The test for examining a Batson challenge consists of three steps. “[A] defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group and the State used its peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race from the potential jury candidates.” Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67 , ¶ 33, 736 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21 , ¶ 45, 729 N.W.2d 356, 369 ). 2012State v. Overbey, 2010 S.D. 78, ¶ 11 , 790 N.W.2d 35, 40 (quoting In re H.L.S., 2009 S.D. 92 , ¶ 11, 774 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 ). [¶ 33.] The test for examining a Batson challenge consists of three steps. “[A] defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group and the State used its peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race from the potential jury candidates.” Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67 , ¶ 33, 736 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21 , ¶ 45, 729 N.W.2d 356, 369 ). | 1 | 1 |
Flute v. Classgreen2 sentences2000See Flute v. Class, 1997 SD 10, ¶ 11 , 559 N.W.2d 554, 557 (court exercises decreasing scrutiny as time passes). 2000See Flute v. Class, 1997 SD 10, ¶ 11 , 559 N.W.2d 554, 557 (court exercises decreasing scrutiny as time passes). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Quontrell Wayne Lewisgreen2 sentences2000“While it is true that striking a [minority] venireperson for racial reasons is always violative of the Constitution, it is not true that • all peremptory strikes of [minority] venirepersons aré for racial reasons.” Honomichl, 498 N.W.2d at 639 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 892 F.2d 735, 736 (8th Cir.1989)). 2000“While it is true that striking a [minority] venireperson for racial reasons is always violative of the Constitution, it is not true that • all peremptory strikes of [minority] venirepersons aré for racial reasons.” Honomichl, 498 N.W.2d at 639 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 892 F.2d 735, 736 (8th Cir.1989)). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Calderongreen2 sentences2000“Unless the facts supporting the Batson claim are articulated at trial, ‘they are lost to the record and appellate review becomes impossible.’ ” Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp.2d 979, 997 (C.D. 2000"Unless the facts supporting the Batson claim are articulated at trial, `they are lost to the record and appellate review becomes impossible.'" Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp.2d 979, 997 (C.D. | 1 | 1 |
| Operating Engineers & Participating Employers Pre-Apprentice v. Weiss Bros. Construction Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coombs v. DiGuglielmo
green
2 sentences2014In performing that analysis, the court “should not supinely accept ‘any purportedly race-neutral reason that a skilled attorney can conjure up in response to a Batson challenge,’ but must decide if the reason offered for the strike was ‘merely a pretext designed to mask the improper consideration of race to exclude’ a [venire-member].” Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 19 , 829 N.W.2d at 466 (quoting Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255 , 261 n. 5 (3d Cir.2010)) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. *371 231, 251-52, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2331-32 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005)). [¶ 20.] We remand on the Batson issue 2014In performing that analysis, the court “should not supinely accept ‘any purportedly race-neutral reason that a skilled attorney can conjure up in response to a Batson challenge,’ but must decide if the reason offered for the strike was ‘merely a pretext designed to mask the improper consideration of race to exclude’ a [venire-member].” Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 19 , 829 N.W.2d at 466 (quoting Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255 , 261 n. 5 (3d Cir.2010)) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. *371 231, 251-52, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2331-32 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005)). [¶ 20.] We remand on the Batson issue | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Rice v. Collins
green
2 sentences2014However, under the final step of the Batson analysis, “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 , 126 S.Ct. 969, 974 , 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (citation omitted). 2014However, under the final step of the Batson analysis, “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 , 126 S.Ct. 969, 974 , 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miller-El v. Dretke
green
2 sentences2014In performing that analysis, the court “should not supinely accept ‘any purportedly race-neutral reason that a skilled attorney can conjure up in response to a Batson challenge,’ but must decide if the reason offered for the strike was ‘merely a pretext designed to mask the improper consideration of race to exclude’ a [venire-member].” Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 19 , 829 N.W.2d at 466 (quoting Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255 , 261 n. 5 (3d Cir.2010)) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. *371 231, 251-52, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2331-32 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005)). [¶ 20.] We remand on the Batson issue 2014In performing that analysis, the court “should not supinely accept ‘any purportedly race-neutral reason that a skilled attorney can conjure up in response to a Batson challenge,’ but must decide if the reason offered for the strike was ‘merely a pretext designed to mask the improper consideration of race to exclude’ a [venire-member].” Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 19 , 829 N.W.2d at 466 (quoting Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255 , 261 n. 5 (3d Cir.2010)) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. *371 231, 251-52, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2331-32 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005)). [¶ 20.] We remand on the Batson issue | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Rivera v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2013A Batson violation usu *467 ally compels reversal and remand because an unlawful exclusion “ ‘violates a defendant’s right to equal protection,’ ‘unconstitutionally discriminate[s] against the excluded juror,’ and ‘undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.’ ” Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161 , 129 S.Ct. 1446, 1455 , 173 L.Ed.2d 320 (2009) (citation omitted). 2013A Batson violation usu *467 ally compels reversal and remand because an unlawful exclusion “ ‘violates a defendant’s right to equal protection,’ ‘unconstitutionally discriminate[s] against the excluded juror,’ and ‘undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.’ ” Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161 , 129 S.Ct. 1446, 1455 , 173 L.Ed.2d 320 (2009) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Washington v. Davis
green
2 sentences2013So, with that I guess we’ll proceed. [¶ 16.] The test to determine whether a Batson violation has occurred is well-settled: First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Batson v. Kentucky, ] 476 U.S. [79,] 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 [, 1721, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)] (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-242 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). 2013So, with that I guess we’ll proceed. [¶ 16.] The test to determine whether a Batson violation has occurred is well-settled: First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Batson v. Kentucky, ] 476 U.S. [79,] 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 [, 1721, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)] (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-242 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re HLS
green
2 sentences2012State v. Overbey, 2010 S.D. 78, ¶ 11 , 790 N.W.2d 35, 40 (quoting In re H.L.S., 2009 S.D. 92 , ¶ 11, 774 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 ). [¶ 33.] The test for examining a Batson challenge consists of three steps. “[A] defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group and the State used its peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race from the potential jury candidates.” Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67 , ¶ 33, 736 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21 , ¶ 45, 729 N.W.2d 356, 369 ). 2012State v. Overbey, 2010 S.D. 78, ¶ 11 , 790 N.W.2d 35, 40 (quoting In re H.L.S., 2009 S.D. 92 , ¶ 11, 774 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 ). [¶ 33.] The test for examining a Batson challenge consists of three steps. “[A] defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group and the State used its peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race from the potential jury candidates.” Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67 , ¶ 33, 736 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21 , ¶ 45, 729 N.W.2d 356, 369 ). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
green
2 sentences2008Given the record and our case law, Ryan has not demonstrated that the trial court was clearly erroneous when it accepted the State’s explanations as race neutral and found the State had not engaged in purposeful discrimination when it exercised its peremptory challenges. [¶ 13.] Ryan argues, however, that the trial court did not complete the third step of the Batson analysis: whether the prosecutor’s race neutral explanation in exercising its challenges provide[s] “a ‘clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of [the prosecutor’s] ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” Batson, 4 2008Given the record and our case law, Ryan has not demonstrated that the trial court was clearly erroneous when it accepted the State’s explanations as race neutral and found the State had not engaged in purposeful discrimination when it exercised its peremptory challenges. [¶ 13.] Ryan argues, however, that the trial court did not complete the third step of the Batson analysis: whether the prosecutor’s race neutral explanation in exercising its challenges provide[s] “a ‘clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of [the prosecutor’s] ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” Batson, 4 | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Mesa
green
2 sentences2008Id. [¶ 7.] When we examine a challenge claiming insufficient evidence: [W]e determine “whether there is sufficient evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; in making this determination, the Court will accept the evidence, and the most favorable inference fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict.” State v. Owen, 2007 SD 21, ¶ 35 , 729 N.W.2d 356, 367 (quoting State v. Mesa, 2004 SD 68, ¶ 9 , 681 N.W.2d 84, 87 ). 2008Id. [¶ 7.] When we examine a challenge claiming insufficient evidence: [W]e determine “whether there is sufficient evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; in making this determination, the Court will accept the evidence, and the most favorable inference fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict.” State v. Owen, 2007 SD 21, ¶ 35 , 729 N.W.2d 356, 367 (quoting State v. Mesa, 2004 SD 68, ¶ 9 , 681 N.W.2d 84, 87 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Martin
green
1 sentence2008Id. [¶ 7.] When we examine a challenge claiming insufficient evidence: [W]e determine “whether there is sufficient evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; in making this determination, the Court will accept the evidence, and the most favorable inference fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict.” State v. Owen, 2007 SD 21, ¶ 35 , 729 N.W.2d 356, 367 (quoting State v. Mesa, 2004 SD 68, ¶ 9 , 681 N.W.2d 84, 87 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ford v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2000A “requirement that any Batson claim be raised not only before trial, but in the period between the selection of the jurors and the administration of their oaths is a sensible rule.” Id. [¶47.] As there was no objection, we review this matter not for harmless error, but plain error. 2000A "requirement that any Batson claim be raised not only before trial, but in the period between the selection of the jurors and the administration of their oaths is a sensible rule." Id. [¶ 47.] As there was no objection, we review this matter not for harmless error, but plain error. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.