Batson challenge in Tennessee

2026“When determining the existence of a Batson violation, the trial court must carefully articulate specific reason for each finding on the record.” Logan, 2009 WL 782757 , at *3 (citation omitted). “‘On appeal, the trial court’s findings are to be accorded great deference and not set aside unless clearly erroneous.’” Spratt, 31 S.W.3d at 596 . (quoting Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 906 ).

2026“When determining the existence of a Batson violation, the trial court must carefully articulate specific reason for each finding on the record.” Logan, 2009 WL 782757 , at *3 (citation omitted). “‘On appeal, the trial court’s findings are to be accorded great deference and not set aside unless clearly erroneous.’” Spratt, 31 S.W.3d at 596 . (quoting Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 906 ).

2026The State renewed its reverse Batson challenge, arguing the defendant had excused another Caucasian juror “who has said he can be fair.” The defendant responded that Juror Hughes had stated during voir dire that “you’ve got to try to convict the guilty.” The trial court responded, 8 The trial court’s Order did not explicitly rule on whether the State had a duty to preserve E.F.’s cell phone. 9 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). -4- That’s taken – taken completely out of context, because I heard it when he said it . . . .

2022Batson Challenge The defendant argues the trial court denied his “right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers” by permitting “the dismissal of the only minority member of the jury pool” in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2015Under this last prong, “the party raising the Batson objection bears the burden of persuading the trial court that the other party -14- has engaged in purposeful and impermissible discrimination.” Kiser, 284 S.W.3d at 258 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 ); see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1985) (noting that “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike”).

2014Under this last prong, “the party raising the Batson objection bears the burden of persuading the trial court that the other party has engaged in purposeful and impermissible discrimination.” Kiser, 284 S.W.3d at 258 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 ); see Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 (noting that “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike”).

2022On appeal, the reviewing court is “highly deferential” to “the trial court’s factual determinations in a Batson hearing,” which “largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. at 2244 (citation omitted).

2022On appeal, the reviewing court is “highly deferential” to “the trial court’s factual determinations in a Batson hearing,” which “largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. at 2244 (citation omitted).

2010T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).

2007See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 , 142 n.13 (1994) (“The exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness of the system.”).

2009The prosecution’s expressed concern with these jurors’ equivocation was therefore supported by these jurors’ responses during voir dire. 35 At the third prong of a Batson inquiry, “the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 .

2009The prosecution’s expressed concern with these jurors’ equivocation was therefore supported by these jurors’ responses during voir dire. 35 At the third prong of a Batson inquiry, “the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 .

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2026“When determining the existence of a Batson violation, the trial court must carefully articulate specific reason for each finding on the record.” Logan, 2009 WL 782757 , at *3 (citation omitted). “‘On appeal, the trial court’s findings are to be accorded great deference and not set aside unless clearly erroneous.’” Spratt, 31 S.W.3d at 596 . (quoting Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 906 ).

2026“When determining the existence of a Batson violation, the trial court must carefully articulate specific reason for each finding on the record.” Logan, 2009 WL 782757 , at *3 (citation omitted). “‘On appeal, the trial court’s findings are to be accorded great deference and not set aside unless clearly erroneous.’” Spratt, 31 S.W.3d at 596 . (quoting Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 906 ).

1997“The exclusion ‘undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.’” Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 902 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 , 106 S.Ct. at 1718 ). 10 The Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992), ensures that Batson will apply to all parties by prohibiting criminal defendants from using peremptory challenges to strike a venireperson solely on the basis of the venireperson’s minority status. 9 Thus, the State may make a “reverse” Batson objection.

1997“The exclusion ‘undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.’” Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 902 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 , 106 S.Ct. at 1718 ). 10 The Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992), ensures that Batson will apply to all parties by prohibiting criminal defendants from using peremptory challenges to strike a venireperson solely on the basis of the venireperson’s minority status. 9 Thus, the State may make a “reverse” Batson objection.

2015Under this last prong, “the party raising the Batson objection bears the burden of persuading the trial court that the other party -14- has engaged in purposeful and impermissible discrimination.” Kiser, 284 S.W.3d at 258 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 ); see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1985) (noting that “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike”).

2014Under this last prong, “the party raising the Batson objection bears the burden of persuading the trial court that the other party has engaged in purposeful and impermissible discrimination.” Kiser, 284 S.W.3d at 258 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 ); see Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 (noting that “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike”).

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2014State v. Kiser, 284 S.W.3d 227 , 256 n.29 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. Crim.

2014State v. Kiser, 284 S.W.3d 227 , 256 n.29 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. Crim.

2026Our supreme court has noted, “determination of the [proponent’s] discriminatory intent or lack thereof turns largely on the evaluation of the [proponent’s] credibility, of which the attorney’s demeanor is often the best evidence.” Kiser, 284, S.W.3d at 255 (quoting State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 914 (Tenn. 1994)).

2026Our supreme court has noted, “determination of the [proponent’s] discriminatory intent or lack thereof turns largely on the evaluation of the [proponent’s] credibility, of which the attorney’s demeanor is often the best evidence.” Kiser, 284, S.W.3d at 255 (quoting State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 914 (Tenn. 1994)).

2022Id. at 245 ; see Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 770-71 (holding that a Batson violation occurred in a civil case when the defendants’ reason for challenging an African-American juror was inconsistent with how they questioned other potential jurors and based upon incorrect information).

2022Id. at 245 ; see Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 770-71 (holding that a Batson violation occurred in a civil case when the defendants’ reason for challenging an African-American juror was inconsistent with how they questioned other potential jurors and based upon incorrect information).

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 416 (1991) (holding that a defendant and a stricken juror need not share the same race to establish a Batson violation and that the Caucasian defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of an African-American juror); Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 281 ; Zakour, 215 S.W.3d at 767 ; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 369 n.6; Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 826 ; State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn. Crim.

2002“When a defendant is wrongly deprived of peremptory challenges because of a trial court’s erroneous application of the Batson test, the remedy is a reversal of the conviction and a remand for a new trial.” Id. at 598 (citing United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998)).

2002“When a defendant is wrongly deprived of peremptory challenges because of a trial court’s erroneous application of the Batson test, the remedy is a reversal of the conviction and a remand for a new trial.” Id. at 598 (citing United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998)).

2019App. 2000); Cox v. State, 880 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tenn. Crim.

2019App. 2000); Cox v. State, 880 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tenn. Crim.

2018See Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1754 .

2018See Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1754 .

2017See, e.g., State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983). -19- In any event, the record reflects that the prosecutor excused the only prospective African-American juror, that the trial court asked for a race-neutral explanation, and that the prosecutor did not dispute the allegation that he did not challenge other jurors for the reason he challenged Juror S. The prosecutor’s explanation for challenging Juror S. was not consistent with his treatment of other similarly situated jurors.

2017See, e.g., State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983). -19- In any event, the record reflects that the prosecutor excused the only prospective African-American juror, that the trial court asked for a race-neutral explanation, and that the prosecutor did not dispute the allegation that he did not challenge other jurors for the reason he challenged Juror S. The prosecutor’s explanation for challenging Juror S. was not consistent with his treatment of other similarly situated jurors.

2013A “‘State’s purposeful or deliberate denial to [African-Americans] on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause.’” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965).

2010See State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 914 (Tenn.1994) (citing State v. Ellison, 841 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tenn. 1992)), cert. denied 516 U.S. 829 (1995)).

2009If the prosecution offers a race-neutral explanation for its challenges, the third prong requires the trial court to determine, “from all of the circumstances, whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Id.; see also Snyder v. Louisiana, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1208 , 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (“[I]n reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.”).

2009If the prosecution offers a race-neutral explanation for its challenges, the third prong requires the trial court to determine, “from all of the circumstances, whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Id.; see also Snyder v. Louisiana, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1208 , 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (“[I]n reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.”).

2009State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993).

2007That explanation must be a “‘clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of [the lawyer’s] ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” Id. at 98 n.20 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)). -4- In the final step of the Supreme Court’s Batson analysis, the trial court must then decide if the complaining party has established purposeful discrimination.

2005Here, the defendant was not wrongly deprived of a peremptory challenge. -33- complete charge of the law applicable to the facts of the case.” State v. Davenport, 973 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tenn. Crim.

2005Here, the defendant was not wrongly deprived of a peremptory challenge. -33- complete charge of the law applicable to the facts of the case.” State v. Davenport, 973 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tenn. Crim.

2005App. 2000) (quoting United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1996)).

2005App. 2000) (quoting United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1996)).