Batson challenge in Arizona

2022State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389 , 400- 01 ¶ 52 (2006). ¶5 A Batson challenge “involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the challenger proved purposeful racial discrimination.” State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391 , 404 ¶ 44 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2022State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389 , 400- 01 ¶ 52 (2006). ¶5 A Batson challenge “involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the challenger proved purposeful racial discrimination.” State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391 , 404 ¶ 44 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2025An appellate court views the superior court’s findings on a Batson challenge with “great deference” because those findings “largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21; see also State v. Porter, 251 Ariz. 293 , 297, ¶ 6 (2021).

2025An appellate court views the superior court’s findings on a Batson challenge with “great deference” because those findings “largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21; see also State v. Porter, 251 Ariz. 293 , 297, ¶ 6 (2021).

2018State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 203, ¶ 12 (2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254 (2017); Newell, 212 Ariz. at 401, ¶ 54 . ¶27 A Batson challenge is comprised of three steps.

2018State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 203, ¶ 12 (2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254 (2017); Newell, 212 Ariz. at 401, ¶ 54 . ¶27 A Batson challenge is comprised of three steps.

2021Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995); see also State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391 , 404 ¶ 44 (2013) (same). ¶11 Step one of the Batson framework—establishing a case of prima facie racial discrimination—may be satisfied by a pattern of strikes against minority jurors.

2021Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995); see also State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391 , 404 ¶ 44 (2013) (same). ¶11 Step one of the Batson framework—establishing a case of prima facie racial discrimination—may be satisfied by a pattern of strikes against minority jurors.

2006“We review de novo the trial court’s application of the law.” State v. Lucas, 199 Ariz. 366, 368, ¶ 6 , 18 P.3d 160, 162 (App.2001). ¶ 53 A Batson challenge involves a three-step analysis.

2006“We review de novo the trial court’s application of the law.” State v. Lucas, 199 Ariz. 366, 368, ¶ 6 , 18 P.3d 160, 162 (App.2001). ¶ 53 A Batson challenge involves a three-step analysis.

2022See Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (remanding to require prosecutor to explain reasons underlying strikes if prima facie showing of discrimination established on remand); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 486 (leaving open possibility that motivation for peremptory strike might be “profitably explored further on remand” under different circumstances); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004) (after trial court relied “on its own speculation as to” state’s reasons for strikes, remanding for evidentiary hearing for state to “present evidence as to the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons” and all

2021Id. at 486 . ¶14 The rule we elicit from Snyder is that appellate courts may not uphold a Batson ruling based on a demeanor-based justification when a non-demeanor-based justification is clearly pretextual and the trial court did not clarify which explanation it found credible in denying a Batson challenge.

2021To the extent that Williams suggests that trial courts are always required to make explicit findings at Batson’s third step, we reject it as inconsistent with Arizona law. ¶18 Indeed, “[Arizona] precedent allows [appellate courts] to defer to an implicit finding that a reason was non-discriminatory even when the trial court did not expressly rule on the third Batson factor,” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 73 (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70 , 87 ¶¶ 63–64 (2003)); see also State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133 , 147 ¶ 28 (2002) (affirming the court’s implicit finding under step three

2021To the extent that Williams suggests that trial courts are always required to make explicit findings at Batson’s third step, we reject it as inconsistent with Arizona law. ¶18 Indeed, “[Arizona] precedent allows [appellate courts] to defer to an implicit finding that a reason was non-discriminatory even when the trial court did not expressly rule on the third Batson factor,” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 73 (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70 , 87 ¶¶ 63–64 (2003)); see also State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133 , 147 ¶ 28 (2002) (affirming the court’s implicit finding under step three

2020See State v. Bustamante, 229 Ariz. 256, 261, ¶ 16 (App. 2012) (finding no Batson error where a juror was struck for having “some language issues” and because she was a teacher and worked with children); State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 10 , ¶¶ 20–27 (2010) (finding no Batson error where a juror was struck because she had a Hispanic surname and had difficulty reading English).

2016He also raised his hand, as did five others, to the court’s question posed to the panel: “[W]ho would vote not guilty right now[?]” ¶11 After Orner raised his Batson challenge, the court asked the State to give a race-neutral explanation for the strike, and the prosecutor responded, “[W]e had very little information on [#42].” The State indicated it had also struck two other potential jurors based on the limited information they revealed during voir dire. ¶12 By asking for a “race-neutral” explanation, the court implicitly found that Orner met his initial burden to make a prima facie case of i

2021Here, good reason exists to address the identified issue in order to clarify whether, when a Batson challenge is raised, our trial courts are required to make express findings concerning a demeanor-based justification for a peremptory strike. ¶6 We will not reverse a court’s ruling on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous, State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254 , 271 ¶ 35 (2017), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135 (2018), and we afford great deference to trial court findings in this context, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Batson,

2021Here, good reason exists to address the identified issue in order to clarify whether, when a Batson challenge is raised, our trial courts are required to make express findings concerning a demeanor-based justification for a peremptory strike. ¶6 We will not reverse a court’s ruling on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous, State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254 , 271 ¶ 35 (2017), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135 (2018), and we afford great deference to trial court findings in this context, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Batson,

2021State v. Hardy, 230 Ariz. 281, 285, ¶ 11 (2012). ¶7 A Batson challenge has three steps.

2021State v. Hardy, 230 Ariz. 281, 285, ¶ 11 (2012). ¶7 A Batson challenge has three steps.

2000But even if it did, “a Batson issue does not present fundamental error and a failure to raise it cannot be excused on that ground.” State v. Holder, 155 Ariz. 83, 85 , 745 P.2d 141, 148 (1987).

2000But even if it did, “a Batson issue does not present fundamental error and a failure to raise it cannot be excused on that ground.” State v. Holder, 155 Ariz. 83, 85 , 745 P.2d 141, 148 (1987).

2021See State v. Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, 220, ¶ 17 (App. 2007) (noting third step in Batson challenge requires the party challenging the strike to "persuade the trial court that the proffered race-neutral explanation is pretextual").

2020Standard of Review. ¶11 "When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge, we defer to its factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but review its legal determinations de novo." State v. Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, 220, ¶ 16 (App. 2007).

2018Newell, 212 Ariz. at 400-01, ¶¶ 52 , 54 (citing Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 240 , and State v. Cruz, 175 Ariz. 395, 398 (1993)). ¶6 We find no Batson error.

2002Relying on our decision in State v. Cruz, he argues that where “the state offers a facially neutral, but wholly subjective, reason for a peremptory strike, it must be coupled with some form of objective verification” in order to satisfy step two of the Batson analysis. 175 Ariz. 395, 399 , 857 P.2d 1249, 1253 (1993). ¶25 The Cruz rule has been called into question by the Supreme Court’s subsequent holding that an explanation need only be facially race-neutral, not “persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 .

2022State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389 , 400- 01 ¶ 52 (2006). ¶5 A Batson challenge “involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the challenger proved purposeful racial discrimination.” State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391 , 404 ¶ 44 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2022State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389 , 400- 01 ¶ 52 (2006). ¶5 A Batson challenge “involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the challenger proved purposeful racial discrimination.” State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391 , 404 ¶ 44 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2020See State v. Bustamante, 229 Ariz. 256, 261, ¶ 16 (App. 2012) (finding no Batson error where a juror was struck for having “some language issues” and because she was a teacher and worked with children); State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 10 , ¶¶ 20–27 (2010) (finding no Batson error where a juror was struck because she had a Hispanic surname and had difficulty reading English).

2018Given that a Batson violation is, by definition, the conscious exclusion of a potential juror based on impermissible criteria, Garcia , 224 Ariz. at 10 ¶ 21, 226 P.3d at 379 , additional trial remedies such as forfeiting the misused peremptory challenges are also permissible, subject to abuse-of-discretion review. ¶ 18 Beyond restoring the wrongfully excluded jurors to the venire in this case, for instance, the trial court also forfeited the three challenges that the State attempted to use in a discriminatory fashion.

2020Id. (emphasis added). ¶15 The trial court’s ultimate finding is entitled to great deference, Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 366–69 (plurality opinion), and we will not reverse the denial of a Batson challenge absent clear error, State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 400, ¶ 52 (2006).

2020Id. (emphasis added). ¶15 The trial court’s ultimate finding is entitled to great deference, Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 366–69 (plurality opinion), and we will not reverse the denial of a Batson challenge absent clear error, State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 400, ¶ 52 (2006).

2002However, although “the fact that the state accepted other Hispanic jurors on the venire is indicative of a nondiscriminatory motive,” it is “not dispositive.” State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 27, 30 , 992 P.2d 1122, 1125 (App.1998) (citing Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir.1997) (presence of minority jurors does not preclude successful Batson challenge)).

2002However, although “the fact that the state accepted other Hispanic jurors on the venire is indicative of a nondiscriminatory motive,” it is “not dispositive.” State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 27, 30 , 992 P.2d 1122, 1125 (App.1998) (citing Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir.1997) (presence of minority jurors does not preclude successful Batson challenge)).

2021Moreover, Porter did not object in the trial court to its purported failure to conduct a comparative juror analysis. ¶21 “Comparing prospective jurors who were struck and not struck can be an important step in determining whether a Batson violation occurred.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2248 ; see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005).

2021Moreover, Porter did not object in the trial court to its purported failure to conduct a comparative juror analysis. ¶21 “Comparing prospective jurors who were struck and not struck can be an important step in determining whether a Batson violation occurred.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2248 ; see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005).

2020During the 5 STATE v. WOMBLE Decision of the Court third step, the superior court evaluates the persuasiveness of the State’s explanation, State v. Harris, 184 Ariz. 617, 619 (App. 1995), including “the striking party’s credibility, considering the demeanor of the striking attorney and the excluded juror to determine whether the race-neutral rationale is a pretext for discrimination,” Hardy, 230 Ariz. at 285 , ¶ 12 (citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008)). ¶17 Womble made a prima facie showing of discrimination because juror 8 was the only Hispanic juror.

2020During the 5 STATE v. WOMBLE Decision of the Court third step, the superior court evaluates the persuasiveness of the State’s explanation, State v. Harris, 184 Ariz. 617, 619 (App. 1995), including “the striking party’s credibility, considering the demeanor of the striking attorney and the excluded juror to determine whether the race-neutral rationale is a pretext for discrimination,” Hardy, 230 Ariz. at 285 , ¶ 12 (citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008)). ¶17 Womble made a prima facie showing of discrimination because juror 8 was the only Hispanic juror.

2022See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2250 (“To be sure, the back and forth of a Batson hearing can be hurried, and prosecutors can make mistakes when providing explanations.

2022See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2250 (“To be sure, the back and forth of a Batson hearing can be hurried, and prosecutors can make mistakes when providing explanations.

2021Here, good reason exists to address the identified issue in order to clarify whether, when a Batson challenge is raised, our trial courts are required to make express findings concerning a demeanor-based justification for a peremptory strike. ¶6 We will not reverse a court’s ruling on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous, State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254 , 271 ¶ 35 (2017), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135 (2018), and we afford great deference to trial court findings in this context, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Batson,

2021Here, good reason exists to address the identified issue in order to clarify whether, when a Batson challenge is raised, our trial courts are required to make express findings concerning a demeanor-based justification for a peremptory strike. ¶6 We will not reverse a court’s ruling on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous, State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254 , 271 ¶ 35 (2017), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135 (2018), and we afford great deference to trial court findings in this context, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Batson,

2016State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 24 (1995).

2016State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 24 (1995).

2022See Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (remanding to require prosecutor to explain reasons underlying strikes if prima facie showing of discrimination established on remand); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 486 (leaving open possibility that motivation for peremptory strike might be “profitably explored further on remand” under different circumstances); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004) (after trial court relied “on its own speculation as to” state’s reasons for strikes, remanding for evidentiary hearing for state to “present evidence as to the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons” and all

1993Although many state and federal cases since Batson have extended its application, see, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541 , 760 P.2d 541 (1988) (white defendant can raise Batson challenge), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982 , 111 S.Ct. 1638 , 113 L.Ed.2d 733 (1991); State v. Anaya, 170 Ariz. 436, 441 , 825 P.2d 961, 966 (App.1991) (.Batson applies to criminal defendant’s use of peremptories), the instant case presents a classic Batson situation.

2021To the extent that Williams suggests that trial courts are always required to make explicit findings at Batson’s third step, we reject it as inconsistent with Arizona law. ¶18 Indeed, “[Arizona] precedent allows [appellate courts] to defer to an implicit finding that a reason was non-discriminatory even when the trial court did not expressly rule on the third Batson factor,” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 73 (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70 , 87 ¶¶ 63–64 (2003)); see also State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133 , 147 ¶ 28 (2002) (affirming the court’s implicit finding under step three

2021To the extent that Williams suggests that trial courts are always required to make explicit findings at Batson’s third step, we reject it as inconsistent with Arizona law. ¶18 Indeed, “[Arizona] precedent allows [appellate courts] to defer to an implicit finding that a reason was non-discriminatory even when the trial court did not expressly rule on the third Batson factor,” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 73 (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70 , 87 ¶¶ 63–64 (2003)); see also State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133 , 147 ¶ 28 (2002) (affirming the court’s implicit finding under step three

2020But in those cases, either: 1) the prosecutor and the trial court observed the same behavior or demeanor that supported the court's nondiscriminatory finding, Carter, 96 N.E.3d at 1064-65, ¶¶ 50-51 ; see also Hernandez, 170 Ariz. 11 STATE v. PALMER Decision of the Court at 304-05; or, 2) the record clearly illustrated the prospective juror's problematic responses to questions about the applicable law or the applicable standard of proof, or inability to follow the instructions faithfully, Hodge, 726 A.2d at 546-48 ; Carter, 96 N.E.3d at 1064-65, ¶¶ 50-51 ; see also State v. Decker, 239 Ariz. 29

2020But in those cases, either: 1) the prosecutor and the trial court observed the same behavior or demeanor that supported the court's nondiscriminatory finding, Carter, 96 N.E.3d at 1064-65, ¶¶ 50-51 ; see also Hernandez, 170 Ariz. 11 STATE v. PALMER Decision of the Court at 304-05; or, 2) the record clearly illustrated the prospective juror's problematic responses to questions about the applicable law or the applicable standard of proof, or inability to follow the instructions faithfully, Hodge, 726 A.2d at 546-48 ; Carter, 96 N.E.3d at 1064-65, ¶¶ 50-51 ; see also State v. Decker, 239 Ariz. 29

2017Id. at 285 , ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560, 565, ¶ 11 (2010)).

2017Id. at 285 , ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560, 565, ¶ 11 (2010)).

2022“A Batson challenge involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the [defendant] proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 86 ¶ 63 (quoting State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391 , 404 ¶ 44 (2013)).

2022“A Batson challenge involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the [defendant] proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 86 ¶ 63 (quoting State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391 , 404 ¶ 44 (2013)).

2022This analysis is not pro forma; the “Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172 .

2020Though “[s]tates do have flexibility in formulating appropriate procedures to comply with Batson,” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168 , Arizona has not elaborated on the basic framework, see, e.g., State v. Urrea, 244 Ariz. 443 , 445, ¶ 9 (2018). ¶10 The Batson framework is not pro forma—it “is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172 .