Batson violation in South Carolina

2023See RRR, Inc. v. Toggas, 378 S.C. 174, 182 , 662 S.E.2d 438, 442 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The grant or denial of new trial motions rests within the discretion of the circuit court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless its findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence or the conclusions reached are controlled by error of law."); State v. Haigler, 334 S.C. 623, 628 , 515 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1999) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the striking of a venireperson on the basis of race."); State v. Blackwell, 420 S.C. 127, 14

2023See RRR, Inc. v. Toggas, 378 S.C. 174, 182 , 662 S.E.2d 438, 442 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The grant or denial of new trial motions rests within the discretion of the circuit court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless its findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence or the conclusions reached are controlled by error of law."); State v. Haigler, 334 S.C. 623, 628 , 515 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1999) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the striking of a venireperson on the basis of race."); State v. Blackwell, 420 S.C. 127, 14

2024See Shuler, 344 S.C. at 621 , 545 S.E.2d at 813 ("[T]he composition of the jury panel is a factor that may be considered when determining whether a party engaged in purposeful discrimination pursuant to a Batson challenge.").

2024See Shuler, 344 S.C. at 621 , 545 S.E.2d at 813 ("[T]he composition of the jury panel is a factor that may be considered when determining whether a party engaged in purposeful discrimination pursuant to a Batson challenge.").

2025See State v. Weatherall, 431 S.C. 485 , 493, 848 S.E.2d 338 , 343 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The trial court's findings regarding purposeful discrimination are accorded great deference and will be set aside on appeal only if clearly erroneous." (quoting State v. Blackwell, 420 S.C. 127, 148 , 801 S.E.2d 713, 724 (2017))); State v. Cochran, 369 S.C. 308, 312 , 631 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2006) ("This standard of review, however, is premised on the trial court following the mandated procedure for a Batson hearing."); id. ("Where the assignment of error is the failure to follow the Batson hearing proced

2025See State v. Weatherall, 431 S.C. 485 , 493, 848 S.E.2d 338 , 343 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The trial court's findings regarding purposeful discrimination are accorded great deference and will be set aside on appeal only if clearly erroneous." (quoting State v. Blackwell, 420 S.C. 127, 148 , 801 S.E.2d 713, 724 (2017))); State v. Cochran, 369 S.C. 308, 312 , 631 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2006) ("This standard of review, however, is premised on the trial court following the mandated procedure for a Batson hearing."); id. ("Where the assignment of error is the failure to follow the Batson hearing proced

2026See id. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 ("[At] the third step, . . . the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination."); id. ("The ultimate burden always rests with the opponent of the challenge to prove purposeful discrimination."); State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508-09 , 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009) (holding that under the third step of the Batson test "[t]he opponent must show the race or gender[-]neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another r

2026See id. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 ("[At] the third step, . . . the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination."); id. ("The ultimate burden always rests with the opponent of the challenge to prove purposeful discrimination."); State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508-09 , 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009) (holding that under the third step of the Batson test "[t]he opponent must show the race or gender[-]neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another r

2025See State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 124 , 470 S.E.2d 366, 372 (1996) ("[T]he trial [court] must hold a Batson hearing when members of a cognizable racial group or gender are struck and the opposing party requests a hearing."), overruled in part by Giles, 407 S.C. at 14 , 754 S.E.2d at 261 .

2025See State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 124 , 470 S.E.2d 366, 372 (1996) ("[T]he trial [court] must hold a Batson hearing when members of a cognizable racial group or gender are struck and the opposing party requests a hearing."), overruled in part by Giles, 407 S.C. at 14 , 754 S.E.2d at 261 .

2024"This standard of 1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 92–95 (1986) (holding racial discrimination in jury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and outlining the process for a challenge). 2 Although Blake testified he had medical records to prove he was at the hospital with a sickle cell crisis on the day of the shooting, he did not provide any such records to his attorney and claimed he was unaware that he needed them for court. review, however, is premised on the trial court following the mandated procedure for a Batson hearing." State v. Cochran, 369 S.C

2024"This standard of 1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 92–95 (1986) (holding racial discrimination in jury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and outlining the process for a challenge). 2 Although Blake testified he had medical records to prove he was at the hospital with a sickle cell crisis on the day of the shooting, he did not provide any such records to his attorney and claimed he was unaware that he needed them for court. review, however, is premised on the trial court following the mandated procedure for a Batson hearing." State v. Cochran, 369 S.C

2026See id. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 ("[At] the third step, . . . the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination."); id. ("The ultimate burden always rests with the opponent of the challenge to prove purposeful discrimination."); State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508-09 , 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009) (holding that under the third step of the Batson test "[t]he opponent must show the race or gender[-]neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another r

2026See id. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 ("[At] the third step, . . . the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination."); id. ("The ultimate burden always rests with the opponent of the challenge to prove purposeful discrimination."); State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508-09 , 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009) (holding that under the third step of the Batson test "[t]he opponent must show the race or gender[-]neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another r

2026See id. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 ("[At] the third step, . . . the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination."); id. ("The ultimate burden always rests with the opponent of the challenge to prove purposeful discrimination."); State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508-09 , 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009) (holding that under the third step of the Batson test "[t]he opponent must show the race or gender[-]neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another r

2026See id. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 ("[At] the third step, . . . the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination."); id. ("The ultimate burden always rests with the opponent of the challenge to prove purposeful discrimination."); State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508-09 , 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009) (holding that under the third step of the Batson test "[t]he opponent must show the race or gender[-]neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another r

2006See State v. Tucker, 334 S.C. 1 , 512 S.E.2d 99 (1999) (no Batson violation where the State exercised all six of its peremptory strikes against blacks because the explanations were race-neutral); State v. Casey, 325 S.C. 447 , 481 S.E.2d 169 (Ct.App.1997) (no Batson violation where solicitor had neutral reasons for all five strikes used against males).

2006See State v. Tucker, 334 S.C. 1 , 512 S.E.2d 99 (1999) (no Batson violation where the State exercised all six of its peremptory strikes against blacks because the explanations were race-neutral); State v. Casey, 325 S.C. 447 , 481 S.E.2d 169 (Ct.App.1997) (no Batson violation where solicitor had neutral reasons for all five strikes used against males).

2016“Under some circumstances, the race-neutral explanation given by the proponent may be so fundamentally implausible that the [trial court] may determine ... the explanation was mere pretext even without a showing of disparate treatment.” Haigler, 334 S.C. at 629 , 515 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 55 , 495 S.E.2d 205, 207 (1998)).

2016“Under some circumstances, the race-neutral explanation given by the proponent may be so fundamentally implausible that the [trial court] may determine ... the explanation was mere pretext even without a showing of disparate treatment.” Haigler, 334 S.C. at 629 , 515 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 55 , 495 S.E.2d 205, 207 (1998)).

2024The trial judge must determine whether the prosecutor's stated reasons were the actual reasons or instead were a pretext for discrimination." Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241 ; see also State v. Cochran, 369 S.C. at 314 , 631 S.E.2d at 297–98 ("Once a peremptory challenge is opposed, the trial court must, upon request, conduct a Batson hearing and adhere to the procedures set forth in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 124 , 470 S.E.2d 366, 372 (1996))." Our supreme court has further explained: We likewise find, based on a ha

2024The trial judge must determine whether the prosecutor's stated reasons were the actual reasons or instead were a pretext for discrimination." Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241 ; see also State v. Cochran, 369 S.C. at 314 , 631 S.E.2d at 297–98 ("Once a peremptory challenge is opposed, the trial court must, upon request, conduct a Batson hearing and adhere to the procedures set forth in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 124 , 470 S.E.2d 366, 372 (1996))." Our supreme court has further explained: We likewise find, based on a ha

2003In State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 58 , 358 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1987), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), our Supreme Court held that if the trial court finds a Batson violation, "the process of selecting *230 the jury shall start de novo." The Court stated, "members of the tainted jury and all persons who were struck shall be placed back in the jury venire.

2003In State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 58 , 358 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1987), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302 , 454 S.E.2d 317 (1995), our Supreme Court held that if the trial court finds a Batson violation, "the process of selecting *230 the jury shall start de novo." The Court stated, "members of the tainted jury and all persons who were struck shall be placed back in the jury venire.

2018"The burden of persuading the court that a Batson violation has occurred remains at all times on the opponent of the strike." State v. Evins , 373 S.C. 404 , 415, 645 S.E.2d 904 , 909 (2007).

2018"The burden of persuading the court that a Batson violation has occurred remains at all times on the opponent of the strike." State v. Evins , 373 S.C. 404 , 415, 645 S.E.2d 904 , 909 (2007).

1995See Riddle v. State, 314 S.C. 1 , 443 S.E. (2d) 557 , cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 518 , 130 L.Ed. (2d) 424 (1994) (whether a Batson violation has occurred must be determined by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record surrounding the strike); Green, 306 S.C. at 98 , 409 S.E. (2d) at 788 (absent showing that solicitor intentionally exercised strike because of racial concerns or for a discriminatory purpose, the trial judge’s finding that strike was not racially motivated should be given great deference on appeal).

1995See Riddle v. State, 314 S.C. 1 , 443 S.E. (2d) 557 , cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 518 , 130 L.Ed. (2d) 424 (1994) (whether a Batson violation has occurred must be determined by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record surrounding the strike); Green, 306 S.C. at 98 , 409 S.E. (2d) at 788 (absent showing that solicitor intentionally exercised strike because of racial concerns or for a discriminatory purpose, the trial judge’s finding that strike was not racially motivated should be given great deference on appeal).

2024While "[s]tep two of the analysis is perhaps the easiest step to meet as it does not require that the race-neutral explanation be persuasive, or even plausible[,]" step three "requires the court to carefully evaluate whether the party asserting the Batson challenge has proven racial discrimination by demonstrating that the proffered race-neutral reasons are mere pretext for a discriminatory intent." Inman, 409 S.C. at 26–27, 760 S.E.2d at 108 .

2024While "[s]tep two of the analysis is perhaps the easiest step to meet as it does not require that the race-neutral explanation be persuasive, or even plausible[,]" step three "requires the court to carefully evaluate whether the party asserting the Batson challenge has proven racial discrimination by demonstrating that the proffered race-neutral reasons are mere pretext for a discriminatory intent." Inman, 409 S.C. at 26–27, 760 S.E.2d at 108 .

1995See Riddle v. State, 314 S.C. 1 , 443 S.E. (2d) 557 , cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 518 , 130 L.Ed. (2d) 424 (1994) (whether a Batson violation has occurred must be determined by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record surrounding the strike); Green, 306 S.C. at 98 , 409 S.E. (2d) at 788 (absent showing that solicitor intentionally exercised strike because of racial concerns or for a discriminatory purpose, the trial judge’s finding that strike was not racially motivated should be given great deference on appeal).

1995See Riddle v. State, 314 S.C. 1 , 443 S.E. (2d) 557 , cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 518 , 130 L.Ed. (2d) 424 (1994) (whether a Batson violation has occurred must be determined by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record surrounding the strike); Green, 306 S.C. at 98 , 409 S.E. (2d) at 788 (absent showing that solicitor intentionally exercised strike because of racial concerns or for a discriminatory purpose, the trial judge’s finding that strike was not racially motivated should be given great deference on appeal).

2017As to whether the circuit court erred in granting the State's Batson motion: Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 ("Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection."); State v. Taylor, 399 S.C. 51, 57 , 731 S.E.2d 596, 599 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Whether a Batson violation has occurred must be determined by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record."); State v. Garris, 394 S.C. 336, 353 , 714 S.E.2d 888, 897 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The [circuit] court's findings regarding purposeful discrimination are given great deference and will n

2017As to whether the circuit court erred in granting the State's Batson motion: Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 ("Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection."); State v. Taylor, 399 S.C. 51, 57 , 731 S.E.2d 596, 599 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Whether a Batson violation has occurred must be determined by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record."); State v. Garris, 394 S.C. 336, 353 , 714 S.E.2d 888, 897 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The [circuit] court's findings regarding purposeful discrimination are given great deference and will n

2007On the merits, Defendants rely on procedure set forth in State v. Jones to invalidate the trial court’s conduct of the Batson hearing. 293 S.C. 54, 58 , 358 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1987) (“In order to raise and preserve a Batson issue, the defendant must move for a hearing after the jury is selected but before it is sworn.”).

2007On the merits, Defendants rely on procedure set forth in State v. Jones to invalidate the trial court’s conduct of the Batson hearing. 293 S.C. 54, 58 , 358 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1987) (“In order to raise and preserve a Batson issue, the defendant must move for a hearing after the jury is selected but before it is sworn.”).

2014In doing so, the party proves that the “originally neutral reason was ... a pretext because it was not applied in a neutral manner.” State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 281 , 379 S.E.2d 891, 892 (1989). 6 *28 We find that, with respect to the Batson hearing conducted for Juror 60, the circuit court committed legal error by improperly placing the ultimate burden of persuasion on Appellant.

2014In doing so, the party proves that the “originally neutral reason was ... a pretext because it was not applied in a neutral manner.” State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 281 , 379 S.E.2d 891, 892 (1989). 6 *28 We find that, with respect to the Batson hearing conducted for Juror 60, the circuit court committed legal error by improperly placing the ultimate burden of persuasion on Appellant.

2005As we stated in State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47 , 456 S.E.2d 357 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856 , 116 S.Ct. 160 , 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995), to hold that a trial court may not seat a juror who was previously improperly excluded by defense counsel due to a Batson violation would reward a party for his own improper conduct. 13 Lewis offered a reason for striking juror 304, i.e., due to her demeanor, 14 that was different from the reason his co-defendant struck juror 304, i.e. she was a housewife.

2005As we stated in State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47 , 456 S.E.2d 357 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856 , 116 S.Ct. 160 , 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995), to hold that a trial court may not seat a juror who was previously improperly excluded by defense counsel due to a Batson violation would reward a party for his own improper conduct. 13 Lewis offered a reason for striking juror 304, i.e., due to her demeanor, 14 that was different from the reason his co-defendant struck juror 304, i.e. she was a housewife.

1998Compare State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294 , 384 S.E.2d 707 (1989) (finding the discriminatory reason vitiated the two nondiscriminatory reasons given for the strike); with State v. Martinez, 294 S.C. 72 , 362 S.E.2d 641 (1987) (finding no Batson violation where both a nondiscriminatory reason and a discriminatory reason had been given for the strike).

1998Compare State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294 , 384 S.E.2d 707 (1989) (finding the discriminatory reason vitiated the two nondiscriminatory reasons given for the strike); with State v. Martinez, 294 S.C. 72 , 362 S.E.2d 641 (1987) (finding no Batson violation where both a nondiscriminatory reason and a discriminatory reason had been given for the strike).

2014When an appellate court finds that the circuit court improperly granted a Batson motion, and “one of the disputed jurors is seated on the jury, then the erroneous Batson ruling has tainted the jury and prejudice is presumed in such cases ‘because there is no way to determine with any degree of certainty whether a defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was abridged.’ ” Edwards, 384 S.C. at 509 , 682 S.E.2d at 823 (quoting State v. Rayfield, 369 S.C. 106, 114 , 631 S.E.2d 244, 248 (2006)).

2014When an appellate court finds that the circuit court improperly granted a Batson motion, and “one of the disputed jurors is seated on the jury, then the erroneous Batson ruling has tainted the jury and prejudice is presumed in such cases ‘because there is no way to determine with any degree of certainty whether a defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was abridged.’ ” Edwards, 384 S.C. at 509 , 682 S.E.2d at 823 (quoting State v. Rayfield, 369 S.C. 106, 114 , 631 S.E.2d 244, 248 (2006)).

2007State v. Bell, 305 S.C. 11 , 406 S.E.2d 165 (1991); State v. Green, 301 S.C. 347 , 392 S.E.2d 157 (1990); State v. Elmore, 300 S.C. 130 , 386 S.E.2d 769 (1989).

2007State v. Bell, 305 S.C. 11 , 406 S.E.2d 165 (1991); State v. Green, 301 S.C. 347 , 392 S.E.2d 157 (1990); State v. Elmore, 300 S.C. 130 , 386 S.E.2d 769 (1989).

2025See State v. Weatherall, 431 S.C. 485 , 493, 848 S.E.2d 338 , 343 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The trial court's findings regarding purposeful discrimination are accorded great deference and will be set aside on appeal only if clearly erroneous." (quoting State v. Blackwell, 420 S.C. 127, 148 , 801 S.E.2d 713, 724 (2017))); State v. Cochran, 369 S.C. 308, 312 , 631 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2006) ("This standard of review, however, is premised on the trial court following the mandated procedure for a Batson hearing."); id. ("Where the assignment of error is the failure to follow the Batson hearing proced

2025See State v. Weatherall, 431 S.C. 485 , 493, 848 S.E.2d 338 , 343 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The trial court's findings regarding purposeful discrimination are accorded great deference and will be set aside on appeal only if clearly erroneous." (quoting State v. Blackwell, 420 S.C. 127, 148 , 801 S.E.2d 713, 724 (2017))); State v. Cochran, 369 S.C. 308, 312 , 631 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2006) ("This standard of review, however, is premised on the trial court following the mandated procedure for a Batson hearing."); id. ("Where the assignment of error is the failure to follow the Batson hearing proced

2013For the purpose of demonstrating potential jurors are similarly situated under Batson, potential jurors are not required to be “identical in all respects.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 , 247 n. 6, 125 S.Ct. 2317 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (“A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters.”).

2013For the purpose of demonstrating potential jurors are similarly situated under Batson, potential jurors are not required to be “identical in all respects.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 , 247 n. 6, 125 S.Ct. 2317 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (“A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters.”).

2006See State v. Dyar, [ 317 S.C. 77 , 452 S.E.2d 603 (1994)] (composition of jury panel is one factor to consider in Batson analysis); State v. Guess, 318 S.C. 269 , 457 S.E.2d 6 (Ct.App.1995) (finding no purposeful discrimination, in part because jury included six members of the minority allegedly offended); State v. Watts, 320 S.C. 377 , 465 S.E.2d 359 (Ct.App.1995) (finding no purposeful discrimination, in part because jury was composed of eight white people and four black people, and prosecutor had struck two white people).

2006See State v. Dyar, [ 317 S.C. 77 , 452 S.E.2d 603 (1994)] (composition of jury panel is one factor to consider in Batson analysis); State v. Guess, 318 S.C. 269 , 457 S.E.2d 6 (Ct.App.1995) (finding no purposeful discrimination, in part because jury included six members of the minority allegedly offended); State v. Watts, 320 S.C. 377 , 465 S.E.2d 359 (Ct.App.1995) (finding no purposeful discrimination, in part because jury was composed of eight white people and four black people, and prosecutor had struck two white people).

2006See State v. Tucker, 334 S.C. 1 , 512 S.E.2d 99 (1999) (no Batson violation where the State exercised all six of its peremptory strikes against blacks because the explanations were race-neutral); State v. Casey, 325 S.C. 447 , 481 S.E.2d 169 (Ct.App.1997) (no Batson violation where solicitor had neutral reasons for all five strikes used against males).

2006See State v. Tucker, 334 S.C. 1 , 512 S.E.2d 99 (1999) (no Batson violation where the State exercised all six of its peremptory strikes against blacks because the explanations were race-neutral); State v. Casey, 325 S.C. 447 , 481 S.E.2d 169 (Ct.App.1997) (no Batson violation where solicitor had neutral reasons for all five strikes used against males).

2005As we stated in State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47 , 456 S.E.2d 357 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856 , 116 S.Ct. 160 , 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995), to hold that a trial court may not seat a juror who was previously improperly excluded by defense counsel due to a Batson violation would reward a party for his own improper conduct. 13 Lewis offered a reason for striking juror 304, i.e., due to her demeanor, 14 that was different from the reason his co-defendant struck juror 304, i.e. she was a housewife.

2005As we stated in State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47 , 456 S.E.2d 357 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856 , 116 S.Ct. 160 , 133 L.Ed.2d 103 (1995), to hold that a trial court may not seat a juror who was previously improperly excluded by defense counsel due to a Batson violation would reward a party for his own improper conduct. 13 Lewis offered a reason for striking juror 304, i.e., due to her demeanor, 14 that was different from the reason his co-defendant struck juror 304, i.e. she was a housewife.

2025See Giles, 407 S.C. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 (holding that the second step of the Batson analysis requires the proponent of the challenge to provide a gender-neutral explanation for the challenge); id. at 21-22 , 754 S.E.2d at 265 (finding the explanation for the second step of the Batson test must "be clear and reasonably specific such that the opponent of the challenge has a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext in the reason given and the trial court to fulfill its duty to assess the plausibility of the reason in light of all the evidence"); State v. Wright, 354 S.C. 48, 55 , 57

2025See Giles, 407 S.C. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 (holding that the second step of the Batson analysis requires the proponent of the challenge to provide a gender-neutral explanation for the challenge); id. at 21-22 , 754 S.E.2d at 265 (finding the explanation for the second step of the Batson test must "be clear and reasonably specific such that the opponent of the challenge has a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext in the reason given and the trial court to fulfill its duty to assess the plausibility of the reason in light of all the evidence"); State v. Wright, 354 S.C. 48, 55 , 57