8 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 2016–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2024When the prosecutor reiterated that it was based on transgender identity, defense counsel said: "[T]he Commonwealth all but just admitted a Batson1 violation 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ("the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race"); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), 2 right here," and again, "The Commonwealth has all but admitted a Batson violation . . . ." The original transcript of the proceeding incorrectly recorded these two statements as: "[T]he Commonw 2024When the prosecutor reiterated that it was based on transgender identity, defense counsel said: "[T]he Commonwealth all but just admitted a Batson1 violation 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ("the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race"); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), 2 right here," and again, "The Commonwealth has all but admitted a Batson violation . . . ." The original transcript of the proceeding incorrectly recorded these two statements as: "[T]he Commonw | 2 | 4 |
Vasquez v. Hillerygreen2 sentences2016The defendant would have us view the Wood decision as considering the Batson claim under the ‘“substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice” standard of review, not because defense counsel waived the claimed error at trial but because appellate counsel failed to preserve the objection on appeal. 3 In this unique circumstance, I believe this reasoning to be incorrect. ‘“When constitutional error calls into question the objectivity of those charged with bringing a defendant to judgment, a reviewing court can neither indulge a presumption of regularity nor evaluate the resulting harm. . . . 2016The defendant would have us view the Wood decision as considering the Batson claim under the ‘“substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice” standard of review, not because defense counsel waived the claimed error at trial but because appellate counsel failed to preserve the objection on appeal. 3 In this unique circumstance, I believe this reasoning to be incorrect. ‘“When constitutional error calls into question the objectivity of those charged with bringing a defendant to judgment, a reviewing court can neither indulge a presumption of regularity nor evaluate the resulting harm. . . . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Smithgreen2 sentences2025See Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2008) ("At Batson's second step, the question of whether the state has offered a 'race-neutral' reason is a question of law that we review de novo"); United States v. Mulero-Algarin, 535 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2008) ("A district court's determination of the facial adequacy of the government's proffered explanation for withholding a substantial assistance motion presents a question of law that, logically, engenders de novo review"); United States v. Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1058 (2008) ("When considering a 2025See Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2008) ("At Batson's second step, the question of whether the state has offered a 'race-neutral' reason is a question of law that we review de novo"); United States v. Mulero-Algarin, 535 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2008) ("A district court's determination of the facial adequacy of the government's proffered explanation for withholding a substantial assistance motion presents a question of law that, logically, engenders de novo review"); United States v. Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1058 (2008) ("When considering a | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mulero-Algaringreen2 sentences2025See Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2008) ("At Batson's second step, the question of whether the state has offered a 'race-neutral' reason is a question of law that we review de novo"); United States v. Mulero-Algarin, 535 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2008) ("A district court's determination of the facial adequacy of the government's proffered explanation for withholding a substantial assistance motion presents a question of law that, logically, engenders de novo review"); United States v. Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1058 (2008) ("When considering a 2025See Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2008) ("At Batson's second step, the question of whether the state has offered a 'race-neutral' reason is a question of law that we review de novo"); United States v. Mulero-Algarin, 535 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2008) ("A district court's determination of the facial adequacy of the government's proffered explanation for withholding a substantial assistance motion presents a question of law that, logically, engenders de novo review"); United States v. Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1058 (2008) ("When considering a | 1 | 1 |
Paulino v. Harrisongreen2 sentences2025See Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2008) ("At Batson's second step, the question of whether the state has offered a 'race-neutral' reason is a question of law that we review de novo"); United States v. Mulero-Algarin, 535 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2008) ("A district court's determination of the facial adequacy of the government's proffered explanation for withholding a substantial assistance motion presents a question of law that, logically, engenders de novo review"); United States v. Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1058 (2008) ("When considering a 2025See Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2008) ("At Batson's second step, the question of whether the state has offered a 'race-neutral' reason is a question of law that we review de novo"); United States v. Mulero-Algarin, 535 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2008) ("A district court's determination of the facial adequacy of the government's proffered explanation for withholding a substantial assistance motion presents a question of law that, logically, engenders de novo review"); United States v. Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1058 (2008) ("When considering a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chapmangreen2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. 2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johansgreen2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. 2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Maldonadogreen2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. 2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hollowaygreen2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. 2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parkergreen2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. 2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Missouri v. Parkergreen2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. 2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Bessingergreen2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. 2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Aspen v. Bissonnettegreen2 sentences2016See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) ("More powerful than the[] bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve"); Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 302 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting from Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 577 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[W]e take into account 'whether similarly situated jurors from outside the allegedly targeted group were permitted to serve' on the jury in ruling on a Batson challenge"). 2016See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) ("More powerful than the[] bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve"); Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 302 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting from Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 577 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[W]e take into account 'whether similarly situated jurors from outside the allegedly targeted group were permitted to serve' on the jury in ruling on a Batson challenge"). | 1 | 1 |
Winston v. Boatwrightgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618, 628-629 (7th Cir. 2011) (erroneous denial of defendant’s Batson objection is structural error). 2016See, e.g., Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618, 628-629 (7th Cir. 2011) (erroneous denial of defendant’s Batson objection is structural error). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Russell Dereck Battle, A/K/A Buckgreen2 sentences2016See also United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). 2016See also United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Marvin Jerome Horsley, Earl Howard McDonaldgreen2 sentences2016See also United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). 2016See also United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2016Cf. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-264 (1986) (“discrimination [on the basis of race] in the [selection of the] grand jury undermines the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself, and is not amenable to harmless-error review”); Batson, supra at 84 n.3, quoting from Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 , 626 n.3 (1972) (“The basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons from participation injury service on account of their' race ‘are essentially the same for grand juries and for petit juries’ ”). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Westgreen2 sentences2016See also United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). 2016See also United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Miller-El v. Dretkegreen2 sentences2016See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) ("More powerful than the[] bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve"); Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 302 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting from Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 577 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[W]e take into account 'whether similarly situated jurors from outside the allegedly targeted group were permitted to serve' on the jury in ruling on a Batson challenge"). 2016See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) ("More powerful than the[] bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve"); Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 302 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting from Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 577 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[W]e take into account 'whether similarly situated jurors from outside the allegedly targeted group were permitted to serve' on the jury in ruling on a Batson challenge"). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Californiagreen2 sentences2016See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) ("The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process"); 7 Williams v. Lousiana, 136 S. Ct. 2156, 2156-2157 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand, with whom Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. join), quoting from Johnson v. California, supra at 173 (It is "improper to 'rel[y] on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of discrimination'"). 2016See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) ("The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process"); 7 Williams v. Lousiana, 136 S. Ct. 2156, 2156-2157 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand, with whom Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. join), quoting from Johnson v. California, supra at 173 (It is "improper to 'rel[y] on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of discrimination'"). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2016See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) ("The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process"); 7 Williams v. Lousiana, 136 S. Ct. 2156, 2156-2157 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand, with whom Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. join), quoting from Johnson v. California, supra at 173 (It is "improper to 'rel[y] on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of discrimination'"). 2016See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) ("The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process"); 7 Williams v. Lousiana, 136 S. Ct. 2156, 2156-2157 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand, with whom Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. join), quoting from Johnson v. California, supra at 173 (It is "improper to 'rel[y] on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of discrimination'"). | 1 | 1 |
Sanchez v. Rodengreen2 sentences2016Its analysis, however, rests on three different errors. 2 See Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 308 (1st Cir. 2014) (remanding case for evidentiary hearing after finding prima facie case of Batson violation). 2016See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) ("More powerful than the[] bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve"); Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 302 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting from Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 577 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[W]e take into account 'whether similarly situated jurors from outside the allegedly targeted group were permitted to serve' on the jury in ruling on a Batson challenge"). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dolores Reidgreen1 sentence2016See United States v. Reid, 764 F.3d 528, 533 (6th Cir. 2014), and cases cited. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Flowers v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences2025Acknowledging that the prosecutor did not perfectly recite juror no. 101's statement,[10] we discern no discriminatory intent where the prosecutor disclaimed that he was "paraphrasing" the prospective juror's words, all of which he "didn't get." See note 5, supra. Indeed, because "the back and forth of a Batson hearing can be hurried, and prosecutors can make mistakes when providing explanations[, which] is entirely understandable, . . . mistaken explanations should not be confused with racial discrimination."[11] Flowers, supra. Finally, we decline the defendant's invitation to create a new r 2025Acknowledging that the prosecutor did not perfectly recite juror no. 101's statement,[10] we discern no discriminatory intent where the prosecutor disclaimed that he was "paraphrasing" the prospective juror's words, all of which he "didn't get." See note 5, supra. Indeed, because "the back and forth of a Batson hearing can be hurried, and prosecutors can make mistakes when providing explanations[, which] is entirely understandable, . . . mistaken explanations should not be confused with racial discrimination."[11] Flowers, supra. Finally, we decline the defendant's invitation to create a new r | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Soares
green
2 sentences2024When the prosecutor reiterated that it was based on transgender identity, defense counsel said: "[T]he Commonwealth all but just admitted a Batson1 violation 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ("the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race"); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), 2 right here," and again, "The Commonwealth has all but admitted a Batson violation . . . ." The original transcript of the proceeding incorrectly recorded these two statements as: "[T]he Commonw 2024When the prosecutor reiterated that it was based on transgender identity, defense counsel said: "[T]he Commonwealth all but just admitted a Batson1 violation 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ("the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race"); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), 2 right here," and again, "The Commonwealth has all but admitted a Batson violation . . . ." The original transcript of the proceeding incorrectly recorded these two statements as: "[T]he Commonw | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Lee
green
1 sentence2024In May 2018, this court decided Lee, 479 Mass. at 561 , upon which the defendant relies to support the April 2022 motion for reconsideration at issue here. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Massachusetts v. Soares
green
2 sentences2024When the prosecutor reiterated that it was based on transgender identity, defense counsel said: "[T]he Commonwealth all but just admitted a Batson1 violation 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ("the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race"); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), 2 right here," and again, "The Commonwealth has all but admitted a Batson violation . . . ." The original transcript of the proceeding incorrectly recorded these two statements as: "[T]he Commonw 2024When the prosecutor reiterated that it was based on transgender identity, defense counsel said: "[T]he Commonwealth all but just admitted a Batson1 violation 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ("the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race"); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), 2 right here," and again, "The Commonwealth has all but admitted a Batson violation . . . ." The original transcript of the proceeding incorrectly recorded these two statements as: "[T]he Commonw | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Mensah
green
2 sentences2018Rev. 307 , 355 (2010) ("Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, South Carolina, and the Military Court of Appeals have eliminated the prima facie step [of the Batson test]"). 7 Although "the numbers considered in isolation are inconclusive," United States v. Mensah , 737 F.3d 789 , 802 (1st Cir. 2013), it is worth noting that the Commonwealth had only used one other peremptory challenge at this point (to challenge a man who had immigrated from India); the defendant, in contrast, had used six. 8 "[I]t would have been well within the judge's discretion to require an explanation, even without finding a p 2018Rev. 307 , 355 (2010) ("Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, South Carolina, and the Military Court of Appeals have eliminated the prima facie step [of the Batson test]"). 7 Although "the numbers considered in isolation are inconclusive," United States v. Mensah , 737 F.3d 789 , 802 (1st Cir. 2013), it is worth noting that the Commonwealth had only used one other peremptory challenge at this point (to challenge a man who had immigrated from India); the defendant, in contrast, had used six. 8 "[I]t would have been well within the judge's discretion to require an explanation, even without finding a p | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Lopes
green
2 sentences2018Such questioning could have facilitated our task on appeal ...." Lopes , 478 Mass. at 600 n.6, 91 N.E.3d 1126 . 9 This prospective juror had been arrested eleven years prior to the trial for an incident of domestic violence. 2018Such questioning could have facilitated our task on appeal ...." Lopes , 478 Mass. at 600 n.6, 91 N.E.3d 1126 . 9 This prospective juror had been arrested eleven years prior to the trial for an incident of domestic violence. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Wood
green
2 sentences2016Further, to the extent it intimates that the Supreme Judicial Court's failure to address the Batson claim in the case of Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266 (2014), the appeal of Butler's codefendant, in which it was not raised or addressed, might have preclusive effect here because of G. 2016Further, to the extent it intimates that the Supreme Judicial Court's failure to address the Batson claim in the case of Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266 (2014), the appeal of Butler's codefendant, in which it was not raised or addressed, might have preclusive effect here because of G. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.