Batson challenge in Indiana

2025Based upon the record presented, we conclude the trial court fulfilled its Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1904 | April 7, 2025 Page 11 of 16 duty to evaluate the persuasiveness of “the step two justification” as required at “the third and last stage of a Batson inquiry.” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1208 . 3 [16] Even assuming the trial court adequately fulfilled its third-step duty under Batson, Davis maintains that the record reveals that the State’s peremptory strike to Potential Juror Number 93 was pretextual and that the trial court clearly erred in concluding otherwise.

2025Based upon the record presented, we conclude the trial court fulfilled its Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1904 | April 7, 2025 Page 11 of 16 duty to evaluate the persuasiveness of “the step two justification” as required at “the third and last stage of a Batson inquiry.” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1208 . 3 [16] Even assuming the trial court adequately fulfilled its third-step duty under Batson, Davis maintains that the record reveals that the State’s peremptory strike to Potential Juror Number 93 was pretextual and that the trial court clearly erred in concluding otherwise.

2020“Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s rights to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” Id. at 86 . [14] Our Supreme Court has explained the required burden-shifting analysis for a Batson challenge as follows: The Batson Court developed a three-step test to determine whether a peremptory challenge has been used improperly to disqualify a potential juror on the basis of race.

2020“Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s rights to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” Id. at 86 . [14] Our Supreme Court has explained the required burden-shifting analysis for a Batson challenge as follows: The Batson Court developed a three-step test to determine whether a peremptory challenge has been used improperly to disqualify a potential juror on the basis of race.

2018"Upon appellate review, a trial court's decision concerning whether a peremptory challenge is discriminatory is given great deference, and will be set aside only if found to be clearly erroneous." Forrest v. State , 757 N.E.2d 1003 , 1004 (Ind. 2001). [6] When a defendant raises a race-based Batson claim, three steps are involved.

2015Blackmon argues' that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge and that reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial is the proper remedy., “Upon appellate review, a trial court’s decision concerning whether a peremptory challenge is discriminatory is given great deference, and will be set aside only if found to be clearly erroneous.” Forrest v. State, 757 N.E.2d 1003, 1004 (Ind.2001), When a party raises a race-based Batson claim, three steps are involved.

2025Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1904 | April 7, 2025 Page 9 of 16 * * * * * At the third and last stage of a Batson inquiry, “in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S. Ct. 1203 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 277 , 125 S. Ct. 2317 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).

2025Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1904 | April 7, 2025 Page 9 of 16 * * * * * At the third and last stage of a Batson inquiry, “in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S. Ct. 1203 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 277 , 125 S. Ct. 2317 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).

2019“Although the burden of persuasion on a Batson challenge rests with the party opposing the strike, the third step—determination of discrimination—is the ‘duty’ of the trial judge.” Cartwright, 962 N.E.2d at 1221 (internal citations omitted).

2019“Although the burden of persuasion on a Batson challenge rests with the party opposing the strike, the third step—determination of discrimination—is the ‘duty’ of the trial judge.” Cartwright, 962 N.E.2d at 1221 (internal citations omitted).

2018Although this third step involves evaluating "the persuasiveness of the justification" proffered by the prosecutor, "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Highler v. State , 854 N.E.2d 823 , 828 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 ). "[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted." Snyder , 552 U.S.at 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203 . [7] Childress asserts that t

2018Although this third step involves evaluating "the persuasiveness of the justification" proffered by the prosecutor, "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Highler v. State , 854 N.E.2d 823 , 828 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 ). "[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted." Snyder , 552 U.S.at 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203 . [7] Childress asserts that t

2025Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1904 | April 7, 2025 Page 9 of 16 * * * * * At the third and last stage of a Batson inquiry, “in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S. Ct. 1203 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 277 , 125 S. Ct. 2317 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).

2025Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1904 | April 7, 2025 Page 9 of 16 * * * * * At the third and last stage of a Batson inquiry, “in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S. Ct. 1203 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 277 , 125 S. Ct. 2317 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).

2019See Cartwright , 962 N.E.2d at 1222 (rejecting defendant's contention that trial court must explicitly state reasons for deciding a Batson challenge *1267 and noting that at least one federal circuit court has declared that federal law has never required explicit fact-findings) (citing Stenhouse v. Hobbs , 631 F.3d 888 , 893 (8th Cir. 2011) ), cert. denied ; Addison , 962 N.E.2d at 1210 (also citing Stenhouse , 631 F.3d at 893 ); see also Richardson v. State , 122 N.E.3d 923 , 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting that trial court not required to make factual findings to support its determination),

2019See Cartwright , 962 N.E.2d at 1222 (rejecting defendant's contention that trial court must explicitly state reasons for deciding a Batson challenge *1267 and noting that at least one federal circuit court has declared that federal law has never required explicit fact-findings) (citing Stenhouse v. Hobbs , 631 F.3d 888 , 893 (8th Cir. 2011) ), cert. denied ; Addison , 962 N.E.2d at 1210 (also citing Stenhouse , 631 F.3d at 893 ); see also Richardson v. State , 122 N.E.3d 923 , 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting that trial court not required to make factual findings to support its determination),

2012Killebrew v. State, 925 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trails, denied.

2012Killebrew v. State, 925 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trails, denied.

2025Although the burden of persuasion on a Batson challenge rests with the party opposing the strike, Jeter, 888 N.E.2d at 1264 , the third step— determination of discrimination—is the “duty” of the trial judge.

2025Although the burden of persuasion on a Batson challenge rests with the party opposing the strike, Jeter, 888 N.E.2d at 1264 , the third step— determination of discrimination—is the “duty” of the trial judge.

2019Ashabraner v. Bowers , 753 N.E.2d 662 , 666-67 (Ind. 2001). 3 The parties do not dispute that the first two steps of the Batson inquiry are satisfied.

2019Ashabraner v. Bowers , 753 N.E.2d 662 , 666-67 (Ind. 2001). 3 The parties do not dispute that the first two steps of the Batson inquiry are satisfied.

2017See Weekly v. State, 496 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind. 1986) (defendant waived Batson challenge on appeal by failing to present adequate record).

2016See Weekly v. State, 496 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind. 1986) (defendant waived Batson challenge on appeal by failing to present adequate record).

2018Although this third step involves evaluating "the persuasiveness of the justification" proffered by the prosecutor, "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Highler v. State , 854 N.E.2d 823 , 828 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 ). "[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted." Snyder , 552 U.S.at 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203 . [7] Childress asserts that t

2018Although this third step involves evaluating "the persuasiveness of the justification" proffered by the prosecutor, "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Highler v. State , 854 N.E.2d 823 , 828 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 ). "[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted." Snyder , 552 U.S.at 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203 . [7] Childress asserts that t

2019In determining whether the State's explanation for the strike is credible and not a *1266 pretext for discriminatory intent, the trial court must consider the State's explanation "in light of all evidence with a bearing on it." Id. (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke , 545 U.S. 231 , 251-52, 125 S.Ct. 2317 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) ); see also Snyder , 552 U.S. at 478 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 ("[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.").

2019In determining whether the State's explanation for the strike is credible and not a *1266 pretext for discriminatory intent, the trial court must consider the State's explanation "in light of all evidence with a bearing on it." Id. (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke , 545 U.S. 231 , 251-52, 125 S.Ct. 2317 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) ); see also Snyder , 552 U.S. at 478 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 ("[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.").

2026Schumm v. State, 866 N.E.2d 781, 789 (Ind. Ct. App.), clarified on other grounds on reh’g, 868 N.E.2d 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). [34] As noted above, after Davis raised his Batson objection, the State proffered at least four race-neutral reasons for striking Prospective Juror 67, namely: (1) that he “would feel responsible for sending someone away” and that it “would possibly influence his judgement [sic]”; (2) that he had stated that a codefendant who “didn’t pull the trigger . . . should be guilty of a lesser charge”; (3) that he had left multiple answers blank on the jury questionnaire; and

2008When a party raises a Batson challenge, the trial court must undertake a three-step test. “ ‘First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race.’ ” Schumm v. State, 866 N.E.2d 781, 789 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), reh’g granted on other grounds (quoting Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Ind.2006)).

2016See Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1211 (citing Chambers v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 ) (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)).

2012See, e.g., Weekly v. State, 496 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind.1986) (declaring defendant waived his Bat-sort elaim where the only information in the record on appeal was that the defendant objected to the jury — no reason was given); Chambers v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (holding a race-based Batson claim waived where “[t]he record of voir dire is silent regarding the race of any prospective jurors challenged” and “[tjrial counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection to any of the prosecutor’s [peremptory] challenges”).

2001Instead, "[ilf the explanation, on its face, is based on something other than race, the explanation will be deemed race neutral." McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind.1997). 3 Our experience is that the typical Batson claim turns on the sufficiency of a proffered race neutral explanation for exclusion of the juror. 4 Here, however, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not reach that step because they resolved the issue by finding no prima facie case.

2001Instead, "[ilf the explanation, on its face, is based on something other than race, the explanation will be deemed race neutral." McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind.1997). 3 Our experience is that the typical Batson claim turns on the sufficiency of a proffered race neutral explanation for exclusion of the juror. 4 Here, however, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not reach that step because they resolved the issue by finding no prima facie case.

2012Although at least one federal circuit court has declared “federal law has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge, especially where a prima facie case is acknowledged and the prosecution presents specific nondiscriminatory reasons on the record,” Stenhouse v. Hobbs, 631 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir.2008) (en banc)), nonetheless by simply declaring, without more, that the State “articulated race neutral reasons for striking all three jurors,” Tr. at 93-94, the trial court appears to have combined stages two and thre

2012Although at least one federal circuit court has declared “federal law has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge, especially where a prima facie case is acknowledged and the prosecution presents specific nondiscriminatory reasons on the record,” Stenhouse v. Hobbs, 631 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir.2008) (en banc)), nonetheless by simply declaring, without more, that the State “articulated race neutral reasons for striking all three jurors,” Tr. at 93-94, the trial court appears to have combined stages two and thre

2018Although the burden of persuasion on a Batson challenge rests with the party opposing the strike, “the third step—determination of discrimination—is the duty of the trial judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2018Although the burden of persuasion on a Batson challenge rests with the party opposing the strike, “the third step—determination of discrimination—is the duty of the trial judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2012“Active discrimination ... during th[e] process [of jury selection] condones violations of the United States Constitution within the very institution entrusted with its enforcement, and so invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991).

2012“Active discrimination ... during th[e] process [of jury selection] condones violations of the United States Constitution within the very institution entrusted with its enforcement, and so invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991).

2020“A prima facie showing requires the defendant to show that peremptory challenges were used to remove members of a cognizable racial group from the jury pool and that the facts and circumstances raise an inference that the removal was because of race.” Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 576 (Ind. 2006).

2020“A prima facie showing requires the defendant to show that peremptory challenges were used to remove members of a cognizable racial group from the jury pool and that the facts and circumstances raise an inference that the removal was because of race.” Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 576 (Ind. 2006).

2020“A defendant’s race-based Batson claim involves a three-step process.” Id.

2019See Cartwright , 962 N.E.2d at 1222 (rejecting defendant's contention that trial court must explicitly state reasons for deciding a Batson challenge *1267 and noting that at least one federal circuit court has declared that federal law has never required explicit fact-findings) (citing Stenhouse v. Hobbs , 631 F.3d 888 , 893 (8th Cir. 2011) ), cert. denied ; Addison , 962 N.E.2d at 1210 (also citing Stenhouse , 631 F.3d at 893 ); see also Richardson v. State , 122 N.E.3d 923 , 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting that trial court not required to make factual findings to support its determination),

2018Although this court has stated that “a trial court is not required to make explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge[,]” Blackmon, 47 N.E.3d at 1233 , our supreme court has warned against the dangers of combining the second and third steps of the Batson inquiry because the “analytical structure established by Batson cannot operate properly if the second and third steps are conflated.” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1210 .

2018Although this court has stated that “a trial court is not required to make explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge[,]” Blackmon, 47 N.E.3d at 1233 , our supreme court has warned against the dangers of combining the second and third steps of the Batson inquiry because the “analytical structure established by Batson cannot operate properly if the second and third steps are conflated.” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1210 .

2020Is this the right role for you, is this the right job for you? [Juror Six]: No. Id. [11] The State correctly notes that for-cause excusal, which would preclude Batson- objection review, is appropriate where a juror expresses uncertainty about her ability or unwillingness to “decide guilt or innocence impartially.” Daniel v. State, 582 N.E.2d 364, 371 (Ind. 1991).