presumption instruction in Wyoming

2002In Wesaw , we stated that the presumption of claim denial "does not arise unless an employee failed to report within 72 hours and failed to file an injury report within ten days." Wesaw, 2001 WY 17, ¶ 14 , 19 P.3d at 506 (emphasis in original). [¶ 16] In the instant case, the appellant's actions indicate that she understood by January 2000 the nature of her injuries and that they were work-related.

2002In Wesaw , we stated that the presumption of claim denial "does not arise unless an employee failed to report within 72 hours and failed to file an injury report within ten days." Wesaw, 2001 WY 17, ¶ 14 , 19 P.3d at 506 (emphasis in original). [¶ 16] In the instant case, the appellant's actions indicate that she understood by January 2000 the nature of her injuries and that they were work-related.

2009Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 991 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Wyo.1999), we interpreted a statute stating that an employee's late filing of an injury report in a worker's compensation case raised a presumption that his claim should be denied.

2001Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 991 P.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Wyo.1999). [¶ 16] We note our recent opinion in Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, 14 , 19 P.3d 500, ¶ 14 (Wyo.2001), wherein we stated that the presumption of claim denial "does not arise unless an employee failed to report within 72 hours and failed to file an injury report within ten days." In this instance, the hearing examiner did not make a determination as to whether Ms. Garl satisfied the seventy-two-hour report requirement.

2000In this respect, the presumption instruction is diametrically opposite that of the use of deductions and inferences which the jury may logically and properly draw from facts and cireumstances introduced which point toward intention. - [Citations.]" Stuebgen v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 870, 884-885 (1976).

1983In this respect, the presumption instruction is diametrically opposite that of the use of deductions and inferences which the jury may logically and properly draw from facts and circumstances introduced which point toward intention. [Citations.]" Stuebgen v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 870, 884-885 (1976).

2024Id. at 884-85. [¶24] In Krucheck v. State, 671 P.2d 1222, 1223 (Wyo. 1983), decided after Sandstrom, this Court continued to refine its precedent on permissive inference instructions and invalidated an instruction that stated “the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly or dangerous manner raises a presumption of malice.” We held the instruction violated both W.R.E. 303 and the principles enunciated in Sandstrom because it did not include the required disclaimers under Rule 303 and read as mandatory.

2000Krucheck, 671 P.2d at 1225 .

2017In addition, if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, the court shall instruct the jury that its existence, on all the evidence, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶43] In Hereford v. State, 2015 WY 17, ¶ 19 , 342 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Wyo. 2015) (internal citation omitted), we addressed the standard for permissive presumptions, explaining that “[a] permissive presumption or inference will satisfy the constitution ‘so long as the connection between the inferred fact and the proven fact is one that reason and common sense justify in the l

2017In addition, if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, the court shall instruct the jury that its existence, on all the evidence, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶43] In Hereford v. State, 2015 WY 17, ¶ 19 , 342 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Wyo. 2015) (internal citation omitted), we addressed the standard for permissive presumptions, explaining that “[a] permissive presumption or inference will satisfy the constitution ‘so long as the connection between the inferred fact and the proven fact is one that reason and common sense justify in the l

2008Page v. State, 2008 WY 23, 18 , 63 P.3d 904, 908 (Wyo.2008).

1998Stat. § 27-14-502 (1991) requires that a claimant report an injury to the employer within seventy-two hours and file a report of the injury with the clerk of the district court within ten days, failing which there is a presumption that the claim will be denied.” 911 P.2d at 426 (emphasis added).

1976Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 , 89 S.Ct. 1532 , 23 L.Ed. 57 (1969); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 , 90 S.Ct. 642 , 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970); United States v. Matalon, 425 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 841 , 91 S.Ct. 82 , 27 L.Ed.2d 76 .

1976Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 , 89 S.Ct. 1532 , 23 L.Ed. 57 (1969); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 , 90 S.Ct. 642 , 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970); United States v. Matalon, 425 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 841 , 91 S.Ct. 82 , 27 L.Ed.2d 76 .

1960See Smith v. Badura, 70 Or. 58 , 139 P. 107 , where the land was fenced and improved, the" court stating that this indicated an intention to claim the title adversely, thereby raising a presumption of a claim of right or title.

1960See Smith v. Badura, 70 Or. 58 , 139 P. 107 , where the land was fenced and improved, the" court stating that this indicated an intention to claim the title adversely, thereby raising a presumption of a claim of right or title.