presumption rule in New York

2011Contrary to Family Court’s determination, the mother was not required to establish a prima facie case of the child’s need for support or the specific expenses she incurred on behalf of the child (see Matter of Johnson v Robusto, 254 AD2d 828, 829 [1998]). 4 Under the CSSA, “ ‘[t]here is a presumption that the standard of support calculated pursuant to Family Court Act § 413 (1) (c) is reasonable and appropriate’ ” (id., quoting Matter of Steuben County Dept. of Social Servs. v James, 171 AD2d 1023, 1023 [1991]; see Matter of Flanigan v Knipple, 266 AD2d 752, 753 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 759 [

1998Under the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA), “[t]here is a presumption that the standard of support calculated pursuant to Family Court Act § 413 (1) (c) is reasonable and appropriate” (Matter of Steuben County Dept. of Social Servs. [Bonnie J.] v James, 171 AD2d 1023 ).

2025Accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and affording a liberal reading of the complaint in view of the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant ( see Oluwo v Mills , 228 AD3d 879, 880; MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v Makhnevich , 201 AD3d 931, 932), the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to rebut the presumption of immunity afforded the defendant pursuant to Social Services Law § 419 ( see id. §§ 413[1]; 424; Gentile v Wegman , 212 AD3d 409; Matter of Bonilla v Town of Hempstead , 131 AD3d 1166; Isabelle V. v City of New York , 150 AD2d 312, 313).

2025Accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and affording a liberal reading of the complaint in view of the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant ( see Oluwo v Mills , 228 AD3d 879, 880; MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v Makhnevich , 201 AD3d 931, 932), the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to rebut the presumption of immunity afforded the defendant pursuant to Social Services Law § 419 ( see id. §§ 413[1]; 424; Gentile v Wegman , 212 AD3d 409; Matter of Bonilla v Town of Hempstead , 131 AD3d 1166; Isabelle V. v City of New York , 150 AD2d 312, 313).

2004Serv., 74 NY2d 833, 834 [1989], amended 74 NY2d 942 [1989]).

2003Serv., 74 NY2d 833, 834 [1989], amended 74 NY2d 942 [1989]; Matter of Goldsmith v DeBuono, 245 AD2d 627, 631 [1997]), a mere appearance of impropriety will not constitute a sufficient basis to set aside an administrative determination (see 10 NYCRR 51.17 [a]; Matter of Goldsmith v DeBuono, supra).

2003Serv., 74 NY2d 833, 834 [1989], amended 74 NY2d 942 [1989]; Matter of Goldsmith v DeBuono, 245 AD2d 627, 631 [1997]), a mere appearance of impropriety will not constitute a sufficient basis to set aside an administrative determination (see 10 NYCRR 51.17 [a]; Matter of Goldsmith v DeBuono, supra).

2002It is axiomatic that “[e]very person is entitled to an impartial hearing in an administrative setting” (Matter of Goldsmith v DeBuono, 245 AD2d 627, 631 ) and there exists a presumption that hearing officers and committee members are free from bias (see, 10 NYCRR 51.17 [a]); mere allegations are not sufficient (see, id.; see also, Matter of Kole v New York State Educ.

2026It is a core tenet of the CPL that factual issues essential to the disposition of a motion must be decided at a hearing.</p> <p>Indeed, in the speedy trial context, courts consistently hold that failure to conduct a hearing when the motion's resolution depends on issues of fact is error requiring remand for a hearing (<i>see People v Vidal</i>, 161 AD2d 313, 313 [1st Dept 1990] ["a factual dispute mandating a hearing existed on defendant's claim that the same delay violated his rights to a speedy trial under CPL 30.20 and the (United States) Constitution"];<i> People v Beckerman</i>, 184 AD3d

2026It is a core tenet of the CPL that factual issues essential to the disposition of a motion must be decided at a hearing.</p> <p>Indeed, in the speedy trial context, courts consistently hold that failure to conduct a hearing when the motion's resolution depends on issues of fact is error requiring remand for a hearing (<i>see People v Vidal</i>, 161 AD2d 313, 313 [1st Dept 1990] ["a factual dispute mandating a hearing existed on defendant's claim that the same delay violated his rights to a speedy trial under CPL 30.20 and the (United States) Constitution"];<i> People v Beckerman</i>, 184 AD3d

2026It is a core tenet of the CPL that factual issues essential to the disposition of a motion must be decided at a hearing.</p> <p>Indeed, in the speedy trial context, courts consistently hold that failure to conduct a hearing when the motion's resolution depends on issues of fact is error requiring remand for a hearing (<i>see People v Vidal</i>, 161 AD2d 313, 313 [1st Dept 1990] ["a factual dispute mandating a hearing existed on defendant's claim that the same delay violated his rights to a speedy trial under CPL 30.20 and the (United States) Constitution"];<i> People v Beckerman</i>, 184 AD3d

2026It is a core tenet of the CPL that factual issues essential to the disposition of a motion must be decided at a hearing.</p> <p>Indeed, in the speedy trial context, courts consistently hold that failure to conduct a hearing when the motion's resolution depends on issues of fact is error requiring remand for a hearing (<i>see People v Vidal</i>, 161 AD2d 313, 313 [1st Dept 1990] ["a factual dispute mandating a hearing existed on defendant's claim that the same delay violated his rights to a speedy trial under CPL 30.20 and the (United States) Constitution"];<i> People v Beckerman</i>, 184 AD3d

2025Accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and affording a liberal reading of the complaint in view of the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant ( see Oluwo v Mills , 228 AD3d 879, 880; MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v Makhnevich , 201 AD3d 931, 932), the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to rebut the presumption of immunity afforded the defendant pursuant to Social Services Law § 419 ( see id. §§ 413[1]; 424; Gentile v Wegman , 212 AD3d 409; Matter of Bonilla v Town of Hempstead , 131 AD3d 1166; Isabelle V. v City of New York , 150 AD2d 312, 313).

2025Accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and affording a liberal reading of the complaint in view of the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant ( see Oluwo v Mills , 228 AD3d 879, 880; MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v Makhnevich , 201 AD3d 931, 932), the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to rebut the presumption of immunity afforded the defendant pursuant to Social Services Law § 419 ( see id. §§ 413[1]; 424; Gentile v Wegman , 212 AD3d 409; Matter of Bonilla v Town of Hempstead , 131 AD3d 1166; Isabelle V. v City of New York , 150 AD2d 312, 313).

2017“The presumption that a warning will be heeded is based on the assumption that persons exercise ordinary care for their own safety,” and “that a reasonable person will act appropriately if given adequate information.” (American Law of Products Liability 3d § 34:37 [2016].) The policy underlying the presumption is to “reinforce the basic duty to warn, [and] to encourage manufacturers to produce safer products,” and “[wjithout the presumption, recovery would be precluded in some cases, even where the evidence proved that the dangerous propensities of the product caused the plaintiffs injuries.”

2011While proof as to the child’s needs or specific expenses incurred by the mother on his behalf may be relevant in determining whether the father’s pro rata share, after strict application of the CSSA guidelines, would be “unjust or inappropriate” (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [f]), it is the father’s burden to make such a showing and does not bear upon the mother’s entitlement to child support (see Matter of Johnson v Robusto, 254 AD2d at 829; Matter of Rochler v Rochler, 215 AD2d 831, 832 [1995]; cf. Matter of Hewitt v Hewitt, 247 AD2d 751, 753 [1998]).

2011While proof as to the child’s needs or specific expenses incurred by the mother on his behalf may be relevant in determining whether the father’s pro rata share, after strict application of the CSSA guidelines, would be “unjust or inappropriate” (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [f]), it is the father’s burden to make such a showing and does not bear upon the mother’s entitlement to child support (see Matter of Johnson v Robusto, 254 AD2d at 829; Matter of Rochler v Rochler, 215 AD2d 831, 832 [1995]; cf. Matter of Hewitt v Hewitt, 247 AD2d 751, 753 [1998]).

2011Contrary to Family Court’s determination, the mother was not required to establish a prima facie case of the child’s need for support or the specific expenses she incurred on behalf of the child (see Matter of Johnson v Robusto, 254 AD2d 828, 829 [1998]). 4 Under the CSSA, “ ‘[t]here is a presumption that the standard of support calculated pursuant to Family Court Act § 413 (1) (c) is reasonable and appropriate’ ” (id., quoting Matter of Steuben County Dept. of Social Servs. v James, 171 AD2d 1023, 1023 [1991]; see Matter of Flanigan v Knipple, 266 AD2d 752, 753 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 759 [

2011While proof as to the child’s needs or specific expenses incurred by the mother on his behalf may be relevant in determining whether the father’s pro rata share, after strict application of the CSSA guidelines, would be “unjust or inappropriate” (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [f]), it is the father’s burden to make such a showing and does not bear upon the mother’s entitlement to child support (see Matter of Johnson v Robusto, 254 AD2d at 829; Matter of Rochler v Rochler, 215 AD2d 831, 832 [1995]; cf. Matter of Hewitt v Hewitt, 247 AD2d 751, 753 [1998]).

2011Contrary to Family Court’s determination, the mother was not required to establish a prima facie case of the child’s need for support or the specific expenses she incurred on behalf of the child (see Matter of Johnson v Robusto, 254 AD2d 828, 829 [1998]). 4 Under the CSSA, “ ‘[t]here is a presumption that the standard of support calculated pursuant to Family Court Act § 413 (1) (c) is reasonable and appropriate’ ” (id., quoting Matter of Steuben County Dept. of Social Servs. v James, 171 AD2d 1023, 1023 [1991]; see Matter of Flanigan v Knipple, 266 AD2d 752, 753 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 759 [

2007Thirty years ago, Justice Shapiro, writing a dissent in Matter of Baskin v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Ramapo ( 48 AD2d 667, 668 [1975]), condemned reliance on the “mere evanescent possibility of future violation.” As he explained: “It is clear that the existence of a mere opportunity for future evasion or violation of law does not raise a presumption that such violation in fact actually presently exists ....

2004To establish a claim of hearing officer bias, petitioner was required to provide factual evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that the hearing officer was free from bias (see Matter of Maglione v New York State Dept. of Health, 9 AD3d 522, 523 [2004]; Matter of Donlon v Mills, 260 AD2d 971, 974 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 752 [1999]), and prove that “the outcome flowed from the alleged bias” (Matter of Hughes v Suffolk County Dept. of Civ.

2004To establish a claim of hearing officer bias, petitioner was required to provide factual evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that the hearing officer was free from bias (see Matter of Maglione v New York State Dept. of Health, 9 AD3d 522, 523 [2004]; Matter of Donlon v Mills, 260 AD2d 971, 974 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 752 [1999]), and prove that “the outcome flowed from the alleged bias” (Matter of Hughes v Suffolk County Dept. of Civ.