presumption instruction in Wisconsin

2010Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶¶ 43-45 .

1984In Negron, the court stated: “Nor are we inclined to require that an indigent, poorly educated Puerto Rican thrown into a criminal trial as his initiation to our trial system, come to that trial with a comprehension that the nature of our adversarial processes is such that he is in peril of forfeiting even the rudiments of a fair proceeding unless he insists upon them.” 434 F.2d at 390 .

1982During the pendency of that appeal, this court issued its opinion in Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450 , 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980), ratifying the presumption instruction used at Shumate’s trial.

1982During the pendency of that appeal, this court issued its opinion in Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450 , 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980), ratifying the presumption instruction used at Shumate’s trial.

1980In Genova v. State, 91 Wis.2d 595 , 283 N.W.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals concluded that an instruction similar to the one in issue in this case states a permissive presumption under Wisconsin law and that no reasonable juror could interpret the language otherwise. 3 In Adams v. State, 92 Wis.2d 875, 887 , 289 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals determined that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction as a mandatory rebut-table presumption which shifted “the burden of persuasion” to the defendant.

1980In Genova v. State, 91 Wis.2d 595 , 283 N.W.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals concluded that an instruction similar to the one in issue in this case states a permissive presumption under Wisconsin law and that no reasonable juror could interpret the language otherwise. 3 In Adams v. State, 92 Wis.2d 875, 887 , 289 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals determined that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction as a mandatory rebut-table presumption which shifted “the burden of persuasion” to the defendant.

1980In Genova v. State, 91 Wis.2d 595 , 283 N.W.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals concluded that an instruction similar to the one in issue in this case states a permissive presumption under Wisconsin law and that no reasonable juror could interpret the language otherwise. 3 In Adams v. State, 92 Wis.2d 875, 887 , 289 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals determined that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction as a mandatory rebut-table presumption which shifted “the burden of persuasion” to the defendant.

1980In Genova v. State, 91 Wis.2d 595 , 283 N.W.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals concluded that an instruction similar to the one in issue in this case states a permissive presumption under Wisconsin law and that no reasonable juror could interpret the language otherwise. [3] In Adams v. State, 92 *481 Wis.2d 875, 887, 289 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals determined that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction as a mandatory rebuttable presumption which shifted "the burden of persuasion" to the defendant.

1980In Genova v. State, 91 Wis.2d 595 , 283 N.W.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals concluded that an instruction similar to the one in issue in this case states a permissive presumption under Wisconsin law and that no reasonable juror could interpret the language otherwise. 3 In Adams v. State, 92 Wis.2d 875, 887 , 289 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals determined that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction as a mandatory rebut-table presumption which shifted “the burden of persuasion” to the defendant.

1978We are, however, of the opinion that when the possession has been for a long period, the presumption of a claim of right hostile to the title granted does arise in every case where such possession is inconsistent with the rights of the grantee, and that in such case a court or jury might find the possession adverse from the nature of the possession, without proof of an express declaration on the part of the occupant that he claimed to hold in hostility to his grant. . . .” Brinkman, 44 Wis. at 525 .

1976The court then stated the following rule: "`. . . where the immunity from local zoning regulation is claimed by any agency or authority which occupies a superior position in the governmental hierarchy, the presumption is that such immunity was intended in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary.' Aviation Services v. Board of Adjustment, Hanover Township (1956), 20 N.J. 275 , 282 , 119 A.2d 761 , 765 ." 249 A.2d at 33 .

1976Finally, the court held that: "The United States Government, whether as owner or lessee, is immune from local zoning ordinances." 249 A.2d at 35 .

1976The court then stated the following rule: "`. . . where the immunity from local zoning regulation is claimed by any agency or authority which occupies a superior position in the governmental hierarchy, the presumption is that such immunity was intended in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary.' Aviation Services v. Board of Adjustment, Hanover Township (1956), 20 N.J. 275 , 282 , 119 A.2d 761 , 765 ." 249 A.2d at 33 .

1976The court then stated the following rule: "`. . . where the immunity from local zoning regulation is claimed by any agency or authority which occupies a superior position in the governmental hierarchy, the presumption is that such immunity was intended in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary.' Aviation Services v. Board of Adjustment, Hanover Township (1956), 20 N.J. 275 , 282 , 119 A.2d 761 , 765 ." 249 A.2d at 33 .

1976S. A. § 18.1070 (41) (2).’’ In holding that the statute was unconstitutional because it created a presumption in violation of defendants’ privilege against self-incrimination, the court said in 55 Mich. App. at page 520 , 223 N. W. 2d at page 32 : “Statutory presumptions are merely aids to expedite prosecution.

1976S. A. § 18.1070 (41) (2).’’ In holding that the statute was unconstitutional because it created a presumption in violation of defendants’ privilege against self-incrimination, the court said in 55 Mich. App. at page 520 , 223 N. W. 2d at page 32 : “Statutory presumptions are merely aids to expedite prosecution.

1930Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 43 , 31 Sup. Ct. 36, discusses the doctrine of presumption.” The contention of the appellant is that the Schlesinger Case has repudiated the basis upon which the decision in Income Tax Cases, supra, purports to rest, and requires that the latter case be overruled in so far as it establishes the validity of sub. (2) (d), sec. 71.05, and sub. (4) (c), sec. 71.09, Stats.